commit 3efe8bb8ac6c1b62cc488e72b890b699f2fe7081 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Wed Jan 18 15:45:02 2017 -0500
Remove some now-spurious blocks and indentation. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 137 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------------- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 72 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 22cab26..e99aa00 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2944,22 +2944,20 @@ num_bridges_usable(void) { int n_options = 0;
- if (1) { - /* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */ - tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); - guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info(); - tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE); + /* XXXX prop271 Is this quite right? */ + tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges); + guard_selection_t *gs = get_guard_selection_info(); + tor_assert(gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE);
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { - if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) - continue; - if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) - continue; - const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity); - if (node && node->ri) - ++n_options; - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); - } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { + if (guard->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) + continue; + if (tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) + continue; + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(guard->identity); + if (node && node->ri) + ++n_options; + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard);
return n_options; } @@ -3106,27 +3104,26 @@ getinfo_helper_format_single_entry_guard(const entry_guard_t *e) char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1]; char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
- if (1) { - /* modern case. This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status - * codes above weren't really intended for prop271 guards. - * - * XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information - */ - if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) { - status = "never-connected"; - } else if (! e->currently_listed) { - when = e->unlisted_since_date; - status = "unusable"; - } else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) { - status = "unusable"; - } else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) { - when = e->failing_since; - status = "down"; - } else { - status = "up"; - } + /* This is going to be a bit tricky, since the status + * codes weren't really intended for prop271 guards. + * + * XXXX use a more appropriate format for exporting this information + */ + if (e->confirmed_idx < 0) { + status = "never-connected"; + } else if (! e->currently_listed) { + when = e->unlisted_since_date; + status = "unusable"; + } else if (! e->is_filtered_guard) { + status = "unusable"; + } else if (e->is_reachable == GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) { + when = e->failing_since; + status = "down"; + } else { + status = "up"; }
+ node = entry_guard_find_node(e); if (node) { node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf); @@ -3247,26 +3244,24 @@ const node_t * guards_choose_guard(cpath_build_state_t *state, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out) { - if (1) { - const node_t *r = NULL; - const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL; - entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; - // XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here. - if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) { - /* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be - * chosen as our guard for this circuit. */ - rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); - memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN); - } - if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), - GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, - rst, - &r, - guard_state_out) < 0) { - tor_assert(r == NULL); - } - return r; + const node_t *r = NULL; + const uint8_t *exit_id = NULL; + entry_guard_restriction_t *rst = NULL; + // XXXX prop271 spec deviation -- use of restriction here. + if (state && (exit_id = build_state_get_exit_rsa_id(state))) { + /* We're building to a targeted exit node, so that node can't be + * chosen as our guard for this circuit. */ + rst = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_restriction_t)); + memcpy(rst->exclude_id, exit_id, DIGEST_LEN); + } + if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), + GUARD_USAGE_TRAFFIC, + rst, + &r, + guard_state_out) < 0) { + tor_assert(r == NULL); } + return r; }
/** Helper: pick a directory guard, with whatever algorithm is used. */ @@ -3274,25 +3269,23 @@ const node_t * guards_choose_dirguard(dirinfo_type_t info, circuit_guard_state_t **guard_state_out) { - if (1) { - /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here, - * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info - * downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into - * choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you - * find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha, - * when we realized that every Tor on the network would support - * microdescriptors. -NM */ - (void) info; - const node_t *r = NULL; - if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), - GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD, - NULL, - &r, - guard_state_out) < 0) { - tor_assert(r == NULL); - } - return r; - } + /* XXXX prop271 We don't need to look at the dirinfo_type_t here, + * apparently. If you look at the old implementation, and you follow info + * downwards through choose_random_dirguard(), into + * choose_random_entry_impl(), into populate_live_entry_guards()... you + * find out that it isn't even used, and hasn't been since 0.2.7.1-alpha, + * when we realized that every Tor on the network would support + * microdescriptors. -NM */ + (void) info; + const node_t *r = NULL; + if (entry_guard_pick_for_circuit(get_guard_selection_info(), + GUARD_USAGE_DIRGUARD, + NULL, + &r, + guard_state_out) < 0) { + tor_assert(r == NULL); + } + return r; }
/**