commit 6c19e603c825cdbf4a6dc33196c792bf47c19bba Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Mon Jul 24 13:52:41 2017 -0400
Clarify how clients find the expected identity key
Fixes bug 22862; based on patch from Teor. --- tor-spec.txt | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index f61e98f..86fdcc6 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -287,10 +287,15 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
In all handshake variants, once all certificates are exchanged, all parties receiving certificates must confirm that the identity key is as - expected. (When initiating a connection, the expected identity key is - the one given in the directory; when creating a connection because of an - EXTEND cell, the expected identity key is the one given in the cell.) If - the key is not as expected, the party must close the connection. + expected. If the key is not as expected, the party must close the + connection. + + (When initiating a connection, if a reasonably live consensus is + available, then the expected identity key is taken from that + consensus. But when initiating a connection otherwise, the expected + identity key is the one given in the hard-coded authority or fallback + list. Finally, when creating a connection because of an EXTEND cell, the + expected identity key is the one given in the cell.)
When connecting to an OR, all parties SHOULD reject the connection if that OR has a malformed or missing certificate. When accepting an incoming