[tor-commits] [tor/master] Extract or_options_t from or.h

commit 13116378b1a8118e277320e377a691064e54983a Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Sun Jul 1 14:58:29 2018 -0400

Extract or_options_t from or.h

I decided to have this file included from config.h, though, since it is used nearly everywhere. --- src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c | 2 +- src/or/config.h | 1 + src/or/control.h | 1 + src/or/hs_config.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 1062 +-------------------------------------------- src/or/or_options_st.h | 1077 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/policies.h | 1 + src/or/rendservice.h | 1 + 8 files changed, 1084 insertions(+), 1062 deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c index 1ee5f1f62..d600602a7 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c +++ b/src/or/circuitmux_ewma.c @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ #include "or/circuitmux_ewma.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h" #include "or/networkstatus.h" +#include "or/or_options_st.h"

/*** EWMA parameter #defines ***/

@@ -826,4 +827,3 @@ circuitmux_ewma_free_all(void) { ewma_ticks_initialized = 0; } - diff --git a/src/or/config.h b/src/or/config.h index 869499582..5fdf7862e 100644 --- a/src/or/config.h +++ b/src/or/config.h @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #ifndef TOR_CONFIG_H #define TOR_CONFIG_H

+#include "or/or_options_st.h" #include "lib/testsupport/testsupport.h"

#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__) || defined(DARWIN) diff --git a/src/or/control.h b/src/or/control.h index 53ac87107..5c5fe8a91 100644 --- a/src/or/control.h +++ b/src/or/control.h @@ -184,6 +184,7 @@ int control_event_signal(uintptr_t signal);

int init_control_cookie_authentication(int enabled); char *get_controller_cookie_file_name(void); +struct config_line_t; smartlist_t *decode_hashed_passwords(struct config_line_t *passwords); void disable_control_logging(void); void enable_control_logging(void); diff --git a/src/or/hs_config.c b/src/or/hs_config.c index 603cd6e74..cb55faa9d 100644 --- a/src/or/hs_config.c +++ b/src/or/hs_config.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "or/hs_service.h" #include "or/rendservice.h" #include "lib/encoding/confline.h" +#include "or/or_options_st.h"

/* Using the given list of services, stage them into our global state. Every * service version are handled. This function can remove entries in the given diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 0886517dd..4ed774389 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -981,1067 +981,7 @@ typedef struct routerset_t routerset_t; * to pick its own port. */ #define CFG_AUTO_PORT 0xc4005e

-/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types: - * Exit-only, OR-only, or both */ -typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR, - OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR, - OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t; - -struct config_line_t; - -/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */ -typedef struct { - uint32_t magic_; - - /** What should the tor process actually do? */ - enum { - CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD, - CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG, - CMD_KEYGEN, - CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION, - } command; - char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */ - - struct config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines - * for logs */ - int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */ - - int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which - * each log message occurs? */ - int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file - before we start writing? */ - char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */ - char *AndroidIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for Android logging. */ - - char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */ - char *DataDirectory_option; /**< Where to store long-term data, as - * configured by the user. */ - char *DataDirectory; /**< Where to store long-term data, as modified. */ - int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */ - - char *KeyDirectory_option; /**< Where to store keys, as - * configured by the user. */ - char *KeyDirectory; /**< Where to store keys data, as modified. */ - int KeyDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the KeyDirectory g+r? */ - - char *CacheDirectory_option; /**< Where to store cached data, as - * configured by the user. */ - char *CacheDirectory; /**< Where to store cached data, as modified. */ - int CacheDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CacheDirectory g+r? */ - - char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */ - char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */ - char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */ - - routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, - * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to - * consider as exits. */ - routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, - * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to - * consider as entry points. */ - int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes - * are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes, - * do we just fail instead? */ - routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, - * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs - * not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes - * above. */ - routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, - * country codes and IP address patterns of - * ORs not to consider as exits. */ - - /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_; - - int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our - * process for all current and future memory. */ - - struct config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */ - int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private - * addresses, and our own published addresses? - */ - int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local - * interface addresses? - * Includes OutboundBindAddresses and - * configured ports. */ - int ReducedExitPolicy; /**<Should we use the Reduced Exit Policy? */ - struct config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */ - struct config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */ - /** Local address to bind outbound sockets */ - struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress; - /** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */ - struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR; - /** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */ - struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit; - /** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines. - * [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6 - */ - tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2]; - /** Directory server only: which versions of - * Tor should we tell users to run? */ - struct config_line_t *RecommendedVersions; - struct config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions; - struct config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions; - struct config_line_t *RecommendedPackages; - /** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */ - int DirAllowPrivateAddresses; - /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */ - int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses; - char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */ - /** Ports to listen on for OR connections. */ - struct config_line_t *ORPort_lines; - /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */ - struct config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines; - /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */ - struct config_line_t *SocksPort_lines; - /** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */ - struct config_line_t *TransPort_lines; - char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy - * implementation are we using? */ - /** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */ - enum { - TPT_DEFAULT, - TPT_PF_DIVERT, - TPT_IPFW, - TPT_TPROXY, - } TransProxyType_parsed; - /** Ports to listen on for transparent natd connections. */ - struct config_line_t *NATDPort_lines; - /** Ports to listen on for HTTP Tunnel connections. */ - struct config_line_t *HTTPTunnelPort_lines; - struct config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control - * connections. */ - /** List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on for control connections. */ - struct config_line_t *ControlSocket; - - int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */ - int UnixSocksGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS Unix sockets g+rw? */ - /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */ - struct config_line_t *DirPort_lines; - /** Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */ - struct config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; - - /* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be - * MaxMemInQueues. */ - uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw; - uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated - * for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */ - /** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */ - uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold; - - /** @name port booleans - * - * Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a - * non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type - * configured in one of the _lines options above. - * For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured. - * If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use: - * SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set || - * HTTPTunnelPort_set - * rather than SocksPort_set. - * - * @{ - */ - unsigned int ORPort_set : 1; - unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1; - unsigned int TransPort_set : 1; - unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1; - unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1; - unsigned int DirPort_set : 1; - unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1; - unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1; - unsigned int HTTPTunnelPort_set : 1; - /**@}*/ - - int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */ - int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */ - int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory - * for version 3 directories? */ - int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative - * directory that's willing to recommend - * versions? */ - int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory - * that aggregates bridge descriptors? */ - - /** If set on a bridge relay, it will include this value on a new - * "bridge-distribution-request" line in its bridge descriptor. */ - char *BridgeDistribution; - - /** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport - * for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */ - char *BridgePassword; - /** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http - * authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */ - char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_; - - int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */ - struct config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */ - - struct config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client - transport plugins. */ - - struct config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client - transport plugins. */ - - /** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */ - struct config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr; - - /** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */ - struct config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions; - - int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make - * this explicit so we can change how we behave in the - * future. */ - - /** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new - * descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */ - int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority; - - int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk? - * Not used yet. */ - int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */ - - int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections - open shorter and pad them less against - connection-level traffic analysis? */ - /** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client - * and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still - * pad to the server regardless of server support. */ - int ConnectionPadding; - - /** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are - * "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */ - smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor; - /** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */ - dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_; - /** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */ - int PublishHidServDescriptors; - int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */ - int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */ - - int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden - * service directories after what time? */ - - int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */ - int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent - * through a Tor circuit? */ - - /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden - * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related - * circuits.) */ - int Tor2webMode; - - /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */ - routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints; - - /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS - * circuits. */ - routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes; - - /** A routerset that should be used when picking third-hop nodes for HS - * circuits. */ - routerset_t *HSLayer3Nodes; - - /** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) - * circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and - * rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using - * 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.) - * This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by - * this tor instance a Single Onion Service. - * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be - * set to 1. - * Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or - * rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly. - */ - int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode; - /* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor - * instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables - * non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol. - * Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option - * directly. - */ - int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode; - - int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ - int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ - int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we - * have this many. */ - int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket - * exhaustion. */ - int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */ - int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */ - smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows - * (strings). */ - /** IP:ports our firewall allows. */ - struct config_line_t *ReachableAddresses; - struct config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */ - struct config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */ - - int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */ - uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */ - - /** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are - * relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do - * what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says - * nothing). */ - int RefuseUnknownExits; - - /** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient - * uptime. */ - smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts; - /** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and - * unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the - * user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an - * observer somewhere on the Internet. */ - smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts; - /** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option - * controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status - * event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */ - smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts; - /** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */ - smartlist_t *TrackHostExits; - int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an - * addressmap */ - struct config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */ - int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a - * hostname ending with one of the suffixes in - * <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a - * virtual address. */ - /** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value - * "." means "match everything." */ - smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes; - int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service - * descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */ - int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep - * connections alive? */ - int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait - * unattached before we fail it? */ - int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value - * for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout - * history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled() - * rather than checking this value directly. */ - int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at - * least this many seconds ago. Used until - * adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */ - int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at - least this long after last activity */ - int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits - * and try a new circuit if the stream has been - * waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use - * our default internal timeout schedule. */ - int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */ - int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building - * a new one? */ - int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than - this interval ago. */ - uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing - * to use in a second? */ - uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing - * to use in a second? */ - uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to - * tell other nodes we have? */ - uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we - * willing to use for all relayed conns? */ - uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we - * use in a second for all relayed conns? */ - uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */ - uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */ - int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */ - struct config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines - * for rendezvous services. */ - struct config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for - * client-side authorizations for hidden - * services */ - char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */ - - int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds - * have passed. */ - int MainloopStats; /**< Log main loop statistics as part of the - * heartbeat messages. */ - - char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */ - tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */ - uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */ - char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */ - - char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */ - tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */ - uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */ - char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */ - - char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */ - tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */ - uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */ - - char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */ - tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */ - uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */ - char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */ - char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */ - - /** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities. - * If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time, - * use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */ - struct config_line_t *DirAuthorities; - - /** List of fallback directory servers */ - struct config_line_t *FallbackDir; - /** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */ - int UseDefaultFallbackDirs; - - /** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them - * along with fallbackdirs */ - double DirAuthorityFallbackRate; - - /** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and - * not the default ones. */ - struct config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority; - - /** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */ - struct config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority; - - struct config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */ - struct config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR, - normalized */ - struct config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for - * node families */ - smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets; /**< List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */ - struct config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to - * mark as bad exits. */ - struct config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to - * reject. */ - struct config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to - * never mark as valid. */ - /** @name AuthDir...CC - * - * Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to - * reject entirely. - * - * @{ - */ - smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs; - smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs; - smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs; - /**@}*/ - - int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits, - * and vote for all other exits as good. */ - int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this - * number of servers per IP address. */ - int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */ - int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */ - - /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising - * this amount of capacity or more. */ - uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee; - - /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient - * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */ - uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee; - - char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when - * does it start? */ - uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting - * interval before hibernation? 0 for "never - * hibernate." */ - /** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached? - * "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax - * "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax - * "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax - * "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */ - char *AccountingRule_option; - enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule; - - /** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */ - struct config_line_t *HashedControlPassword; - /** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */ - struct config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword; - - int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for - * the control system? */ - char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort - * authentication cookie. */ - char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended - * ORPort authentication cookie. */ - int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */ - int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the - * ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */ - int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to - * circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller - * to cope? (1) */ - int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively - * make circuits in the background (0), - * or not (1)? */ - - /** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor - * instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */ - char *OwningControllerProcess; - /** FD specifier for a controller that owns this Tor instance. */ - int OwningControllerFD; - - int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how - * long do we wait before exiting? */ - char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */ - - /* Derived from SafeLogging */ - enum { - SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE - } SafeLogging_; - - int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */ - int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application - * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */ - int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor - * protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */ - int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly - * log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */ - int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware - * acceleration where available? */ - /** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */ - int TokenBucketRefillInterval; - char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */ - char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */ - - /** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number - * of fixed nodes? */ - int UseEntryGuards_option; - /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on - * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or - * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of - * UseEntryGuards_option. */ - int UseEntryGuards; - - int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */ - - /** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the - * consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter - * decide. */ - int UseGuardFraction; - - int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish? - * If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */ - int NumPrimaryGuards; /**< How many primary guards do we want? */ - - int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */ - /** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which - * means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */ - int FetchDirInfoEarly; - - /** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */ - int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly; - - int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via - * tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default); - * If 0, disabled. */ - - char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual - * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */ - char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual - * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */ - int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit - * addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in - * the local domains. */ - int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure - * hijacking. */ - int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent - * DNS poisoning attacks. */ - char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal - * resolver from the file here rather than from - * /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */ - char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html - disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show - that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server - will know this without any specialized knowledge. */ - int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to - disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */ - /** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing - * or broken. */ - int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig; - /** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get - * rate-limited. */ - int CountPrivateBandwidth; - smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses; /**< A list of addresses that definitely - * should be resolvable. Used for - * testing our DNS server. */ - int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the - * same network zone in the same circuit. */ - int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames - * with weird characters. */ - /** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */ - int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames; - - /** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them, - * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */ - int DownloadExtraInfo; - - /** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients - * requesting network statuses from us as directory. */ - int DirReqStatistics_option; - /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on - * DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */ - int DirReqStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */ - int ExitPortStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */ - int ConnDirectionStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */ - int CellStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */ - int PaddingStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */ - int EntryStatistics; - - /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service - * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */ - int HiddenServiceStatistics_option; - /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on - * HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, - * else no. */ - int HiddenServiceStatistics; - - /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */ - int ExtraInfoStatistics; - - /** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves - * to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping. - * Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */ - int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses; - - /** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses - * over randomly chosen exits. */ - int ClientRejectInternalAddresses; - - /** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid - * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */ - int ClientUseIPv4; - /** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid - * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. - * Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value - * directly. */ - int ClientUseIPv6; - /** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node - * connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients - * prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value - * directly. */ - int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort; - /** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct - * directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other - * clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of - * accessing this value directly. */ - int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort; - - /** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */ - int V3AuthVotingInterval; - /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */ - int V3AuthVoteDelay; - /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */ - int V3AuthDistDelay; - /** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */ - int V3AuthNIntervalsValid; - - /** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key - * migration purposes? */ - int V3AuthUseLegacyKey; - - /** Location of bandwidth measurement file */ - char *V3BandwidthsFile; - - /** Location of guardfraction file */ - char *GuardfractionFile; - - /** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus - * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */ - char *ConsensusParams; - - /** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see - * before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */ - int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised; - - /** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh. - * Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval; - - /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes. - * Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay; - - /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial - * signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/ - int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay; - - /** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus - voting. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset; - - /** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it - * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only - * altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability; - - /** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will - * probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing - * networks. */ - int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime; - - /** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only - * altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only - * altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered - * on testing networks. */ - int TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered - * on testing networks. */ - int TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities - * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably - * live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback - * directory mirrors. - * - * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection - * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection - * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback - * directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a - * usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a - * list of fallback directory mirrors. - * - * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection - * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection - * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities - * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably - * live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch - * from a list of fallback directory mirrors. - * - * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection - * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection - * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only - * altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors when they - * have no running bridges. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay; - - /** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they - * batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has - * passed. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest; - - /** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring - * it? Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall; - - /** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying - * to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or - * error out? Only altered on testing networks. */ - int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries; - - /** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a - * couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values - * of certain configuration options. */ - int TestingTorNetwork; - - /** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */ - uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold; - - /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */ - uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold; - - /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit - * regardless of exit policy. */ - routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit; - int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict; - - /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard - * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */ - routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard; - int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict; - - /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir - * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */ - routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir; - int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict; - - /** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingEnableConnBwEvent; - - /** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */ - int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent; - - /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country - * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help - * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */ - int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry; - - /** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */ - char *GeoIPFile; - char *GeoIPv6File; - - /** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular - * country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in - * ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */ - int GeoIPExcludeUnknown; - - /** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want - * to make this false. */ - int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP; - - /* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection. - * - * If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection, - * we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest. - * Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent - * 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as - * much. - * - * If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm. - * - * If this value is negative, we're using the default approach - * according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus. - */ - double CircuitPriorityHalflife; - - /** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set. - * This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that - * the defaults have changed. */ - int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_; - - /** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't. - * If -1, Tor decides. */ - int UseMicrodescriptors; - - /** File where we should write the ControlPort. */ - char *ControlPortWriteToFile; - /** Should that file be group-readable? */ - int ControlPortFileGroupReadable; - -#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024 - /** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at - * once. */ - int MaxClientCircuitsPending; - - /** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we - * never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */ - int OptimisticData; - - /** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on - * control ports. */ - int DisableNetwork; - - /** - * Parameters for path-bias detection. - * @{ - * These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently - * experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or - * misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain - * fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. - * - * The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to - * build through a guard before we make these checks. The - * PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options - * control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we - * won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits - * succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that - * guard. - * - * When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a - * guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so - * that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. - * - * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, - * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. - * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, - * .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively. - */ - int PathBiasCircThreshold; - double PathBiasNoticeRate; - double PathBiasWarnRate; - double PathBiasExtremeRate; - int PathBiasDropGuards; - int PathBiasScaleThreshold; - /** @} */ - - /** - * Parameters for path-bias use detection - * @{ - * Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior - * of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. - * - * Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully - * building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds - * only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not - * counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered - * successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving - * well-formed responses to RELAY cells. - * - * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, - * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. - * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80, - * .60, and 100, respectively. - */ - int PathBiasUseThreshold; - double PathBiasNoticeUseRate; - double PathBiasExtremeUseRate; - int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold; - /** @} */ - - int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */ - - /** Fraction: */ - double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits; - - /** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we - * should guess a suitable value. */ - int SSLKeyLifetime; - - /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */ - int GuardLifetime; - - /** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use - * the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy - * is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user." - * - * XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */ - int ExitRelay; - - /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */ - int SigningKeyLifetime; - /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */ - int TestingLinkCertLifetime; - /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */ - int TestingAuthKeyLifetime; - - /** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ - int TestingSigningKeySlop; - /** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ - int TestingLinkKeySlop; - /** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ - int TestingAuthKeySlop; - - /** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master - * ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */ - int OfflineMasterKey; - - enum { - FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0, - FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON, - FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF - } keygen_force_passphrase; - int use_keygen_passphrase_fd; - int keygen_passphrase_fd; - int change_key_passphrase; - char *master_key_fname; - - /** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */ - int KeepBindCapabilities; - - /** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the - * lifetime of this Tor process. - */ - uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog; - - /** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only - * relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't - * participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the - * vote indicating participation. */ - int AuthDirSharedRandomness; - - /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */ - int DisableOOSCheck; - - /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells? - * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */ - int ExtendByEd25519ID; - - /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, - * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ - /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ - int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys; - - /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */ - int IncludeUsed; - - /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old - * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0, - * use the default. */ - int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs; - - /** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program. - */ - int NoExec; - - /** Have the KIST scheduler run every X milliseconds. If less than zero, do - * not use the KIST scheduler but use the old vanilla scheduler instead. If - * zero, do what the consensus says and fall back to using KIST as if this is - * set to "10 msec" if the consensus doesn't say anything. */ - int KISTSchedRunInterval; - - /** A multiplier for the KIST per-socket limit calculation. */ - double KISTSockBufSizeFactor; - - /** The list of scheduler type string ordered by priority that is first one - * has to be tried first. Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla */ - smartlist_t *Schedulers; - /* An ordered list of scheduler_types mapped from Schedulers. */ - smartlist_t *SchedulerTypes_; - - /** List of files that were opened by %include in torrc and torrc-defaults */ - smartlist_t *FilesOpenedByIncludes; - - /** If true, Tor shouldn't install any posix signal handlers, since it is - * running embedded inside another process. - */ - int DisableSignalHandlers; - - /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */ - int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled; - /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any - * defense is used. */ - int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections; - /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */ - int DoSCircuitCreationRate; - /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is - * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */ - int DoSCircuitCreationBurst; - /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used - * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */ - int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType; - /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious - * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address - * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */ - int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod; - - /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */ - int DoSConnectionEnabled; - /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */ - int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount; - /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be - * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */ - int DoSConnectionDefenseType; - - /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */ - int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous; -} or_options_t; +typedef struct or_options_t or_options_t;

#define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_protocol_warning_severity_level())

diff --git a/src/or/or_options_st.h b/src/or/or_options_st.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0c0c5d32b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/or/or_options_st.h @@ -0,0 +1,1077 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#ifndef TOR_OR_OPTIONS_ST_H +#define TOR_OR_OPTIONS_ST_H + +#include "lib/cc/torint.h" +#include "lib/net/address.h" + +struct smartlist_t; +struct config_line_t; + +/** Enumeration of outbound address configuration types: + * Exit-only, OR-only, or both */ +typedef enum {OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT, OUTBOUND_ADDR_OR, + OUTBOUND_ADDR_EXIT_AND_OR, + OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX} outbound_addr_t; + +/** Configuration options for a Tor process. */ +struct or_options_t { + uint32_t magic_; + + /** What should the tor process actually do? */ + enum { + CMD_RUN_TOR=0, CMD_LIST_FINGERPRINT, CMD_HASH_PASSWORD, + CMD_VERIFY_CONFIG, CMD_RUN_UNITTESTS, CMD_DUMP_CONFIG, + CMD_KEYGEN, + CMD_KEY_EXPIRATION, + } command; + char *command_arg; /**< Argument for command-line option. */ + + struct config_line_t *Logs; /**< New-style list of configuration lines + * for logs */ + int LogTimeGranularity; /**< Log resolution in milliseconds. */ + + int LogMessageDomains; /**< Boolean: Should we log the domain(s) in which + * each log message occurs? */ + int TruncateLogFile; /**< Boolean: Should we truncate the log file + before we start writing? */ + char *SyslogIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for syslog logging. */ + char *AndroidIdentityTag; /**< Identity tag to add for Android logging. */ + + char *DebugLogFile; /**< Where to send verbose log messages. */ + char *DataDirectory_option; /**< Where to store long-term data, as + * configured by the user. */ + char *DataDirectory; /**< Where to store long-term data, as modified. */ + int DataDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the DataDirectory g+r? */ + + char *KeyDirectory_option; /**< Where to store keys, as + * configured by the user. */ + char *KeyDirectory; /**< Where to store keys data, as modified. */ + int KeyDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the KeyDirectory g+r? */ + + char *CacheDirectory_option; /**< Where to store cached data, as + * configured by the user. */ + char *CacheDirectory; /**< Where to store cached data, as modified. */ + int CacheDirectoryGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CacheDirectory g+r? */ + + char *Nickname; /**< OR only: nickname of this onion router. */ + char *Address; /**< OR only: configured address for this onion router. */ + char *PidFile; /**< Where to store PID of Tor process. */ + + routerset_t *ExitNodes; /**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, + * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to + * consider as exits. */ + routerset_t *EntryNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, + * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs to + * consider as entry points. */ + int StrictNodes; /**< Boolean: When none of our EntryNodes or ExitNodes + * are up, or we need to access a node in ExcludeNodes, + * do we just fail instead? */ + routerset_t *ExcludeNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, + * country codes and IP address patterns of ORs + * not to use in circuits. But see StrictNodes + * above. */ + routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodes;/**< Structure containing nicknames, digests, + * country codes and IP address patterns of + * ORs not to consider as exits. */ + + /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ + routerset_t *ExcludeExitNodesUnion_; + + int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our + * process for all current and future memory. */ + + struct config_line_t *ExitPolicy; /**< Lists of exit policy components. */ + int ExitPolicyRejectPrivate; /**< Should we not exit to reserved private + * addresses, and our own published addresses? + */ + int ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces; /**< Should we not exit to local + * interface addresses? + * Includes OutboundBindAddresses and + * configured ports. */ + int ReducedExitPolicy; /**<Should we use the Reduced Exit Policy? */ + struct config_line_t *SocksPolicy; /**< Lists of socks policy components */ + struct config_line_t *DirPolicy; /**< Lists of dir policy components */ + /** Local address to bind outbound sockets */ + struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddress; + /** Local address to bind outbound relay sockets */ + struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressOR; + /** Local address to bind outbound exit sockets */ + struct config_line_t *OutboundBindAddressExit; + /** Addresses derived from the various OutboundBindAddress lines. + * [][0] is IPv4, [][1] is IPv6 + */ + tor_addr_t OutboundBindAddresses[OUTBOUND_ADDR_MAX][2]; + /** Directory server only: which versions of + * Tor should we tell users to run? */ + struct config_line_t *RecommendedVersions; + struct config_line_t *RecommendedClientVersions; + struct config_line_t *RecommendedServerVersions; + struct config_line_t *RecommendedPackages; + /** Whether dirservers allow router descriptors with private IPs. */ + int DirAllowPrivateAddresses; + /** Whether routers accept EXTEND cells to routers with private IPs. */ + int ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses; + char *User; /**< Name of user to run Tor as. */ + /** Ports to listen on for OR connections. */ + struct config_line_t *ORPort_lines; + /** Ports to listen on for extended OR connections. */ + struct config_line_t *ExtORPort_lines; + /** Ports to listen on for SOCKS connections. */ + struct config_line_t *SocksPort_lines; + /** Ports to listen on for transparent pf/netfilter connections. */ + struct config_line_t *TransPort_lines; + char *TransProxyType; /**< What kind of transparent proxy + * implementation are we using? */ + /** Parsed value of TransProxyType. */ + enum { + TPT_DEFAULT, + TPT_PF_DIVERT, + TPT_IPFW, + TPT_TPROXY, + } TransProxyType_parsed; + /** Ports to listen on for transparent natd connections. */ + struct config_line_t *NATDPort_lines; + /** Ports to listen on for HTTP Tunnel connections. */ + struct config_line_t *HTTPTunnelPort_lines; + struct config_line_t *ControlPort_lines; /**< Ports to listen on for control + * connections. */ + /** List of Unix Domain Sockets to listen on for control connections. */ + struct config_line_t *ControlSocket; + + int ControlSocketsGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are control sockets g+rw? */ + int UnixSocksGroupWritable; /**< Boolean: Are SOCKS Unix sockets g+rw? */ + /** Ports to listen on for directory connections. */ + struct config_line_t *DirPort_lines; + /** Ports to listen on for DNS requests. */ + struct config_line_t *DNSPort_lines; + + /* MaxMemInQueues value as input by the user. We clean this up to be + * MaxMemInQueues. */ + uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_raw; + uint64_t MaxMemInQueues;/**< If we have more memory than this allocated + * for queues and buffers, run the OOM handler */ + /** Above this value, consider ourselves low on RAM. */ + uint64_t MaxMemInQueues_low_threshold; + + /** @name port booleans + * + * Derived booleans: For server ports and ControlPort, true iff there is a + * non-listener port on an AF_INET or AF_INET6 address of the given type + * configured in one of the _lines options above. + * For client ports, also true if there is a unix socket configured. + * If you are checking for client ports, you may want to use: + * SocksPort_set || TransPort_set || NATDPort_set || DNSPort_set || + * HTTPTunnelPort_set + * rather than SocksPort_set. + * + * @{ + */ + unsigned int ORPort_set : 1; + unsigned int SocksPort_set : 1; + unsigned int TransPort_set : 1; + unsigned int NATDPort_set : 1; + unsigned int ControlPort_set : 1; + unsigned int DirPort_set : 1; + unsigned int DNSPort_set : 1; + unsigned int ExtORPort_set : 1; + unsigned int HTTPTunnelPort_set : 1; + /**@}*/ + + int AssumeReachable; /**< Whether to publish our descriptor regardless. */ + int AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory? */ + int V3AuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory + * for version 3 directories? */ + int VersioningAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative + * directory that's willing to recommend + * versions? */ + int BridgeAuthoritativeDir; /**< Boolean: is this an authoritative directory + * that aggregates bridge descriptors? */ + + /** If set on a bridge relay, it will include this value on a new + * "bridge-distribution-request" line in its bridge descriptor. */ + char *BridgeDistribution; + + /** If set on a bridge authority, it will answer requests on its dirport + * for bridge statuses -- but only if the requests use this password. */ + char *BridgePassword; + /** If BridgePassword is set, this is a SHA256 digest of the basic http + * authenticator for it. Used so we can do a time-independent comparison. */ + char *BridgePassword_AuthDigest_; + + int UseBridges; /**< Boolean: should we start all circuits with a bridge? */ + struct config_line_t *Bridges; /**< List of bootstrap bridge addresses. */ + + struct config_line_t *ClientTransportPlugin; /**< List of client + transport plugins. */ + + struct config_line_t *ServerTransportPlugin; /**< List of client + transport plugins. */ + + /** List of TCP/IP addresses that transports should listen at. */ + struct config_line_t *ServerTransportListenAddr; + + /** List of options that must be passed to pluggable transports. */ + struct config_line_t *ServerTransportOptions; + + int BridgeRelay; /**< Boolean: are we acting as a bridge relay? We make + * this explicit so we can change how we behave in the + * future. */ + + /** Boolean: if we know the bridge's digest, should we get new + * descriptors from the bridge authorities or from the bridge itself? */ + int UpdateBridgesFromAuthority; + + int AvoidDiskWrites; /**< Boolean: should we never cache things to disk? + * Not used yet. */ + int ClientOnly; /**< Boolean: should we never evolve into a server role? */ + + int ReducedConnectionPadding; /**< Boolean: Should we try to keep connections + open shorter and pad them less against + connection-level traffic analysis? */ + /** Autobool: if auto, then connection padding will be negotiated by client + * and server. If 0, it will be fully disabled. If 1, the client will still + * pad to the server regardless of server support. */ + int ConnectionPadding; + + /** To what authority types do we publish our descriptor? Choices are + * "v1", "v2", "v3", "bridge", or "". */ + struct smartlist_t *PublishServerDescriptor; + /** A bitfield of authority types, derived from PublishServerDescriptor. */ + dirinfo_type_t PublishServerDescriptor_; + /** Boolean: do we publish hidden service descriptors to the HS auths? */ + int PublishHidServDescriptors; + int FetchServerDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch server descriptors as normal? */ + int FetchHidServDescriptors; /**< and hidden service descriptors? */ + + int MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2; /**< As directory authority, accept hidden + * service directories after what time? */ + + int FetchUselessDescriptors; /**< Do we fetch non-running descriptors too? */ + int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent + * through a Tor circuit? */ + + /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden + * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related + * circuits.) */ + int Tor2webMode; + + /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */ + routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints; + + /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS + * circuits. */ + routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes; + + /** A routerset that should be used when picking third-hop nodes for HS + * circuits. */ + routerset_t *HSLayer3Nodes; + + /** Onion Services in HiddenServiceSingleHopMode make one-hop (direct) + * circuits between the onion service server, and the introduction and + * rendezvous points. (Onion service descriptors are still posted using + * 3-hop paths, to avoid onion service directories blocking the service.) + * This option makes every hidden service instance hosted by + * this tor instance a Single Onion Service. + * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode requires HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to be + * set to 1. + * Use rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or + * rend_service_reveal_startup_time() instead of using this option directly. + */ + int HiddenServiceSingleHopMode; + /* Makes hidden service clients and servers non-anonymous on this tor + * instance. Allows the non-anonymous HiddenServiceSingleHopMode. Enables + * non-anonymous behaviour in the hidden service protocol. + * Use rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() instead of using this option + * directly. + */ + int HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode; + + int ConnLimit; /**< Demanded minimum number of simultaneous connections. */ + int ConnLimit_; /**< Maximum allowed number of simultaneous connections. */ + int ConnLimit_high_thresh; /**< start trying to lower socket usage if we + * have this many. */ + int ConnLimit_low_thresh; /**< try to get down to here after socket + * exhaustion. */ + int RunAsDaemon; /**< If true, run in the background. (Unix only) */ + int FascistFirewall; /**< Whether to prefer ORs reachable on open ports. */ + struct smartlist_t *FirewallPorts; /**< Which ports our firewall allows + * (strings). */ + /** IP:ports our firewall allows. */ + struct config_line_t *ReachableAddresses; + struct config_line_t *ReachableORAddresses; /**< IP:ports for OR conns. */ + struct config_line_t *ReachableDirAddresses; /**< IP:ports for Dir conns. */ + + int ConstrainedSockets; /**< Shrink xmit and recv socket buffers. */ + uint64_t ConstrainedSockSize; /**< Size of constrained buffers. */ + + /** Whether we should drop exit streams from Tors that we don't know are + * relays. One of "0" (never refuse), "1" (always refuse), or "-1" (do + * what the consensus says, defaulting to 'refuse' if the consensus says + * nothing). */ + int RefuseUnknownExits; + + /** Application ports that require all nodes in circ to have sufficient + * uptime. */ + struct smartlist_t *LongLivedPorts; + /** Application ports that are likely to be unencrypted and + * unauthenticated; we reject requests for them to prevent the + * user from screwing up and leaking plaintext secrets to an + * observer somewhere on the Internet. */ + struct smartlist_t *RejectPlaintextPorts; + /** Related to RejectPlaintextPorts above, except this config option + * controls whether we warn (in the log and via a controller status + * event) every time a risky connection is attempted. */ + struct smartlist_t *WarnPlaintextPorts; + /** Should we try to reuse the same exit node for a given host */ + struct smartlist_t *TrackHostExits; + int TrackHostExitsExpire; /**< Number of seconds until we expire an + * addressmap */ + struct config_line_t *AddressMap; /**< List of address map directives. */ + int AutomapHostsOnResolve; /**< If true, when we get a resolve request for a + * hostname ending with one of the suffixes in + * <b>AutomapHostsSuffixes</b>, map it to a + * virtual address. */ + /** List of suffixes for <b>AutomapHostsOnResolve</b>. The special value + * "." means "match everything." */ + struct smartlist_t *AutomapHostsSuffixes; + int RendPostPeriod; /**< How often do we post each rendezvous service + * descriptor? Remember to publish them independently. */ + int KeepalivePeriod; /**< How often do we send padding cells to keep + * connections alive? */ + int SocksTimeout; /**< How long do we let a socks connection wait + * unattached before we fail it? */ + int LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; /**< If non-zero, we attempt to learn a value + * for CircuitBuildTimeout based on timeout + * history. Use circuit_build_times_disabled() + * rather than checking this value directly. */ + int CircuitBuildTimeout; /**< Cull non-open circuits that were born at + * least this many seconds ago. Used until + * adaptive algorithm learns a new value. */ + int CircuitsAvailableTimeout; /**< Try to have an open circuit for at + least this long after last activity */ + int CircuitStreamTimeout; /**< If non-zero, detach streams from circuits + * and try a new circuit if the stream has been + * waiting for this many seconds. If zero, use + * our default internal timeout schedule. */ + int MaxOnionQueueDelay; /*< DOCDOC */ + int NewCircuitPeriod; /**< How long do we use a circuit before building + * a new one? */ + int MaxCircuitDirtiness; /**< Never use circs that were first used more than + this interval ago. */ + uint64_t BandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we willing + * to use in a second? */ + uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing + * to use in a second? */ + uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to + * tell other nodes we have? */ + uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we + * willing to use for all relayed conns? */ + uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we + * use in a second for all relayed conns? */ + uint64_t PerConnBWRate; /**< Long-term bw on a single TLS conn, if set. */ + uint64_t PerConnBWBurst; /**< Allowed burst on a single TLS conn, if set. */ + int NumCPUs; /**< How many CPUs should we try to use? */ + struct config_line_t *RendConfigLines; /**< List of configuration lines + * for rendezvous services. */ + struct config_line_t *HidServAuth; /**< List of configuration lines for + * client-side authorizations for hidden + * services */ + char *ContactInfo; /**< Contact info to be published in the directory. */ + + int HeartbeatPeriod; /**< Log heartbeat messages after this many seconds + * have passed. */ + int MainloopStats; /**< Log main loop statistics as part of the + * heartbeat messages. */ + + char *HTTPProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as http proxy, if any. */ + tor_addr_t HTTPProxyAddr; /**< Parsed IPv4 addr for http proxy, if any. */ + uint16_t HTTPProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for http proxy, if any. */ + char *HTTPProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */ + + char *HTTPSProxy; /**< hostname[:port] to use as https proxy, if any. */ + tor_addr_t HTTPSProxyAddr; /**< Parsed addr for https proxy, if any. */ + uint16_t HTTPSProxyPort; /**< Parsed port for https proxy, if any. */ + char *HTTPSProxyAuthenticator; /**< username:password string, if any. */ + + char *Socks4Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS4 proxy, if any. */ + tor_addr_t Socks4ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */ + uint16_t Socks4ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks4Proxy. */ + + char *Socks5Proxy; /**< hostname:port to use as a SOCKS5 proxy, if any. */ + tor_addr_t Socks5ProxyAddr; /**< Derived from Sock5Proxy. */ + uint16_t Socks5ProxyPort; /**< Derived from Socks5Proxy. */ + char *Socks5ProxyUsername; /**< Username for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */ + char *Socks5ProxyPassword; /**< Password for SOCKS5 authentication, if any */ + + /** List of configuration lines for replacement directory authorities. + * If you just want to replace one class of authority at a time, + * use the "Alternate*Authority" options below instead. */ + struct config_line_t *DirAuthorities; + + /** List of fallback directory servers */ + struct config_line_t *FallbackDir; + /** Whether to use the default hard-coded FallbackDirs */ + int UseDefaultFallbackDirs; + + /** Weight to apply to all directory authority rates if considering them + * along with fallbackdirs */ + double DirAuthorityFallbackRate; + + /** If set, use these main (currently v3) directory authorities and + * not the default ones. */ + struct config_line_t *AlternateDirAuthority; + + /** If set, use these bridge authorities and not the default one. */ + struct config_line_t *AlternateBridgeAuthority; + + struct config_line_t *MyFamily_lines; /**< Declared family for this OR. */ + struct config_line_t *MyFamily; /**< Declared family for this OR, + normalized */ + struct config_line_t *NodeFamilies; /**< List of config lines for + * node families */ + /** List of parsed NodeFamilies values. */ + struct smartlist_t *NodeFamilySets; + struct config_line_t *AuthDirBadExit; /**< Address policy for descriptors to + * mark as bad exits. */ + struct config_line_t *AuthDirReject; /**< Address policy for descriptors to + * reject. */ + struct config_line_t *AuthDirInvalid; /**< Address policy for descriptors to + * never mark as valid. */ + /** @name AuthDir...CC + * + * Lists of country codes to mark as BadExit, or Invalid, or to + * reject entirely. + * + * @{ + */ + struct smartlist_t *AuthDirBadExitCCs; + struct smartlist_t *AuthDirInvalidCCs; + struct smartlist_t *AuthDirRejectCCs; + /**@}*/ + + int AuthDirListBadExits; /**< True iff we should list bad exits, + * and vote for all other exits as good. */ + int AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr; /**< Do not permit more than this + * number of servers per IP address. */ + int AuthDirHasIPv6Connectivity; /**< Boolean: are we on IPv6? */ + int AuthDirPinKeys; /**< Boolean: Do we enforce key-pinning? */ + + /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising + * this amount of capacity or more. */ + uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee; + + /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient + * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */ + uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee; + + char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when + * does it start? */ + uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting + * interval before hibernation? 0 for "never + * hibernate." */ + /** How do we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached? + * "max" for when in or out reaches AccountingMax + * "sum" for when in plus out reaches AccountingMax + * "in" for when in reaches AccountingMax + * "out" for when out reaches AccountingMax */ + char *AccountingRule_option; + enum { ACCT_MAX, ACCT_SUM, ACCT_IN, ACCT_OUT } AccountingRule; + + /** Base64-encoded hash of accepted passwords for the control system. */ + struct config_line_t *HashedControlPassword; + /** As HashedControlPassword, but not saved. */ + struct config_line_t *HashedControlSessionPassword; + + int CookieAuthentication; /**< Boolean: do we enable cookie-based auth for + * the control system? */ + char *CookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of a ControlPort + * authentication cookie. */ + char *ExtORPortCookieAuthFile; /**< Filesystem location of Extended + * ORPort authentication cookie. */ + int CookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the CookieAuthFile g+r? */ + int ExtORPortCookieAuthFileGroupReadable; /**< Boolean: Is the + * ExtORPortCookieAuthFile g+r? */ + int LeaveStreamsUnattached; /**< Boolean: Does Tor attach new streams to + * circuits itself (0), or does it expect a controller + * to cope? (1) */ + int DisablePredictedCircuits; /**< Boolean: does Tor preemptively + * make circuits in the background (0), + * or not (1)? */ + + /** Process specifier for a controller that ‘owns’ this Tor + * instance. Tor will terminate if its owning controller does. */ + char *OwningControllerProcess; + /** FD specifier for a controller that owns this Tor instance. */ + int OwningControllerFD; + + int ShutdownWaitLength; /**< When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, how + * long do we wait before exiting? */ + char *SafeLogging; /**< Contains "relay", "1", "0" (meaning no scrubbing). */ + + /* Derived from SafeLogging */ + enum { + SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE + } SafeLogging_; + + int Sandbox; /**< Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */ + int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application + * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */ + int ProtocolWarnings; /**< Boolean: when other parties screw up the Tor + * protocol, is it a warn or an info in our logs? */ + int TestSocks; /**< Boolean: when we get a socks connection, do we loudly + * log whether it was DNS-leaking or not? */ + int HardwareAccel; /**< Boolean: Should we enable OpenSSL hardware + * acceleration where available? */ + /** Token Bucket Refill resolution in milliseconds. */ + int TokenBucketRefillInterval; + char *AccelName; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine name. */ + char *AccelDir; /**< Optional hardware acceleration engine search dir. */ + + /** Boolean: Do we try to enter from a smallish number + * of fixed nodes? */ + int UseEntryGuards_option; + /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on + * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or + * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of + * UseEntryGuards_option. */ + int UseEntryGuards; + + int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */ + + /** If 1, we use any guardfraction information we see in the + * consensus. If 0, we don't. If -1, let the consensus parameter + * decide. */ + int UseGuardFraction; + + int NumDirectoryGuards; /**< How many dir guards do we try to establish? + * If 0, use value from NumEntryGuards. */ + int NumPrimaryGuards; /**< How many primary guards do we want? */ + + int RephistTrackTime; /**< How many seconds do we keep rephist info? */ + /** Should we always fetch our dir info on the mirror schedule (which + * means directly from the authorities) no matter our other config? */ + int FetchDirInfoEarly; + + /** Should we fetch our dir info at the start of the consensus period? */ + int FetchDirInfoExtraEarly; + + int DirCache; /**< Cache all directory documents and accept requests via + * tunnelled dir conns from clients. If 1, enabled (default); + * If 0, disabled. */ + + char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv4; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual + * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv4 addresses */ + char *VirtualAddrNetworkIPv6; /**< Address and mask to hand out for virtual + * MAPADDRESS requests for IPv6 addresses */ + int ServerDNSSearchDomains; /**< Boolean: If set, we don't force exit + * addresses to be FQDNs, but rather search for them in + * the local domains. */ + int ServerDNSDetectHijacking; /**< Boolean: If true, check for DNS failure + * hijacking. */ + int ServerDNSRandomizeCase; /**< Boolean: Use the 0x20-hack to prevent + * DNS poisoning attacks. */ + char *ServerDNSResolvConfFile; /**< If provided, we configure our internal + * resolver from the file here rather than from + * /etc/resolv.conf (Unix) or the registry (Windows). */ + char *DirPortFrontPage; /**< This is a full path to a file with an html + disclaimer. This allows a server administrator to show + that they're running Tor and anyone visiting their server + will know this without any specialized knowledge. */ + int DisableDebuggerAttachment; /**< Currently Linux only specific attempt to + disable ptrace; needs BSD testing. */ + /** Boolean: if set, we start even if our resolv.conf file is missing + * or broken. */ + int ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig; + /** Boolean: if set, then even connections to private addresses will get + * rate-limited. */ + int CountPrivateBandwidth; + /** A list of addresses that definitely should be resolvable. Used for + * testing our DNS server. */ + struct smartlist_t *ServerDNSTestAddresses; + int EnforceDistinctSubnets; /**< If true, don't allow multiple routers in the + * same network zone in the same circuit. */ + int AllowNonRFC953Hostnames; /**< If true, we allow connections to hostnames + * with weird characters. */ + /** If true, we try resolving hostnames with weird characters. */ + int ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames; + + /** If true, we try to download extra-info documents (and we serve them, + * if we are a cache). For authorities, this is always true. */ + int DownloadExtraInfo; + + /** If true, we're configured to collect statistics on clients + * requesting network statuses from us as directory. */ + int DirReqStatistics_option; + /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on + * DirReqStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, else no. */ + int DirReqStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics on port usage. */ + int ExitPortStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect connection statistics. */ + int ConnDirectionStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect cell statistics. */ + int CellStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect padding statistics. */ + int PaddingStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as entry node. */ + int EntryStatistics; + + /** If true, the user wants us to collect statistics as hidden service + * directory, introduction point, or rendezvous point. */ + int HiddenServiceStatistics_option; + /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on + * HiddenServiceStatistics_option -- yes if it's set and we're a server, + * else no. */ + int HiddenServiceStatistics; + + /** If true, include statistics file contents in extra-info documents. */ + int ExtraInfoStatistics; + + /** If true, do not believe anybody who tells us that a domain resolves + * to an internal address, or that an internal address has a PTR mapping. + * Helps avoid some cross-site attacks. */ + int ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses; + + /** If true, do not accept any requests to connect to internal addresses + * over randomly chosen exits. */ + int ClientRejectInternalAddresses; + + /** If true, clients may connect over IPv4. If false, they will avoid + * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. */ + int ClientUseIPv4; + /** If true, clients may connect over IPv6. If false, they will avoid + * connecting over IPv4. We enforce this for OR and Dir connections. + * Use fascist_firewall_use_ipv6() instead of accessing this value + * directly. */ + int ClientUseIPv6; + /** If true, prefer an IPv6 OR port over an IPv4 one for entry node + * connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other clients + * prefer IPv4. Use node_ipv6_or_preferred() instead of accessing this value + * directly. */ + int ClientPreferIPv6ORPort; + /** If true, prefer an IPv6 directory port over an IPv4 one for direct + * directory connections. If auto, bridge clients prefer IPv6, and other + * clients prefer IPv4. Use fascist_firewall_prefer_ipv6_dirport() instead of + * accessing this value directly. */ + int ClientPreferIPv6DirPort; + + /** The length of time that we think a consensus should be fresh. */ + int V3AuthVotingInterval; + /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute votes. */ + int V3AuthVoteDelay; + /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute signatures. */ + int V3AuthDistDelay; + /** The number of intervals we think a consensus should be valid. */ + int V3AuthNIntervalsValid; + + /** Should advertise and sign consensuses with a legacy key, for key + * migration purposes? */ + int V3AuthUseLegacyKey; + + /** Location of bandwidth measurement file */ + char *V3BandwidthsFile; + + /** Location of guardfraction file */ + char *GuardfractionFile; + + /** Authority only: key=value pairs that we add to our networkstatus + * consensus vote on the 'params' line. */ + char *ConsensusParams; + + /** Authority only: minimum number of measured bandwidths we must see + * before we only believe measured bandwidths to assign flags. */ + int MinMeasuredBWsForAuthToIgnoreAdvertised; + + /** The length of time that we think an initial consensus should be fresh. + * Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval; + + /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial votes. + * Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay; + + /** The length of time we think it will take to distribute initial + * signatures. Only altered on testing networks.*/ + int TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay; + + /** Offset in seconds added to the starting time for consensus + voting. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingV3AuthVotingStartOffset; + + /** If an authority has been around for less than this amount of time, it + * does not believe its reachability information is accurate. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability; + + /** Clients don't download any descriptor this recent, since it will + * probably not have propagated to enough caches. Only altered on testing + * networks. */ + int TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime; + + /** Schedule for when servers should download things in general. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingServerDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download things in general. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingClientDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when servers should download consensuses. Only altered + * on testing networks. */ + int TestingServerConsensusDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses. Only altered + * on testing networks. */ + int TestingClientConsensusDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities + * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably + * live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a list of fallback + * directory mirrors. + * + * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection + * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection + * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from fallback + * directory mirrors if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a + * usable, reasonably live consensus). Only used by clients fetching from a + * list of fallback directory mirrors. + * + * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection + * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection + * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int ClientBootstrapConsensusFallbackDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download consensuses from authorities + * if they are bootstrapping (that is, they don't have a usable, reasonably + * live consensus). Only used by clients which don't have or won't fetch + * from a list of fallback directory mirrors. + * + * This schedule is incremented by (potentially concurrent) connection + * attempts, unlike other schedules, which are incremented by connection + * failures. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int ClientBootstrapConsensusAuthorityOnlyDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors. Only + * altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingBridgeDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** Schedule for when clients should download bridge descriptors when they + * have no running bridges. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingBridgeBootstrapDownloadInitialDelay; + + /** When directory clients have only a few descriptors to request, they + * batch them until they have more, or until this amount of time has + * passed. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingClientMaxIntervalWithoutRequest; + + /** How long do we let a directory connection stall before expiring + * it? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingDirConnectionMaxStall; + + /** How many simultaneous in-progress connections will we make when trying + * to fetch a consensus before we wait for one to complete, timeout, or + * error out? Only altered on testing networks. */ + int ClientBootstrapConsensusMaxInProgressTries; + + /** If true, we take part in a testing network. Change the defaults of a + * couple of other configuration options and allow to change the values + * of certain configuration options. */ + int TestingTorNetwork; + + /** Minimum value for the Exit flag threshold on testing networks. */ + uint64_t TestingMinExitFlagThreshold; + + /** Minimum value for the Fast flag threshold on testing networks. */ + uint64_t TestingMinFastFlagThreshold; + + /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Exit + * regardless of exit policy. */ + routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteExit; + int TestingDirAuthVoteExitIsStrict; + + /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted Guard + * regardless of uptime and bandwidth. */ + routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteGuard; + int TestingDirAuthVoteGuardIsStrict; + + /** Relays in a testing network which should be voted HSDir + * regardless of uptime and DirPort. */ + routerset_t *TestingDirAuthVoteHSDir; + int TestingDirAuthVoteHSDirIsStrict; + + /** Enable CONN_BW events. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingEnableConnBwEvent; + + /** Enable CELL_STATS events. Only altered on testing networks. */ + int TestingEnableCellStatsEvent; + + /** If true, and we have GeoIP data, and we're a bridge, keep a per-country + * count of how many client addresses have contacted us so that we can help + * the bridge authority guess which countries have blocked access to us. */ + int BridgeRecordUsageByCountry; + + /** Optionally, IPv4 and IPv6 GeoIP data. */ + char *GeoIPFile; + char *GeoIPv6File; + + /** Autobool: if auto, then any attempt to Exclude{Exit,}Nodes a particular + * country code will exclude all nodes in ?? and A1. If true, all nodes in + * ?? and A1 are excluded. Has no effect if we don't know any GeoIP data. */ + int GeoIPExcludeUnknown; + + /** If true, SIGHUP should reload the torrc. Sometimes controllers want + * to make this false. */ + int ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP; + + /* The main parameter for picking circuits within a connection. + * + * If this value is positive, when picking a cell to relay on a connection, + * we always relay from the circuit whose weighted cell count is lowest. + * Cells are weighted exponentially such that if one cell is sent + * 'CircuitPriorityHalflife' seconds before another, it counts for half as + * much. + * + * If this value is zero, we're disabling the cell-EWMA algorithm. + * + * If this value is negative, we're using the default approach + * according to either Tor or a parameter set in the consensus. + */ + double CircuitPriorityHalflife; + + /** Set to true if the TestingTorNetwork configuration option is set. + * This is used so that options_validate() has a chance to realize that + * the defaults have changed. */ + int UsingTestNetworkDefaults_; + + /** If 1, we try to use microdescriptors to build circuits. If 0, we don't. + * If -1, Tor decides. */ + int UseMicrodescriptors; + + /** File where we should write the ControlPort. */ + char *ControlPortWriteToFile; + /** Should that file be group-readable? */ + int ControlPortFileGroupReadable; + +#define MAX_MAX_CLIENT_CIRCUITS_PENDING 1024 + /** Maximum number of non-open general-purpose origin circuits to allow at + * once. */ + int MaxClientCircuitsPending; + + /** If 1, we always send optimistic data when it's supported. If 0, we + * never use it. If -1, we do what the consensus says. */ + int OptimisticData; + + /** If 1, we accept and launch no external network connections, except on + * control ports. */ + int DisableNetwork; + + /** + * Parameters for path-bias detection. + * @{ + * These options override the default behavior of Tor's (**currently + * experimental**) path bias detection algorithm. To try to find broken or + * misbehaving guard nodes, Tor looks for nodes where more than a certain + * fraction of circuits through that guard fail to get built. + * + * The PathBiasCircThreshold option controls how many circuits we need to + * build through a guard before we make these checks. The + * PathBiasNoticeRate, PathBiasWarnRate and PathBiasExtremeRate options + * control what fraction of circuits must succeed through a guard so we + * won't write log messages. If less than PathBiasExtremeRate circuits + * succeed *and* PathBiasDropGuards is set to 1, we disable use of that + * guard. + * + * When we have seen more than PathBiasScaleThreshold circuits through a + * guard, we scale our observations by 0.5 (governed by the consensus) so + * that new observations don't get swamped by old ones. + * + * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, + * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. + * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 150, .70, + * .50, .30, 0, and 300 respectively. + */ + int PathBiasCircThreshold; + double PathBiasNoticeRate; + double PathBiasWarnRate; + double PathBiasExtremeRate; + int PathBiasDropGuards; + int PathBiasScaleThreshold; + /** @} */ + + /** + * Parameters for path-bias use detection + * @{ + * Similar to the above options, these options override the default behavior + * of Tor's (**currently experimental**) path use bias detection algorithm. + * + * Where as the path bias parameters govern thresholds for successfully + * building circuits, these four path use bias parameters govern thresholds + * only for circuit usage. Circuits which receive no stream usage are not + * counted by this detection algorithm. A used circuit is considered + * successful if it is capable of carrying streams or otherwise receiving + * well-formed responses to RELAY cells. + * + * By default, or if a negative value is provided for one of these options, + * Tor uses reasonable defaults from the networkstatus consensus document. + * If no defaults are available there, these options default to 20, .80, + * .60, and 100, respectively. + */ + int PathBiasUseThreshold; + double PathBiasNoticeUseRate; + double PathBiasExtremeUseRate; + int PathBiasScaleUseThreshold; + /** @} */ + + int IPv6Exit; /**< Do we support exiting to IPv6 addresses? */ + + /** Fraction: */ + double PathsNeededToBuildCircuits; + + /** What expiry time shall we place on our SSL certs? "0" means we + * should guess a suitable value. */ + int SSLKeyLifetime; + + /** How long (seconds) do we keep a guard before picking a new one? */ + int GuardLifetime; + + /** Is this an exit node? This is a tristate, where "1" means "yes, and use + * the default exit policy if none is given" and "0" means "no; exit policy + * is 'reject *'" and "auto" (-1) means "same as 1, but warn the user." + * + * XXXX Eventually, the default will be 0. */ + int ExitRelay; + + /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our signing keys to be valid? */ + int SigningKeyLifetime; + /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our link keys to be valid? */ + int TestingLinkCertLifetime; + /** For how long (seconds) do we declare our auth keys to be valid? */ + int TestingAuthKeyLifetime; + + /** How long before signing keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ + int TestingSigningKeySlop; + /** How long before link keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ + int TestingLinkKeySlop; + /** How long before auth keys expire will we try to make a new one? */ + int TestingAuthKeySlop; + + /** Force use of offline master key features: never generate a master + * ed25519 identity key except from tor --keygen */ + int OfflineMasterKey; + + enum { + FORCE_PASSPHRASE_AUTO=0, + FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON, + FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF + } keygen_force_passphrase; + int use_keygen_passphrase_fd; + int keygen_passphrase_fd; + int change_key_passphrase; + char *master_key_fname; + + /** Autobool: Do we try to retain capabilities if we can? */ + int KeepBindCapabilities; + + /** Maximum total size of unparseable descriptors to log during the + * lifetime of this Tor process. + */ + uint64_t MaxUnparseableDescSizeToLog; + + /** Bool (default: 1): Switch for the shared random protocol. Only + * relevant to a directory authority. If off, the authority won't + * participate in the protocol. If on (default), a flag is added to the + * vote indicating participation. */ + int AuthDirSharedRandomness; + + /** If 1, we skip all OOS checks. */ + int DisableOOSCheck; + + /** Autobool: Should we include Ed25519 identities in extend2 cells? + * If -1, we should do whatever the consensus parameter says. */ + int ExtendByEd25519ID; + + /** Bool (default: 1): When testing routerinfos as a directory authority, + * do we enforce Ed25519 identity match? */ + /* NOTE: remove this option someday. */ + int AuthDirTestEd25519LinkKeys; + + /** Bool (default: 0): Tells if a %include was used on torrc */ + int IncludeUsed; + + /** The seconds after expiration which we as a relay should keep old + * consensuses around so that we can generate diffs from them. If 0, + * use the default. */ + int MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs; + + /** Bool (default: 0). Tells Tor to never try to exec another program. + */ + int NoExec; + + /** Have the KIST scheduler run every X milliseconds. If less than zero, do + * not use the KIST scheduler but use the old vanilla scheduler instead. If + * zero, do what the consensus says and fall back to using KIST as if this is + * set to "10 msec" if the consensus doesn't say anything. */ + int KISTSchedRunInterval; + + /** A multiplier for the KIST per-socket limit calculation. */ + double KISTSockBufSizeFactor; + + /** The list of scheduler type string ordered by priority that is first one + * has to be tried first. Default: KIST,KISTLite,Vanilla */ + struct smartlist_t *Schedulers; + /* An ordered list of scheduler_types mapped from Schedulers. */ + struct smartlist_t *SchedulerTypes_; + + /** List of files that were opened by %include in torrc and torrc-defaults */ + struct smartlist_t *FilesOpenedByIncludes; + + /** If true, Tor shouldn't install any posix signal handlers, since it is + * running embedded inside another process. + */ + int DisableSignalHandlers; + + /** Autobool: Is the circuit creation DoS mitigation subsystem enabled? */ + int DoSCircuitCreationEnabled; + /** Minimum concurrent connection needed from one single address before any + * defense is used. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections; + /** Circuit rate used to refill the token bucket. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationRate; + /** Maximum allowed burst of circuits. Reaching that value, the address is + * detected as malicious and a defense might be used. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationBurst; + /** When an address is marked as malicous, what defense should be used + * against it. See the dos_cc_defense_type_t enum. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType; + /** For how much time (in seconds) the defense is applicable for a malicious + * address. A random time delta is added to the defense time of an address + * which will be between 1 second and half of this value. */ + int DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod; + + /** Autobool: Is the DoS connection mitigation subsystem enabled? */ + int DoSConnectionEnabled; + /** Maximum concurrent connection allowed per address. */ + int DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount; + /** When an address is reaches the maximum count, what defense should be + * used against it. See the dos_conn_defense_type_t enum. */ + int DoSConnectionDefenseType; + + /** Autobool: Do we refuse single hop client rendezvous? */ + int DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous; +}; + +#endif diff --git a/src/or/policies.h b/src/or/policies.h index ff0b54499..7da3ba031 100644 --- a/src/or/policies.h +++ b/src/or/policies.h @@ -121,6 +121,7 @@ int policies_parse_exit_policy_from_options( uint32_t local_address, const tor_addr_t *ipv6_local_address, smartlist_t **result); +struct config_line_t; int policies_parse_exit_policy(struct config_line_t *cfg, smartlist_t **dest, exit_policy_parser_cfg_t options, const smartlist_t *configured_addresses); diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h index b11a2a7da..35962df7f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.h +++ b/src/or/rendservice.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include "or/hs_service.h"

typedef struct rend_intro_cell_t rend_intro_cell_t; +struct config_line_t;

/* This can be used for both INTRODUCE1 and INTRODUCE2 */