commit df4aeaa0d63ecf8f282f54c8178cf48fee10bad0 Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@fscked.org Date: Wed Oct 31 18:50:45 2012 -0700
Update manpage for new PathBias torrc options. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 29 +++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index d268717..734bc64 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1173,28 +1173,37 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
**PathBiasNoticeRate** __NUM__ +
-**PathBiasDisableRate** __NUM__ + +**PathBiasWarnRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasExtremeRate** __NUM__ + + +**PathBiasDropGuards** __NUM__ +
**PathBiasScaleThreshold** __NUM__ +
+**PathBiasMultFactor** __NUM__ + + **PathBiasScaleFactor** __NUM__:: These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain fraction of circuits through that node fail after the first hop. The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to build - through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate and - PathBiasDisableRate options control what fraction of circuits must - succeed through a guard so we won't warn about it or disable it, - respectively. When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold - circuits through a guard, we divide our observations by - PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations don't get swamped by old - ones. + + through a guard before we make these checks. The PathBiasNoticeRate, + PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options control what fraction of + circuits must succeed through a guard so we won't write log messages. + If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards + is set to 1, we disable use of that guard. + + + + When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold + circuits through a guard, we scale our observations by + PathBiasMultFactor/PathBiasScaleFactor, so that new observations don't get + swamped by old ones. + + By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. - If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .70, - 0.0, 200, and 4 respectively. + If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, + .50, .30, 0, 300, 1, and 2 respectively.
**ClientUseIPv6** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, Tor might connect to entry nodes over