commit 51f1127c2fea9b34ee32bbf8b56ea2658424b9f2 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Tue Sep 19 14:22:47 2017 -0400
Clarify which ciphers we are talking about in tor-spec 0.3.
Make sure we mention all the ciphers we use, and use the phrase "unless otherwise specified" liberally to make sure that people don't think that we're still RSA1024 all over.
Also rename the hybrid encryption thing to "legacy hybrid encryption", and put it in its own section.
Closes ticket 22722. --- rend-spec.txt | 25 +++++++++++++------------ tor-spec.txt | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rend-spec.txt b/rend-spec.txt index 24d06f1..d3a93e1 100644 --- a/rend-spec.txt +++ b/rend-spec.txt @@ -658,10 +658,10 @@ an identity key digest that is encoded in hex and prefixed with a '$'.
The hybrid encryption to Bob's PK works just like the hybrid - encryption in CREATE cells (see tor-spec). Thus the payload of the - version 0 RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell on the wire will contain - 20+42+16+20+20+128=246 bytes, and the version 1 and version 2 - introduction formats have other sizes. + encryption in CREATE cells (see tor-spec, section 0.4). Thus the + payload of the version 0 RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE1 cell on the + wire will contain 20+42+16+20+20+128=246 bytes, and the version 1 + and version 2 introduction formats have other sizes.
Through Tor 0.2.0.6-alpha, clients only generated the v0 introduction format, whereas hidden services have understood and accepted v0, @@ -689,14 +689,15 @@ determined later; the current implementation sends a single '1' byte on failure.)
- When Bob's OP receives the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell, it first checks - for a replay. Because of the (undesirable!) malleability of the hybrid - encryption, Bob's OP should only check whether the RSA-encrypted part is - replayed. It does this by keeping, for each introduction key, a list of - cryptographic digests of all the RSA-encrypted parts of the INTRODUCE2 - cells that it's seen, and dropping any INTRODUCE2 cell whose RSA-encrypted - part it has seen before. When Bob's OP stops using a given introduction - key, it drops the replay cache corresponding to that key. + When Bob's OP receives the RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE2 cell, it first + checks for a replay. Because of the (undesirable!) malleability of + the legacy hybrid encryption algorithm, Bob's OP should only check + whether the RSA-encrypted part is replayed. It does this by keeping, + for each introduction key, a list of cryptographic digests of all the + RSA-encrypted parts of the INTRODUCE2 cells that it's seen, and + dropping any INTRODUCE2 cell whose RSA-encrypted part it has seen + before. When Bob's OP stops using a given introduction key, it drops + the replay cache corresponding to that key.
(Versions of Tor before 0.2.3.9-alpha used the timestamp in the INTRODUCE2 cell to limit the lifetime of entries in the replay cache. This proved to diff --git a/tor-spec.txt b/tor-spec.txt index bb74678..3c8b6e9 100644 --- a/tor-spec.txt +++ b/tor-spec.txt @@ -71,19 +71,24 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
0.3. Ciphers
- For a stream cipher, we use 128-bit AES in counter mode, with an IV of all - 0 bytes. + These are the ciphers we use _unless otherwise specified_. Several of + them are deprecated for new use.
- For a public-key cipher, we use RSA with 1024-bit keys and a fixed - exponent of 65537. We use OAEP-MGF1 padding, with SHA-1 as its digest - function. We leave the optional "Label" parameter unset. (For OAEP - padding, see ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.pdf) + For a stream cipher, unless otherwise specified, we use 128-bit AES in + counter mode, with an IV of all 0 bytes. (We also require AES256.)
- For the "ntor" handshake, we also use the Curve25519 elliptic curve group. + For a public-key cipher, unless otherwise specified, we use RSA with + 1024-bit keys and a fixed exponent of 65537. We use OAEP-MGF1 + padding, with SHA-1 as its digest function. We leave the optional + "Label" parameter unset. (For OAEP padding, see + ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.pdf)
- For Diffie-Hellman, we use a generator (g) of 2. For the modulus (p), we - use the 1024-bit safe prime from rfc2409 section 6.2 whose hex - representation is: + We also use the Curve25519 group and the Ed25519 signature format in + several places. + + For Diffie-Hellman, unless otherwise specified, we use a generator + (g) of 2. For the modulus (p), we use the 1024-bit safe prime from + rfc2409 section 6.2 whose hex representation is:
"FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" @@ -99,22 +104,28 @@ see tor-design.pdf. per second, but there are too many oddball attacks for me to be comfortable that this is safe. -NM]
- For a hash function, we use SHA-1. + For a hash function, unless otherwise specified, we use SHA-1.
KEY_LEN=16. DH_LEN=128; DH_SEC_LEN=40. PK_ENC_LEN=128; PK_PAD_LEN=42. HASH_LEN=20.
- When we refer to "the hash of a public key", we mean the SHA-1 hash of the - DER encoding of an ASN.1 RSA public key (as specified in PKCS.1). + We also use SHA256 and SHA3-256 in some places. + + When we refer to "the hash of a public key", unless otherwise + specified, we mean the SHA-1 hash of the DER encoding of an ASN.1 RSA + public key (as specified in PKCS.1).
All "random" values MUST be generated with a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator seeded from a strong entropy source, unless otherwise noted.
- The "hybrid encryption" of a byte sequence M with a public key PK is - computed as follows: +0.4. A bad hybrid encryption algorithm, for legacy purposes. + + Some specifications will refer to the "legacy hybrid encryption" of a + byte sequence M with a public key PK. It is computed as follows: + 1. If the length of M is no more than PK_ENC_LEN-PK_PAD_LEN, pad and encrypt M with PK. 2. Otherwise, generate a KEY_LEN byte random key K. @@ -123,12 +134,12 @@ see tor-design.pdf. Pad and encrypt K|M1 with PK. Encrypt M2 with our stream cipher, using the key K. Concatenate these encrypted values.
- [XXX Note that this "hybrid encryption" approach does not prevent + Note that this "hybrid encryption" approach does not prevent an attacker from adding or removing bytes to the end of M. It also allows attackers to modify the bytes not covered by the OAEP -- see Goldberg's PET2006 paper for details. Do not use it as the basis for new protocols! Also note that as used in Tor's protocols, case 1 - never occurs.] + never occurs.
1. System overview
@@ -878,8 +889,8 @@ see tor-design.pdf.
The payload for a CREATE cell is an 'onion skin', which consists of the first step of the DH handshake data (also known as g^x). This - value is hybrid-encrypted (see 0.3) to the server's onion key, giving - a client handshake of: + value is encrypted using the "legacy hybrid encryption" algorithm + (see 0.4 above) to the server's onion key, giving a client handshake:
PK-encrypted: Padding [PK_PAD_LEN bytes]