[tor-commits] [tor/master] Add "ADD_ONION"/"DEL_ONION" and "GETINFO onions/*" to the controller.

commit 915c7438a77edfaf3103b69cb494a4f069a79a0c Author: Yawning Angel yawning@schwanenlied.me Date: Sat Apr 25 08:23:15 2015 +0000

Add "ADD_ONION"/"DEL_ONION" and "GETINFO onions/*" to the controller.

These commands allow for the creation and management of ephemeral Onion ("Hidden") services that are either bound to the lifetime of the originating control connection, or optionally the lifetime of the tor instance.

Implements #6411. --- changes/feature6411 | 7 + src/common/crypto.c | 72 ++++++++ src/common/crypto.h | 3 + src/or/connection.c | 7 + src/or/control.c | 405 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/control.h | 5 + src/or/or.h | 3 + src/or/rendservice.c | 301 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- src/or/rendservice.h | 19 +++ src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 4 +- src/test/test_controller.c | 161 ++++++++++++++++++ src/test/test_crypto.c | 37 ++++ 13 files changed, 980 insertions(+), 45 deletions(-)

diff --git a/changes/feature6411 b/changes/feature6411 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6024364 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/feature6411 @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Major features (controller): + - Add the ADD_ONION and DEL_ONION commands that allows the creation + and management of hidden services via the controller. Closes + ticket 6411. + - New "GETINFO onions/current" and "GETINFO onions/detached" to get + information about hidden services created via the controller. + Part of ticket 6411. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 7857a54..8038631 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -1397,6 +1397,78 @@ crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out) return 0; }

+/** Given a crypto_pk_t <b>pk</b>, allocate a new buffer containing the + * Base64 encoding of the DER representation of the private key as a NUL + * terminated string, and return it via <b>priv_out</b>. Return 0 on + * sucess, -1 on failure. + * + * It is the caller's responsibility to sanitize and free the resulting buffer. + */ +int +crypto_pk_base64_encode(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out) +{ + unsigned char *der = NULL; + int der_len; + int ret = -1; + + *priv_out = NULL; + + der_len = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pk->key, &der); + if (der_len < 0 || der == NULL) + return ret; + + size_t priv_len = base64_encode_size(der_len, 0) + 1; + char *priv = tor_malloc_zero(priv_len); + if (base64_encode(priv, priv_len, (char *)der, der_len, 0) >= 0) { + *priv_out = priv; + ret = 0; + } else { + tor_free(priv); + } + + memwipe(der, 0, der_len); + OPENSSL_free(der); + return ret; +} + +/** Given a string containing the Base64 encoded DER representation of the + * private key <b>str</b>, decode and return the result on success, or NULL + * on failure. + */ +crypto_pk_t * +crypto_pk_base64_decode(const char *str, size_t len) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + + char *der = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1); + int der_len = base64_decode(der, len, str, len); + if (der_len <= 0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Stored RSA private key seems corrupted (base64)."); + goto out; + } + + const unsigned char *dp = (unsigned char*)der; /* Shut the compiler up. */ + RSA *rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &dp, der_len); + if (!rsa) { + crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "decoding private key"); + goto out; + } + + pk = crypto_new_pk_from_rsa_(rsa); + + /* Make sure it's valid. */ + if (crypto_pk_check_key(pk) <= 0) { + crypto_pk_free(pk); + pk = NULL; + goto out; + } + + out: + memwipe(der, 0, len + 1); + tor_free(der); + return pk; +} + /* symmetric crypto */

/** Return a pointer to the key set for the cipher in <b>env</b>. diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index 1ac02ea..8b620d9 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -184,6 +184,9 @@ int crypto_pk_get_all_digests(crypto_pk_t *pk, digests_t *digests_out); int crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out,int add_space); int crypto_pk_get_hashed_fingerprint(crypto_pk_t *pk, char *fp_out);

+int crypto_pk_base64_encode(const crypto_pk_t *pk, char **priv_out); +crypto_pk_t *crypto_pk_base64_decode(const char *str, size_t len); + /* symmetric crypto */ const char *crypto_cipher_get_key(crypto_cipher_t *env);

diff --git a/src/or/connection.c b/src/or/connection.c index 5610815..24d47cc 100644 --- a/src/or/connection.c +++ b/src/or/connection.c @@ -586,6 +586,13 @@ connection_free_(connection_t *conn) control_connection_t *control_conn = TO_CONTROL_CONN(conn); tor_free(control_conn->safecookie_client_hash); tor_free(control_conn->incoming_cmd); + if (control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services, char *, cp, { + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + }); + smartlist_free(control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services); + } }

/* Probably already freed by connection_free. */ diff --git a/src/or/control.c b/src/or/control.c index 8c95b05..7c8a6c4 100644 --- a/src/or/control.c +++ b/src/or/control.c @@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ #include "networkstatus.h" #include "nodelist.h" #include "policies.h" +#include "rendcommon.h" +#include "rendservice.h" #include "reasons.h" #include "rendclient.h" #include "rendcommon.h" @@ -96,6 +98,11 @@ static uint8_t *authentication_cookie = NULL; "Tor safe cookie authentication controller-to-server hash" #define SAFECOOKIE_SERVER_NONCE_LEN DIGEST256_LEN

+/** The list of onion services that have been added via ADD_ONION that do not + * belong to any particular control connection. + */ +static smartlist_t *detached_onion_services = NULL; + /** A sufficiently large size to record the last bootstrap phase string. */ #define BOOTSTRAP_MSG_LEN 1024

@@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ static int handle_control_usefeature(control_connection_t *conn, const char *body); static int handle_control_hsfetch(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, const char *body); +static int handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, + const char *body); +static int handle_control_del_onion(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, + const char *body); static int write_stream_target_to_buf(entry_connection_t *conn, char *buf, size_t len); static void orconn_target_get_name(char *buf, size_t len, @@ -2170,6 +2181,31 @@ getinfo_helper_events(control_connection_t *control_conn, return 0; }

+/** Implementation helper for GETINFO: knows how to enumerate hidden services + * created via the control port. */ +static int +getinfo_helper_onions(control_connection_t *control_conn, + const char *question, char **answer, + const char **errmsg) +{ + smartlist_t *onion_list = NULL; + + if (!strcmp(question, "onions/current")) { + onion_list = control_conn->ephemeral_onion_services; + } else if (!strcmp(question, "onions/detached")) { + onion_list = detached_onion_services; + } else { + return 0; + } + if (!onion_list || smartlist_len(onion_list) == 0) { + *errmsg = "No onion services of the specified type."; + return -1; + } + *answer = smartlist_join_strings(onion_list, "\r\n", 0, NULL); + + return 0; +} + /** Callback function for GETINFO: on a given control connection, try to * answer the question <b>q</b> and store the newly-allocated answer in * *<b>a</b>. If an internal error occurs, return -1 and optionally set @@ -2306,6 +2342,10 @@ static const getinfo_item_t getinfo_items[] = { ITEM("exit-policy/ipv4", policies, "IPv4 parts of exit policy"), ITEM("exit-policy/ipv6", policies, "IPv6 parts of exit policy"), PREFIX("ip-to-country/", geoip, "Perform a GEOIP lookup"), + ITEM("onions/current", onions, + "Onion services owned by the current control connection."), + ITEM("onions/detached", onions, + "Onion services detached from the control connection."), { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 } };

@@ -3388,6 +3428,348 @@ exit: return 0; }

+/** Called when we get a ADD_ONION command; parse the body, and set up + * the new ephemeral Onion Service. */ +static int +handle_control_add_onion(control_connection_t *conn, + uint32_t len, + const char *body) +{ + smartlist_t *args; + size_t arg_len; + (void) len; /* body is nul-terminated; it's safe to ignore the length */ + args = getargs_helper("ADD_ONION", conn, body, 2, -1); + if (!args) + return 0; + arg_len = smartlist_len(args); + + /* Parse all of the arguments that do not involve handling cryptographic + * material first, since there's no reason to touch that at all if any of + * the other arguments are malformed. + */ + smartlist_t *port_cfgs = smartlist_new(); + int discard_pk = 0; + int detach = 0; + for (size_t i = 1; i < arg_len; i++) { + static const char *port_prefix = "Port="; + static const char *flags_prefix = "Flags="; + + const char *arg = smartlist_get(args, i); + if (!strcasecmpstart(arg, port_prefix)) { + /* "Port=VIRTPORT[,TARGET]". */ + const char *port_str = arg + strlen(port_prefix); + + rend_service_port_config_t *cfg = + rend_service_parse_port_config(port_str, ",", NULL); + if (!cfg) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Invalid VIRTPORT/TARGET\r\n"); + goto out; + } + smartlist_add(port_cfgs, cfg); + } else if (!strcasecmpstart(arg, flags_prefix)) { + /* "Flags=Flag[,Flag]", where Flag can be: + * * 'DiscardPK' - If tor generates the keypair, do not include it in + * the response. + * * 'Detach' - Do not tie this onion service to any particular control + * connection. + */ + static const char *discard_flag = "DiscardPK"; + static const char *detach_flag = "Detach"; + + smartlist_t *flags = smartlist_new(); + int bad = 0; + + smartlist_split_string(flags, arg + strlen(flags_prefix), ",", + SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + if (smartlist_len(flags) < 1) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Invalid 'Flags' argument\r\n"); + bad = 1; + } + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(flags, const char *, flag) + { + if (!strcasecmp(flag, discard_flag)) { + discard_pk = 1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(flag, detach_flag)) { + detach = 1; + } else { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, + "512 Invalid 'Flags' argument: %s\r\n", + escaped(flag)); + bad = 1; + break; + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(flag); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(flags, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(flags); + if (bad) + goto out; + } else { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "513 Invalid argument\r\n"); + goto out; + } + } + if (smartlist_len(port_cfgs) == 0) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Missing 'Port' argument\r\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* Parse the "keytype:keyblob" argument. */ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + const char *key_new_alg = NULL; + char *key_new_blob = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg(smartlist_get(args, 0), discard_pk, + &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + if (!pk) { + if (err_msg) { + connection_write_str_to_buf(err_msg, conn); + tor_free(err_msg); + } + goto out; + } + tor_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Create the HS, using private key pk, and port config port_cfg. + * rend_service_add_ephemeral() will take ownership of pk and port_cfg, + * regardless of success/failure. + */ + char *service_id = NULL; + int ret = rend_service_add_ephemeral(pk, port_cfgs, &service_id); + port_cfgs = NULL; /* port_cfgs is now owned by the rendservice code. */ + switch (ret) { + case RSAE_OKAY: + { + char *buf = NULL; + tor_assert(service_id); + if (key_new_alg) { + tor_assert(key_new_blob); + tor_asprintf(&buf, + "250-ServiceID=%s\r\n" + "250-PrivateKey=%s:%s\r\n" + "250 OK\r\n", + service_id, + key_new_alg, + key_new_blob); + } else { + tor_asprintf(&buf, + "250-ServiceID=%s\r\n" + "250 OK\r\n", + service_id); + } + if (detach) { + if (!detached_onion_services) + detached_onion_services = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(detached_onion_services, service_id); + } else { + if (!conn->ephemeral_onion_services) + conn->ephemeral_onion_services = smartlist_new(); + smartlist_add(conn->ephemeral_onion_services, service_id); + } + + connection_write_str_to_buf(buf, conn); + memwipe(buf, 0, strlen(buf)); + tor_free(buf); + break; + } + case RSAE_BADPRIVKEY: + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "551 Failed to generate onion address\r\n"); + break; + case RSAE_ADDREXISTS: + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "550 Onion address collision\r\n"); + break; + case RSAE_BADVIRTPORT: + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Invalid VIRTPORT/TARGET\r\n"); + break; + case RSAE_INTERNAL: /* FALLSTHROUGH */ + default: + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "551 Failed to add Onion Service\r\n"); + } + if (key_new_blob) { + memwipe(key_new_blob, 0, strlen(key_new_blob)); + tor_free(key_new_blob); + } + + out: + if (port_cfgs) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(port_cfgs, rend_service_port_config_t*, p, + rend_service_port_config_free(p)); + smartlist_free(port_cfgs); + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char *, cp, { + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + }); + smartlist_free(args); + return 0; +} + +/** Helper function to handle parsing the KeyType:KeyBlob argument to the + * ADD_ONION command. Return a new crypto_pk_t and if a new key was generated + * and the private key not discarded, the algorithm and serialized private key, + * or NULL and an optional control protocol error message on failure. The + * caller is responsible for freeing the returned key_new_blob and err_msg. + * + * Note: The error messages returned are deliberately vague to avoid echoing + * key material. + */ +STATIC crypto_pk_t * +add_onion_helper_keyarg(const char *arg, int discard_pk, + const char **key_new_alg_out, char **key_new_blob_out, + char **err_msg_out) +{ + smartlist_t *key_args = smartlist_new(); + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + const char *key_new_alg = NULL; + char *key_new_blob = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + int ok = 0; + + smartlist_split_string(key_args, arg, ":", SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + if (smartlist_len(key_args) != 2) { + err_msg = tor_strdup("512 Invalid key type/blob\r\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* The format is "KeyType:KeyBlob". */ + static const char *key_type_new = "NEW"; + static const char *key_type_best = "BEST"; + static const char *key_type_rsa1024 = "RSA1024"; + + const char *key_type = smartlist_get(key_args, 0); + const char *key_blob = smartlist_get(key_args, 1); + + if (!strcasecmp(key_type_rsa1024, key_type)) { + /* "RSA:<Base64 Blob>" - Loading a pre-existing RSA1024 key. */ + pk = crypto_pk_base64_decode(key_blob, strlen(key_blob)); + if (!pk) { + err_msg = tor_strdup("512 Failed to decode RSA key\r\n"); + goto err; + } + if (crypto_pk_num_bits(pk) != PK_BYTES*8) { + err_msg = tor_strdup("512 Invalid RSA key size\r\n"); + goto err; + } + } else if (!strcasecmp(key_type_new, key_type)) { + /* "NEW:<Algorithm>" - Generating a new key, blob as algorithm. */ + if (!strcasecmp(key_type_rsa1024, key_blob) || + !strcasecmp(key_type_best, key_blob)) { + /* "RSA1024", RSA 1024 bit, also currently "BEST" by default. */ + pk = crypto_pk_new(); + if (crypto_pk_generate_key(pk)) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "551 Failed to generate %s key\r\n", + key_type_rsa1024); + goto err; + } + if (!discard_pk) { + if (crypto_pk_base64_encode(pk, &key_new_blob)) { + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "551 Failed to encode %s key\r\n", + key_type_rsa1024); + goto err; + } + key_new_alg = key_type_rsa1024; + } + } else { + err_msg = tor_strdup("513 Invalid key type\r\n"); + goto err; + } + } else { + err_msg = tor_strdup("513 Invalid key type\r\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Succeded in loading or generating a private key. */ + tor_assert(pk); + ok = 1; + + err: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(key_args, char *, cp, { + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + }); + + if (!ok) { + crypto_pk_free(pk); + pk = NULL; + } + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; + *key_new_alg_out = key_new_alg; + *key_new_blob_out = key_new_blob; + + return pk; +} + +/** Called when we get a DEL_ONION command; parse the body, and remove + * the existing ephemeral Onion Service. */ +static int +handle_control_del_onion(control_connection_t *conn, + uint32_t len, + const char *body) +{ + smartlist_t *args; + (void) len; /* body is nul-terminated; it's safe to ignore the length */ + args = getargs_helper("DEL_ONION", conn, body, 1, 1); + if (!args) + return 0; + + const char *service_id = smartlist_get(args, 0); + if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "512 Malformed Onion Service id\r\n"); + goto out; + } + + /* Determine if the onion service belongs to this particular control + * connection, or if it is in the global list of detached services. If it + * is in neither, either the service ID is invalid in some way, or it + * explicitly belongs to a different control connection, and an error + * should be returned. + */ + smartlist_t *services[2] = { + conn->ephemeral_onion_services, + detached_onion_services + }; + smartlist_t *onion_services = NULL; + int idx = -1; + for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAY_LENGTH(services); i++) { + idx = smartlist_string_pos(services[i], service_id); + if (idx != -1) { + onion_services = services[i]; + break; + } + } + if (onion_services == NULL) { + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "552 Unknown Onion Service id\r\n"); + } else { + int ret = rend_service_del_ephemeral(service_id); + if (ret) { + /* This should *NEVER* fail, since the service is on either the + * per-control connection list, or the global one. + */ + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Failed to remove Onion Service %s.", + escaped(service_id)); + tor_fragile_assert(); + } + + /* Remove/scrub the service_id from the appropriate list. */ + char *cp = smartlist_get(onion_services, idx); + smartlist_del(onion_services, idx); + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + + send_control_done(conn); + } + + out: + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char *, cp, { + memwipe(cp, 0, strlen(cp)); + tor_free(cp); + }); + smartlist_free(args); + return 0; +} + /** Called when <b>conn</b> has no more bytes left on its outbuf. */ int connection_control_finished_flushing(control_connection_t *conn) @@ -3434,6 +3816,15 @@ connection_control_closed(control_connection_t *conn) conn->event_mask = 0; control_update_global_event_mask();

+ /* Close all ephemeral Onion Services if any. + * The list and it's contents are scrubbed/freed in connection_free_. + */ + if (conn->ephemeral_onion_services) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(conn->ephemeral_onion_services, char *, cp, { + rend_service_del_ephemeral(cp); + }); + } + if (conn->is_owning_control_connection) { lost_owning_controller("connection", "closed"); } @@ -3688,6 +4079,16 @@ connection_control_process_inbuf(control_connection_t *conn) } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "HSFETCH")) { if (handle_control_hsfetch(conn, cmd_data_len, args)) return -1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "ADD_ONION")) { + int ret = handle_control_add_onion(conn, cmd_data_len, args); + memwipe(args, 0, cmd_data_len); /* Scrub the private key. */ + if (ret) + return -1; + } else if (!strcasecmp(conn->incoming_cmd, "DEL_ONION")) { + int ret = handle_control_del_onion(conn, cmd_data_len, args); + memwipe(args, 0, cmd_data_len); /* Scrub the service id/pk. */ + if (ret) + return -1; } else { connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "510 Unrecognized command "%s"\r\n", conn->incoming_cmd); @@ -5520,6 +5921,10 @@ control_free_all(void) { if (authentication_cookie) /* Free the auth cookie */ tor_free(authentication_cookie); + if (detached_onion_services) { /* Free the detached onion services */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(detached_onion_services, char *, cp, tor_free(cp)); + smartlist_free(detached_onion_services); + } }

#ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS diff --git a/src/or/control.h b/src/or/control.h index 93bcb8e..cb0468f 100644 --- a/src/or/control.h +++ b/src/or/control.h @@ -233,6 +233,11 @@ void append_cell_stats_by_command(smartlist_t *event_parts, void format_cell_stats(char **event_string, circuit_t *circ, cell_stats_t *cell_stats); STATIC char *get_bw_samples(void); + +STATIC crypto_pk_t *add_onion_helper_keyarg(const char *arg, int discard_pk, + const char **key_new_alg_out, + char **key_new_blob_out, + char **err_msg_out); #endif

#endif diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 1c00423..dee1881 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1735,6 +1735,9 @@ typedef struct control_connection_t { * connection. */ unsigned int is_owning_control_connection:1;

+ /** List of ephemeral onion services belonging to this connection. */ + smartlist_t *ephemeral_onion_services; + /** If we have sent an AUTHCHALLENGE reply on this connection and * have not received a successful AUTHENTICATE command, points to * the value which the client must send to authenticate itself; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 41bbd69..f257f6e 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -42,9 +42,15 @@ static int intro_point_accepted_intro_count(rend_intro_point_t *intro); static int intro_point_should_expire_now(rend_intro_point_t *intro, time_t now); struct rend_service_t; +static int rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s); static int rend_service_load_keys(struct rend_service_t *s); static int rend_service_load_auth_keys(struct rend_service_t *s, const char *hfname); +static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( + const char* digest); +static struct rend_service_t *rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id); +static const char *rend_service_escaped_dir( + const struct rend_service_t *s);

static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v0_or_v1( rend_intro_cell_t *intro, @@ -65,7 +71,7 @@ static ssize_t rend_service_parse_intro_for_v3( /** Represents the mapping from a virtual port of a rendezvous service to * a real port on some IP. */ -typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t { +struct rend_service_port_config_s { /* The incoming HS virtual port we're mapping */ uint16_t virtual_port; /* Is this an AF_UNIX port? */ @@ -76,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t { tor_addr_t real_addr; /* The socket path to connect to, if is_unix_addr */ char unix_addr[FLEXIBLE_ARRAY_MEMBER]; -} rend_service_port_config_t; +};

/** Try to maintain this many intro points per service by default. */ #define NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT 3 @@ -102,7 +108,8 @@ typedef struct rend_service_port_config_t { /** Represents a single hidden service running at this OP. */ typedef struct rend_service_t { /* Fields specified in config file */ - char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it */ + char *directory; /**< where in the filesystem it stores it. Will be NULL if + * this service is ephemeral. */ int dir_group_readable; /**< if 1, allow group read permissions on directory */ smartlist_t *ports; /**< List of rend_service_port_config_t */ @@ -141,6 +148,14 @@ typedef struct rend_service_t { int allow_unknown_ports; } rend_service_t;

+/** Returns a escaped string representation of the service, <b>s</b>. + */ +static const char * +rend_service_escaped_dir(const struct rend_service_t *s) +{ + return (s->directory) ? escaped(s->directory) : "[EPHEMERAL]"; +} + /** A list of rend_service_t's for services run on this OP. */ static smartlist_t *rend_service_list = NULL; @@ -195,7 +210,8 @@ rend_service_free(rend_service_t *service) return;

tor_free(service->directory); - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, void*, p, tor_free(p)); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(service->ports, rend_service_port_config_t*, p, + rend_service_port_config_free(p)); smartlist_free(service->ports); if (service->private_key) crypto_pk_free(service->private_key); @@ -232,8 +248,9 @@ rend_service_free_all(void) }

/** Validate <b>service</b> and add it to rend_service_list if possible. + * Return 0 on success and -1 on failure. */ -static void +static int rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service) { int i; @@ -245,16 +262,17 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service) smartlist_len(service->clients) == 0) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with client authorization but no " "clients; ignoring.", - escaped(service->directory)); + rend_service_escaped_dir(service)); rend_service_free(service); - return; + return -1; }

if (!smartlist_len(service->ports)) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Hidden service (%s) with no ports configured; " "ignoring.", - escaped(service->directory)); + rend_service_escaped_dir(service)); rend_service_free(service); + return -1; } else { int dupe = 0; /* XXX This duplicate check has two problems: @@ -272,14 +290,17 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service) * lock file. But this is enough to detect a simple mistake that * at least one person has actually made. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr, - dupe = dupe || - !strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory)); - if (dupe) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for " - "directory %s, ignoring.", service->directory); - rend_service_free(service); - return; + if (service->directory != NULL) { /* Skip dupe for ephemeral services. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, ptr, + dupe = dupe || + !strcmp(ptr->directory, service->directory)); + if (dupe) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Another hidden service is already configured for " + "directory %s, ignoring.", + rend_service_escaped_dir(service)); + rend_service_free(service); + return -1; + } } smartlist_add(rend_service_list, service); log_debug(LD_REND,"Configuring service with directory "%s"", @@ -305,7 +326,9 @@ rend_add_service(rend_service_t *service) #endif /* defined(HAVE_SYS_UN_H) */ } } + return 0; } + /* NOTREACHED */ }

/** Return a new rend_service_port_config_t with its path set to @@ -324,15 +347,17 @@ rend_service_port_config_new(const char *socket_path) return conf; }

-/** Parses a real-port to virtual-port mapping and returns a new - * rend_service_port_config_t. +/** Parses a real-port to virtual-port mapping separated by the provided + * separator and returns a new rend_service_port_config_t, or NULL and an + * optional error string on failure. * - * The format is: VirtualPort (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort|'socket':path)? + * The format is: VirtualPort SEP (IP|RealPort|IP:RealPort|'socket':path)? * * IP defaults to 127.0.0.1; RealPort defaults to VirtualPort. */ -static rend_service_port_config_t * -parse_port_config(const char *string) +rend_service_port_config_t * +rend_service_parse_port_config(const char *string, const char *sep, + char **err_msg_out) { smartlist_t *sl; int virtport; @@ -343,19 +368,24 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) rend_service_port_config_t *result = NULL; unsigned int is_unix_addr = 0; char *socket_path = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL;

sl = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_split_string(sl, string, " ", + smartlist_split_string(sl, string, sep, SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); if (smartlist_len(sl) < 1 || smartlist_len(sl) > 2) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration."); + if (err_msg_out) + err_msg = tor_strdup("Bad syntax in hidden service port configuration."); + goto err; }

virtport = (int)tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(sl,0), 10, 1, 65535, NULL,NULL); if (!virtport) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service port " - "configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0))); + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Missing or invalid port %s in hidden service " + "port configuration", escaped(smartlist_get(sl,0))); + goto err; }

@@ -369,10 +399,11 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) addrport = smartlist_get(sl,1); ret = config_parse_unix_port(addrport, &socket_path); if (ret < 0 && ret != -ENOENT) { - if (ret == -EINVAL) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, - "Empty socket path in hidden service port configuration."); - } + if (ret == -EINVAL) + if (err_msg_out) + err_msg = tor_strdup("Empty socket path in hidden service port " + "configuration."); + goto err; } if (socket_path) { @@ -380,8 +411,10 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) } else if (strchr(addrport, ':') || strchr(addrport, '.')) { /* else try it as an IP:port pair if it has a : or . in it */ if (tor_addr_port_lookup(addrport, &addr, &p)<0) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable address in hidden service port " - "configuration."); + if (err_msg_out) + err_msg = tor_strdup("Unparseable address in hidden service port " + "configuration."); + goto err; } realport = p?p:virtport; @@ -389,8 +422,11 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) /* No addr:port, no addr -- must be port. */ realport = (int)tor_parse_long(addrport, 10, 1, 65535, NULL, NULL); if (!realport) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG,"Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in hidden " - "service port configuration.", escaped(addrport)); + if (err_msg_out) + tor_asprintf(&err_msg, "Unparseable or out-of-range port %s in " + "hidden service port configuration.", + escaped(addrport)); + goto err; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, 0x7F000001u); /* Default to 127.0.0.1 */ @@ -408,6 +444,7 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) }

err: + if (err_msg_out) *err_msg_out = err_msg; SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c)); smartlist_free(sl); if (socket_path) tor_free(socket_path); @@ -415,6 +452,13 @@ parse_port_config(const char *string) return result; }

+/** Release all storage held in a rend_service_port_config_t. */ +void +rend_service_port_config_free(rend_service_port_config_t *p) +{ + tor_free(p); +} + /** Set up rend_service_list, based on the values of HiddenServiceDir and * HiddenServicePort in <b>options</b>. Return 0 on success and -1 on * failure. (If <b>validate_only</b> is set, parse, warn and return as @@ -456,11 +500,16 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) return -1; } if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServicePort")) { - portcfg = parse_port_config(line->value); + char *err_msg = NULL; + portcfg = rend_service_parse_port_config(line->value, " ", &err_msg); if (!portcfg) { + if (err_msg) + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "%s", err_msg); + tor_free(err_msg); rend_service_free(service); return -1; } + tor_assert(!err_msg); smartlist_add(service->ports, portcfg); } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts")) { service->allow_unknown_ports = (int)tor_parse_long(line->value, @@ -632,6 +681,28 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) if (old_service_list && !validate_only) { smartlist_t *surviving_services = smartlist_new();

+ /* Preserve the existing ephemeral services. + * + * This is the ephemeral service equivalent of the "Copy introduction + * points to new services" block, except there's no copy required since + * the service structure isn't regenerated. + * + * After this is done, all ephemeral services will be: + * * Removed from old_service_list, so the equivalent non-ephemeral code + * will not attempt to preserve them. + * * Added to the new rend_service_list (that previously only had the + * services listed in the configuration). + * * Added to surviving_services, which is the list of services that + * will NOT have their intro point closed. + */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_service_list, rend_service_t *, old, { + if (!old->directory) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(old_service_list, old); + smartlist_add(surviving_services, old); + smartlist_add(rend_service_list, old); + } + }); + /* Copy introduction points to new services. */ /* XXXX This is O(n^2), but it's only called on reconfigure, so it's * probably ok? */ @@ -685,6 +756,118 @@ rend_config_services(const or_options_t *options, int validate_only) return 0; }

+/** Add the ephemeral service <b>pk</b>/<b>ports</b> if possible. + * + * Regardless of sucess/failure, callers should not touch pk/ports after + * calling this routine, and may assume that correct cleanup has been done + * on failure. + * + * Return an appropriate rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t. + */ +rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t +rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk, + smartlist_t *ports, + char **service_id_out) +{ + *service_id_out = NULL; + /* Allocate the service structure, and initialize the key, and key derived + * parameters. + */ + rend_service_t *s = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_t)); + s->directory = NULL; /* This indicates the service is ephemeral. */ + s->private_key = pk; + s->auth_type = REND_NO_AUTH; + s->ports = ports; + s->intro_period_started = time(NULL); + s->n_intro_points_wanted = NUM_INTRO_POINTS_DEFAULT; + if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) { + rend_service_free(s); + return RSAE_BADPRIVKEY; + } + + if (!s->ports || smartlist_len(s->ports) == 0) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "At least one VIRTPORT/TARGET must be specified."); + rend_service_free(s); + return RSAE_BADVIRTPORT; + } + + /* Enforcing pk/id uniqueness should be done by rend_service_load_keys(), but + * it's not, see #14828. + */ + if (rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(s->pk_digest)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service private key collides with an " + "existing service."); + rend_service_free(s); + return RSAE_ADDREXISTS; + } + if (rend_service_get_by_service_id(s->service_id)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Onion Service id collides with an existing service."); + rend_service_free(s); + return RSAE_ADDREXISTS; + } + + /* Initialize the service. */ + if (rend_add_service(s)) { + rend_service_free(s); + return RSAE_INTERNAL; + } + *service_id_out = tor_strdup(s->service_id); + + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Added ephemeral Onion Service: %s", s->service_id); + return RSAE_OKAY; +} + +/** Remove the ephemeral service <b>service_id</b> if possible. Returns 0 on + * success, and -1 on failure. + */ +int +rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id) +{ + rend_service_t *s; + if (!rend_valid_service_id(service_id)) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested malformed Onion Service id for removal."); + return -1; + } + if ((s = rend_service_get_by_service_id(service_id)) == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-existent Onion Service id for " + "removal."); + return -1; + } + if (s->directory) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Requested non-ephemeral Onion Service for removal."); + return -1; + } + + /* Kill the intro point circuit for the Onion Service, and remove it from + * the list. Closing existing connections is the application's problem. + * + * XXX: As with the comment in rend_config_services(), a nice abstraction + * would be ideal here, but for now just duplicate the code. + */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(circuit_get_global_list(), circuit_t *, circ) { + if (!circ->marked_for_close && + circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && + (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO || + circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO)) { + origin_circuit_t *oc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + tor_assert(oc->rend_data); + if (!tor_memeq(s->pk_digest, oc->rend_data->rend_pk_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + continue; + log_debug(LD_REND, "Closing intro point %s for service %s.", + safe_str_client(extend_info_describe( + oc->build_state->chosen_exit)), + oc->rend_data->onion_address); + circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED); + } + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ); + smartlist_remove(rend_service_list, s); + rend_service_free(s); + + log_debug(LD_CONFIG, "Removed ephemeral Onion Service: %s", service_id); + + return 0; +} + /** Replace the old value of <b>service</b>->desc with one that reflects * the other fields in service. */ @@ -769,6 +952,7 @@ rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(smartlist_t *lst, const rend_service_t *s) { tor_assert(lst); tor_assert(s); + tor_assert(s->directory); smartlist_add_asprintf(lst, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"private_key", s->directory); smartlist_add_asprintf(lst, "%s"PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname", @@ -787,11 +971,31 @@ rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst, if (!rend_service_list) return; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(rend_service_list, rend_service_t *, s) { - rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(open_lst, s); - smartlist_add(stat_lst, tor_strdup(s->directory)); + if (s->directory) { + rend_service_add_filenames_to_list(open_lst, s); + smartlist_add(stat_lst, tor_strdup(s->directory)); + } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(s); }

+/** Derive all rend_service_t internal material based on the service's key. + * Returns 0 on sucess, -1 on failure. + */ +static int +rend_service_derive_key_digests(struct rend_service_t *s) +{ + if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID."); + return -1; + } + if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + /** Load and/or generate private keys for the hidden service <b>s</b>, * possibly including keys for client authorization. Return 0 on success, -1 * on failure. */ @@ -830,15 +1034,10 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s) if (!s->private_key) return -1;

- /* Create service file */ - if (rend_get_service_id(s->private_key, s->service_id)<0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service ID."); + if (rend_service_derive_key_digests(s) < 0) return -1; - } - if (crypto_pk_get_digest(s->private_key, s->pk_digest)<0) { - log_warn(LD_BUG, "Couldn't compute hash of public key."); - return -1; - } + + /* Create service file */ if (strlcpy(fname,s->directory,sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname) || strlcat(fname,PATH_SEPARATOR"hostname",sizeof(fname)) >= sizeof(fname)) { @@ -1078,6 +1277,20 @@ rend_service_get_by_pk_digest(const char* digest) return NULL; }

+/** Return the service whose service id is <b>id</b>, or NULL if no such + * service exists. + */ +static struct rend_service_t * +rend_service_get_by_service_id(const char *id) +{ + tor_assert(strlen(id) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rend_service_list, rend_service_t*, s, { + if (tor_memeq(s->service_id, id, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)) + return s; + }); + return NULL; +} + /** Return 1 if any virtual port in <b>service</b> wants a circuit * to have good uptime. Else return 0. */ diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.h b/src/or/rendservice.h index 754f7c3..6d0973b 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.h +++ b/src/or/rendservice.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "or.h"

typedef struct rend_intro_cell_s rend_intro_cell_t; +typedef struct rend_service_port_config_s rend_service_port_config_t;

#ifdef RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE

@@ -101,5 +102,23 @@ int rend_service_set_connection_addr_port(edge_connection_t *conn, void rend_service_dump_stats(int severity); void rend_service_free_all(void);

+rend_service_port_config_t *rend_service_parse_port_config(const char *string, + const char *sep, + char **err_msg_out); +void rend_service_port_config_free(rend_service_port_config_t *p); + +/** Return value from rend_service_add_ephemeral. */ +typedef enum { + RSAE_BADVIRTPORT = -4, /**< Invalid VIRTPORT/TARGET(s) */ + RSAE_ADDREXISTS = -3, /**< Onion address collision */ + RSAE_BADPRIVKEY = -2, /**< Invalid public key */ + RSAE_INTERNAL = -1, /**< Internal error */ + RSAE_OKAY = 0 /**< Service added as expected */ +} rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t; +rend_service_add_ephemeral_status_t rend_service_add_ephemeral(crypto_pk_t *pk, + smartlist_t *ports, + char **service_id_out); +int rend_service_del_ephemeral(const char *service_id); + #endif

diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 570048d..c36ebb7 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \ src/test/test_circuitmux.c \ src/test/test_config.c \ src/test/test_containers.c \ + src/test/test_controller.c \ src/test/test_controller_events.c \ src/test/test_crypto.c \ src/test/test_data.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 0524a69..f30b8ae 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1127,6 +1127,7 @@ extern struct testcase_t circuitlist_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t circuitmux_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t config_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t container_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t controller_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t controller_event_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t crypto_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t dir_tests[]; @@ -1171,7 +1172,8 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "circuitmux/", circuitmux_tests }, { "config/", config_tests }, { "container/", container_tests }, - { "control/", controller_event_tests }, + { "control/", controller_tests }, + { "control/event/", controller_event_tests }, { "crypto/", crypto_tests }, { "dir/", dir_tests }, { "dir/md/", microdesc_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test_controller.c b/src/test/test_controller.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9039dc7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_controller.c @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2015, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#define CONTROL_PRIVATE +#include "or.h" +#include "control.h" +#include "rendservice.h" +#include "test.h" + +static void +test_add_onion_helper_keyarg(void *arg) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *pk2 = NULL; + const char *key_new_alg = NULL; + char *key_new_blob = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + char *encoded = NULL; + char *arg_str = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + /* Test explicit RSA1024 key generation. */ + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg("NEW:RSA1024", 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(pk); + tt_str_op(key_new_alg, OP_EQ, "RSA1024"); + tt_assert(key_new_blob); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test "BEST" key generation (Assumes BEST = RSA1024). */ + crypto_pk_free(pk); + tor_free(key_new_blob); + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg("NEW:BEST", 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(pk); + tt_str_op(key_new_alg, OP_EQ, "RSA1024"); + tt_assert(key_new_blob); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test discarding the private key. */ + crypto_pk_free(pk); + tor_free(key_new_blob); + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg("NEW:BEST", 1, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(pk); + tt_assert(!key_new_alg); + tt_assert(!key_new_blob); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test generating a invalid key type. */ + crypto_pk_free(pk); + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg("NEW:RSA512", 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(!pk); + tt_assert(!key_new_alg); + tt_assert(!key_new_blob); + tt_assert(err_msg); + + /* Test loading a RSA1024 key. */ + tor_free(err_msg); + pk = pk_generate(0); + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, crypto_pk_base64_encode(pk, &encoded)); + tor_asprintf(&arg_str, "RSA1024:%s", encoded); + pk2 = add_onion_helper_keyarg(arg_str, 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(pk2); + tt_assert(!key_new_alg); + tt_assert(!key_new_blob); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + tt_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk, pk2) == 0); + + /* Test loading a invalid key type. */ + tor_free(arg_str); + tor_asprintf(&arg_str, "RSA512:%s", encoded); + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg(arg_str, 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(!pk); + tt_assert(!key_new_alg); + tt_assert(!key_new_blob); + tt_assert(err_msg); + + /* Test loading a invalid key. */ + tor_free(arg_str); + tor_free(err_msg); + encoded[strlen(encoded)/2] = '\0'; + tor_asprintf(&arg_str, "RSA1024:%s", encoded); + pk = add_onion_helper_keyarg(arg_str, 0, &key_new_alg, &key_new_blob, + &err_msg); + tt_assert(!pk); + tt_assert(!key_new_alg); + tt_assert(!key_new_blob); + tt_assert(err_msg); + + done: + crypto_pk_free(pk); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); + tor_free(key_new_blob); + tor_free(err_msg); + tor_free(encoded); + tor_free(arg_str); +} + +static void +test_rend_service_parse_port_config(void *arg) +{ + const char *sep = ","; + rend_service_port_config_t *cfg = NULL; + char *err_msg = NULL; + + (void)arg; + + /* Test "VIRTPORT" only. */ + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("80", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(cfg); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test "VIRTPORT,TARGET" (Target is port). */ + rend_service_port_config_free(cfg); + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("80,8080", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(cfg); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test "VIRTPORT,TARGET" (Target is IPv4:port). */ + rend_service_port_config_free(cfg); + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("80,192.0.2.1:8080", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(cfg); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* Test "VIRTPORT,TARGET" (Target is IPv6:port). */ + rend_service_port_config_free(cfg); + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("80,[2001:db8::1]:8080", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(cfg); + tt_assert(!err_msg); + + /* XXX: Someone should add tests for AF_UNIX targets if supported. */ + + /* Test empty config. */ + rend_service_port_config_free(cfg); + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(!cfg); + tt_assert(err_msg); + + /* Test invalid port. */ + tor_free(err_msg); + cfg = rend_service_parse_port_config("90001", sep, &err_msg); + tt_assert(!cfg); + tt_assert(err_msg); + + done: + rend_service_port_config_free(cfg); + tor_free(err_msg); +} + +struct testcase_t controller_tests[] = { + { "add_onion_helper_keyarg", test_add_onion_helper_keyarg, 0, NULL, NULL }, + { "rend_service_parse_port_config", test_rend_service_parse_port_config, 0, + NULL, NULL }, + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; + diff --git a/src/test/test_crypto.c b/src/test/test_crypto.c index bcd7069..84a90da 100644 --- a/src/test/test_crypto.c +++ b/src/test/test_crypto.c @@ -597,6 +597,42 @@ test_crypto_pk_fingerprints(void *arg) tor_free(mem_op_hex_tmp); }

+static void +test_crypto_pk_base64(void *arg) +{ + crypto_pk_t *pk1 = NULL; + crypto_pk_t *pk2 = NULL; + char *encoded = NULL; + + (void)arg; + + /* Test Base64 encoding a key. */ + pk1 = pk_generate(0); + tt_assert(pk1); + tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, crypto_pk_base64_encode(pk1, &encoded)); + tt_assert(encoded); + + /* Test decoding a valid key. */ + pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(encoded, strlen(encoded)); + tt_assert(pk2); + tt_assert(crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,pk2) == 0); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); + + /* Test decoding a invalid key (not Base64). */ + static const char *invalid_b64 = "The key is in another castle!"; + pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(invalid_b64, strlen(invalid_b64)); + tt_assert(!pk2); + + /* Test decoding a truncated Base64 blob. */ + pk2 = crypto_pk_base64_decode(encoded, strlen(encoded)/2); + tt_assert(!pk2); + + done: + crypto_pk_free(pk1); + crypto_pk_free(pk2); + tor_free(encoded); +} + /** Sanity check for crypto pk digests */ static void test_crypto_digests(void *arg) @@ -1667,6 +1703,7 @@ struct testcase_t crypto_tests[] = { CRYPTO_LEGACY(sha), CRYPTO_LEGACY(pk), { "pk_fingerprints", test_crypto_pk_fingerprints, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + { "pk_base64", test_crypto_pk_base64, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, CRYPTO_LEGACY(digests), CRYPTO_LEGACY(dh), { "aes_iv_AES", test_crypto_aes_iv, TT_FORK, &passthrough_setup,