commit d82384658d77189cbfae9db90e6ec14af6572b5e Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Mon Jul 11 17:02:03 2011 -0400
Tweaks to bug2798 based on comments by arma --- changes/bug2798 | 2 +- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 22 +++++++--------------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/changes/bug2798 b/changes/bug2798 index e4ab8e5..8fd2243 100644 --- a/changes/bug2798 +++ b/changes/bug2798 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: + o Major bugfixes: - When configuring a large set of nodes in EntryNodes (as with 'EntryNodes {cc}' or 'EntryNodes 1.1.1.1/16'), choose only a random subset to be guards, and choose them in random diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 5d40e0d..d86d049 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -3984,10 +3984,10 @@ entry_nodes_should_be_added(void) should_add_entry_nodes = 1; }
-/** Add all nodes in EntryNodes that aren't currently guard nodes to the list - * of guard nodes, at the front. */ +/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from + * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */ static void -entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) +entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options) { smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps; smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list; @@ -4017,12 +4017,6 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
/* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
- /* XXXX023 Now that we allow countries and IP ranges in EntryNodes, this is - * potentially an enormous list. For now, we disable such values for - * EntryNodes in options_validate(); really, this wants a better solution. - * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers - * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. - */ routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes, options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node, @@ -4036,17 +4030,15 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) });
/* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable - * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_routers. */ + * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) { if (is_an_entry_guard(node->identity)) { SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) { - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: excluded"); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) { - log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Dropping node: fascist firewall"); SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node); continue; } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) { @@ -4059,7 +4051,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(const or_options_t *options) smartlist_clear(entry_guards); /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */ smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list); - /* Next, scramble the reset of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ + /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */ smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes); smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes); smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes); @@ -4125,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) entry_guards = smartlist_create();
if (should_add_entry_nodes) - entry_guards_prepend_from_config(options); + entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) && smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards) @@ -4150,7 +4142,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */ if (options->StrictNodes) { /* in theory this case should never happen, since - * entry_guards_prepend_from_config() drops unwanted relays */ + * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */ tor_fragile_assert(); } else { log_info(LD_CIRC,