commit 6a0694fea80168bb8d6a90fda4bf0c0af1bfe2ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm@torproject.org> Date: Thu Aug 22 11:45:26 2013 -0400 Proposal 222-remove-client-timestamps --- proposals/222-remove-client-timestamps.txt | 244 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 244 insertions(+) diff --git a/proposals/222-remove-client-timestamps.txt b/proposals/222-remove-client-timestamps.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dd84bf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/222-remove-client-timestamps.txt @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +Filename: 222-remove-client-timestamps.txt +Title: Stop sending client timestamps +Authors: Nick Mathewson +Created: 22 August 2013 +Target: 0.2.5.x +Status: Open + +0. Summary + + There are a few places in Tor where clients and servers send + timestamps. I list them and discuss how to eliminate them. + +1. Introduction + + Despite this late date, many hosts aren't running NTP and + don't have very well synchronized clocks. Even more hosts + aren't running a secure NTP; it's probably easy to + desynchronize target hosts. + + Given all of this, it's probably a fingerprinting opportunity + whenever clients send their view of the current time. + Let's try to avoid that. + + I'm also going to list the places where servers send their + view of the current time, and propose that we eliminate some + of those. + + Scope: This proposal is about eliminating passive timestamp + exposure, not about tricky active detection mechanisms where + you do something like offering a client a large number of + about-to-expire/just-expired certificates to see which ones + they accept. + +2. The Tor link protocol + +2.1. NETINFO (client and server) + + NETINFO cells specify that both parties include a 4-byte + timestamp. + + Instead, let's say that clients should set this timestamp to + 0. Nothing currently looks at a client's setting for this + field, so this change should be safe. + +2.2. AUTHENTICATE (server) + + The AUTHENTICATE cell is not ordinarily sent by clients. It + contains an 8-byte timestamp and a 16-byte random value. + Instead, let's replace both with a 24-byte (truncated) HMAC of + the current time, using a random key. + + This will achieve the goal of including a timestamp in the + cell (preventing replays even in the presence of bad entropy), + while at the same time not including the time here. + +2.3. TLS + +2.3.1. ClientRandom in the TLS handshake + + See TLS proposal in appendix A. + + This presents a TLS fingerprinting/censorship opportunity. I + propose that we investigate whether "random " or "zero" is + more common on the wire, choose that, and lobby for changes to + TLS implementations. + +2.3.2. Certificate validity intervals + + Servers use the current time in setting certificate validity + for their initial certificates. They randomize this value + somewhat. I propose that we don't change this, since it's a + server-only issue, and already somewhat mitigated. + +3. Directory protocol + +3.1. Published + + This field in descriptors is generated by servers only; I + propose no change. + +3.2. The Date header + + This HTTP header is sent by directory servers only; I propose + no change. + +4. The hidden service protocol + +4.1. Descriptor publication time + + Hidden service descriptors include a publication time. I + propose that we round this time down to the nearest N minutes, + perhaps for N=30. + +4.2. INTRODUCE2 cell timestamp + + INTRODUCE2 cells once limited the duration of their replay + caches by including a timestamp in the INTRODUCE2 cells. Since + 0.2.3.9-alpha, this timestamp is ignored, and key lifetime is + used instead. + + When we determine that no hidden services are running on + 0.2.2.x (and really, no hidden services should be running on + 0.2.2.x!), we can simply send 0 instead. (See ticket #7803). + + This might be a good place to use a consensus parameter, so + that a large number of clients switch at the same time. + + I claim this would be suitable for backport to 0.2.4. + +5. The application layer + + The application layer is mostly out of scope for this proposal, + except: + + TorBrowser already (I hear) drops the timestamp from the + ClientRandom field in TLS. We should encourage other TLS + applications to do so. (See Appendix A.) + + + +================================================================= +APPENDIX A: "Let's replace gmt_unix_time in TLS" + +PROBLEM: + +The gmt_unix_time field in the Random field in the TLS handshake +provides a way for an observer to fingerprint clients. + +Despite the late date, much of the world is still not +synchronized to the second via an ntp-like service. This means +that different clients have different views of the current time, +which provides a fingerprint that helps to track and distinguish +them. This fingerprint is useful for tracking clients as they +move around. It can also distinguish clients using a single VPN, +NAT, or privacy network. (Tor's modified firefox avoids this by +not sending the time.) + +Worse, some implementations don't send the current time, but the +process time, or the computer's uptime, both of which are far +more distinguishing than the current time() value. + +The information fingerprint here is strong enough to uniquely +identify some TLS users (the ones whose clocks are hours off). +Even for the ones whose clocks are mostly right (within a second +or two), the field leaks a bit of information, and it only takes +so many bits to make a user unique. + + +WHY gmt_unix_time IN THE FIRST PLACE? + +According to third-hand reports -- (and correct me if I'm wrong!) +it was introduced in SSL 3.0 to prevent complete failure in cases +where the PRNG was completely broken, by making a part of the +Random field that would definitely vary between TLS handshakes. + +I doubt that this goal is really achieved: on modern desktop +environments, it's not really so strange to start two TLS +connections within the same second. + +WHY ELSE IS gmt_unix_time USED? + +The consensus among implementors seems to be that it's unwise to +depend on any particular value or interpretation for the field. +The TLS 1.2 standard, RFC 5246, says that "Clocks are not +required to be set correctly by the basic TLS protocol; +higher-level or application protocols may define additional +requirements." + +Some implementations set the entire field randomly; this appears +not to have broken TLS on the internet. + +At least one tool (tlsdate) uses the server-side value of the +field as an authenticated view of the current time. + + + +PROPOSAL 1: + +Declare that implementations MAY replace gmt_unix_time either +with four more random bytes, or four bytes of zeroes. + +Make your implementation just do that. + +(Rationale: some implementations (like TorBrowser) are already +doing this in practice. It's sensible and simple. You're +unlikely to mess it up, or cause trouble.) + + + +PROPOSAL 2: + +Okay, if you really want to preserve the security allegedly +provided by gmt_unix_time, allow the following approach instead: + +Set the Random field, not to 32 bytes from your PRNG, but to the +HMAC-SHA256 of any high resolution timer that you have, using 32 +bytes from your PRNG as a key. In other words, replace this: + + Random.gmt_unix_time = time(); + Random.random_bytes = get_random_bytes(28) + +with this: + + now = hires_time(); // clock_gettime(), or concatenate time() + // with a CPU timer, or process + // uptime, or whatever. + key = get_random_bytes(32); + Random = hmac_sha256(key, now); + +This approach is better than the status quo on the following +counts: + + * It doesn't leak your view of the current time, assuming that + your PRNG isn't busted. + + * It actually fixes the problem that gmt_unix_time purported to + fix, by using a high-resolution time that's much less likely to + be used twice. Even if the PRNG is broken, the value is still + nonrepeating. + +It is not worse than the status quo: + + * It is unpredictable from an attacker's POV, assuming that the + PRNG works. (Because an HMAC, even of known data, with an + unknown random key is supposed to look random). + + +CONSIDERATIONS: + +I'd personally suggest proposal 1 (just set the field at random) for +most users. Yes, it makes things a little worse if your PRNG can +generate repeat values... but nearly everything in cryptography +fails if your PRNG is broken. + + +You might want to apply this fix on clients only. With a few +exceptions (like hidden services) the server's view of the current +time is not sensitive. + + +Implementors might want to make this feature optional and +on-by-default, just in case some higher-level application protocol +really does depend on it. +==================================================================