commit e8e6ecf319e01a380184afbe42a3711a2a16512f Author: George Kadianakis desnacked@riseup.net Date: Thu Jan 26 20:11:42 2017 +0200
Give proposal 250 its own spec file (srv-spec.txt)
This commit only copies text, it doesn't modify it. I mod it on the subsequent commit. --- srv-spec.txt | 641 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 641 insertions(+)
diff --git a/srv-spec.txt b/srv-spec.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d05d11d --- /dev/null +++ b/srv-spec.txt @@ -0,0 +1,641 @@ +Filename: 250-commit-reveal-consensus.txt +Title: Random Number Generation During Tor Voting +Authors: David Goulet, George Kadianakis +Created: 2015-08-03 +Status: Closed +Supersedes: 225 + + + Table Of Contents: + + 1. Introduction + 1.1. Motivation + 1.2. Previous work + 2. Overview + 2.1. Introduction to our commit-and-reveal protocol + 2.2. Ten thousand feet view of the protocol + 2.3. How we use the consensus [CONS] + 2.3.1. Inserting Shared Random Values in the consensus + 2.4. Persistent State of the Protocol [STATE] + 2.5. Protocol Illustration + 3. Protocol + 3.1 Commitment Phase [COMMITMENTPHASE] + 3.1.1. Voting During Commitment Phase + 3.1.2. Persistent State During Commitment Phase [STATECOMMIT] + 3.2 Reveal Phase + 3.2.1. Voting During Reveal Phase + 3.2.2. Persistent State During Reveal Phase [STATEREVEAL] + 3.3. Shared Random Value Calculation At 00:00UTC + 3.3.1. Shared Randomness Calculation [SRCALC] + 3.4. Bootstrapping Procedure + 3.5. Rebooting Directory Authorities [REBOOT] + 4. Specification [SPEC] + 4.1. Voting + 4.1.1. Computing commitments and reveals [COMMITREVEAL] + 4.1.2. Validating commitments and reveals [VALIDATEVALUES] + 4.1.4. Encoding commit/reveal values in votes [COMMITVOTE] + 4.1.5. Shared Random Value [SRVOTE] + 4.2. Encoding Shared Random Values in the consensus [SRCONSENSUS] + 4.3. Persistent state format [STATEFORMAT] + 5. Security Analysis + 5.1. Security of commit-and-reveal and future directions + 5.2. Predicting the shared random value during reveal phase + 5.3. Partition attacks + 5.3.1. Partition attacks during commit phase + 5.3.2. Partition attacks during reveal phase + 6. Discussion + 6.1. Why the added complexity from proposal 225? + 6.2. Why do you do a commit-and-reveal protocol in 24 rounds? + 6.3. Why can't we recover if the 00:00UTC consensus fails? + 7. Acknowledgements + + +1. Introduction + +1.1. Motivation + + For the next generation hidden services project, we need the Tor network to + produce a fresh random value every day in such a way that it cannot be + predicted in advance or influenced by an attacker. + + Currently we need this random value to make the HSDir hash ring + unpredictable (#8244), which should resolve a wide class of hidden service + DoS attacks and should make it harder for people to gauge the popularity + and activity of target hidden services. Furthermore this random value can + be used by other systems in need of fresh global randomness like + Tor-related protocols (e.g. OnioNS) or even non-Tor-related (e.g. warrant + canaries). + +1.2. Previous work + + Proposal 225 specifies a commit-and-reveal protocol that can be run as an + external script and have the results be fed to the directory authorities. + However, directory authority operators feel unsafe running a third-party + script that opens TCP ports and accepts connections from the Internet. + Hence, this proposal aims to embed the commit-and-reveal idea in the Tor + voting process which should make it smoother to deploy and maintain. + + Another idea proposed specifically for Tor is Nick Hopper's "A threshold + signature-based proposal for a shared RNG" which was never turned into an + actual Tor proposal. + +2. Overview + + This proposal alters the Tor consensus protocol such that a random number is + generated every midnight by the directory authorities during the regular voting + process. The distributed random generator scheme is based on the + commit-and-reveal technique. + + The proposal also specifies how the final shared random value is embedded + in consensus documents so that clients who need it can get it. + +2.1. Introduction to our commit-and-reveal protocol + + Every day, before voting for the consensus at 00:00UTC each authority + generates a new random value and keeps it for the whole day. The authority + cryptographically hashes the random value and calls the output its + "commitment" value. The original random value is called the "reveal" value. + + The idea is that given a reveal value you can cryptographically confirm that + it corresponds to a given commitment value (by hashing it). However given a + commitment value you should not be able to derive the underlying reveal + value. The construction of these values is specified in section [COMMITREVEAL]. + +2.1. Ten thousand feet view of the protocol + + Our commit-and-reveal protocol aims to produce a fresh shared random value + everyday at 00:00UTC. The final fresh random value is embedded in the + consensus document at that time. + + Our protocol has two phases and uses the hourly voting procedure of Tor. + Each phase lasts 12 hours, which means that 12 voting rounds happen in + between. In short, the protocol works as follows: + + Commit phase: + + Starting at 00:00UTC and for a period of 12 hours, authorities every + hour include their commitment in their votes. They also include any + received commitments from other authorities, if available. + + Reveal phase: + + At 12:00UTC, the reveal phase starts and lasts till the end of the + protocol at 00:00UTC. In this stage, authorities must reveal the value + they committed to in the previous phase. The commitment and revealed + values from other authorities, when available, are also added to the + vote. + + Shared Randomness Calculation: + + At 00:00UTC, the shared random value is computed from the agreed + revealed values and added to the consensus. + + This concludes the commit-and-reveal protocol at 00:00UTC everyday. + +2.3. How we use the consensus [CONS] + + The produced shared random values needs to be readily available to + clients. For this reason we include them in the consensus documents. + + Every hour the consensus documents need to include the shared random value + of the day, as well as the shared random value of the previous day. That's + because either of these values might be needed at a given time for a Tor + client to access a hidden service according to section [TIME-OVERLAP] of + proposal 224. This means that both of these two values need to be included + in votes as well. + + Hence, consensuses need to include: + + (a) The shared random value of the current time period. + (b) The shared random value of the previous time period. + + For this, a new SR consensus method will be needed to indicate which + authorities support this new protocol. + +2.3.1. Inserting Shared Random Values in the consensus + + After voting happens, we need to be careful on how we pick which shared + random values (SRV) to put in the consensus, to avoid breaking the consensus + because of authorities having different views of the commit-and-reveal + protocol (because maybe they missed some rounds of the protocol). + + For this reason, authorities look at the received votes before creating a + consensus and employ the following logic: + + - First of all, they make sure that the agreed upon consensus method is + above the SR consensus method. + + - Authorities include an SRV in the consensus if and only if the SRV has + been voted by at least the majority of authorities. + + - For the consensus at 00:00UTC, authorities include an SRV in the consensus + if and only if the SRV has been voted by at least AuthDirNumAgreements + authorities (where AuthDirNumAgreements is a newly introduced consensus + parameter). + + Authorities include in the consensus the most popular SRV that also + satisfies the above constraints. Otherwise, no SRV should be included. + + The above logic is used to make it harder to break the consensus by natural + partioning causes. + + We use the AuthDirNumAgreements consensus parameter to enforce that a + _supermajority_ of dirauths supports the SR protocol during SRV creation, so + that even if a few of those dirauths drop offline in the middle of the run + the SR protocol does not get disturbed. We go to extra lengths to ensure + this because changing SRVs in the middle of the day has terrible + reachability consequences for hidden service clients. + +2.4. Persistent State of the Protocol [STATE] + + A directory authority needs to keep a persistent state on disk of the on + going protocol run. This allows an authority to join the protocol seamlessly + in the case of a reboot. + + During the commitment phase, it is populated with the commitments of all + authorities. Then during the reveal phase, the reveal values are also + stored in the state. + + As discussed previously, the shared random values from the current and + previous time period must also be present in the state at all times if they + are available. + +2.5. Protocol Illustration + + An illustration for better understanding the protocol can be found here: + https://people.torproject.org/~asn/hs_notes/shared_rand.jpg + + It reads left-to-right. + + The illustration displays what the authorities (A_1, A_2, A_3) put in their + votes. A chain 'A_1 -> c_1 -> r_1' denotes that authority A_1 committed to + the value c_1 which corresponds to the reveal value r_1. + + The illustration depicts only a few rounds of the whole protocol. It starts + with the first three rounds of the commit phase, then it jumps to the last + round of the commit phase. It continues with the first two rounds of the + reveal phase and then it jumps to the final round of the protocol run. It + finally shows the first round of the commit phase of the next protocol run + (00:00UTC) where the final Shared Random Value is computed. In our fictional + example, the SRV was computed with 3 authority contributions and its value + is "a56fg39h". + + We advice you to revisit this after you have read the whole document. + +3. Protocol + + In this section we give a detailed specification of the protocol. We + describe the protocol participants' logic and the messages they send. The + encoding of the messages is specified in the next section ([SPEC]). + + Now we go through the phases of the protocol: + +3.1 Commitment Phase [COMMITMENTPHASE] + + The commit phase lasts from 00:00UTC to 12:00UTC. + + During this phase, an authority commits a value in its vote and + saves it to the permanent state as well. + + Authorities also save any received authoritative commits by other authorities + in their permanent state. We call a commit by Alice "authoritative" if it was + included in Alice's vote. + +3.1.1. Voting During Commitment Phase + + During the commit phase, each authority includes in its votes: + + - The commitment value for this protocol run. + - Any authoritative commitments received from other authorities. + - The two previous shared random values produced by the protocol (if any). + + The commit phase lasts for 12 hours, so authorities have multiple chances to + commit their values. An authority MUST NOT commit a second value during a + subsequent round of the commit phase. + + If an authority publishes a second commitment value in the same commit + phase, only the first commitment should be taken in account by other + authorities. Any subsequent commitments MUST be ignored. + +3.1.2. Persistent State During Commitment Phase [STATECOMMIT] + + During the commitment phase, authorities save in their persistent state the + authoritative commits they have received from each authority. Only one commit + per authority must be considered trusted and active at a given time. + +3.2 Reveal Phase + + The reveal phase lasts from 12:00UTC to 00:00UTC. + + Now that the commitments have been agreed on, it's time for authorities to + reveal their random values. + +3.2.1. Voting During Reveal Phase + + During the reveal phase, each authority includes in its votes: + + - Its reveal value that was previously committed in the commit phase. + - All the commitments and reveals received from other authorities. + - The two previous shared random values produced by the protocol (if any). + + The set of commitments have been decided during the commitment + phase and must remain the same. If an authority tries to change its + commitment during the reveal phase or introduce a new commitment, + the new commitment MUST be ignored. + +3.2.2. Persistent State During Reveal Phase [STATEREVEAL] + + During the reveal phase, authorities keep the authoritative commits from the + commit phase in their persistent state. They also save any received reveals + that correspond to authoritative commits and are valid (as specified in + [VALIDATEVALUES]). + + An authority that just received a reveal value from another authority's vote, + MUST wait till the next voting round before including that reveal value in + its votes. + +3.3. Shared Random Value Calculation At 00:00UTC + + Finally, at 00:00UTC every day, authorities compute a fresh shared random + value and this value must be added to the consensus so clients can use it. + + Authorities calculate the shared random value using the reveal values in + their state as specified in subsection [SRCALC]. + + Authorities at 00:00UTC start including this new shared random value in + their votes, replacing the one from two protocol runs ago. Authorities also + start including this new shared random value in the consensus as well. + + Apart from that, authorities at 00:00UTC proceed voting normally as they + would in the first round of the commitment phase (section [COMMITMENTPHASE]). + +3.3.1. Shared Randomness Calculation [SRCALC] + + An authority that wants to derive the shared random value SRV, should use + the appropriate reveal values for that time period and calculate SRV as + follows. + + HASHED_REVEALS = H(ID_a | R_a | ID_b | R_b | ..) + + SRV = SHA3-256("shared-random" | INT_8(REVEAL_NUM) | INT_4(VERSION) | + HASHED_REVEALS | PREVIOUS_SRV) + + where the ID_a value is the identity key fingerprint of authority 'a' and R_a + is the corresponding reveal value of that authority for the current period. + + Also, REVEAL_NUM is the number of revealed values in this construction, + VERSION is the protocol version number and PREVIOUS_SRV is the previous + shared random value. If no previous shared random value is known, then + PREVIOUS_SRV is set to 32 NUL (\x00) bytes. + + To maintain consistent ordering in HASHED_REVEALS, all the ID_a | R_a pairs + are ordered based on the R_a value in ascending order. + +3.4. Bootstrapping Procedure + + As described in [CONS], two shared random values are required for the HSDir + overlay periods to work properly as specified in proposal 224. Hence + clients MUST NOT use the randomness of this system till it has bootstrapped + completely; that is, until two shared random values are included in a + consensus. This should happen after three 00:00UTC consensuses have been + produced, which takes 48 hours. + +3.5. Rebooting Directory Authorities [REBOOT] + + The shared randomness protocol must be able to support directory + authorities who leave or join in the middle of the protocol execution. + + An authority that commits in the Commitment Phase and then leaves MUST have + stored its reveal value on disk so that it continues participating in the + protocol if it returns before or during the Reveal Phase. The reveal value + MUST be stored timestamped to avoid sending it on wrong protocol runs. + + An authority that misses the Commitment Phase cannot commit anymore, so it's + unable to participate in the protocol for that run. Same goes for an + authority that misses the Reveal phase. Authorities who do not participate in + the protocol SHOULD still carry commits and reveals of others in their vote. + + Finally, authorities MUST implement their persistent state in such a way that they + will never commit two different values in the same protocol run, even if they + have to reboot in the middle (assuming that their persistent state file is + kept). A suggested way to structure the persistent state is found at [STATEFORMAT]. + +4. Specification [SPEC] + +4.1. Voting + + This section describes how commitments, reveals and SR values are encoded in + votes. We describe how to encode both the authority's own + commitments/reveals and also the commitments/reveals received from the other + authorities. Commitments and reveals share the same line, but reveals are + optional. + + Participating authorities need to include the line: + "shared-rand-participate" + in their votes to announce that they take part in the protocol. + +4.1.1. Computing commitments and reveals [COMMITREVEAL] + + A directory authority that wants to participate in this protocol needs to + create a new pair of commitment/reveal values for every protocol + run. Authorities SHOULD generate a fresh pair of such values right before the + first commitment phase of the day (at 00:00UTC). + + The value REVEAL is computed as follows: + + REVEAL = base64-encode( TIMESTAMP || H(RN) ) + + where RN is the SHA3 hashed value of a 256-bit random value. We hash the + random value to avoid exposing raw bytes from our PRNG to the network (see + [RANDOM-REFS]). + + TIMESTAMP is an 8-bytes network-endian time_t value. Authorities SHOULD + set TIMESTAMP to the valid-after time of the vote document they first plan + to publish their commit into (so usually at 00:00UTC, except if they start + up in a later commit round). + + The value COMMIT is computed as follows: + + COMMIT = base64-encode( TIMESTAMP || H(REVEAL) ) + +4.1.2. Validating commitments and reveals [VALIDATEVALUES] + + Given a COMMIT message and a REVEAL message it should be possible to verify + that they indeed correspond. To do so, the client extracts the random value + H(RN) from the REVEAL message, hashes it, and compares it with the H(H(RN)) + from the COMMIT message. We say that the COMMIT and REVEAL messages + correspond, if the comparison was successful. + + Pariticipants MUST also check that corresponding COMMIT and REVEAL values + have the same timestamp value. + + Authorities should ignore reveal values during the Reveal Phase that don't + correspond to commit values published during the Commitment Phase. + +4.1.4. Encoding commit/reveal values in votes [COMMITVOTE] + + An authority puts in its vote the commitments and reveals it has produced and + seen from the other authorities. To do so, it includes the following in its + votes: + + "shared-rand-commit" SP VERSION SP ALGNAME SP IDENTITY SP COMMIT [SP REVEAL] NL + + where VERSION is the version of the protocol the commit was created with. + IDENTITY is the authority's SHA1 identity fingerprint and COMMIT is the + encoded commit [COMMITREVEAL]. Authorities during the reveal phase can + also optionally include an encoded reveal value REVEAL. There MUST be only + one line per authority else the vote is considered invalid. Finally, the + ALGNAME is the hash algorithm that should be used to compute COMMIT and + REVEAL which is "sha3-256" for version 1. + +4.1.5. Shared Random Value [SRVOTE] + + Authorities include a shared random value (SRV) in their votes using the + following encoding for the previous and current value respectively: + + "shared-rand-previous-value" SP NUM_REVEALS SP VALUE NL + "shared-rand-current-value" SP NUM_REVEALS SP VALUE NL + + where VALUE is the actual shared random value encoded in hex (computed as + specified in section [SRCALC]. NUM_REVEALS is the number of reveal values + used to generate this SRV. + + To maintain consistent ordering, the shared random values of the previous + period should be listed before the values of the current period. + +4.2. Encoding Shared Random Values in the consensus [SRCONSENSUS] + + Authorities insert the two active shared random values in the consensus + following the same encoding format as in [SRVOTE]. + +4.3. Persistent state format [STATEFORMAT] + + As a way to keep ground truth state in this protocol, an authority MUST + keep a persistent state of the protocol. The next sub-section suggest a + format for this state which is the same as the current state file format. + + It contains a preamble, a commitment and reveal section and a list of + shared random values. + + The preamble (or header) contains the following items. They MUST occur in + the order given here: + + "Version" SP version NL + + [At start, exactly once.] + + A document format version. For this specification, version is "1". + + "ValidUntil" SP YYYY-MM-DD SP HH:MM:SS NL + + [Exactly once] + + After this time, this state is expired and shouldn't be used nor + trusted. The validity time period is till the end of the current + protocol run (the upcoming noon). + + The following details the commitment and reveal section. They are encoded + the same as in the vote. This makes it easier for implementation purposes. + + "Commit" SP version SP algname SP identity SP commit [SP reveal] NL + + [Exactly once per authority] + + The values are the same as detailed in section [COMMITVOTE]. + + This line is also used by an authority to store its own value. + + Finally is the shared random value section. + + "SharedRandPreviousValue" SP num_reveals SP value NL + + [At most once] + + This is the previous shared random value agreed on at the previous + period. The fields are the same as in section [SRVOTE]. + + "SharedRandCurrentValue" SP num_reveals SP value NL + + [At most once] + + This is the latest shared random value. The fields are the same as in + section [SRVOTE]. + +5. Security Analysis + +5.1. Security of commit-and-reveal and future directions + + The security of commit-and-reveal protocols is well understood, and has + certain flaws. Basically, the protocol is insecure to the extent that an + adversary who controls b of the authorities gets to choose among 2^b + outcomes for the result of the protocol. However, an attacker who is not a + dirauth should not be able to influence the outcome at all. + + We believe that this system offers sufficient security especially compared + to the current situation. More secure solutions require much more advanced + crypto and more complex protocols so this seems like an acceptable solution + for now. + + For alternative approaches on collaborative random number generation also + see the discussion at [RNGMESSAGING]. + +5.2. Predicting the shared random value during reveal phase + + The reveal phase lasts 12 hours, and most authorities will send their + reveal value on the first round of the reveal phase. This means that an + attacker can predict the final shared random value about 12 hours before + it's generated. + + This does not pose a problem for the HSDir hash ring, since we impose an + higher uptime restriction on HSDir nodes, so 12 hours predictability is not + an issue. + + Any other protocols using the shared random value from this system should + be aware of this property. + +5.3. Partition attacks + + This design is not immune to certain partition attacks. We believe they + don't offer much gain to an attacker as they are very easy to detect and + difficult to pull off since an attacker would need to compromise a directory + authority at the very least. Also, because of the byzantine general problem, + it's very hard (even impossible in some cases) to protect against all such + attacks. Nevertheless, this section describes all possible partition attack + and how to detect them. + +5.3.1. Partition attacks during commit phase + + A malicious directory authority could send only its commit to one single + authority which results in that authority having an extra commit value for + the shared random calculation that the others don't have. Since the + consensus needs majority, this won't affect the final SRV value. However, + the attacker, using this attack, could remove a single directory authority + from the consensus decision at 24:00 when the SRV is computed. + + An attacker could also partition the authorities by sending two different + commitment values to different authorities during the commit phase. + + All of the above is fairly easy to detect. Commitment values in the vote + coming from an authority should NEVER be different between authorities. If + so, this means an attack is ongoing or very bad bug (highly unlikely). + +5.3.2. Partition attacks during reveal phase + + Let's consider Alice, a malicious directory authority. Alice could wait + until the last reveal round, and reveal its value to half of the + authorities. That would partition the authorities into two sets: the ones + who think that the shared random value should contain this new reveal, and + the rest who don't know about it. This would result in a tie and two + different shared random value. + + A similar attack is possible. For example, two rounds before the end of the + reveal phase, Alice could advertise her reveal value to only half of the + dirauths. This way, in the last reveal phase round, half of the dirauths + will include that reveal value in their votes and the others will not. In + the end of the reveal phase, half of the dirauths will calculate a + different shared randomness value than the others. + + We claim that this attack is not particularly fruitful: Alice ends up + having two shared random values to chose from which is a fundamental + problem of commit-and-reveal protocols as well (since the last person can + always abort or reveal). The attacker can also sabotage the consensus, but + there are other ways this can be done with the current voting system. + + Furthermore, we claim that such an attack is very noisy and detectable. + First of all, it requires the authority to sabotage two consensuses which + will cause quite some noise. Furthermore, the authority needs to send + different votes to different auths which is detectable. Like the commit + phase attack, the detection here is to make sure that the commiment values + in a vote coming from an authority are always the same for each authority. + +6. Discussion + +6.1. Why the added complexity from proposal 225? + + The complexity difference between this proposal and prop225 is in part + because prop225 doesn't specify how the shared random value gets to the + clients. This proposal spends lots of effort specifying how the two shared + random values can always be readily accessible to clients. + +6.2. Why do you do a commit-and-reveal protocol in 24 rounds? + + The reader might be wondering why we span the protocol over the course of a + whole day (24 hours), when only 3 rounds would be sufficient to generate a + shared random value. + + We decided to do it this way, because we piggyback on the Tor voting + protocol which also happens every hour. + + We could instead only do the shared randomness protocol from 21:00 to 00:00 + every day. Or to do it multiple times a day. + + However, we decided that since the shared random value needs to be in every + consensus anyway, carrying the commitments/reveals as well will not be a + big problem. Also, this way we give more chances for a failing dirauth to + recover and rejoin the protocol. + +6.3. Why can't we recover if the 00:00UTC consensus fails? + + If the 00:00UTC consensus fails, there will be no shared random value for + the whole day. In theory, we could recover by calculating the shared + randomness of the day at 01:00UTC instead. However, the engineering issues + with adding such recovery logic are too great. For example, it's not easy + for an authority who just booted to learn whether a specific consensus + failed to be created. + +7. Acknowledgements + + Thanks to everyone who has contributed to this design with feedback and + discussion. + + Thanks go to arma, ioerror, kernelcorn, nickm, s7r, Sebastian, teor, weasel + and everyone else! + +References: + +[RANDOM-REFS]: + http://projectbullrun.org/dual-ec/ext-rand.html + https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-November/009954.html + +[RNGMESSAGING]: + https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/messaging/2015/002032.html