commit ddf945fd9136f062ab82c4fc76eb013e05da0b52 Author: Mike Perry mikeperry-git@fscked.org Date: Thu Oct 11 01:59:59 2012 -0700
Clean up verbage. --- proposals/xxx-path-bias-tuning.txt | 61 ++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/proposals/xxx-path-bias-tuning.txt b/proposals/xxx-path-bias-tuning.txt index cd4a459..964aedb 100644 --- a/proposals/xxx-path-bias-tuning.txt +++ b/proposals/xxx-path-bias-tuning.txt @@ -15,11 +15,10 @@ Overview
Motivation
- The Path Bias defense is designed to defend against a type of route - capture where malicious Guard nodes deliberately fail circuits that - are determined to extend to non-colluding Exit nodes to maximize - their network utilization in favor of carrying only compromised - traffic. + The Path Bias defense is designed to defend against a type of route capture + where malicious Guard nodes deliberately fail circuits that extend to + non-colluding Exit nodes to maximize their network utilization in favor of + carrying only compromised traffic.
This attack was explored in the academic literature in [1], and a variant involving cryptographic tagging was posted to tor-dev[2] in @@ -55,7 +54,7 @@ Design Description does not produce integer truncation.
No log messages should be displayed, nor should any Guard be - dropped until it has completed more than 150 first hops. + dropped until it has completed at least 150 first hops (inclusive).
Analysis: Simulation
@@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ Future Analysis: Deployed Clients
It's my belief that further analysis should be done by deploying loglines for all three thresholds in clients in the live network - and utilize user reports on how often high rates of circuit failure + to utilize user reports on how often high rates of circuit failure are seen before we deploy changes to rotate away from failing Guards.
I believe these log lines should be deployed in 0.2.3.x clients, @@ -131,38 +130,40 @@ Security Considerations from a Guard node that previously succeeded 80% of its circuits, an adversary would need to induce a 25% success rate for around 350 circuit attempts before the client would reject it or a 5% success rate - for around 215 attempts, using a scaling window of 300 circuits. - - Assuming one circuit per Guard per 10 minutes of normal client + for around 215 attempts, both using a scaling window of 300 circuits. + + Assuming one circuit per Guard per 10 minutes of active client activity, this is a sustained network-wide DoS attack of 60 hours for the 25% case, or 38 hours for the 5% case.
- Presumably this is enough time for the directory authorites to respond - by altering the pb_disablepct consensus parameter before clients - rotate. + Presumably this is enough time for the directory authorities to respond by + altering the pb_disablepct consensus parameter before clients rotate, + especially given that most clients are not active for even 38 hours on end, + and will tend to stop building circuits while idle. + + If we raised the scaling window to 500 circuits, it would require 1050 + circuits if the DoS brought circuit success down to 25% (175 hours), and + 415 circuits if the DoS brought the circuit success down to 5% (69 hours).
- The converse of this, though, is that larger values allow Guard nodes - to compromise clients for duty cycles of around the size of this window - (up to the (c/n)^2 * 100/CUTOFF_PERCENT limit in aggregate), so we do - have to consider that trade off. + The tradeoff, though, is that larger scaling window values allow Guard nodes + to compromise clients for duty cycles of around the size of this window (up to + the (c/n)^2 * 100/CUTOFF_PERCENT limit in aggregate), so we do have to find + balance between these concerns.
Implementation Notes: Log Messages
Log messages need to be chosen with care to avoid alarming users. I suggest:
- Notice: "It appears that your Guard %s is failing a larger number of - circuits than usual. This could mean that the Guard is overloaded, or - the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are %d/%d." + Notice: "Your Guard %s is failing more circuits than usual. Most likely + this means the Tor network is overloaded. Success counts are %d/%d."
- Warn: "It appears that your Guard %s is failing a very large number of - circuits. Most likely, this could mean that the Guard is overloaded, - or the Tor network is overloaded, but it could also mean an attack - against you or the Guard. Success counts are %d/%d." + Warn: "Your Guard %s is failing a very large amount of circuits. Most likely + this means the Tor network is overloaded, but it could also mean an attack + against you or potentially the Guard itself. Success counts are %d/%d."
- Drop: "It appears that your Guard %s is failing an extremely large - number of circuits. [Tor has disabled use of this Guard.] Success - counts are %d/%d." + Drop: "Your Guard %s is failing an extremely large amount of circuits. [Tor + has disabled use of this Guard.] Success counts are %d/%d."
The second piece of the Drop message would not be present in 0.2.3.x, since the Guard won't actually be dropped. @@ -177,13 +178,13 @@ Implementation Notes: Consensus Parameters The minimum number of first hops before we log or drop Guards.
pb_noticepct=70 - The threshhold of circuit success below which we display a notice. + The threshold of circuit success below which we display a notice.
pb_warnpct=50 - The threshhold of circuit success below which we display a warn. + The threshold of circuit success below which we display a warn.
pb_disablepct=30 - The threshhold of circuit success below which we disable the guard. + The threshold of circuit success below which we disable the guard.
pb_scalecircs=300 The number of first hops at which we scale the counts down.