[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'bug26924_032' into bug26924

30 Jul 2018

commit d01602bebb6d068fcc3d37197e25134ded45d24f
Merge: 9ae359754 859d5a737
Author: teor teor@torproject.org
Date:   Wed Jul 25 14:50:45 2018 +1000
Merge branch 'bug26924_032' into bug26924
Update rendcommon.h include path.
changes/bug26924            |  4 ++++
 changes/bug26927            |  4 ++++
 src/core/or/connection_or.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --cc src/core/or/connection_or.c
index 159ee9626,000000000..4fc77fde0
mode 100644,000000..100644

--- a/src/core/or/connection_or.c
+++ b/src/core/or/connection_or.c
@@@ -1,2996 -1,0 +1,3000 @@@
 +/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
 + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
 + * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
 +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
 +
 +/**
 + * \file connection_or.c
 + * \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
 + * cells on the network.
 + *
 + * An or_connection_t is a subtype of connection_t (as implemented in
 + * connection.c) that uses a TLS connection to send and receive cells on the
 + * Tor network. (By sending and receiving cells connection_or.c, it cooperates
 + * with channeltls.c to implement a the channel interface of channel.c.)
 + *
 + * Every OR connection has an underlying tortls_t object (as implemented in
 + * tortls.c) which it uses as its TLS stream.  It is responsible for
 + * sending and receiving cells over that TLS.
 + *
 + * This module also implements the client side of the v3 Tor link handshake,
 + **/
 +#include "core/or/or.h"
 +#include "feature/client/bridges.h"
 +#include "lib/container/buffers.h"
 +/*
 + * Define this so we get channel internal functions, since we're implementing
 + * part of a subclass (channel_tls_t).
 + */
 +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_
 +#define CONNECTION_OR_PRIVATE
 +#include "core/or/channel.h"
 +#include "core/or/channeltls.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitbuild.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitlist.h"
 +#include "core/or/circuitstats.h"
 +#include "core/or/command.h"
 +#include "app/config/config.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h"
 +#include "core/or/connection_or.h"
 +#include "feature/control/control.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_rand.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
 +#include "feature/dircache/dirserv.h"
 +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/geoip.h"
 +#include "core/mainloop/main.h"
 +#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/microdesc.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h"
 +#include "core/proto/proto_cell.h"
 +#include "core/or/reasons.h"
 +#include "core/or/relay.h"
++#include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
 +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/router.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
 +#include "feature/relay/ext_orport.h"
 +#include "core/or/scheduler.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
 +#include "core/or/channelpadding.h"
 +
 +#include "core/or/cell_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h"
 +#include "app/config/or_state_st.h"
 +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h"
 +#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h"
 +#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
 +
 +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
 +
 +static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
 +static int connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
 +static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
 +static int connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                                   int started_here,
 +                                                   char *digest_rcvd_out);
 +
 +static void connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn);
 +
 +static unsigned int
 +connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
 +static void connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn);
 +
 +/*
 + * Call this when changing connection state, so notifications to the owning
 + * channel can be handled.
 + */
 +
 +static void connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state);
 +
 +static void connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                           int started_here);
 +
 +/**************************************************************/
 +
 +/** Convert a connection_t* to an or_connection_t*; assert if the cast is
 + * invalid. */
 +or_connection_t *
 +TO_OR_CONN(connection_t *c)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(c->magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
 +  return DOWNCAST(or_connection_t, c);
 +}
 +
 +/** Global map between Extended ORPort identifiers and OR
 + *  connections. */
 +static digestmap_t *orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
 +
 +/** Clear clear conn->identity_digest and update other data
 + * structures as appropriate.*/
 +void
 +connection_or_clear_identity(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
 +}
 +
 +/** Clear all identities in OR conns.*/
 +void
 +connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
 +{
 +  smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
 +  {
 +    if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
 +      connection_or_clear_identity(TO_OR_CONN(conn));
 +    }
 +  });
 +}
 +
 +/** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
 + * the appropriate digest maps.
 + *
 + * NOTE that this function only allows two kinds of transitions: from
 + * unset identity to set identity, and from idempotent re-settings
 + * of the same identity.  It's not allowed to clear an identity or to
 + * change an identity.  Return 0 on success, and -1 if the transition
 + * is not allowed.
 + **/
 +static void
 +connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                  const char *rsa_digest,
 +                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id)
 +{
 +  channel_t *chan = NULL;
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  tor_assert(rsa_digest);
 +
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Set identity digest for %p (%s): %s %s.",
 +           conn,
 +           escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address),
 +           hex_str(rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
 +           ed25519_fmt(ed_id));
 +  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "   (Previously: %s %s)",
 +           hex_str(conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
 +           chan ? ed25519_fmt(&chan->ed25519_identity) : "<null>");
 +
 +  const int rsa_id_was_set = ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
 +  const int ed_id_was_set =
 +    chan && !ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
 +  const int rsa_changed =
 +    tor_memneq(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  const int ed_changed = ed_id_was_set &&
 +    (!ed_id || !ed25519_pubkey_eq(ed_id, &chan->ed25519_identity));
 +
 +  tor_assert(!rsa_changed || !rsa_id_was_set);
 +  tor_assert(!ed_changed || !ed_id_was_set);
 +
 +  if (!rsa_changed && !ed_changed)
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
 +  if (rsa_id_was_set) {
 +    connection_or_clear_identity(conn);
 +    if (chan)
 +      channel_clear_identity_digest(chan);
 +  }
 +
 +  memcpy(conn->identity_digest, rsa_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +
 +  /* If we're initializing the IDs to zero, don't add a mapping yet. */
 +  if (tor_digest_is_zero(rsa_digest) &&
 +      (!ed_id || ed25519_public_key_is_zero(ed_id)))
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* Deal with channels */
 +  if (chan)
 +    channel_set_identity_digest(chan, rsa_digest, ed_id);
 +}
 +
 +/** Remove the Extended ORPort identifier of <b>conn</b> from the
 + *  global identifier list. Also, clear the identifier from the
 + *  connection itself. */
 +void
 +connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  or_connection_t *tmp;
 +  if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
 +    return;
 +  if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
 +    return;
 +
 +  tmp = digestmap_remove(orconn_ext_or_id_map, conn->ext_or_conn_id);
 +  if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
 +    tor_assert(tmp == conn);
 +
 +  memset(conn->ext_or_conn_id, 0, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the connection whose ext_or_id is <b>id</b>. Return NULL if no such
 + * connection is found. */
 +or_connection_t *
 +connection_or_get_by_ext_or_id(const char *id)
 +{
 +  if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
 +    return NULL;
 +  return digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, id);
 +}
 +
 +/** Deallocate the global Extended ORPort identifier list */
 +void
 +connection_or_clear_ext_or_id_map(void)
 +{
 +  digestmap_free(orconn_ext_or_id_map, NULL);
 +  orconn_ext_or_id_map = NULL;
 +}
 +
 +/** Creates an Extended ORPort identifier for <b>conn</b> and deposits
 + *  it into the global list of identifiers. */
 +void
 +connection_or_set_ext_or_identifier(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  char random_id[EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN];
 +  or_connection_t *tmp;
 +
 +  if (!orconn_ext_or_id_map)
 +    orconn_ext_or_id_map = digestmap_new();
 +
 +  /* Remove any previous identifiers: */
 +  if (conn->ext_or_conn_id && !tor_digest_is_zero(conn->ext_or_conn_id))
 +      connection_or_remove_from_ext_or_id_map(conn);
 +
 +  do {
 +    crypto_rand(random_id, sizeof(random_id));
 +  } while (digestmap_get(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id));
 +
 +  if (!conn->ext_or_conn_id)
 +    conn->ext_or_conn_id = tor_malloc_zero(EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
 +
 +  memcpy(conn->ext_or_conn_id, random_id, EXT_OR_CONN_ID_LEN);
 +
 +  tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_ext_or_id_map, random_id, conn);
 +  tor_assert(!tmp);
 +}
 +
 +/**************************************************************/
 +
 +/** Map from a string describing what a non-open OR connection was doing when
 + * failed, to an intptr_t describing the count of connections that failed that
 + * way.  Note that the count is stored _as_ the pointer.
 + */
 +static strmap_t *broken_connection_counts;
 +
 +/** If true, do not record information in <b>broken_connection_counts</b>. */
 +static int disable_broken_connection_counts = 0;
 +
 +/** Record that an OR connection failed in <b>state</b>. */
 +static void
 +note_broken_connection(const char *state)
 +{
 +  void *ptr;
 +  intptr_t val;
 +  if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
 +    return;
 +
 +  if (!broken_connection_counts)
 +    broken_connection_counts = strmap_new();
 +
 +  ptr = strmap_get(broken_connection_counts, state);
 +  val = (intptr_t)ptr;
 +  val++;
 +  ptr = (void*)val;
 +  strmap_set(broken_connection_counts, state, ptr);
 +}
 +
 +/** Forget all recorded states for failed connections.  If
 + * <b>stop_recording</b> is true, don't record any more. */
 +void
 +clear_broken_connection_map(int stop_recording)
 +{
 +  if (broken_connection_counts)
 +    strmap_free(broken_connection_counts, NULL);
 +  broken_connection_counts = NULL;
 +  if (stop_recording)
 +    disable_broken_connection_counts = 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Write a detailed description the state of <b>orconn</b> into the
 + * <b>buflen</b>-byte buffer at <b>buf</b>.  This description includes not
 + * only the OR-conn level state but also the TLS state.  It's useful for
 + * diagnosing broken handshakes. */
 +static void
 +connection_or_get_state_description(or_connection_t *orconn,
 +                                    char *buf, size_t buflen)
 +{
 +  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(orconn);
 +  const char *conn_state;
 +  char tls_state[256];
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR || conn->type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
 +
 +  conn_state = conn_state_to_string(conn->type, conn->state);
 +  tor_tls_get_state_description(orconn->tls, tls_state, sizeof(tls_state));
 +
 +  tor_snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s with SSL state %s", conn_state, tls_state);
 +}
 +
 +/** Record the current state of <b>orconn</b> as the state of a broken
 + * connection. */
 +static void
 +connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_connection_t *orconn)
 +{
 +  char buf[256];
 +  if (disable_broken_connection_counts)
 +    return;
 +  connection_or_get_state_description(orconn, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Connection died in state '%s'", buf);
 +  note_broken_connection(buf);
 +}
 +
 +/** Helper type used to sort connection states and find the most frequent. */
 +typedef struct broken_state_count_t {
 +  intptr_t count;
 +  const char *state;
 +} broken_state_count_t;
 +
 +/** Helper function used to sort broken_state_count_t by frequency. */
 +static int
 +broken_state_count_compare(const void **a_ptr, const void **b_ptr)
 +{
 +  const broken_state_count_t *a = *a_ptr, *b = *b_ptr;
 +  if (b->count < a->count)
 +    return -1;
 +  else if (b->count == a->count)
 +    return 0;
 +  else
 +    return 1;
 +}
 +
 +/** Upper limit on the number of different states to report for connection
 + * failure. */
 +#define MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT 10
 +
 +/** Report a list of the top states for failed OR connections at log level
 + * <b>severity</b>, in log domain <b>domain</b>. */
 +void
 +connection_or_report_broken_states(int severity, int domain)
 +{
 +  int total = 0;
 +  smartlist_t *items;
 +
 +  if (!broken_connection_counts || disable_broken_connection_counts)
 +    return;
 +
 +  items = smartlist_new();
 +  STRMAP_FOREACH(broken_connection_counts, state, void *, countptr) {
 +    broken_state_count_t *c = tor_malloc(sizeof(broken_state_count_t));
 +    c->count = (intptr_t)countptr;
 +    total += (int)c->count;
 +    c->state = state;
 +    smartlist_add(items, c);
 +  } STRMAP_FOREACH_END;
 +
 +  smartlist_sort(items, broken_state_count_compare);
 +
 +  tor_log(severity, domain, "%d connections have failed%s", total,
 +      smartlist_len(items) > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT ? ". Top reasons:" : ":");
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(items, const broken_state_count_t *, c) {
 +    if (c_sl_idx > MAX_REASONS_TO_REPORT)
 +      break;
 +    tor_log(severity, domain,
 +        " %d connections died in state %s", (int)c->count, c->state);
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(c);
 +
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(items, broken_state_count_t *, c, tor_free(c));
 +  smartlist_free(items);
 +}
 +
 +/** Call this to change or_connection_t states, so the owning channel_tls_t can
 + * be notified.
 + */
 +
 +static void
 +connection_or_change_state(or_connection_t *conn, uint8_t state)
 +{
 +  uint8_t old_state;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  old_state = conn->base_.state;
 +  conn->base_.state = state;
 +
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(conn->chan, conn,
 +                                              old_state, state);
 +}
 +
 +/** Return the number of circuits using an or_connection_t; this used to
 + * be an or_connection_t field, but it got moved to channel_t and we
 + * shouldn't maintain two copies. */
 +
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_or_get_num_circuits, (or_connection_t *conn))
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  if (conn->chan) {
 +    return channel_num_circuits(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +  } else return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/**************************************************************/
 +
 +/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
 + * in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
 + * wire format.
 + *
 + * Note that this function doesn't touch <b>dst</b>->next: the caller
 + * should set it or clear it as appropriate.
 + */
 +void
 +cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src, int wide_circ_ids)
 +{
 +  char *dest = dst->body;
 +  if (wide_circ_ids) {
 +    set_uint32(dest, htonl(src->circ_id));
 +    dest += 4;
 +  } else {
 +    /* Clear the last two bytes of dest, in case we can accidentally
 +     * send them to the network somehow. */
 +    memset(dest+CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE-2, 0, 2);
 +    set_uint16(dest, htons(src->circ_id));
 +    dest += 2;
 +  }
 +  set_uint8(dest, src->command);
 +  memcpy(dest+1, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
 +}
 +
 +/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
 + * cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
 + */
 +static void
 +cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src, int wide_circ_ids)
 +{
 +  if (wide_circ_ids) {
 +    dest->circ_id = ntohl(get_uint32(src));
 +    src += 4;
 +  } else {
 +    dest->circ_id = ntohs(get_uint16(src));
 +    src += 2;
 +  }
 +  dest->command = get_uint8(src);
 +  memcpy(dest->payload, src+1, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
 +}
 +
 +/** Write the header of <b>cell</b> into the first VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE
 + * bytes of <b>hdr_out</b>. Returns number of bytes used. */
 +int
 +var_cell_pack_header(const var_cell_t *cell, char *hdr_out, int wide_circ_ids)
 +{
 +  int r;
 +  if (wide_circ_ids) {
 +    set_uint32(hdr_out, htonl(cell->circ_id));
 +    hdr_out += 4;
 +    r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE;
 +  } else {
 +    set_uint16(hdr_out, htons(cell->circ_id));
 +    hdr_out += 2;
 +    r = VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE - 2;
 +  }
 +  set_uint8(hdr_out, cell->command);
 +  set_uint16(hdr_out+1, htons(cell->payload_len));
 +  return r;
 +}
 +
 +/** Allocate and return a new var_cell_t with <b>payload_len</b> bytes of
 + * payload space. */
 +var_cell_t *
 +var_cell_new(uint16_t payload_len)
 +{
 +  size_t size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + payload_len;
 +  var_cell_t *cell = tor_malloc_zero(size);
 +  cell->payload_len = payload_len;
 +  cell->command = 0;
 +  cell->circ_id = 0;
 +  return cell;
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Copy a var_cell_t
 + */
 +
 +var_cell_t *
 +var_cell_copy(const var_cell_t *src)
 +{
 +  var_cell_t *copy = NULL;
 +  size_t size = 0;
 +
 +  if (src != NULL) {
 +    size = offsetof(var_cell_t, payload) + src->payload_len;
 +    copy = tor_malloc_zero(size);
 +    copy->payload_len = src->payload_len;
 +    copy->command = src->command;
 +    copy->circ_id = src->circ_id;
 +    memcpy(copy->payload, src->payload, copy->payload_len);
 +  }
 +
 +  return copy;
 +}
 +
 +/** Release all space held by <b>cell</b>. */
 +void
 +var_cell_free_(var_cell_t *cell)
 +{
 +  tor_free(cell);
 +}
 +
 +/** We've received an EOF from <b>conn</b>. Mark it for close and return. */
 +int
 +connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
 +  connection_or_close_normally(conn, 1);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
 + * If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
 + * connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
 + * (else do nothing).
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  /** Don't let the inbuf of a nonopen OR connection grow beyond this many
 +   * bytes: it's either a broken client, a non-Tor client, or a DOS
 +   * attempt. */
 +#define MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN 0
 +
 +  int ret = 0;
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  switch (conn->base_.state) {
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
 +      ret = connection_read_proxy_handshake(TO_CONN(conn));
 +
 +      /* start TLS after handshake completion, or deal with error */
 +      if (ret == 1) {
 +        tor_assert(TO_CONN(conn)->proxy_state == PROXY_CONNECTED);
 +        if (connection_tls_start_handshake(conn, 0) < 0)
 +          ret = -1;
 +        /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +        if (conn->chan)
 +          channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +      }
 +      if (ret < 0) {
 +        connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
 +      }
 +
 +      return ret;
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
 +      return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
 +    default:
 +      break; /* don't do anything */
 +  }
 +
 +  /* This check was necessary with 0.2.2, when the TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING
 +   * check would otherwise just let data accumulate.  It serves no purpose
 +   * in 0.2.3.
 +   *
 +   * XXXX Remove this check once we verify that the above paragraph is
 +   * 100% true. */
 +  if (buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf) > MAX_OR_INBUF_WHEN_NONOPEN) {
 +    log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_NET, "Accumulated too much data (%d bytes) "
 +           "on nonopen OR connection %s %s:%u in state %s; closing.",
 +           (int)buf_datalen(conn->base_.inbuf),
 +           connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn) ? "to" : "from",
 +           conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
 +           conn_state_to_string(conn->base_.type, conn->base_.state));
 +    connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
 +    ret = -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  return ret;
 +}
 +
 +/** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
 + * from active circuits. */
 +int
 +connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  size_t datalen;
 +
 +  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +
 +  /* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
 +   * high water mark. */
 +  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
 +  if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
 +    /* Let the scheduler know */
 +    scheduler_channel_wants_writes(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** This is for channeltls.c to ask how many cells we could accept if
 + * they were available. */
 +ssize_t
 +connection_or_num_cells_writeable(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  size_t datalen, cell_network_size;
 +  ssize_t n = 0;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  /*
 +   * If we're under the high water mark, we're potentially
 +   * writeable; note this is different from the calculation above
 +   * used to trigger when to start writing after we've stopped.
 +   */
 +  datalen = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn));
 +  if (datalen < OR_CONN_HIGHWATER) {
 +    cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +    n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen, cell_network_size);
 +  }
 +
 +  return n;
 +}
 +
 +/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
 + * its outbuf.
 + *
 + * Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
 + *
 + * If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
 + * return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
 +
 +  switch (conn->base_.state) {
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2:
 +    case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3:
 +      break;
 +    default:
 +      log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->base_.state);
 +      tor_fragile_assert();
 +      return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Update the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  const int proxy_type = or_conn->proxy_type;
 +  connection_t *conn;
 +
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +  conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
 +  tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
 +            conn->address,conn->port);
 +  control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE, 0);
 +
 +  if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
 +    /* start proxy handshake */
 +    if (connection_proxy_connect(conn, proxy_type) < 0) {
 +      connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +
 +    connection_start_reading(conn);
 +    connection_or_change_state(or_conn, OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_HANDSHAKING);
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
 +    /* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
 +    connection_or_close_for_error(or_conn, 0);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Called when we're about to finally unlink and free an OR connection:
 + * perform necessary accounting and cleanup */
 +void
 +connection_or_about_to_close(or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
 +
 +  /* Tell the controlling channel we're closed */
 +  if (or_conn->chan) {
 +    channel_closed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
 +    /*
 +     * NULL this out because the channel might hang around a little
 +     * longer before channel_run_cleanup() gets it.
 +     */
 +    or_conn->chan->conn = NULL;
 +    or_conn->chan = NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Remember why we're closing this connection. */
 +  if (conn->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
 +    /* now mark things down as needed */
 +    if (connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_conn)) {
 +      const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +      connection_or_note_state_when_broken(or_conn);
 +      /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
 +      entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
 +      if (conn->state >= OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING) {
 +        int reason = tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error);
 +        control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
 +                                     reason);
 +        if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
 +          control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
 +                orconn_end_reason_to_control_string(reason),
 +                reason, or_conn);
 +      }
 +    }
 +  } else if (conn->hold_open_until_flushed) {
 +    /* We only set hold_open_until_flushed when we're intentionally
 +     * closing a connection. */
 +    control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
 +                tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
 +  } else if (!tor_digest_is_zero(or_conn->identity_digest)) {
 +    control_event_or_conn_status(or_conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CLOSED,
 +                tls_error_to_orconn_end_reason(or_conn->tls_error));
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Return 1 if identity digest <b>id_digest</b> is known to be a
 + * currently or recently running relay. Otherwise return 0. */
 +int
 +connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(const char *id_digest)
 +{
 +  if (router_get_consensus_status_by_id(id_digest))
 +    return 1; /* It's in the consensus: "yes" */
 +  if (router_get_by_id_digest(id_digest))
 +    return 1; /* Not in the consensus, but we have a descriptor for
 +               * it. Probably it was in a recent consensus. "Yes". */
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Set the per-conn read and write limits for <b>conn</b>. If it's a known
 + * relay, we will rely on the global read and write buckets, so give it
 + * per-conn limits that are big enough they'll never matter. But if it's
 + * not a known relay, first check if we set PerConnBwRate/Burst, then
 + * check if the consensus sets them, else default to 'big enough'.
 + *
 + * If <b>reset</b> is true, set the bucket to be full.  Otherwise, just
 + * clip the bucket if it happens to be <em>too</em> full.
 + */
 +static void
 +connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(or_connection_t *conn, int reset,
 +                                          const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  int rate, burst; /* per-connection rate limiting params */
 +  if (connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(conn->identity_digest)) {
 +    /* It's in the consensus, or we have a descriptor for it meaning it
 +     * was probably in a recent consensus. It's a recognized relay:
 +     * give it full bandwidth. */
 +    rate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
 +    burst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
 +  } else {
 +    /* Not a recognized relay. Squeeze it down based on the suggested
 +     * bandwidth parameters in the consensus, but allow local config
 +     * options to override. */
 +    rate = options->PerConnBWRate ? (int)options->PerConnBWRate :
 +        networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwrate",
 +                                (int)options->BandwidthRate, 1, INT32_MAX);
 +    burst = options->PerConnBWBurst ? (int)options->PerConnBWBurst :
 +        networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "perconnbwburst",
 +                                (int)options->BandwidthBurst, 1, INT32_MAX);
 +  }
 +
 +  token_bucket_rw_adjust(&conn->bucket, rate, burst);
 +  if (reset) {
 +    token_bucket_rw_reset(&conn->bucket, monotime_coarse_get_stamp());
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Either our set of relays or our per-conn rate limits have changed.
 + * Go through all the OR connections and update their token buckets to make
 + * sure they don't exceed their maximum values. */
 +void
 +connection_or_update_token_buckets(smartlist_t *conns,
 +                                   const or_options_t *options)
 +{
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conns, connection_t *, conn,
 +  {
 +    if (connection_speaks_cells(conn))
 +      connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(TO_OR_CONN(conn), 0, options);
 +  });
 +}
 +
 +/* Mark <b>or_conn</b> as canonical if <b>is_canonical</b> is set, and
 + * non-canonical otherwise. Adjust idle_timeout accordingly.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_or_set_canonical(or_connection_t *or_conn,
 +                            int is_canonical)
 +{
 +  if (bool_eq(is_canonical, or_conn->is_canonical) &&
 +      or_conn->idle_timeout != 0) {
 +    /* Don't recalculate an existing idle_timeout unless the canonical
 +     * status changed. */
 +    return;
 +  }
 +
 +  or_conn->is_canonical = !! is_canonical; /* force to a 1-bit boolean */
 +  or_conn->idle_timeout = channelpadding_get_channel_idle_timeout(
 +          TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan), is_canonical);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_CIRC,
 +          "Channel %"PRIu64 " chose an idle timeout of %d.",
 +          or_conn->chan ?
 +          (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan)->global_identifier):0,
 +          or_conn->idle_timeout);
 +}
 +
 +/** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
 + * have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
 + * by checking to see if this describes a router we know.
 + * <b>started_here</b> is 1 if we are the initiator of <b>conn</b> and
 + * 0 if it's an incoming connection.  */
 +void
 +connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                     const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
 +                                     const char *id_digest,
 +                                     const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
 +                                     int started_here)
 +{
 +  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "init conn from address %s: %s, %s (%d)",
 +            fmt_addr(addr),
 +            hex_str((const char*)id_digest, DIGEST_LEN),
 +            ed25519_fmt(ed_id),
 +            started_here);
 +
 +  connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest, ed_id);
 +  connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper(conn, 1, get_options());
 +
 +  conn->base_.port = port;
 +  tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, addr);
 +  tor_addr_copy(&conn->real_addr, addr);
 +
 +  connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, started_here);
 +}
 +
 +/** Check whether the identity of <b>conn</b> matches a known node.  If it
 + * does, check whether the address of conn matches the expected address, and
 + * update the connection's is_canonical flag, nickname, and address fields as
 + * appropriate. */
 +static void
 +connection_or_check_canonicity(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
 +{
 +  const char *id_digest = conn->identity_digest;
 +  const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id = NULL;
 +  const tor_addr_t *addr = &conn->real_addr;
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    ed_id = & TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->ed25519_identity;
 +
 +  const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(id_digest);
 +  if (r &&
 +      node_supports_ed25519_link_authentication(r, 1) &&
 +      ! node_ed25519_id_matches(r, ed_id)) {
 +    /* If this node is capable of proving an ed25519 ID,
 +     * we can't call this a canonical connection unless both IDs match. */
 +     r = NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (r) {
 +    tor_addr_port_t node_ap;
 +    node_get_pref_orport(r, &node_ap);
 +    /* XXXX proposal 186 is making this more complex.  For now, a conn
 +       is canonical when it uses the _preferred_ address. */
 +    if (tor_addr_eq(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr))
 +      connection_or_set_canonical(conn, 1);
 +    if (!started_here) {
 +      /* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
 +       * This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
 +       * its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
 +      /* XXXX arma: this is stupid, and it's the reason we need real_addr
 +       * to track is_canonical properly.  What requires it? */
 +      /* XXXX <arma> i believe the reason we did this, originally, is because
 +       * we wanted to log what OR a connection was to, and if we logged the
 +       * right IP address and port 56244, that wouldn't be as helpful. now we
 +       * log the "right" port too, so we know if it's moria1 or moria2.
 +       */
 +      tor_addr_copy(&conn->base_.addr, &node_ap.addr);
 +      conn->base_.port = node_ap.port;
 +    }
 +    tor_free(conn->nickname);
 +    conn->nickname = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(r));
 +    tor_free(conn->base_.address);
 +    conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&node_ap.addr);
 +  } else {
 +    tor_free(conn->nickname);
 +    conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
 +    conn->nickname[0] = '$';
 +    base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
 +                  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +
 +    tor_free(conn->base_.address);
 +    conn->base_.address = tor_addr_to_str_dup(addr);
 +  }
 +
 +  /*
 +   * We have to tell channeltls.c to update the channel marks (local, in
 +   * particular), since we may have changed the address.
 +   */
 +
 +  if (conn->chan) {
 +    channel_tls_update_marks(conn);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** These just pass all the is_bad_for_new_circs manipulation on to
 + * channel_t */
 +
 +static unsigned int
 +connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +
 +  if (or_conn->chan)
 +    return channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
 +  else return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static void
 +connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +
 +  if (or_conn->chan)
 +    channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan));
 +}
 +
 +/** How old do we let a connection to an OR get before deciding it's
 + * too old for new circuits? */
 +#define TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD (60*60*24*7)
 +
 +/** Expire an or_connection if it is too old. Helper for
 + * connection_or_group_set_badness_ and fast path for
 + * channel_rsa_id_group_set_badness.
 + *
 + * Returns 1 if the connection was already expired, else 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_single_set_badness_(time_t now,
 +                                  or_connection_t *or_conn,
 +                                  int force)
 +{
 +  /* XXXX this function should also be about channels? */
 +  if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
 +      connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
 +    return 1;
 +
 +  if (force ||
 +      or_conn->base_.timestamp_created + TIME_BEFORE_OR_CONN_IS_TOO_OLD
 +        < now) {
 +    log_info(LD_OR,
 +             "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as too old for new circuits "
 +             "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).",
 +             or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
 +             (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
 +    connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Given a list of all the or_connections with a given
 + * identity, set elements of that list as is_bad_for_new_circs as
 + * appropriate. Helper for connection_or_set_bad_connections().
 + *
 + * Specifically, we set the is_bad_for_new_circs flag on:
 + *    - all connections if <b>force</b> is true.
 + *    - all connections that are too old.
 + *    - all open non-canonical connections for which a canonical connection
 + *      exists to the same router.
 + *    - all open canonical connections for which a 'better' canonical
 + *      connection exists to the same router.
 + *    - all open non-canonical connections for which a 'better' non-canonical
 + *      connection exists to the same router at the same address.
 + *
 + * See channel_is_better() in channel.c for our idea of what makes one OR
 + * connection better than another.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_or_group_set_badness_(smartlist_t *group, int force)
 +{
 +  /* XXXX this function should be entirely about channels, not OR
 +   * XXXX connections. */
 +
 +  or_connection_t *best = NULL;
 +  int n_old = 0, n_inprogress = 0, n_canonical = 0, n_other = 0;
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +
 +  /* Pass 1: expire everything that's old, and see what the status of
 +   * everything else is. */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
 +    if (connection_or_single_set_badness_(now, or_conn, force))
 +      continue;
 +
 +    if (connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn)) {
 +      ++n_old;
 +    } else if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) {
 +      ++n_inprogress;
 +    } else if (or_conn->is_canonical) {
 +      ++n_canonical;
 +    } else {
 +      ++n_other;
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
 +
 +  /* Pass 2: We know how about how good the best connection is.
 +   * expire everything that's worse, and find the very best if we can. */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
 +    if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
 +        connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn))
 +      continue; /* This one doesn't need to be marked bad. */
 +    if (or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
 +      continue; /* Don't mark anything bad until we have seen what happens
 +                 * when the connection finishes. */
 +    if (n_canonical && !or_conn->is_canonical) {
 +      /* We have at least one open canonical connection to this router,
 +       * and this one is open but not canonical.  Mark it bad. */
 +      log_info(LD_OR,
 +               "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
 +               "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).  It is not "
 +               "canonical, and we have another connection to that OR that is.",
 +               or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
 +               (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created));
 +      connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
 +      continue;
 +    }
 +
 +    if (!best ||
 +        channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan),
 +                          TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan))) {
 +      best = or_conn;
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
 +
 +  if (!best)
 +    return;
 +
 +  /* Pass 3: One connection to OR is best.  If it's canonical, mark as bad
 +   * every other open connection.  If it's non-canonical, mark as bad
 +   * every other open connection to the same address.
 +   *
 +   * XXXX This isn't optimal; if we have connections to an OR at multiple
 +   *   addresses, we'd like to pick the best _for each address_, and mark as
 +   *   bad every open connection that isn't best for its address.  But this
 +   *   can only occur in cases where the other OR is old (so we have no
 +   *   canonical connection to it), or where all the connections to the OR are
 +   *   at noncanonical addresses and we have no good direct connection (which
 +   *   means we aren't at risk of attaching circuits to it anyway).  As
 +   *   0.1.2.x dies out, the first case will go away, and the second one is
 +   *   "mostly harmless", so a fix can wait until somebody is bored.
 +   */
 +  SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(group, or_connection_t *, or_conn) {
 +    if (or_conn->base_.marked_for_close ||
 +        connection_or_is_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn) ||
 +        or_conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
 +      continue;
 +    if (or_conn != best &&
 +        channel_is_better(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(best->chan),
 +                          TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(or_conn->chan))) {
 +      /* This isn't the best conn, _and_ the best conn is better than it */
 +      if (best->is_canonical) {
 +        log_info(LD_OR,
 +                 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
 +                 "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old). "
 +                 "We have a better canonical one "
 +                 "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
 +                 or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
 +                 (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
 +                 best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
 +        connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
 +      } else if (!tor_addr_compare(&or_conn->real_addr,
 +                                   &best->real_addr, CMP_EXACT)) {
 +        log_info(LD_OR,
 +                 "Marking OR conn to %s:%d as unsuitable for new circuits: "
 +                 "(fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT", %d secs old).  We have a better "
 +                 "one with the "
 +                 "same address (fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT"; %d secs old).",
 +                 or_conn->base_.address, or_conn->base_.port, or_conn->base_.s,
 +                 (int)(now - or_conn->base_.timestamp_created),
 +                 best->base_.s, (int)(now - best->base_.timestamp_created));
 +        connection_or_mark_bad_for_new_circs(or_conn);
 +      }
 +    }
 +  } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(or_conn);
 +}
 +
 +/* Lifetime of a connection failure. After that, we'll retry. This is in
 + * seconds. */
 +#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME 60
 +/* The interval to use with when to clean up the failure cache. */
 +#define OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL 60
 +
 +/* When is the next time we have to cleanup the failure map. We keep this
 + * because we clean it opportunistically. */
 +static time_t or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts = 0;
 +
 +/* OR connection failure entry data structure. It is kept in the connection
 + * failure map defined below and indexed by OR identity digest, address and
 + * port.
 + *
 + * We need to identify a connection failure with these three values because we
 + * want to avoid to wrongfully blacklist a relay if someone is trying to
 + * extend to a known identity digest but with the wrong IP/port. For instance,
 + * it can happen if a relay changed its port but the client still has an old
 + * descriptor with the old port. We want to stop connecting to that
 + * IP/port/identity all together, not only the relay identity. */
 +typedef struct or_connect_failure_entry_t {
 +  HT_ENTRY(or_connect_failure_entry_t) node;
 +  /* Identity digest of the connection where it is connecting to. */
 +  uint8_t identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  /* This is the connection address from the base connection_t. After the
 +   * connection is checked for canonicity, the base address should represent
 +   * what we know instead of where we are connecting to. This is what we need
 +   * so we can correlate known relays within the consensus. */
 +  tor_addr_t addr;
 +  uint16_t port;
 +  /* Last time we were unable to connect. */
 +  time_t last_failed_connect_ts;
 +} or_connect_failure_entry_t;
 +
 +/* Map where we keep connection failure entries. They are indexed by addr,
 + * port and identity digest. */
 +static HT_HEAD(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t)
 +       or_connect_failures_map = HT_INITIALIZER();
 +
 +/* Helper: Hashtable equal function. Return 1 if equal else 0. */
 +static int
 +or_connect_failure_ht_eq(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *a,
 +                         const or_connect_failure_entry_t *b)
 +{
 +  return fast_memeq(a->identity_digest, b->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN) &&
 +         tor_addr_eq(&a->addr, &b->addr) &&
 +         a->port == b->port;
 +}
 +
 +/* Helper: Return the hash for the hashtable of the given entry. For this
 + * table, it is a combination of address, port and identity digest. */
 +static unsigned int
 +or_connect_failure_ht_hash(const or_connect_failure_entry_t *entry)
 +{
 +  size_t offset = 0, addr_size;
 +  const void *addr_ptr;
 +  /* Largest size is IPv6 and IPv4 is smaller so it is fine. */
 +  uint8_t data[16 + sizeof(uint16_t) + DIGEST_LEN];
 +
 +  /* Get the right address bytes depending on the family. */
 +  switch (tor_addr_family(&entry->addr)) {
 +  case AF_INET:
 +    addr_size = 4;
 +    addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in_addr.s_addr;
 +    break;
 +  case AF_INET6:
 +    addr_size = 16;
 +    addr_ptr = &entry->addr.addr.in6_addr.s6_addr;
 +    break;
 +  default:
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached();
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  memcpy(data, addr_ptr, addr_size);
 +  offset += addr_size;
 +  memcpy(data + offset, entry->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  offset += DIGEST_LEN;
 +  set_uint16(data + offset, entry->port);
 +  offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
 +
 +  return (unsigned int) siphash24g(data, offset);
 +}
 +
 +HT_PROTOTYPE(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
 +             or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq)
 +
 +HT_GENERATE2(or_connect_failure_ht, or_connect_failure_entry_t, node,
 +             or_connect_failure_ht_hash, or_connect_failure_ht_eq,
 +             0.6, tor_reallocarray_, tor_free_)
 +
 +/* Initialize a given connect failure entry with the given identity_digest,
 + * addr and port. All field are optional except ocf. */
 +static void
 +or_connect_failure_init(const char *identity_digest, const tor_addr_t *addr,
 +                        uint16_t port, or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(ocf);
 +  if (identity_digest) {
 +    memcpy(ocf->identity_digest, identity_digest,
 +           sizeof(ocf->identity_digest));
 +  }
 +  if (addr) {
 +    tor_addr_copy(&ocf->addr, addr);
 +  }
 +  ocf->port = port;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return a newly allocated connection failure entry. It is initialized with
 + * the given or_conn data. This can't fail. */
 +static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
 +or_connect_failure_new(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ocf));
 +  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &or_conn->real_addr,
 +                          TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, ocf);
 +  return ocf;
 +}
 +
 +/* Return a connection failure entry matching the given or_conn. NULL is
 + * returned if not found. */
 +static or_connect_failure_entry_t *
 +or_connect_failure_find(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  or_connect_failure_entry_t lookup;
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +  or_connect_failure_init(or_conn->identity_digest, &TO_CONN(or_conn)->addr,
 +                          TO_CONN(or_conn)->port, &lookup);
 +  return HT_FIND(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, &lookup);
 +}
 +
 +/* Note down in the connection failure cache that a failure occurred on the
 + * given or_conn. */
 +STATIC void
 +note_or_connect_failed(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +
 +  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
 +  if (ocf == NULL) {
 +    ocf = or_connect_failure_new(or_conn);
 +    HT_INSERT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ocf);
 +  }
 +  ocf->last_failed_connect_ts = approx_time();
 +}
 +
 +/* Cleanup the connection failure cache and remove all entries below the
 + * given cutoff. */
 +static void
 +or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(time_t cutoff)
 +{
 +  or_connect_failure_entry_t **ptr, **next, *entry;
 +
 +  for (ptr = HT_START(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map);
 +       ptr != NULL; ptr = next) {
 +    entry = *ptr;
 +    if (entry->last_failed_connect_ts <= cutoff) {
 +      next = HT_NEXT_RMV(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
 +      tor_free(entry);
 +    } else {
 +      next = HT_NEXT(or_connect_failure_ht, &or_connect_failures_map, ptr);
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/* Return true iff the given OR connection can connect to its destination that
 + * is the triplet identity_digest, address and port.
 + *
 + * The or_conn MUST have gone through connection_or_check_canonicity() so the
 + * base address is properly set to what we know or doesn't know. */
 +STATIC int
 +should_connect_to_relay(const or_connection_t *or_conn)
 +{
 +  time_t now, cutoff;
 +  time_t connect_failed_since_ts = 0;
 +  or_connect_failure_entry_t *ocf;
 +
 +  tor_assert(or_conn);
 +
 +  now = approx_time();
 +  cutoff = now - OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_LIFETIME;
 +
 +  /* Opportunistically try to cleanup the failure cache. We do that at regular
 +   * interval so it doesn't grow too big. */
 +  if (or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts <= now) {
 +    or_connect_failure_map_cleanup(cutoff);
 +    or_connect_failure_map_next_cleanup_ts =
 +      now + OR_CONNECT_FAILURE_CLEANUP_INTERVAL;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Look if we have failed previously to the same destination as this
 +   * OR connection. */
 +  ocf = or_connect_failure_find(or_conn);
 +  if (ocf) {
 +    connect_failed_since_ts = ocf->last_failed_connect_ts;
 +  }
 +  /* If we do have an unable to connect timestamp and it is below cutoff, we
 +   * can connect. Or we have never failed before so let it connect. */
 +  if (connect_failed_since_ts > cutoff) {
 +    goto no_connect;
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Ok we can connect! */
 +  return 1;
 + no_connect:
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** <b>conn</b> is in the 'connecting' state, and it failed to complete
 + * a TCP connection. Send notifications appropriately.
 + *
 + * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
 + * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_or_connect_failed(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                             int reason, const char *msg)
 +{
 +  control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED, reason);
 +  if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(get_options()))
 +    control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(msg, reason, conn);
 +  note_or_connect_failed(conn);
 +}
 +
 +/** <b>conn</b> got an error in connection_handle_read_impl() or
 + * connection_handle_write_impl() and is going to die soon.
 + *
 + * <b>reason</b> specifies the or_conn_end_reason for the failure;
 + * <b>msg</b> specifies the strerror-style error message.
 + */
 +void
 +connection_or_notify_error(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                           int reason, const char *msg)
 +{
 +  channel_t *chan;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  /* If we're connecting, call connect_failed() too */
 +  if (TO_CONN(conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING)
 +    connection_or_connect_failed(conn, reason, msg);
 +
 +  /* Tell the controlling channel if we have one */
 +  if (conn->chan) {
 +    chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan);
 +    /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
 +    if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
 +      channel_close_for_error(chan);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* No need to mark for error because connection.c is about to do that */
 +}
 +
 +/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
 + * handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.  Optionally,
 + * pass in a pointer to a channel using this connection.
 + *
 + * If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
 + * return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
 + * new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
 + * call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
 + *
 + * This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
 + * ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
 + * OPs connecting to ORs.
 + *
 + * Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
 + */
 +
 +MOCK_IMPL(or_connection_t *,
 +connection_or_connect, (const tor_addr_t *_addr, uint16_t port,
 +                        const char *id_digest,
 +                        const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id,
 +                        channel_tls_t *chan))
 +{
 +  or_connection_t *conn;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int socket_error = 0;
 +  tor_addr_t addr;
 +
 +  int r;
 +  tor_addr_t proxy_addr;
 +  uint16_t proxy_port;
 +  int proxy_type;
 +
 +  tor_assert(_addr);
 +  tor_assert(id_digest);
 +  tor_addr_copy(&addr, _addr);
 +
 +  if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
 +    log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +  if (server_mode(options) && router_ed25519_id_is_me(ed_id)) {
 +    log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself by Ed25519 "
 +             "identity. Refusing.");
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  conn = or_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR, tor_addr_family(&addr));
 +
 +  /*
 +   * Set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember for channels
 +   *
 +   * This stuff needs to happen before connection_or_init_conn_from_address()
 +   * so connection_or_set_identity_digest() and such know where to look to
 +   * keep the channel up to date.
 +   */
 +  conn->chan = chan;
 +  chan->conn = conn;
 +  connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, 1);
 +
 +  /* We have a proper OR connection setup, now check if we can connect to it
 +   * that is we haven't had a failure earlier. This is to avoid to try to
 +   * constantly connect to relays that we think are not reachable. */
 +  if (!should_connect_to_relay(conn)) {
 +    log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Can't connect to identity %s at %s:%u because we "
 +                         "failed earlier. Refusing.",
 +             hex_str(id_digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addr(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr),
 +             TO_CONN(conn)->port);
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
 +  control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
 +
 +  conn->is_outgoing = 1;
 +
 +  /* If we are using a proxy server, find it and use it. */
 +  r = get_proxy_addrport(&proxy_addr, &proxy_port, &proxy_type, TO_CONN(conn));
 +  if (r == 0) {
 +    conn->proxy_type = proxy_type;
 +    if (proxy_type != PROXY_NONE) {
 +      tor_addr_copy(&addr, &proxy_addr);
 +      port = proxy_port;
 +      conn->base_.proxy_state = PROXY_INFANT;
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    /* get_proxy_addrport() might fail if we have a Bridge line that
 +       references a transport, but no ClientTransportPlugin lines
 +       defining its transport proxy. If this is the case, let's try to
 +       output a useful log message to the user. */
 +    const char *transport_name =
 +      find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr,
 +                                             TO_CONN(conn)->port);
 +
 +    if (transport_name) {
 +      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "We were supposed to connect to bridge '%s' "
 +               "using pluggable transport '%s', but we can't find a pluggable "
 +               "transport proxy supporting '%s'. This can happen if you "
 +               "haven't provided a ClientTransportPlugin line, or if "
 +               "your pluggable transport proxy stopped running.",
 +               fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port),
 +               transport_name, transport_name);
 +
 +      control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
 +                                "Can't connect to bridge",
 +                                END_OR_CONN_REASON_PT_MISSING,
 +                                conn);
 +
 +    } else {
 +      log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Tried to connect to '%s' through a proxy, but "
 +               "the proxy address could not be found.",
 +               fmt_addrport(&TO_CONN(conn)->addr, TO_CONN(conn)->port));
 +    }
 +
 +    connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +
 +  switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->base_.address,
 +                             &addr, port, &socket_error)) {
 +    case -1:
 +      /* We failed to establish a connection probably because of a local
 +       * error. No need to blame the guard in this case. Notify the networking
 +       * system of this failure. */
 +      connection_or_connect_failed(conn,
 +                                   errno_to_orconn_end_reason(socket_error),
 +                                   tor_socket_strerror(socket_error));
 +      connection_free_(TO_CONN(conn));
 +      return NULL;
 +    case 0:
 +      connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), READ_EVENT | WRITE_EVENT);
 +      /* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
 +         error indicates broken link on windows */
 +      return conn;
 +    /* case 1: fall through */
 +  }
 +
 +  if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
 +    /* already marked for close */
 +    return NULL;
 +  }
 +  return conn;
 +}
 +
 +/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
 + * the closing state.
 + *
 + * It's safe to call this and connection_or_close_for_error() any time, and
 + * channel layer will treat it as a connection closing for reasons outside
 + * its control, like the remote end closing it.  It can also be a local
 + * reason that's specific to connection_t/or_connection_t rather than
 + * the channel mechanism, such as expiration of old connections in
 + * run_connection_housekeeping().  If you want to close a channel_t
 + * from somewhere that logically works in terms of generic channels
 + * rather than connections, use channel_mark_for_close(); see also
 + * the comment on that function in channel.c.
 + */
 +
 +void
 +connection_or_close_normally(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush)
 +{
 +  channel_t *chan = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(orconn);
 +  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
 +  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
 +  if (orconn->chan) {
 +    chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
 +    /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
 +    if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
 +      channel_close_from_lower_layer(chan);
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Mark orconn for close and transition the associated channel, if any, to
 + * the error state.
 + */
 +
 +MOCK_IMPL(void,
 +connection_or_close_for_error,(or_connection_t *orconn, int flush))
 +{
 +  channel_t *chan = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(orconn);
 +  if (flush) connection_mark_and_flush_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
 +  else connection_mark_for_close_internal(TO_CONN(orconn));
 +  if (orconn->chan) {
 +    chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(orconn->chan);
 +    /* Don't transition if we're already in closing, closed or error */
 +    if (!CHANNEL_CONDEMNED(chan)) {
 +      channel_close_for_error(chan);
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
 + * we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
 + *
 + * Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
 + * pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
 + *
 + * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_tls_start_handshake,(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving))
 +{
 +  channel_listener_t *chan_listener;
 +  channel_t *chan;
 +
 +  /* Incoming connections will need a new channel passed to the
 +   * channel_tls_listener */
 +  if (receiving) {
 +    /* It shouldn't already be set */
 +    tor_assert(!(conn->chan));
 +    chan_listener = channel_tls_get_listener();
 +    if (!chan_listener) {
 +      chan_listener = channel_tls_start_listener();
 +      command_setup_listener(chan_listener);
 +    }
 +    chan = channel_tls_handle_incoming(conn);
 +    channel_listener_queue_incoming(chan_listener, chan);
 +  }
 +
 +  connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
 +  tor_assert(!conn->tls);
 +  conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->base_.s, receiving);
 +  if (!conn->tls) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  tor_tls_set_logged_address(conn->tls, // XXX client and relay?
 +      escaped_safe_str(conn->base_.address));
 +
 +  connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
 +  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"starting TLS handshake on fd "TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT,
 +            conn->base_.s);
 +
 +  if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Block all future attempts to renegotiate on 'conn' */
 +void
 +connection_or_block_renegotiation(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_tls_t *tls = conn->tls;
 +  if (!tls)
 +    return;
 +  tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(tls, NULL, NULL);
 +  tor_tls_block_renegotiation(tls);
 +}
 +
 +/** Invoked on the server side from inside tor_tls_read() when the server
 + * gets a successful TLS renegotiation from the client. */
 +static void
 +connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb(tor_tls_t *tls, void *_conn)
 +{
 +  or_connection_t *conn = _conn;
 +  (void)tls;
 +
 +  /* Don't invoke this again. */
 +  connection_or_block_renegotiation(conn);
 +
 +  if (connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn) < 0) {
 +    /* XXXX_TLS double-check that it's ok to do this from inside read. */
 +    /* XXXX_TLS double-check that this verifies certificates. */
 +    connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
 + * <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
 + *
 + * Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  int result;
 +  check_no_tls_errors();
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
 +  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Continue handshake with %p", conn->tls);
 +  result = tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls);
 +  // log_notice(LD_OR, "Result: %d", result);
 +
 +  switch (result) {
 +    CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
 +    log_info(LD_OR,"tls error [%s]. breaking connection.",
 +             tor_tls_err_to_string(result));
 +      return -1;
 +    case TOR_TLS_DONE:
 +      if (! tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
 +        if (!tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls)) {
 +          tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING);
 +          return connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(conn);
 +        } else {
 +          /* v2/v3 handshake, but we are not a client. */
 +          log_debug(LD_OR, "Done with initial SSL handshake (server-side). "
 +                           "Expecting renegotiation or VERSIONS cell");
 +          tor_tls_set_renegotiate_callback(conn->tls,
 +                                           connection_or_tls_renegotiated_cb,
 +                                           conn);
 +          connection_or_change_state(conn,
 +              OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING);
 +          connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
 +          connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
 +          return 0;
 +        }
 +      }
 +      tor_assert(tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls));
 +      return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
 +    case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
 +      connection_start_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
 +      log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
 +      return 0;
 +    case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
 +      log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
 +      return 0;
 +    case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
 +      log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
 +      return -1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
 + * out as an incoming connection.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_OR ||
 +             conn->base_.type == CONN_TYPE_EXT_OR);
 +  if (!conn->tls)
 +    return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
 +  if (conn->handshake_state)
 +    return conn->handshake_state->started_here;
 +  return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
 +}
 +
 +/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
 + * return -1 if they are lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
 + *
 + * If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
 + * the other side sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
 + * connection, make sure it's the right relay by checking the certificate.
 + *
 + * Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
 + * the certificate to be weird or absent.
 + *
 + * If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
 + * identity key into <b>digest_rcvd_out</b>, which must have DIGEST_LEN
 + * space in it.
 + * If the certificate is invalid or missing on an incoming connection,
 + * we return 0 and set <b>digest_rcvd_out</b> to DIGEST_LEN NUL bytes.
 + * (If we return -1, the contents of this buffer are undefined.)
 + *
 + * As side effects,
 + * 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
 + * 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
 + *    descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
 + *    this relay; and note that this relay is reachable.
 + * 3) If this is a bridge and we didn't configure its identity
 + *    fingerprint, remember the keyid we just learned.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                        int started_here,
 +                                        char *digest_rcvd_out)
 +{
 +  crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
 +  const char *safe_address =
 +    started_here ? conn->base_.address :
 +                   safe_str_client(conn->base_.address);
 +  const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
 +  int has_cert = 0;
 +
 +  check_no_tls_errors();
 +  has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
 +  if (started_here && !has_cert) {
 +    log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
 +             "send a cert! Closing.",
 +             safe_address, conn->base_.port);
 +    return -1;
 +  } else if (!has_cert) {
 +    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
 +              "That's ok.");
 +  }
 +  check_no_tls_errors();
 +
 +  if (has_cert) {
 +    int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
 +                           conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
 +    if (started_here && v<0) {
 +      log_fn(severity,LD_HANDSHAKE,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
 +             " has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
 +             safe_address, conn->base_.port);
 +        return -1;
 +    } else if (v<0) {
 +      log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
 +               "chain; ignoring.");
 +    } else {
 +      log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,
 +                "The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
 +                "with %s:%d", conn_type, safe_address, conn->base_.port);
 +    }
 +    check_no_tls_errors();
 +  }
 +
 +  if (identity_rcvd) {
 +    if (crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd_out) < 0) {
 +      crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
 +      return -1;
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    memset(digest_rcvd_out, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  }
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->chan);
 +  channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan), identity_rcvd, 1);
 +
 +  crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd);
 +
 +  if (started_here) {
 +    /* A TLS handshake can't teach us an Ed25519 ID, so we set it to NULL
 +     * here. */
 +    log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Calling client_learned_peer_id from "
 +              "check_valid_tls_handshake");
 +    return connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(conn,
 +                                        (const uint8_t*)digest_rcvd_out,
 +                                        NULL);
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Called when we (as a connection initiator) have definitively,
 + * authenticatedly, learned that ID of the Tor instance on the other
 + * side of <b>conn</b> is <b>rsa_peer_id</b> and optionally <b>ed_peer_id</b>.
 + * For v1 and v2 handshakes,
 + * this is right after we get a certificate chain in a TLS handshake
 + * or renegotiation.  For v3+ handshakes, this is right after we get a
 + * certificate chain in a CERTS cell.
 + *
 + * If we did not know the ID before, record the one we got.
 + *
 + * If we wanted an ID, but we didn't get the one we expected, log a message
 + * and return -1.
 + * On relays:
 + *  - log a protocol warning whenever the fingerprints don't match;
 + * On clients:
 + *  - if a relay's fingerprint doesn't match, log a warning;
 + *  - if we don't have updated relay fingerprints from a recent consensus, and
 + *    a fallback directory mirror's hard-coded fingerprint has changed, log an
 + *    info explaining that we will try another fallback.
 + *
 + * If we're testing reachability, remember what we learned.
 + *
 + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                     const uint8_t *rsa_peer_id,
 +                                     const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_peer_id)
 +{
 +  const or_options_t *options = get_options();
 +  channel_tls_t *chan_tls = conn->chan;
 +  channel_t *chan = channel_tls_to_base(chan_tls);
 +  int changed_identity = 0;
 +  tor_assert(chan);
 +
 +  const int expected_rsa_key =
 +    ! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest);
 +  const int expected_ed_key =
 +    ! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity);
 +
 +  log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "learned peer id for %p (%s): %s, %s",
 +           conn,
 +           safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
 +           hex_str((const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN),
 +           ed25519_fmt(ed_peer_id));
 +
 +  if (! expected_rsa_key && ! expected_ed_key) {
 +    log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no ID in mind when we made this "
 +             "connection.");
 +    connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
 +                                      (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
 +    tor_free(conn->nickname);
 +    conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
 +    conn->nickname[0] = '$';
 +    base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
 +                  conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +    log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "Connected to router %s at %s:%d without knowing "
 +                    "its key. Hoping for the best.",
 +                    conn->nickname, conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port);
 +    /* if it's a bridge and we didn't know its identity fingerprint, now
 +     * we do -- remember it for future attempts. */
 +    learned_router_identity(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
 +                            (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
 +    changed_identity = 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  const int rsa_mismatch = expected_rsa_key &&
 +    tor_memneq(rsa_peer_id, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
 +  /* It only counts as an ed25519 mismatch if we wanted an ed25519 identity
 +   * and didn't get it. It's okay if we get one that we didn't ask for. */
 +  const int ed25519_mismatch =
 +    expected_ed_key &&
 +    (ed_peer_id == NULL ||
 +     ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&chan->ed25519_identity, ed_peer_id));
 +
 +  if (rsa_mismatch || ed25519_mismatch) {
 +    /* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
 +    char seen_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
 +    char expected_rsa[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
 +    char seen_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
 +    char expected_ed[ED25519_BASE64_LEN+1];
 +    base16_encode(seen_rsa, sizeof(seen_rsa),
 +                  (const char*)rsa_peer_id, DIGEST_LEN);
 +    base16_encode(expected_rsa, sizeof(expected_rsa), conn->identity_digest,
 +                  DIGEST_LEN);
 +    if (ed_peer_id) {
 +      ed25519_public_to_base64(seen_ed, ed_peer_id);
 +    } else {
 +      strlcpy(seen_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(seen_ed));
 +    }
 +    if (! ed25519_public_key_is_zero(&chan->ed25519_identity)) {
 +      ed25519_public_to_base64(expected_ed, &chan->ed25519_identity);
 +    } else {
 +      strlcpy(expected_ed, "no ed25519 key", sizeof(expected_ed));
 +    }
 +    const int using_hardcoded_fingerprints =
 +      !networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time(NULL),
 +                                                   usable_consensus_flavor());
 +    const int is_fallback_fingerprint = router_digest_is_fallback_dir(
 +                                                   conn->identity_digest);
 +    const int is_authority_fingerprint = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(
 +                                                   conn->identity_digest);
++    const int non_anonymous_mode = rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options);
 +    int severity;
 +    const char *extra_log = "";
 +
-     if (server_mode(options)) {
++    /* Relays, Single Onion Services, and Tor2web make direct connections using
++     * untrusted authentication keys. */
++    if (server_mode(options) || non_anonymous_mode) {
 +      severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN;
 +    } else {
 +      if (using_hardcoded_fingerprints) {
 +        /* We need to do the checks in this order, because the list of
 +         * fallbacks includes the list of authorities */
 +        if (is_authority_fingerprint) {
 +          severity = LOG_WARN;
 +        } else if (is_fallback_fingerprint) {
 +          /* we expect a small number of fallbacks to change from their
 +           * hard-coded fingerprints over the life of a release */
 +          severity = LOG_INFO;
 +          extra_log = " Tor will try a different fallback.";
 +        } else {
 +          /* it's a bridge, it's either a misconfiguration, or unexpected */
 +          severity = LOG_WARN;
 +        }
 +      } else {
 +        /* a relay has changed its fingerprint from the one in the consensus */
 +        severity = LOG_WARN;
 +      }
 +    }
 +
 +    log_fn(severity, LD_HANDSHAKE,
-            "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA identity key was not "
-            "as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
++           "Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but RSA + ed25519 identity "
++           "keys were not as expected: wanted %s + %s but got %s + %s.%s",
 +           conn->base_.address, conn->base_.port,
 +           expected_rsa, expected_ed, seen_rsa, seen_ed, extra_log);
 +
 +    /* Tell the new guard API about the channel failure */
 +    entry_guard_chan_failed(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +    control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
 +                                 END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
 +    if (!authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options))
 +      control_event_bootstrap_prob_or(
 +                                "Unexpected identity in router certificate",
 +                                END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY,
 +                                conn);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (!expected_ed_key && ed_peer_id) {
-     log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(we had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
-              "connection.");
++    log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, "(We had no Ed25519 ID in mind when we made this "
++             "connection.)");
 +    connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn,
 +                                      (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
 +    changed_identity = 1;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (changed_identity) {
 +    /* If we learned an identity for this connection, then we might have
 +     * just discovered it to be canonical. */
 +    connection_or_check_canonicity(conn, conn->handshake_state->started_here);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (authdir_mode_tests_reachability(options)) {
 +    dirserv_orconn_tls_done(&conn->base_.addr, conn->base_.port,
 +                            (const char*)rsa_peer_id, ed_peer_id);
 +  }
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return when we last used this channel for client activity (origin
 + * circuits). This is called from connection.c, since client_used is now one
 + * of the timestamps in channel_t */
 +
 +time_t
 +connection_or_client_used(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  if (conn->chan) {
 +    return channel_when_last_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +  } else return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** The v1/v2 TLS handshake is finished.
 + *
 + * Make sure we are happy with the peer we just handshaked with.
 + *
 + * If they initiated the connection, make sure they're not already connected,
 + * then initialize conn from the information in router.
 + *
 + * If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
 + * that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
 + * directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
 + *
 + * If this is a v2 TLS handshake, send a versions cell.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
 +  int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
 +
 +  tor_assert(!started_here);
 +
 +  log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE,"%s tls handshake on %p with %s done, using "
 +            "ciphersuite %s. verifying.",
 +            started_here?"outgoing":"incoming",
 +            conn,
 +            safe_str_client(conn->base_.address),
 +            tor_tls_get_ciphersuite_name(conn->tls));
 +
 +  if (connection_or_check_valid_tls_handshake(conn, started_here,
 +                                              digest_rcvd) < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
 +
 +  if (tor_tls_used_v1_handshake(conn->tls)) {
 +    conn->link_proto = 1;
 +    connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
 +                                         conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
 +                                         NULL, 0);
 +    tor_tls_block_renegotiation(conn->tls);
 +    rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(1, started_here);
 +    return connection_or_set_state_open(conn);
 +  } else {
 +    connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2);
 +    if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, started_here) < 0)
 +      return -1;
 +    connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, &conn->base_.addr,
 +                                         conn->base_.port, digest_rcvd,
 +                                         NULL, 0);
 +    return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 0);
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Called as client when initial TLS handshake is done, and we notice
 + * that we got a v3-handshake signalling certificate from the server.
 + * Set up structures, do bookkeeping, and send the versions cell.
 + * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_or_launch_v3_or_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn));
 +
 +  circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
 +
 +  connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
 +  if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(conn, 1) < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  return connection_or_send_versions(conn, 1);
 +}
 +
 +/** Allocate a new connection handshake state for the connection
 + * <b>conn</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
 +int
 +connection_init_or_handshake_state(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here)
 +{
 +  or_handshake_state_t *s;
 +  if (conn->handshake_state) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Duplicate call to connection_init_or_handshake_state!");
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +  s = conn->handshake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
 +  s->started_here = started_here ? 1 : 0;
 +  s->digest_sent_data = 1;
 +  s->digest_received_data = 1;
 +  if (! started_here && get_current_link_cert_cert()) {
 +    s->own_link_cert = tor_cert_dup(get_current_link_cert_cert());
 +  }
 +  s->certs = or_handshake_certs_new();
 +  s->certs->started_here = s->started_here;
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Free all storage held by <b>state</b>. */
 +void
 +or_handshake_state_free_(or_handshake_state_t *state)
 +{
 +  if (!state)
 +    return;
 +  crypto_digest_free(state->digest_sent);
 +  crypto_digest_free(state->digest_received);
 +  or_handshake_certs_free(state->certs);
 +  tor_cert_free(state->own_link_cert);
 +  memwipe(state, 0xBE, sizeof(or_handshake_state_t));
 +  tor_free(state);
 +}
 +
 +/**
 + * Remember that <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if <b>incoming</b> is
 + * false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a V3 handshake using
 + * <b>state</b>.
 + *
 + * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
 + * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
 + * authenticate cell.)
 + */
 +void
 +or_handshake_state_record_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                               or_handshake_state_t *state,
 +                               const cell_t *cell,
 +                               int incoming)
 +{
 +  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
 +  packed_cell_t packed;
 +  if (incoming) {
 +    if (!state->digest_received_data)
 +      return;
 +  } else {
 +    if (!state->digest_sent_data)
 +      return;
 +  }
 +  if (!incoming) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "We shouldn't be sending any non-variable-length cells "
 +             "while making a handshake digest.  But we think we are sending "
 +             "one with type %d.", (int)cell->command);
 +  }
 +  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
 +  if (! *dptr)
 +    *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
 +
 +  d = *dptr;
 +  /* Re-packing like this is a little inefficient, but we don't have to do
 +     this very often at all. */
 +  cell_pack(&packed, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, packed.body, cell_network_size);
 +  memwipe(&packed, 0, sizeof(packed));
 +}
 +
 +/** Remember that a variable-length <b>cell</b> has been transmitted (if
 + * <b>incoming</b> is false) or received (if <b>incoming</b> is true) during a
 + * V3 handshake using <b>state</b>.
 + *
 + * (We don't record the cell, but we keep a digest of everything sent or
 + * received during the v3 handshake, and the client signs it in an
 + * authenticate cell.)
 + */
 +void
 +or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                   or_handshake_state_t *state,
 +                                   const var_cell_t *cell,
 +                                   int incoming)
 +{
 +  crypto_digest_t *d, **dptr;
 +  int n;
 +  char buf[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
 +  if (incoming) {
 +    if (!state->digest_received_data)
 +      return;
 +  } else {
 +    if (!state->digest_sent_data)
 +      return;
 +  }
 +  dptr = incoming ? &state->digest_received : &state->digest_sent;
 +  if (! *dptr)
 +    *dptr = crypto_digest256_new(DIGEST_SHA256);
 +
 +  d = *dptr;
 +
 +  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, buf, conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, buf, n);
 +  crypto_digest_add_bytes(d, (const char *)cell->payload, cell->payload_len);
 +
 +  memwipe(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
 +}
 +
 +/** Set <b>conn</b>'s state to OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN, and tell other subsystems
 + * as appropriate.  Called when we are done with all TLS and OR handshaking.
 + */
 +int
 +connection_or_set_state_open(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  connection_or_change_state(conn, OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN);
 +  control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
 +
 +  /* Link protocol 3 appeared in Tor 0.2.3.6-alpha, so any connection
 +   * that uses an earlier link protocol should not be treated as a relay. */
 +  if (conn->link_proto < 3) {
 +    channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +  }
 +
 +  or_handshake_state_free(conn->handshake_state);
 +  conn->handshake_state = NULL;
 +  connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
 + * For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
 + * connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit().
 + */
 +void
 +connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  packed_cell_t networkcell;
 +  size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +
 +  cell_pack(&networkcell, cell, conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +
 +  rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL);
 +  if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
 +    rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_CELL);
 +
 +  connection_buf_add(networkcell.body, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
 +
 +  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +  if (conn->chan) {
 +    channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +
 +    if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan)->currently_padding) {
 +      rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL);
 +      if (cell->command == CELL_PADDING)
 +        rep_hist_padding_count_write(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
 +    or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
 +}
 +
 +/** Pack a variable-length <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto
 + * <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.  Right now, this <em>DOES NOT</em> support cells that
 + * affect a circuit.
 + */
 +MOCK_IMPL(void,
 +connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf,(const var_cell_t *cell,
 +                                     or_connection_t *conn))
 +{
 +  int n;
 +  char hdr[VAR_CELL_MAX_HEADER_SIZE];
 +  tor_assert(cell);
 +  tor_assert(conn);
 +  n = var_cell_pack_header(cell, hdr, conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +  connection_buf_add(hdr, n, TO_CONN(conn));
 +  connection_buf_add((char*)cell->payload,
 +                          cell->payload_len, TO_CONN(conn));
 +  if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3)
 +    or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 0);
 +
 +  /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +  if (conn->chan)
 +    channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +}
 +
 +/** See whether there's a variable-length cell waiting on <b>or_conn</b>'s
 + * inbuf.  Return values as for fetch_var_cell_from_buf(). */
 +static int
 +connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(or_connection_t *or_conn, var_cell_t **out)
 +{
 +  connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
 +  return fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn->inbuf, out, or_conn->link_proto);
 +}
 +
 +/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
 + *
 + * Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
 + * and hand it to command_process_cell().
 + *
 + * Always return 0.
 + */
 +static int
 +connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  var_cell_t *var_cell;
 +
 +  /*
 +   * Note on memory management for incoming cells: below the channel layer,
 +   * we shouldn't need to consider its internal queueing/copying logic.  It
 +   * is safe to pass cells to it on the stack or on the heap, but in the
 +   * latter case we must be sure we free them later.
 +   *
 +   * The incoming cell queue code in channel.c will (in the common case)
 +   * decide it can pass them to the upper layer immediately, in which case
 +   * those functions may run directly on the cell pointers we pass here, or
 +   * it may decide to queue them, in which case it will allocate its own
 +   * buffer and copy the cell.
 +   */
 +
 +  while (1) {
 +    log_debug(LD_OR,
 +              TOR_SOCKET_T_FORMAT": starting, inbuf_datalen %d "
 +              "(%d pending in tls object).",
 +              conn->base_.s,(int)connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn)),
 +              tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
 +    if (connection_fetch_var_cell_from_buf(conn, &var_cell)) {
 +      if (!var_cell)
 +        return 0; /* not yet. */
 +
 +      /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +      if (conn->chan)
 +        channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +
 +      circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
 +      channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell, conn);
 +      var_cell_free(var_cell);
 +    } else {
 +      const int wide_circ_ids = conn->wide_circ_ids;
 +      size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(conn->wide_circ_ids);
 +      char buf[CELL_MAX_NETWORK_SIZE];
 +      cell_t cell;
 +      if (connection_get_inbuf_len(TO_CONN(conn))
 +          < cell_network_size) /* whole response available? */
 +        return 0; /* not yet */
 +
 +      /* Touch the channel's active timestamp if there is one */
 +      if (conn->chan)
 +        channel_timestamp_active(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan));
 +
 +      circuit_build_times_network_is_live(get_circuit_build_times_mutable());
 +      connection_buf_get_bytes(buf, cell_network_size, TO_CONN(conn));
 +
 +      /* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
 +       * network-order string) */
 +      cell_unpack(&cell, buf, wide_circ_ids);
 +
 +      channel_tls_handle_cell(&cell, conn);
 +    }
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Array of recognized link protocol versions. */
 +static const uint16_t or_protocol_versions[] = { 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 };
 +/** Number of versions in <b>or_protocol_versions</b>. */
 +static const int n_or_protocol_versions =
 +  (int)( sizeof(or_protocol_versions)/sizeof(uint16_t) );
 +
 +/** Return true iff <b>v</b> is a link protocol version that this Tor
 + * implementation believes it can support. */
 +int
 +is_or_protocol_version_known(uint16_t v)
 +{
 +  int i;
 +  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
 +    if (or_protocol_versions[i] == v)
 +      return 1;
 +  }
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Send a VERSIONS cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other host about the
 + * link protocol versions that this Tor can support.
 + *
 + * If <b>v3_plus</b>, this is part of a V3 protocol handshake, so only
 + * allow protocol version v3 or later.  If not <b>v3_plus</b>, this is
 + * not part of a v3 protocol handshake, so don't allow protocol v3 or
 + * later.
 + **/
 +int
 +connection_or_send_versions(or_connection_t *conn, int v3_plus)
 +{
 +  var_cell_t *cell;
 +  int i;
 +  int n_versions = 0;
 +  const int min_version = v3_plus ? 3 : 0;
 +  const int max_version = v3_plus ? UINT16_MAX : 2;
 +  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state &&
 +             !conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at);
 +  cell = var_cell_new(n_or_protocol_versions * 2);
 +  cell->command = CELL_VERSIONS;
 +  for (i = 0; i < n_or_protocol_versions; ++i) {
 +    uint16_t v = or_protocol_versions[i];
 +    if (v < min_version || v > max_version)
 +      continue;
 +    set_uint16(cell->payload+(2*n_versions), htons(v));
 +    ++n_versions;
 +  }
 +  cell->payload_len = n_versions * 2;
 +
 +  connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
 +  conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at = time(NULL);
 +
 +  var_cell_free(cell);
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Send a NETINFO cell on <b>conn</b>, telling the other server what we know
 + * about their address, our address, and the current time. */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_or_send_netinfo,(or_connection_t *conn))
 +{
 +  cell_t cell;
 +  time_t now = time(NULL);
 +  const routerinfo_t *me;
 +  int len;
 +  uint8_t *out;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->handshake_state);
 +
 +  if (conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Attempted to send an extra netinfo cell on a connection "
 +             "where we already sent one.");
 +    return 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
 +  cell.command = CELL_NETINFO;
 +
 +  /* Timestamp, if we're a relay. */
 +  if (public_server_mode(get_options()) || ! conn->is_outgoing)
 +    set_uint32(cell.payload, htonl((uint32_t)now));
 +
 +  /* Their address. */
 +  out = cell.payload + 4;
 +  /* We use &conn->real_addr below, unless it hasn't yet been set. If it
 +   * hasn't yet been set, we know that base_.addr hasn't been tampered with
 +   * yet either. */
 +  len = append_address_to_payload(out, !tor_addr_is_null(&conn->real_addr)
 +                                       ? &conn->real_addr : &conn->base_.addr);
 +  if (len<0)
 +    return -1;
 +  out += len;
 +
 +  /* My address -- only include it if I'm a public relay, or if I'm a
 +   * bridge and this is an incoming connection. If I'm a bridge and this
 +   * is an outgoing connection, act like a normal client and omit it. */
 +  if ((public_server_mode(get_options()) || !conn->is_outgoing) &&
 +      (me = router_get_my_routerinfo())) {
 +    tor_addr_t my_addr;
 +    *out++ = 1 + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr);
 +
 +    tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&my_addr, me->addr);
 +    len = append_address_to_payload(out, &my_addr);
 +    if (len < 0)
 +      return -1;
 +    out += len;
 +
 +    if (!tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr)) {
 +      len = append_address_to_payload(out, &me->ipv6_addr);
 +      if (len < 0)
 +        return -1;
 +    }
 +  } else {
 +    *out = 0;
 +  }
 +
 +  conn->handshake_state->digest_sent_data = 0;
 +  conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo = 1;
 +  connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Helper used to add an encoded certs to a cert cell */
 +static void
 +add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
 +                           uint8_t cert_type,
 +                           const uint8_t *cert_encoded,
 +                           size_t cert_len)
 +{
 +  tor_assert(cert_len <= UINT16_MAX);
 +  certs_cell_cert_t *ccc = certs_cell_cert_new();
 +  ccc->cert_type = cert_type;
 +  ccc->cert_len = cert_len;
 +  certs_cell_cert_setlen_body(ccc, cert_len);
 +  memcpy(certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(ccc), cert_encoded, cert_len);
 +
 +  certs_cell_add_certs(certs_cell, ccc);
 +}
 +
 +/** Add an encoded X509 cert (stored as <b>cert_len</b> bytes at
 + * <b>cert_encoded</b>) to the trunnel certs_cell_t object that we are
 + * building in <b>certs_cell</b>.  Set its type field to <b>cert_type</b>.
 + * (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
 +static void
 +add_x509_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
 +              uint8_t cert_type,
 +              const tor_x509_cert_t *cert)
 +{
 +  if (NULL == cert)
 +    return;
 +
 +  const uint8_t *cert_encoded = NULL;
 +  size_t cert_len;
 +  tor_x509_cert_get_der(cert, &cert_encoded, &cert_len);
 +
 +  add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type, cert_encoded, cert_len);
 +}
 +
 +/** Add an Ed25519 cert from <b>cert</b> to the trunnel certs_cell_t object
 + * that we are building in <b>certs_cell</b>.  Set its type field to
 + * <b>cert_type</b>. (If <b>cert</b> is NULL, take no action.) */
 +static void
 +add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell_t *certs_cell,
 +                 uint8_t cert_type,
 +                 const tor_cert_t *cert)
 +{
 +  if (NULL == cert)
 +    return;
 +
 +  add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell, cert_type,
 +                             cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
 +}
 +
 +#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
 +int certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing = 0;
 +#else
 +#define certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing 0
 +#endif
 +
 +/** Send a CERTS cell on the connection <b>conn</b>.  Return 0 on success, -1
 + * on failure. */
 +int
 +connection_or_send_certs_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  const tor_x509_cert_t *global_link_cert = NULL, *id_cert = NULL;
 +  tor_x509_cert_t *own_link_cert = NULL;
 +  var_cell_t *cell;
 +
 +  certs_cell_t *certs_cell = NULL;
 +
 +  tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
 +
 +  if (! conn->handshake_state)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  const int conn_in_server_mode = ! conn->handshake_state->started_here;
 +
 +  /* Get the encoded values of the X509 certificates */
 +  if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(conn_in_server_mode,
 +                           &global_link_cert, &id_cert) < 0)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  if (conn_in_server_mode) {
 +    own_link_cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(id_cert);
 +
 +  certs_cell = certs_cell_new();
 +
 +  /* Start adding certs.  First the link cert or auth1024 cert. */
 +  if (conn_in_server_mode) {
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal(own_link_cert);
 +    add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
 +                  OR_CERT_TYPE_TLS_LINK, own_link_cert);
 +  } else {
 +    tor_assert(global_link_cert);
 +    add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
 +                  OR_CERT_TYPE_AUTH_1024, global_link_cert);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* Next the RSA->RSA ID cert */
 +  add_x509_cert(certs_cell,
 +                OR_CERT_TYPE_ID_1024, id_cert);
 +
 +  /* Next the Ed25519 certs */
 +  add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
 +                   CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN,
 +                   get_master_signing_key_cert());
 +  if (conn_in_server_mode) {
 +    tor_assert_nonfatal(conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert ||
 +                        certs_cell_ed25519_disabled_for_testing);
 +    add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
 +                     CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK,
 +                     conn->handshake_state->own_link_cert);
 +  } else {
 +    add_ed25519_cert(certs_cell,
 +                     CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH,
 +                     get_current_auth_key_cert());
 +  }
 +
 +  /* And finally the crosscert. */
 +  {
 +    const uint8_t *crosscert=NULL;
 +    size_t crosscert_len;
 +    get_master_rsa_crosscert(&crosscert, &crosscert_len);
 +    if (crosscert) {
 +      add_certs_cell_cert_helper(certs_cell,
 +                               CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID,
 +                               crosscert, crosscert_len);
 +    }
 +  }
 +
 +  /* We've added all the certs; make the cell. */
 +  certs_cell->n_certs = certs_cell_getlen_certs(certs_cell);
 +
 +  ssize_t alloc_len = certs_cell_encoded_len(certs_cell);
 +  tor_assert(alloc_len >= 0 && alloc_len <= UINT16_MAX);
 +  cell = var_cell_new(alloc_len);
 +  cell->command = CELL_CERTS;
 +  ssize_t enc_len = certs_cell_encode(cell->payload, alloc_len, certs_cell);
 +  tor_assert(enc_len > 0 && enc_len <= alloc_len);
 +  cell->payload_len = enc_len;
 +
 +  connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
 +  var_cell_free(cell);
 +  certs_cell_free(certs_cell);
 +  tor_x509_cert_free(own_link_cert);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type</b> is an AUTHCHALLENGE type that
 + * we can send and receive. */
 +int
 +authchallenge_type_is_supported(uint16_t challenge_type)
 +{
 +  switch (challenge_type) {
 +     case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
 +     case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
 +       return 1;
 +     case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
 +     default:
 +       return 0;
 +  }
 +}
 +
 +/** Return true iff <b>challenge_type_a</b> is one that we would rather
 + * use than <b>challenge_type_b</b>. */
 +int
 +authchallenge_type_is_better(uint16_t challenge_type_a,
 +                             uint16_t challenge_type_b)
 +{
 +  /* Any supported type is better than an unsupported one;
 +   * all unsupported types are equally bad. */
 +  if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_a))
 +    return 0;
 +  if (!authchallenge_type_is_supported(challenge_type_b))
 +    return 1;
 +  /* It happens that types are superior in numerically ascending order.
 +   * If that ever changes, this must change too. */
 +  return (challenge_type_a > challenge_type_b);
 +}
 +
 +/** Send an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>. Return 0
 + * on success, -1 on failure. */
 +int
 +connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(or_connection_t *conn)
 +{
 +  var_cell_t *cell = NULL;
 +  int r = -1;
 +  tor_assert(conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3);
 +
 +  if (! conn->handshake_state)
 +    return -1;
 +
 +  auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = auth_challenge_cell_new();
 +
 +  tor_assert(sizeof(ac->challenge) == 32);
 +  crypto_rand((char*)ac->challenge, sizeof(ac->challenge));
 +
 +  auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET);
 +  /* Disabled, because everything that supports this method also supports
 +   * the much-superior ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705 */
 +  /* auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705); */
 +  auth_challenge_cell_add_methods(ac, AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705);
 +  auth_challenge_cell_set_n_methods(ac,
 +                                    auth_challenge_cell_getlen_methods(ac));
 +
 +  cell = var_cell_new(auth_challenge_cell_encoded_len(ac));
 +  ssize_t len = auth_challenge_cell_encode(cell->payload, cell->payload_len,
 +                                           ac);
 +  if (len != cell->payload_len) {
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Encoded auth challenge cell length not as expected");
 +    goto done;
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +  }
 +  cell->command = CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE;
 +
 +  connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
 +  r = 0;
 +
 + done:
 +  var_cell_free(cell);
 +  auth_challenge_cell_free(ac);
 +
 +  return r;
 +}
 +
 +/** Compute the main body of an AUTHENTICATE cell that a client can use
 + * to authenticate itself on a v3 handshake for <b>conn</b>.  Return it
 + * in a var_cell_t.
 + *
 + * If <b>server</b> is true, only calculate the first
 + * V3_AUTH_FIXED_PART_LEN bytes -- the part of the authenticator that's
 + * determined by the rest of the handshake, and which match the provided value
 + * exactly.
 + *
 + * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is NULL, calculate the
 + * first V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN bytes of the authenticator (that is, everything
 + * that should be signed), but don't actually sign it.
 + *
 + * If <b>server</b> is false and <b>signing_key</b> is provided, calculate the
 + * entire authenticator, signed with <b>signing_key</b>.
 + *
 + * Return the length of the cell body on success, and -1 on failure.
 + */
 +var_cell_t *
 +connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
 +                                             const int authtype,
 +                                             crypto_pk_t *signing_key,
 +                                      const ed25519_keypair_t *ed_signing_key,
 +                                      int server)
 +{
 +  auth1_t *auth = NULL;
 +  auth_ctx_t *ctx = auth_ctx_new();
 +  var_cell_t *result = NULL;
 +  int old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 0;
 +  const char *authtype_str = NULL;
 +
 +  int is_ed = 0;
 +
 +  /* assert state is reasonable XXXX */
 +  switch (authtype) {
 +  case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET:
 +    authtype_str = "AUTH0001";
 +    old_tlssecrets_algorithm = 1;
 +    break;
 +  case AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705:
 +    authtype_str = "AUTH0002";
 +    break;
 +  case AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705:
 +    authtype_str = "AUTH0003";
 +    is_ed = 1;
 +    break;
 +  default:
 +    tor_assert(0);
 +    break;
 +  }
 +
 +  auth = auth1_new();
 +  ctx->is_ed = is_ed;
 +
 +  /* Type: 8 bytes. */
 +  memcpy(auth1_getarray_type(auth), authtype_str, 8);
 +
 +  {
 +    const tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert=NULL;
 +    const common_digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
 +    const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
 +    if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(server, NULL, &id_cert))
 +      goto err;
 +    my_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
 +    their_digests =
 +      tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert);
 +    tor_assert(my_digests);
 +    tor_assert(their_digests);
 +    my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
 +    their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
 +
 +    client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
 +    server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
 +
 +    /* Client ID digest: 32 octets. */
 +    memcpy(auth->cid, client_id, 32);
 +
 +    /* Server ID digest: 32 octets. */
 +    memcpy(auth->sid, server_id, 32);
 +  }
 +
 +  if (is_ed) {
 +    const ed25519_public_key_t *my_ed_id, *their_ed_id;
 +    if (!conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign) {
 +      log_warn(LD_OR, "Ed authenticate without Ed ID cert from peer.");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +    my_ed_id = get_master_identity_key();
 +    their_ed_id = &conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key;
 +
 +    const uint8_t *cid_ed = (server ? their_ed_id : my_ed_id)->pubkey;
 +    const uint8_t *sid_ed = (server ? my_ed_id : their_ed_id)->pubkey;
 +
 +    memcpy(auth->u1_cid_ed, cid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +    memcpy(auth->u1_sid_ed, sid_ed, ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
 +  }
 +
 +  {
 +    crypto_digest_t *server_d, *client_d;
 +    if (server) {
 +      server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
 +      client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
 +    } else {
 +      client_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_sent;
 +      server_d = conn->handshake_state->digest_received;
 +    }
 +
 +    /* Server log digest : 32 octets */
 +    crypto_digest_get_digest(server_d, (char*)auth->slog, 32);
 +
 +    /* Client log digest : 32 octets */
 +    crypto_digest_get_digest(client_d, (char*)auth->clog, 32);
 +  }
 +
 +  {
 +    /* Digest of cert used on TLS link : 32 octets. */
 +    tor_x509_cert_t *cert = NULL;
 +    if (server) {
 +      cert = tor_tls_get_own_cert(conn->tls);
 +    } else {
 +      cert = tor_tls_get_peer_cert(conn->tls);
 +    }
 +    if (!cert) {
 +      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to find cert when making %s data.",
 +               authtype_str);
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    memcpy(auth->scert,
 +           tor_x509_cert_get_cert_digests(cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256], 32);
 +
 +    tor_x509_cert_free(cert);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* HMAC of clientrandom and serverrandom using master key : 32 octets */
 +  if (old_tlssecrets_algorithm) {
 +    tor_tls_get_tlssecrets(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets);
 +  } else {
 +    char label[128];
 +    tor_snprintf(label, sizeof(label),
 +                 "EXPORTER FOR TOR TLS CLIENT BINDING %s", authtype_str);
 +    tor_tls_export_key_material(conn->tls, auth->tlssecrets,
 +                                auth->cid, sizeof(auth->cid),
 +                                label);
 +  }
 +
 +  /* 8 octets were reserved for the current time, but we're trying to get out
 +   * of the habit of sending time around willynilly.  Fortunately, nothing
 +   * checks it.  That's followed by 16 bytes of nonce. */
 +  crypto_rand((char*)auth->rand, 24);
 +
 +  ssize_t maxlen = auth1_encoded_len(auth, ctx);
 +  if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
 +    maxlen += ED25519_SIG_LEN;
 +  } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
 +    maxlen += crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key);
 +  }
 +
 +  const int AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN = 4; /* 2 bytes of type, 2 bytes of length */
 +  result = var_cell_new(AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN + maxlen);
 +  uint8_t *const out = result->payload + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
 +  const size_t outlen = maxlen;
 +  ssize_t len;
 +
 +  result->command = CELL_AUTHENTICATE;
 +  set_uint16(result->payload, htons(authtype));
 +
 +  if ((len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx)) < 0) {
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed part of AUTH1 data.");
 +    goto err;
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +  }
 +
 +  if (server) {
 +    auth1_t *tmp = NULL;
 +    ssize_t len2 = auth1_parse(&tmp, out, len, ctx);
 +    if (!tmp) {
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to parse signed part of AUTH1 data that "
 +               "we just encoded");
 +      goto err;
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +    }
 +    result->payload_len = (tmp->end_of_signed - result->payload);
 +
 +    auth1_free(tmp);
 +    if (len2 != len) {
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Mismatched length when re-parsing AUTH1 data.");
 +      goto err;
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +    }
 +    goto done;
 +  }
 +
 +  if (ed_signing_key && is_ed) {
 +    ed25519_signature_t sig;
 +    if (ed25519_sign(&sig, out, len, ed_signing_key) < 0) {
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +      log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to sign ed25519 authentication data");
 +      goto err;
 +      /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +    }
 +    auth1_setlen_sig(auth, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
 +    memcpy(auth1_getarray_sig(auth), sig.sig, ED25519_SIG_LEN);
 +
 +  } else if (signing_key && !is_ed) {
 +    auth1_setlen_sig(auth, crypto_pk_keysize(signing_key));
 +
 +    char d[32];
 +    crypto_digest256(d, (char*)out, len, DIGEST_SHA256);
 +    int siglen = crypto_pk_private_sign(signing_key,
 +                                    (char*)auth1_getarray_sig(auth),
 +                                    auth1_getlen_sig(auth),
 +                                    d, 32);
 +    if (siglen < 0) {
 +      log_warn(LD_OR, "Unable to sign AUTH1 data.");
 +      goto err;
 +    }
 +
 +    auth1_setlen_sig(auth, siglen);
 +  }
 +
 +  len = auth1_encode(out, outlen, auth, ctx);
 +  if (len < 0) {
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to encode signed AUTH1 data.");
 +    goto err;
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +  }
 +  tor_assert(len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN <= result->payload_len);
 +  result->payload_len = len + AUTH_CELL_HEADER_LEN;
 +  set_uint16(result->payload+2, htons(len));
 +
 +  goto done;
 +
 + err:
 +  var_cell_free(result);
 +  result = NULL;
 + done:
 +  auth1_free(auth);
 +  auth_ctx_free(ctx);
 +  return result;
 +}
 +
 +/** Send an AUTHENTICATE cell on the connection <b>conn</b>.  Return 0 on
 + * success, -1 on failure */
 +MOCK_IMPL(int,
 +connection_or_send_authenticate_cell,(or_connection_t *conn, int authtype))
 +{
 +  var_cell_t *cell;
 +  crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_get_my_client_auth_key();
 +  /* XXXX make sure we're actually supposed to send this! */
 +
 +  if (!pk) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't compute authenticate cell: no client auth key");
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +  if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) {
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Tried to send authenticate cell with unknown "
 +             "authentication type %d", authtype);
 +    return -1;
 +  }
 +
 +  cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(conn,
 +                                                 authtype,
 +                                                 pk,
 +                                                 get_current_auth_keypair(),
 +                                                 0 /* not server */);
 +  if (! cell) {
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_START */
 +    log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to compute authenticate cell!");
 +    return -1;
 +    /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
 +  }
 +  connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(cell, conn);
 +  var_cell_free(cell);
 +
 +  return 0;
 +}

    

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[tor-commits] [tor/master] Merge branch 'bug26924_032' into bug26924