commit 4f9f56be473d9bc4d24075a82b981425470ff5b4 Author: teor teor@torproject.org Date: Wed Apr 1 22:25:10 2020 +1000
relay: Check for NULL arguments in circuitbuild
Part of 33633. --- src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 63 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c index 5c3f0d7d2..49a1146ff 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/circuitbuild_relay.c @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ /* Before replying to an extend cell, check the state of the circuit * <b>circ</b>, and the configured tor mode. * + * <b>circ</b> must not be NULL. + * * If the state and mode are valid, return 0. * Otherwise, if they are invalid, log a protocol warning, and return -1. */ @@ -53,11 +55,16 @@ circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(const struct circuit_t *circ) return -1; }
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) { + return -1; + } + if (circ->n_chan) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing."); return -1; } + if (circ->n_hop) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing."); @@ -81,6 +88,10 @@ circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(const struct circuit_t *circ) STATIC int circuit_extend_add_ed25519_helper(struct extend_cell_t *ec) { + IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) { + return -1; + } + /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty @@ -120,6 +131,14 @@ STATIC int circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper(const struct extend_cell_t *ec, const struct circuit_t *circ) { + IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) { + return -1; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) { + return -1; + } + if (!ec->orport_ipv4.port || tor_addr_is_null(&ec->orport_ipv4.addr)) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr."); @@ -133,8 +152,16 @@ circuit_extend_lspec_valid_helper(const struct extend_cell_t *ec, return -1; }
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(circ->magic != OR_CIRCUIT_MAGIC) { + return -1; + } + const channel_t *p_chan = CONST_TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan;
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!p_chan) { + return -1; + } + /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can * assist circular-path attacks. */ @@ -166,6 +193,18 @@ circuit_open_connection_for_extend(const struct extend_cell_t *ec, struct circuit_t *circ, int should_launch) { + /* We have to check circ first, so we can close it on all other failures */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) { + /* We can't mark a NULL circuit for close. */ + return; + } + + /* Now we know that circ is not NULL */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(!ec) { + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED); + return; + } + circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/, (const char*)ec->node_id, &ec->ed_pubkey, @@ -211,6 +250,14 @@ circuit_extend(struct cell_t *cell, struct circuit_t *circ) const char *msg = NULL; int should_launch = 0;
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!cell) { + return -1; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) { + return -1; + } + if (circuit_extend_state_valid_helper(circ) < 0) return -1;
@@ -289,6 +336,22 @@ onionskin_answer(struct or_circuit_t *circ, { cell_t cell;
+ IF_BUG_ONCE(!circ) { + return -1; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(!created_cell) { + return -1; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(!keys) { + return -1; + } + + IF_BUG_ONCE(!rend_circ_nonce) { + return -1; + } + tor_assert(keys_len == CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN);
if (created_cell_format(&cell, created_cell) < 0) {