commit c2c6e8e5b2262ccbeeb3e3f954a9b52bc2096bd1 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Tue Dec 25 23:19:10 2012 -0500
Add documentation for directory guard options --- doc/tor.1.txt | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 7d1742c..26e7882 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1021,10 +1021,22 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. (Default: 1)
+**UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is set to 1, we try to use our entry guards as directory + guards, and failing that, pick more nodes to act as our directory guards. + This helps prevent an adversary from enumerating clients. It's only + available for clients (non-relay, non-bridge) that aren't configured to + download any non-default directory material. It doesn't currently + do anything when we lack a live consensus. (Default: 1) + **NumEntryGuards** __NUM__:: If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers as long-term entries for our circuits. (Default: 3)
+**NumDirectoryGuards** __NUM__:: + If UseEntryGuardsAsDirectoryGuards is enabled, we try to make sure we + have at least NUM routers to use as directory guards. (Default: 3) + **SafeSocks** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP