commit eb966928428a80c105d33bd60bcae5503a1adeb7 Author: Isis Lovecruft isis@torproject.org Date: Thu Mar 29 01:54:05 2018 +0000
protover: TROVE-2018-005 Fix potential DoS in protover protocol parsing.
In protover.c, the `expand_protocol_list()` function expands a `smartlist_t` of `proto_entry_t`s to their protocol name concatenated with each version number. For example, given a `proto_entry_t` like so:
proto_entry_t *proto = tor_malloc(sizeof(proto_entry_t)); proto_range_t *range = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(proto_range_t));
proto->name = tor_strdup("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa"); proto->ranges = smartlist_new();
range->low = 1; range->high = 65536;
smartlist_add(proto->ranges, range);
(Where `[19KB]` is roughly 19KB of `"a"` bytes.) This would expand in `expand_protocol_list()` to a `smartlist_t` containing 65536 copies of the string, e.g.:
"DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=1" "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=2" […] "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa[19KB]aaa=65535"
Thus constituting a potential resource exhaustion attack.
The Rust implementation is not subject to this attack, because it instead expands the above string into a `HashMap<String, HashSet<u32>` prior to #24031, and a `HashMap<UnvalidatedProtocol, ProtoSet>` after). Neither Rust version is subject to this attack, because it only stores the `String` once per protocol. (Although a related, but apparently of too minor impact to be usable, DoS bug has been fixed in #24031. [0])
[0]: https://bugs.torproject.org/24031
* ADDS hard limit on protocol name lengths in protover.c and checks in parse_single_entry() and expand_protocol_list(). * ADDS tests to ensure the bug is caught. * FIXES #25517: https://bugs.torproject.org/25517 --- src/or/protover.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_protover.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 46 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/or/protover.c b/src/or/protover.c index 45f0377d6..24b381361 100644 --- a/src/or/protover.c +++ b/src/or/protover.c @@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ static const struct {
#define N_PROTOCOL_NAMES ARRAY_LENGTH(PROTOCOL_NAMES)
+/* Maximum allowed length of any single subprotocol name. */ +// C_RUST_COUPLED: src/rust/protover/protover.rs +// `MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH` +static const uint MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH = 100; + /** * Given a protocol_type_t, return the corresponding string used in * descriptors. @@ -195,6 +200,15 @@ parse_single_entry(const char *s, const char *end_of_entry) if (equals == s) goto error;
+ /* The name must not be longer than MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH. */ + if (equals - s > MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "When parsing a protocol entry, I got a very large " + "protocol name. This is possibly an attack or a bug, unless " + "the Tor network truly supports protocol names larger than " + "%ud characters. The offending string was: %s", + MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH, escaped(out->name)); + goto error; + } out->name = tor_strndup(s, equals-s);
tor_assert(equals < end_of_entry); @@ -397,6 +411,14 @@ expand_protocol_list(const smartlist_t *protos)
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(protos, const proto_entry_t *, ent) { const char *name = ent->name; + if (strlen(name) > MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH) { + log_warn(LD_NET, "When expanding a protocol entry, I got a very large " + "protocol name. This is possibly an attack or a bug, unless " + "the Tor network truly supports protocol names larger than " + "%ud characters. The offending string was: %s", + MAX_PROTOCOL_NAME_LENGTH, escaped(name)); + continue; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ent->ranges, const proto_range_t *, range) { uint32_t u; for (u = range->low; u <= range->high; ++u) { diff --git a/src/test/test_protover.c b/src/test/test_protover.c index 9b94044b9..66deb7551 100644 --- a/src/test/test_protover.c +++ b/src/test/test_protover.c @@ -110,6 +110,12 @@ test_protover_parse_fail(void *arg) elts = parse_protocol_list("Link=1,9-8,3"); tt_ptr_op(elts, OP_EQ, NULL);
+ /* Protocol name too long */ + elts = parse_protocol_list("DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"); + tt_ptr_op(elts, OP_EQ, NULL); + done: ; } @@ -203,6 +209,15 @@ test_protover_vote(void *arg) tt_str_op(result, OP_EQ, ""); tor_free(result);
+ /* Protocol name too long */ + smartlist_clear(lst); + smartlist_add(lst, (void*) "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"); + result = protover_compute_vote(lst, 1); + tt_str_op(result, OP_EQ, ""); + tor_free(result); + done: tor_free(result); smartlist_free(lst); @@ -270,6 +285,15 @@ test_protover_all_supported(void *arg) tor_end_capture_bugs_(); #endif
+ /* Protocol name too long */ + tor_capture_bugs_(1); + tt_assert(protover_all_supported( + "DoSaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" + "aaaaaaaaaaaa=1-65536", &msg)); + tor_end_capture_bugs_(); + done: tor_end_capture_bugs_(); tor_free(msg);