commit 2de0281879be5abe8cb5a00ecf88549b3ed5c405 Author: Andrea Shepard <andrea@torproject.org> Date: Tue Jun 3 14:37:49 2014 -0700 Squelch spurious LD_BUG message in connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply() --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 22 +++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index a8ad9ec..49f9ba4 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2295,13 +2295,21 @@ connection_ap_handshake_socks_reply(entry_connection_t *conn, char *reply, endreason == END_STREAM_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT) { if (!conn->edge_.on_circuit || !CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(conn->edge_.on_circuit)) { - // DNS remaps can trigger this. So can failed hidden service - // lookups. - log_info(LD_BUG, - "No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream "U64_FORMAT - ". Reason: %d", - U64_PRINTF_ARG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier), - endreason); + if (endreason != END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED) { + log_info(LD_BUG, + "No origin circuit for successful SOCKS stream "U64_FORMAT + ". Reason: %d", + U64_PRINTF_ARG(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->global_identifier), + endreason); + } + /* + * Else DNS remaps and failed hidden service lookups can send us + * here with END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED; ignore it + * + * Perhaps we could make the test more precise; we can tell hidden + * services by conn->edge_.renddata != NULL; anything analogous for + * the DNS remap case? + */ } else { // XXX: Hrmm. It looks like optimistic data can't go through this // codepath, but someone should probably test it and make sure.