commit f2384d5e2c25469038caa84e0dedaa5e2efca29c Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Thu Apr 19 17:13:47 2012 -0400
Make base64_decode in rend_parse_client_keys more foolproof
In general, whenever we can, we should be doing base64_decode(buf, sizeof(buf), s, strlen(s)), and not base_64_decode(buf, expr1, s, expr2) where we hope that expr1 is a good name for the size of buf and expr2 is a good formula for the length of the base64 expression in s. --- src/or/routerparse.c | 6 +++--- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 99b4eb0..7cc8b96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -5171,9 +5171,9 @@ rend_parse_client_keys(strmap_t *parsed_clients, const char *ckstr) /* The size of descriptor_cookie_tmp needs to be REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2, * because a base64 encoding of length 24 does not fit into 16 bytes in all * cases. */ - if ((base64_decode(descriptor_cookie_tmp, REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN+2, - tok->args[0], REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64+2+1) - != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN)) { + if (base64_decode(descriptor_cookie_tmp, sizeof(descriptor_cookie_tmp), + tok->args[0], strlen(tok->args[0])) + != REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Descriptor cookie contains illegal characters: " "%s", escaped(tok->args[0])); goto err;