commit 6e4a4002c5f988615299f0160ff4bbfb9dfdda3e Author: Roger Dingledine arma@torproject.org Date: Tue Jan 15 15:40:17 2013 -0500
Clean up odds and ends --- src/common/compat.h | 3 +- src/common/crypto_curve25519.c | 1 + src/or/circuitbuild.c | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------ src/or/circuituse.c | 6 ++-- src/or/onion.c | 4 +- src/or/or.h | 2 +- 6 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/compat.h b/src/common/compat.h index f597c12..af6bc75 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.h +++ b/src/common/compat.h @@ -546,7 +546,8 @@ const char *tor_socket_strerror(int e); #endif #define ERRNO_IS_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS) #define ERRNO_IS_CONN_EINPROGRESS(e) ((e) == EINPROGRESS) -#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) (ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) || (e) == ECONNABORTED) +#define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_EAGAIN(e) \ + (ERRNO_IS_EAGAIN(e) || (e) == ECONNABORTED) #define ERRNO_IS_ACCEPT_RESOURCE_LIMIT(e) \ ((e) == EMFILE || (e) == ENFILE || (e) == ENOBUFS || (e) == ENOMEM) #define ERRNO_IS_EADDRINUSE(e) ((e) == EADDRINUSE) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c index aead4f8..e9d24d6 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_curve25519.c @@ -208,3 +208,4 @@ curve25519_public_from_base64(curve25519_public_key_t *pkey, return -1; } } + diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index e934acc..12b58e1 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -1437,7 +1437,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) }
/* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias - * build success.. They get counted under use success */ + * "build" success, since they get counted under "use" success. */ if (!circ->has_opened) { if (circ->cpath && circ->cpath->extend_info) { guard = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest( @@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ) * are not possible to differentiate from unresponsive servers. * * The probe is sent at the end of the circuit lifetime for two - * reasons: to prevent cyptographic taggers from being able to + * reasons: to prevent cryptographic taggers from being able to * drop cells to cause timeouts, and to prevent easy recognition * of probes before any real client traffic happens. * @@ -1556,7 +1556,7 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ)
circuit_change_purpose(circ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_PATH_BIAS_TESTING);
- /* Update timestamp for circuit_expire_building to kill us */ + /* Update timestamp for when circuit_expire_building() should kill us */ tor_gettimeofday(&circ->timestamp_began);
/* Generate a random address for the nonce */ @@ -1596,8 +1596,8 @@ pathbias_send_usable_probe(circuit_t *circ) RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN, payload, payload_len, cpath_layer) < 0) { log_notice(LD_CIRC, - "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", - ocirc->global_identifier); + "Failed to send pathbias probe cell on circuit %d.", + ocirc->global_identifier); return -1; }
@@ -1710,7 +1710,7 @@ pathbias_check_close(origin_circuit_t *ocirc, int reason)
} else { if (reason & END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE) { - /* Unused remote circ close reasons all could be bias */ + /* Remote circ close reasons on an unused circuit all could be bias */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Circuit %d remote-closed without successful use for reason %d. " "Circuit purpose %d currently %d,%s. Len %d.", @@ -1836,6 +1836,8 @@ pathbias_count_unusable(origin_circuit_t *circ) /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here. * No need to log that case. */ + /* XXX note cut-and-paste code in this function compared to nearby + * functions. Would be nice to refactor. -RD */ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Stream-failing circuit has no known guard. " "Circuit is a %s currently %s", @@ -1886,11 +1888,11 @@ pathbias_count_timeout(origin_circuit_t *circ) double pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { - circuit_t *circ = global_circuitlist; + circuit_t *circ; int open_circuits = 0;
- /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt */ - for ( ; circ; circ = circ->next) { + /* Count currently open circuits. Give them the benefit of the doubt. */ + for (circ = global_circuitlist; circ; circ = circ->next) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = NULL; if (!CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ) || /* didn't originate here */ circ->marked_for_close) /* already counted */ @@ -1903,8 +1905,8 @@ pathbias_get_closed_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
if (ocirc->path_state >= PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED && fast_memeq(guard->identity, - ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, - DIGEST_LEN)) { + ocirc->cpath->extend_info->identity_digest, + DIGEST_LEN)) { open_circuits++; } } @@ -1928,9 +1930,10 @@ pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard) }
/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to - * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should - * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the - * guard looks fine. */ + * <b>guard</b>, first checking if the failure rate is high enough that + * we should eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; + * return 0 if the guard looks fine. + */ static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) { @@ -1949,7 +1952,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) if (!guard->path_bias_disabled) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Your Guard %s=%s is failing an extremely large amount of " - "circuits. To avoid potential route manipluation attacks, " + "circuits. To avoid potential route manipulation attacks, " "Tor has disabled use of this guard. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " @@ -1992,7 +1995,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) "Your Guard %s=%s is failing a very large amount of " "circuits. Most likely this means the Tor network is " "overloaded, but it could also mean an attack against " - "you or the potentially the guard itself. " + "you or potentially the guard itself. " "Success counts are %ld/%ld. %ld circuits completed, %ld " "were unusable, %ld collapsed, and %ld timed out. For " "reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.", @@ -2058,10 +2061,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard) return 0; }
-/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included - * reply_cell as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body - * contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is - * CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).) +/** A "created" cell <b>reply</b> came back to us on circuit <b>circ</b>. + * (The body of <b>reply</b> varies depending on what sort of handshake + * this is.) * * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath. @@ -2117,9 +2119,9 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ,
/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ. * - * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + * Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, - * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0. + * just give up: force circ to close, and return 0. */ int circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) @@ -2130,7 +2132,7 @@ circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason) tor_assert(circ); tor_assert(layer);
- /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated + /* XXX Since we don't send truncates currently, getting a truncated * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now, * just give up. */ @@ -2223,15 +2225,18 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, return 0; }
-/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>. - * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something - * away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers +/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>: three + the + * number of endpoints that would give something away about our destination. + * + * If the routerlist <b>nodes</b> doesn't have enough routers * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1. + * XXX ^^ I think this behavior is a hold-over from back when we had only a + * few relays in the network, and certainly back before guards existed. + * We should very likely get rid of it. -RD */ static int -new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, - smartlist_t *nodes) +new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, smartlist_t *nodes) { int num_acceptable_routers; int routelen; diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index bdaf7d8..ada2d69 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -452,15 +452,15 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(stream_cutoff, MAX(options->CircuitStreamTimeout,15)*1000 + 1000);
/* Be lenient with cannibalized circs. They already survived the official - * CBT, and they're usually not perf-critical. */ + * CBT, and they're usually not performance-critical. */ SET_CUTOFF(cannibalized_cutoff, MAX(circ_times.close_ms*(4/6.0), options->CircuitStreamTimeout * 1000) + 1000);
- // Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) + /* Intro circs have an extra round trip (and are also 4 hops long) */ SET_CUTOFF(c_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (14/6.0) + 1000);
- // Server intro circs have an extra round trip + /* Server intro circs have an extra round trip */ SET_CUTOFF(s_intro_cutoff, circ_times.timeout_ms * (9/6.0) + 1000);
SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); diff --git a/src/or/onion.c b/src/or/onion.c index 329b01c..1043936 100644 --- a/src/or/onion.c +++ b/src/or/onion.c @@ -374,10 +374,10 @@ onion_skin_server_handshake(int type,
/** Perform the final (client-side) step of a circuit-creation handshake of * type <b>type</b>, using our state in <b>handshake_state</b> and the - * server's response in <b>reply</b> On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b> + * server's response in <b>reply</b>. On success, generate <b>keys_out_len</b> * bytes worth of key material in <b>keys_out_len</b>, set * <b>rend_authenticator_out</b> to the "KH" field that can be used to - * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure, + * establish introduction points at this hop, and return 0. On failure, * return -1. */ int onion_skin_client_handshake(int type, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index eb0dc81..9f5bec7 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2578,7 +2578,7 @@ typedef enum {
struct fast_handshake_state_t; struct ntor_handshake_state_t; -#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000 +#define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_TAP 0x0000 #define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_FAST 0x0001 #define ONION_HANDSHAKE_TYPE_NTOR 0x0002 typedef struct {