commit 475662feb63a90151768fceea5926915432524b7 Author: Nick Mathewson nickm@torproject.org Date: Thu Nov 30 16:53:51 2017 -0500
Add proposal 287, for real this time --- proposals/287-reduce-lifetime.txt | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 105 insertions(+)
diff --git a/proposals/287-reduce-lifetime.txt b/proposals/287-reduce-lifetime.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..06e87d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/proposals/287-reduce-lifetime.txt @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +Filename: 287-reduce-lifetime.txt +Title: Reduce circuit lifetime without overloading the network +Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera +Created: 30-Nov-2017 +Status: Open + +Motivation: + +Currently Tor users are reusing a given circuit for ten minutes (by default) +after it's first used. This time is too long because a malicious Exit relay can +trace a user's pseudonymous profile, especially if connections from multiple +protocols are put on the same circuit. + +This time it is established on MaxCircuitDirtiness parameter and by default its +value is ten minutes. + +I have been thinking in a way to fix this. The first idea that came to my mind +was to use StreamIsolationByHost and StreamIsolationByPort on it, but I wasn't +able to sort it out. + +One day, I thought "Why is time so important?" and later on I realized that +maybe focusing on the amount of bytes running through the circuit could end up +being a better approach on this problem. + +Design: + +I propose two options to reduce this problem, both based on taking into account +the amount of bytes running through a circuit. + +MaxCircuitSizeDirtiness (temporal parameter name) will take an integer field +that is contained on an interval and represents the maximum amount of bytes +that can be written/read (we need to discuss about the use of one for both) by +the circuit. If the circuit exceeds that amount, new streams won't use this +circuit anymore. + +MaxCircuitSizeDirtinessByPort (temporal parameter name) will take an array of +integers that are contained on an interval and represents the maximum amount of +bytes that can be written/read (we need to discuss about the use of one for +both) by the circuit per port (StreamIsolationByPort). This array is parallel +to the array of ports from StreamIsolationByPort. If the circuit exceeds that +amount, new streams won't use this circuit anymore. + +Regarding default values it would be useful to set up one a bit lower than the +average amount of bytes per circuit. On MaxCircuitSizeDirtinessByPort after +discuss it we shouldn't set up a default value because someone can identify the +port used. About MaxCircuitDirtiness, if the others are set up by default it +could be bigger, like thirty minutes, so if the user doesn't send/receive a +significant amount of data the circuit will be changed anyway. + +Security Implications: + +It is believed that the proposed changes will improve the anonymity for end +users. The end user won't reuse a given circuit if they have sent a +considerable amount of bytes, thus making more difficult for malicious Exit +relays to be able to trace a user's pseudonymous profile. + +Obviously this is a probability, of course it's possible that sensitive data +will leak in a little amount of data but it's more even possible that sensitive +data will leak in a large amount. + +Specification: + +In order to implement this feature we will need to add some new +functionalities. We need to parse MaxCircuitSizeDirtiness and +MaxCircuitSizeDirtinessByPort from the torrc config file. We need to create a +function or improve one to check the amount of bytes that are running through +the circuit and if this amount is higher than the established value, consider +the circuit dirty. + +Compatibility: + +The proposed changes should not create any compatibility issues. New Tor +clients will be able to take advantage of this without any modification to the +network. + +Implementation: + +It is proposed that MaxCircuitSizeDirtiness will be enabled by default and also +increase MaxCircuitDirtiness to thirty minutes. + +It is proposed that MaxCircuitSizeDirtinessByPort won't be enabled by default +for port 22, 53, and port 80 as StreamIsolationByPort. + +About TorBrowser or any other Tor application that is able to manage circuits +by its own because of KeepAliveIsolateSOCKSAuth option being active by default +shouldn't be affected by this new feature. As the same form that it currently +ignores MaxCircuitDirtiness parameter. + +Performance and scalability notes: + +The proposed changes will reduce Tor network stress as users who do not exceed +the set amount will reduce circuit generation by three (if default +MaxCircuitDirtinesss value is thirty minutes). + +I want to work on demonstrating that by a research but first it's nice to get the +idea accepted. + +References: + +Tor project research ideas [https://research.torproject.org/ideas.html] + +Enhancing Tor's Performance using Real-time Traffic Classification +[https://www.cypherpunks.ca/~iang/pubs/difftor-ccs.pdf] (It's not exactly about +that, but they talk about circuit lifetime and the ten minutes problem a few +times. Also it's an interesting paper.)