commit d5df9fa2356ed1f9d38d659efa335bb9bb134228 Author: J. Ryan Stinnett jryans@gmail.com Date: Fri Dec 9 14:13:11 2016 -1000
Replace "people" with the appropriate network component in comments
Fixes #18145. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 +- src/or/circuitstats.c | 2 +- src/or/circuituse.c | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 2 +- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/dirserv.c | 6 +++--- src/or/dnsserv.c | 2 +- src/or/hibernate.c | 6 +++--- src/or/or.h | 2 +- src/or/router.c | 6 +++--- src/or/routerlist.c | 2 +- 11 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index f60a8bf..9bd0125 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
/* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay), - * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty + * but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack, * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a * new TLS connection for each extend request. */ diff --git a/src/or/circuitstats.c b/src/or/circuitstats.c index 418acc0..6cb99e4 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/or/circuitstats.c @@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
#define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2)) /* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout - * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ + * to give clients on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */ if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) { if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. " diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 04c5af9..e109cef 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn) log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).", (unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age); - /* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are + /* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are * sucking. */ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 6948bdb..a4d063d 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(options);
/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge? - * We use this so we don't count people who used our bridge thinking it is + * We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is * a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message * below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients) * plus some extra time for clock skew. */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 3874d52..fb077bb 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn, * an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to * do so. */ if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) { - /* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ + /* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */ tor_addr_t addr; int ok; ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name( diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 399d5ea..e106628 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ directory_caches_dir_info(const or_options_t *options) should_refuse_unknown_exits(options); }
-/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote people to ask us directory +/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote clients to ask us directory * requests via the "begin_dir" interface, which doesn't require * having any separate port open. */ int @@ -2236,8 +2236,8 @@ dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs) }
/** Routerstatus <b>rs</b> is part of a group of routers that are on - * too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags: we don't want people - * using it. + * too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags since we don't want it be used + * because of its Sybil-like appearance. */ static void clear_status_flags_on_sybil(routerstatus_t *rs) diff --git a/src/or/dnsserv.c b/src/or/dnsserv.c index c5c0a88..8768b2a 100644 --- a/src/or/dnsserv.c +++ b/src/or/dnsserv.c @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ dnsserv_reject_request(entry_connection_t *conn) }
/** Look up the original name that corresponds to 'addr' in req. We use this - * to preserve case in order to facilitate people using 0x20-hacks to avoid + * to preserve case in order to facilitate clients using 0x20-hacks to avoid * DNS poisoning. */ static const char * evdns_get_orig_address(const struct evdns_server_request *req, diff --git a/src/or/hibernate.c b/src/or/hibernate.c index aaf5c4b..c2b3bbb 100644 --- a/src/or/hibernate.c +++ b/src/or/hibernate.c @@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ configure_accounting(time_t now) if (-0.50 <= delta && delta <= 0.50) { /* The start of the period is now a little later or earlier than we * remembered. That's fine; we might lose some bytes we could otherwise - * have written, but better to err on the side of obeying people's - * accounting settings. */ + * have written, but better to err on the side of obeying accounting + * settings. */ log_info(LD_ACCT, "Accounting interval moved by %.02f%%; " "that's fine.", delta*100); interval_end_time = start_of_accounting_period_after(now); @@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ hibernate_go_dormant(time_t now) log_notice(LD_ACCT,"Going dormant. Blowing away remaining connections.");
/* Close all OR/AP/exit conns. Leave dir conns because we still want - * to be able to upload server descriptors so people know we're still + * to be able to upload server descriptors so clients know we're still * running, and download directories so we can detect if we're obsolete. * Leave control conns because we still want to be controllable. */ diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 7e11bf0..0e508e9 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ typedef struct { uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing * to use in a second? */ uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to - * tell people we have? */ + * tell other nodes we have? */ uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we * willing to use for all relayed conns? */ uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 917caaa..2d8208a 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -1178,9 +1178,9 @@ router_should_be_directory_server(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port) if (accounting_is_enabled(options) && get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) { /* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating, - * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some people set AccountingMax because - * they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a much - * larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it + * but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax + * because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a + * much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it * off if using AccountingRule in. */ int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length(); uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 9bcca76..5fd16ed 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -4483,7 +4483,7 @@ router_load_extrainfo_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos, ei->cache_info.identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); smartlist_string_remove(requested_fingerprints, fp); - /* We silently let people stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for, + /* We silently let relays stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for, * so long as we would have wanted them anyway. Since we always fetch * all the extrainfos we want, and we never actually act on them * inside Tor, this should be harmless. */