commit f88c8ca8c98dc3a0c9e63012ce425d1287625444 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@gmail.com> Date: Sat Dec 24 04:47:30 2011 -0800 Don't close HS service-side rend circs on timeout --- changes/bug1297b | 4 ++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/or.h | 4 ++++ src/or/rendservice.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b index 28b7564..9cf2597 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297b +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -12,3 +12,7 @@ CloseHSClientCircuitsImmediatelyOnTimeout option. Fixes part of bug 1297. + - Don't close hidden-service-side rendezvous circuits when they + reach the normal circuit-build timeout. Previously, we would + close them. Fixes the remaining part of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index d9d95bc..9778ae7 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -550,6 +550,22 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) } } + /* If this is a service-side rendezvous circuit which is far + * enough along in connecting to its destination, consider sparing + * it. */ + if (!(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out) && + victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { + log_info(LD_CIRC,"Marking circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d) " + "as timed-out HS circ; relaunching rendezvous attempt.", + victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, + victim->n_circ_id, + victim->state, circuit_state_to_string(victim->state), + victim->purpose); + TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 1; + rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)); + continue; + } + if (victim->n_conn) log_info(LD_CIRC,"Abandoning circ %s:%d:%d (state %d:%s, purpose %d)", victim->n_conn->_base.address, victim->n_conn->_base.port, diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index d84f04b..3ac8b92 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2614,6 +2614,10 @@ typedef struct origin_circuit_t { * circuit. */ unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1; + /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a + * new connection attempt has been launched. */ + unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1; + /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT]; diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 76caeff..bbc9c91 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1419,6 +1419,17 @@ rend_service_relaunch_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *oldcirc) tor_assert(oldcirc->_base.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND); + /* Don't relaunch the same rend circ twice. */ + if (oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched) { + log_info(LD_REND, "Rendezvous circuit to %s has already been relaunched; " + "not relaunching it again.", + oldcirc->build_state ? + safe_str(extend_info_describe(oldcirc->build_state->chosen_exit)) + : "*unknown*"); + return; + } + oldcirc->hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched = 1; + if (!oldcirc->build_state || oldcirc->build_state->failure_count > MAX_REND_FAILURES || oldcirc->build_state->expiry_time < time(NULL)) { @@ -1727,6 +1738,11 @@ rend_service_rendezvous_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) "cookie %s for service %s", circuit->_base.n_circ_id, hexcookie, serviceid); + /* Clear the 'in-progress HS circ has timed out' flag for + * consistency with what happens on the client side; this line has + * no effect on Tor's behaviour. */ + circuit->hs_circ_has_timed_out = 0; + service = rend_service_get_by_pk_digest( circuit->rend_data->rend_pk_digest); if (!service) {