commit 0c26a6db7e683c23505c1c9187fd538c7b80ce31 Author: David Goulet dgoulet@torproject.org Date: Tue May 3 11:36:09 2016 -0400
prop250: Parse votes and consensus
One of the last piece that parses the votes and consensus in order to update our state and make decision for the SR values.
We need to inform the SR subsystem when we set the current consensus because this can be called when loaded from file or downloaded from other authorities or computed.
The voting schedule is used for the SR timings since we are bound to the voting system.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet dgoulet@torproject.org Signed-off-by: George Kadianakis desnacked@riseup.net --- src/or/directory.c | 5 + src/or/dirvote.c | 7 + src/or/routerparse.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++ src/or/shared_random.c | 395 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- src/or/shared_random.h | 16 ++ src/or/shared_random_state.c | 29 ++++ src/or/shared_random_state.h | 1 + 7 files changed, 609 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 876eaa4..b32090a 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ #include "routerlist.h" #include "routerparse.h" #include "routerset.h" +#include "shared_random.h"
#if defined(EXPORTMALLINFO) && defined(HAVE_MALLOC_H) && defined(HAVE_MALLINFO) #ifndef OPENBSD @@ -2026,6 +2027,10 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn) update_microdescs_from_networkstatus(now); update_microdesc_downloads(now); directory_info_has_arrived(now, 0, 0); + if (authdir_mode_v3(get_options())) { + sr_act_post_consensus( + networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(FLAV_NS)); + } log_info(LD_DIR, "Successfully loaded consensus."); }
diff --git a/src/or/dirvote.c b/src/or/dirvote.c index af093de..4eccdd0 100644 --- a/src/or/dirvote.c +++ b/src/or/dirvote.c @@ -2668,6 +2668,9 @@ dirvote_act(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) dirvote_publish_consensus(); dirvote_clear_votes(0); voting_schedule.have_published_consensus = 1; + /* Update our shared random state with the consensus just published. */ + sr_act_post_consensus( + networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(FLAV_NS)); /* XXXX We will want to try again later if we haven't got enough * signatures yet. Implement this if it turns out to ever happen. */ dirvote_recalculate_timing(options, now); @@ -3007,6 +3010,10 @@ dirvote_add_vote(const char *vote_body, const char **msg_out, int *status_out) } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(v);
+ /* This a valid vote, update our shared random state. */ + sr_handle_received_commits(vote->sr_info.commits, + vote->cert->identity_key); + pending_vote = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(pending_vote_t)); pending_vote->vote_body = new_cached_dir(tor_strndup(vote_body, end_of_vote-vote_body), diff --git a/src/or/routerparse.c b/src/or/routerparse.c index 130f9f4..88cfbdc 100644 --- a/src/or/routerparse.c +++ b/src/or/routerparse.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include "routerparse.h" #include "entrynodes.h" #include "torcert.h" +#include "shared_random.h"
#undef log #include <math.h> @@ -145,6 +146,11 @@ typedef enum { K_CONSENSUS_METHOD, K_LEGACY_DIR_KEY, K_DIRECTORY_FOOTER, + K_SIGNING_CERT_ED, + K_SR_FLAG, + K_COMMIT, + K_PREVIOUS_SRV, + K_CURRENT_SRV, K_PACKAGE,
A_PURPOSE, @@ -446,6 +452,11 @@ static token_rule_t networkstatus_token_table[] = { T1("known-flags", K_KNOWN_FLAGS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T01("params", K_PARAMS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ), T( "fingerprint", K_FINGERPRINT, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T01("signing-ed25519", K_SIGNING_CERT_ED, NO_ARGS , NEED_OBJ ), + T01("shared-rand-participate",K_SR_FLAG, NO_ARGS, NO_OBJ ), + T0N("shared-rand-commit", K_COMMIT, GE(3), NO_OBJ ), + T01("shared-rand-previous-value", K_PREVIOUS_SRV,EQ(2), NO_OBJ ), + T01("shared-rand-current-value", K_CURRENT_SRV, EQ(2), NO_OBJ ), T0N("package", K_PACKAGE, CONCAT_ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
CERTIFICATE_MEMBERS @@ -485,6 +496,9 @@ static token_rule_t networkstatus_consensus_token_table[] = { T01("consensus-method", K_CONSENSUS_METHOD, EQ(1), NO_OBJ), T01("params", K_PARAMS, ARGS, NO_OBJ ),
+ T01("shared-rand-previous-value", K_PREVIOUS_SRV, EQ(2), NO_OBJ ), + T01("shared-rand-current-value", K_CURRENT_SRV, EQ(2), NO_OBJ ), + END_OF_TABLE };
@@ -2843,6 +2857,134 @@ networkstatus_verify_bw_weights(networkstatus_t *ns, int consensus_method) return valid; }
+/** Parse and extract all SR commits from <b>tokens</b> and place them in + * <b>ns</b>. */ +static void +extract_shared_random_commits(networkstatus_t *ns, smartlist_t *tokens) +{ + smartlist_t *chunks = NULL; + + tor_assert(ns); + tor_assert(tokens); + /* Commits are only present in a vote. */ + tor_assert(ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE); + + ns->sr_info.commits = smartlist_new(); + + smartlist_t *commits = find_all_by_keyword(tokens, K_COMMIT); + /* It's normal that a vote might contain no commits even if it participates + * in the SR protocol. Don't treat it as an error. */ + if (commits == NULL) { + goto end; + } + + /* Parse the commit. We do NO validation of number of arguments or ordering + * for forward compatibility, it's the parse commit job to inform us if it's + * supported or not. */ + chunks = smartlist_new(); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(commits, directory_token_t *, tok) { + /* Extract all arguments and put them in the chunks list. */ + for (int i = 0; i < tok->n_args; i++) { + smartlist_add(chunks, tok->args[i]); + } + sr_commit_t *commit = sr_parse_commit(chunks); + smartlist_clear(chunks); + if (commit == NULL) { + /* Get voter identity so we can warn that this dirauth vote contains + * commit we can't parse. */ + networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter = smartlist_get(ns->voters, 0); + tor_assert(voter); + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unable to parse commit %s from vote of voter %s.", + escaped(tok->object_body), + hex_str(voter->identity_digest, + sizeof(voter->identity_digest))); + /* Commitment couldn't be parsed. Continue onto the next commit because + * this one could be unsupported for instance. */ + continue; + } + /* Add newly created commit object to the vote. */ + smartlist_add(ns->sr_info.commits, commit); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(tok); + + end: + smartlist_free(chunks); + smartlist_free(commits); +} + +/** Check if a shared random value of type <b>srv_type</b> is in + * <b>tokens</b>. If there is, parse it and set it to <b>srv_out</b>. Return + * -1 on failure, 0 on success. The resulting srv is allocated on the heap and + * it's the responsibility of the caller to free it. */ +static int +extract_one_srv(smartlist_t *tokens, directory_keyword srv_type, + sr_srv_t **srv_out) +{ + int ret = -1; + directory_token_t *tok; + sr_srv_t *srv = NULL; + smartlist_t *chunks; + + tor_assert(tokens); + + chunks = smartlist_new(); + tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, srv_type); + if (!tok) { + /* That's fine, no SRV is allowed. */ + ret = 0; + goto end; + } + for (int i = 0; i < tok->n_args; i++) { + smartlist_add(chunks, tok->args[i]); + } + srv = sr_parse_srv(chunks); + if (srv == NULL) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unparseable SRV %s", escaped(tok->object_body)); + goto end; + } + /* All is good. */ + *srv_out = srv; + ret = 0; + end: + smartlist_free(chunks); + return ret; +} + +/** Extract any shared random values found in <b>tokens</b> and place them in + * the networkstatus <b>ns</b>. */ +static void +extract_shared_random_srvs(networkstatus_t *ns, smartlist_t *tokens) +{ + const char *voter_identity; + networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter; + + tor_assert(ns); + tor_assert(tokens); + /* Can be only one of them else code flow. */ + tor_assert(ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE || ns->type == NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS); + + if (ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE) { + voter = smartlist_get(ns->voters, 0); + tor_assert(voter); + voter_identity = hex_str(voter->identity_digest, + sizeof(voter->identity_digest)); + } else { + /* Consensus has multiple voters so no specific voter. */ + voter_identity = "consensus"; + } + + /* We extract both and on error, everything is stopped because it means + * the votes is malformed for the shared random value(s). */ + if (extract_one_srv(tokens, K_PREVIOUS_SRV, &ns->sr_info.previous_srv) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unable to parse previous SRV from %s", + voter_identity); + /* Maybe we have a chance with the current SRV so let's try it anyway. */ + } + if (extract_one_srv(tokens, K_CURRENT_SRV, &ns->sr_info.current_srv) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Unable to parse current SRV from %s", + voter_identity); + } +} + /** Parse a v3 networkstatus vote, opinion, or consensus (depending on * ns_type), from <b>s</b>, and return the result. Return NULL on failure. */ networkstatus_t * @@ -3187,6 +3329,22 @@ networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out, } }
+ /* If this is a vote document, check if information about the shared + randomness protocol is included, and extract it. */ + if (ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE) { + /* Does this authority participates in the SR protocol? */ + tok = find_opt_by_keyword(tokens, K_SR_FLAG); + if (tok) { + ns->sr_info.participate = 1; + /* Get the SR commitments and reveals from the vote. */ + extract_shared_random_commits(ns, tokens); + } + } + /* For both a vote and consensus, extract the shared random values. */ + if (ns->type == NS_TYPE_VOTE || ns->type == NS_TYPE_CONSENSUS) { + extract_shared_random_srvs(ns, tokens); + } + /* Parse routerstatus lines. */ rs_tokens = smartlist_new(); rs_area = memarea_new(); diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.c b/src/or/shared_random.c index 0f988af..e3fe1a9 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random.c +++ b/src/or/shared_random.c @@ -6,6 +6,83 @@ * * \brief Functions and data structure needed to accomplish the shared * random protocol as defined in proposal #250. + * + * \details + * + * This file implements the dirauth-only commit-and-reveal protocol specified + * by proposal #250. The protocol has two phases (sr_phase_t): the commitment + * phase and the reveal phase (see get_sr_protocol_phase()). + * + * During the protocol, directory authorities keep state in memory (using + * sr_state_t) and in disk (using sr_disk_state_t). The synchronization between + * these two data structures happens in disk_state_update() and + * disk_state_parse(). + * + * Here is a rough protocol outline: + * + * 1) In the beginning of the commitment phase, dirauths generate a + * commitment/reveal value for the current protocol run (see + * new_protocol_run() and sr_generate_our_commit()). + * + * 2) During voting, dirauths publish their commits in their votes + * depending on the current phase. Dirauths also include the two + * latest shared random values (SRV) in their votes. + * (see sr_get_string_for_vote()) + * + * 3) Upon receiving a commit from a vote, authorities parse it, verify + * it, and attempt to save any new commitment or reveal information in + * their state file (see extract_shared_random_commits() and + * sr_handle_received_commits()). They also parse SRVs from votes to + * decide which SRV should be included in the final consensus (see + * extract_shared_random_srvs()). + * + * 3) After voting is done, we count the SRVs we extracted from the votes, + * to find the one voted by the majority of dirauths which should be + * included in the final consensus (see get_majority_srv_from_votes()). + * If an appropriate SRV is found, it is embedded in the consensus (see + * sr_get_string_for_consensus()). + * + * 4) At the end of the reveal phase, dirauths compute a fresh SRV for the + * day using the active commits (see sr_compute_srv()). This new SRV + * is embedded in the votes as described above. + * + * Some more notes: + * + * - To support rebooting authorities and to avoid double voting, each dirauth + * saves the current state of the protocol on disk so that it can resume + * normally in case of reboot. The disk state (sr_disk_state_t) is managed by + * shared_random_state.c:state_query() and we go to extra lengths to ensure + * that the state is flushed on disk everytime we receive any useful + * information like commits or SRVs. + * + * - When we receive a commit from a vote, we examine it to see if it's useful + * to us and whether it's appropriate to receive it according to the current + * phase of the protocol (see should_keep_commit()). If the commit is useful + * to us, we save it in our disk state using save_commit_to_state(). When we + * receive the reveal information corresponding to a commitment, we verify + * that they indeed match using verify_commit_and_reveal(). + * + * - We treat consensuses as the ground truth, so everytime we generate a new + * consensus we update our SR state accordingly even if our local view was + * different (see sr_act_post_consensus()). + * + * - After a consensus has been composed, the SR protocol state gets prepared + * for the next voting session using sr_state_update(). That function takes + * care of housekeeping and also rotates the SRVs and commits in case a new + * protocol run is coming up. We also call sr_state_update() on bootup (in + * sr_state_init()), to prepare the state for the very first voting session. + * + * Terminology: + * + * - "Commitment" is the commitment value of the commit-and-reveal protocol. + * + * - "Reveal" is the reveal value of the commit-and-reveal protocol. + * + * - "Commit" is a struct (sr_commit_t) that contains a commitment value and + * optionally also a corresponding reveal value. + * + * - "SRV" is the Shared Random Value that gets generated as the result of the + * commit-and-reveal protocol. **/
#define SHARED_RANDOM_PRIVATE @@ -27,6 +104,22 @@ static const char current_srv_str[] = "shared-rand-current-value"; static const char commit_ns_str[] = "shared-rand-commit"; static const char sr_flag_ns_str[] = "shared-rand-participate";
+/* Return a heap allocated copy of the SRV <b>orig</b>. */ +STATIC sr_srv_t * +srv_dup(const sr_srv_t *orig) +{ + sr_srv_t *dup = NULL; + + if (!orig) { + return NULL; + } + + dup = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(sr_srv_t)); + dup->num_reveals = orig->num_reveals; + memcpy(dup->value, orig->value, sizeof(dup->value)); + return dup; +} + /* Allocate a new commit object and initializing it with <b>identity</b> * that MUST be provided. The digest algorithm is set to the default one * that is supported. The rest is uninitialized. This never returns NULL. */ @@ -65,6 +158,59 @@ commit_log(const sr_commit_t *commit) } }
+/* Make sure that the commitment and reveal information in <b>commit</b> + * match. If they match return 0, return -1 otherwise. This function MUST be + * used everytime we receive a new reveal value. Furthermore, the commit + * object MUST have a reveal value and the hash of the reveal value. */ +STATIC int +verify_commit_and_reveal(const sr_commit_t *commit) +{ + tor_assert(commit); + + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Validating commit from authority %s", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr); + + /* Check that the timestamps match. */ + if (commit->commit_ts != commit->reveal_ts) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Commit timestamp %ld doesn't match reveal " + "timestamp %ld", commit->commit_ts, commit->reveal_ts); + goto invalid; + } + + /* Verify that the hashed_reveal received in the COMMIT message, matches + * the reveal we just received. */ + { + /* We first hash the reveal we just received. */ + char received_hashed_reveal[sizeof(commit->hashed_reveal)]; + + /* Only sha3-256 is supported. */ + if (commit->alg != SR_DIGEST_ALG) { + goto invalid; + } + + /* Use the invariant length since the encoded reveal variable has an + * extra byte for the NUL terminated byte. */ + if (crypto_digest256(received_hashed_reveal, commit->encoded_reveal, + SR_REVEAL_BASE64_LEN, commit->alg)) { + /* Unable to digest the reveal blob, this is unlikely. */ + goto invalid; + } + + /* Now compare that with the hashed_reveal we received in COMMIT. */ + if (fast_memneq(received_hashed_reveal, commit->hashed_reveal, + sizeof(received_hashed_reveal))) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Received reveal value from authority %s " + "does't match the commit value.", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr); + goto invalid; + } + } + + return 0; + invalid: + return -1; +} + /* Return true iff the commit contains an encoded reveal value. */ STATIC int commit_has_reveal_value(const sr_commit_t *commit) @@ -403,8 +549,176 @@ get_ns_str_from_sr_values(const sr_srv_t *prev_srv, const sr_srv_t *cur_srv) return srv_str; }
-/* Return the number of required participants of the SR protocol. This is - * based on a consensus params. */ +/* Return 1 iff the two commits have the same commitment values. This + * function does not care about reveal values. */ +STATIC int +commitments_are_the_same(const sr_commit_t *commit_one, + const sr_commit_t *commit_two) +{ + tor_assert(commit_one); + tor_assert(commit_two); + + if (strcmp(commit_one->encoded_commit, commit_two->encoded_commit)) { + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +/* We just received a commit from the vote of authority with + * <b>identity_digest</b>. Return 1 if this commit is authorititative that + * is, it belongs to the authority that voted it. Else return 0 if not. */ +STATIC int +commit_is_authoritative(const sr_commit_t *commit, + const char *voter_key) +{ + tor_assert(commit); + tor_assert(voter_key); + + return !strcmp(commit->rsa_identity_fpr, voter_key); +} + +/* Decide if the newly received <b>commit</b> should be kept depending on + * the current phase and state of the protocol. The <b>voter_key</b> is the + * RSA identity key fingerprint of the authority's vote from which the + * commit comes from. The <b>phase</b> is the phase we should be validating + * the commit for. Return 1 if the commit should be added to our state or 0 + * if not. */ +STATIC int +should_keep_commit(const sr_commit_t *commit, const char *voter_key, + sr_phase_t phase) +{ + sr_commit_t *saved_commit; + + tor_assert(commit); + tor_assert(voter_key); + + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Inspecting commit from %s (voter: %s)?", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr, voter_key); + + /* For a commit to be considered, it needs to be authoritative (it should + * be the voter's own commit). */ + if (!commit_is_authoritative(commit, voter_key)) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Ignoring non-authoritative commit."); + goto ignore; + } + + /* Check if the authority that voted for <b>commit</b> has already posted + * a commit before. */ + saved_commit = sr_state_get_commit(commit->rsa_identity_fpr); + + switch (phase) { + case SR_PHASE_COMMIT: + /* Already having a commit for an authority so ignore this one. */ + if (saved_commit) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Ignoring known commit during COMMIT phase."); + goto ignore; + } + + /* A commit with a reveal value during commitment phase is very wrong. */ + if (commit_has_reveal_value(commit)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Commit from authority %s has a reveal value " + "during COMMIT phase. (voter: %s)", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr, voter_key); + goto ignore; + } + break; + case SR_PHASE_REVEAL: + /* We are now in reveal phase. We keep a commit if and only if: + * + * - We have already seen a commit by this auth, AND + * - the saved commit has the same commitment value as this one, AND + * - the saved commit has no reveal information, AND + * - this commit does have reveal information, AND + * - the reveal & commit information are matching. + * + * If all the above are true, then we are interested in this new commit + * for its reveal information. */ + + if (!saved_commit) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Ignoring commit first seen in reveal phase."); + goto ignore; + } + + if (!commitments_are_the_same(commit, saved_commit)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Commit from authority %s is different from " + "previous commit in our state (voter: %s)", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr, voter_key); + goto ignore; + } + + if (commit_has_reveal_value(saved_commit)) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Ignoring commit with known reveal info."); + goto ignore; + } + + if (!commit_has_reveal_value(commit)) { + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Ignoring commit without reveal value."); + goto ignore; + } + + if (verify_commit_and_reveal(commit) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Commit from authority %s has an invalid " + "reveal value. (voter: %s)", + commit->rsa_identity_fpr, voter_key); + goto ignore; + } + break; + default: + tor_assert(0); + } + + return 1; + + ignore: + return 0; +} + +/* We are in reveal phase and we found a valid and verified <b>commit</b> in + * a vote that contains reveal values that we could use. Update the commit + * we have in our state. Never call this with an unverified commit. */ +STATIC void +save_commit_during_reveal_phase(const sr_commit_t *commit) +{ + sr_commit_t *saved_commit; + + tor_assert(commit); + + /* Get the commit from our state. */ + saved_commit = sr_state_get_commit(commit->rsa_identity_fpr); + tor_assert(saved_commit); + /* Safety net. They can not be different commitments at this point. */ + int same_commits = commitments_are_the_same(commit, saved_commit); + tor_assert(same_commits); + + /* Copy reveal information to our saved commit. */ + sr_state_copy_reveal_info(saved_commit, commit); +} + +/* Save <b>commit</b> to our persistent state. Depending on the current + * phase, different actions are taken. Steals reference of <b>commit</b>. + * The commit object MUST be valid and verified before adding it to the + * state. */ +STATIC void +save_commit_to_state(sr_commit_t *commit) +{ + sr_phase_t phase = sr_state_get_phase(); + + switch (phase) { + case SR_PHASE_COMMIT: + /* During commit phase, just save any new authoritative commit */ + sr_state_add_commit(commit); + break; + case SR_PHASE_REVEAL: + save_commit_during_reveal_phase(commit); + sr_commit_free(commit); + break; + default: + tor_assert(0); + } +} + +/* Return the number of required participants of the SR protocol. This is based + * on a consensus params. */ static int get_n_voters_for_srv_agreement(void) { @@ -789,6 +1103,41 @@ sr_parse_commit(const smartlist_t *args) return NULL; }
+/* Called when we are done parsing a vote by <b>voter_key</b> that might + * contain some useful <b>commits</b>. Find if any of them should be kept + * and update our state accordingly. Once done, the list of commitments will + * be empty. */ +void +sr_handle_received_commits(smartlist_t *commits, crypto_pk_t *voter_key) +{ + char rsa_identity_fpr[FINGERPRINT_LEN + 1]; + + tor_assert(voter_key); + + /* It's possible that the vote has _NO_ commits. */ + if (commits == NULL) { + return; + } + + /* Get the RSA identity fingerprint of this voter */ + if (crypto_pk_get_fingerprint(voter_key, rsa_identity_fpr, 0) < 0) { + return; + } + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(commits, sr_commit_t *, commit) { + /* We won't need the commit in this list anymore, kept or not. */ + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(commits, commit); + /* Check if this commit is valid and should be stored in our state. */ + if (!should_keep_commit(commit, rsa_identity_fpr, + sr_state_get_phase())) { + sr_commit_free(commit); + continue; + } + /* Everything lines up: save this commit to state then! */ + save_commit_to_state(commit); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(commit); +} + /* Return a heap-allocated string containing commits that should be put in * the votes. It's the responsibility of the caller to free the string. * This always return a valid string, either empty or with line(s). */ @@ -873,6 +1222,48 @@ sr_get_string_for_consensus(const smartlist_t *votes) return NULL; }
+/* We just computed a new <b>consensus</b>. Update our state with the SRVs + * from the consensus (might be NULL as well). Register the SRVs in our SR + * state and prepare for the upcoming protocol round. */ +void +sr_act_post_consensus(const networkstatus_t *consensus) +{ + time_t interval_starts; + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + + /* Don't act if our state hasn't been initialized. We can be called during + * boot time when loading consensus from disk which is prior to the + * initialization of the SR subsystem. We also should not be doing + * anything if we are _not_ a directory authority and if we are a bridge + * authority. */ + if (!sr_state_is_initialized() || !authdir_mode_v3(options) || + authdir_mode_bridge(options)) { + return; + } + + /* Set the majority voted SRVs in our state even if both are NULL. It + * doesn't matter this is what the majority has decided. Obviously, we can + * only do that if we have a consensus. */ + if (consensus) { + /* Start by freeing the current SRVs since the SRVs we believed during + * voting do not really matter. Now that all the votes are in, we use the + * majority's opinion on which are the active SRVs. */ + sr_state_clean_srvs(); + /* Reset the fresh flag of the SRV so we know that from now on we don't + * have a new SRV to vote for. We just used the one from the consensus + * decided by the majority. */ + sr_state_unset_fresh_srv(); + /* Set the SR values from the given consensus. */ + sr_state_set_previous_srv(srv_dup(consensus->sr_info.previous_srv)); + sr_state_set_current_srv(srv_dup(consensus->sr_info.current_srv)); + } + + /* Update our internal state with the next voting interval starting time. */ + interval_starts = get_voting_schedule(options, time(NULL), + LOG_NOTICE)->interval_starts; + sr_state_update(interval_starts); +} + /* Initialize shared random subsystem. This MUST be called early in the boot * process of tor. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */ int diff --git a/src/or/shared_random.h b/src/or/shared_random.h index f1fbe27..d52258c 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random.h +++ b/src/or/shared_random.h @@ -101,6 +101,9 @@ typedef struct sr_commit_t {
int sr_init(int save_to_disk); void sr_save_and_cleanup(void); +void sr_act_post_consensus(const networkstatus_t *consensus); +void sr_handle_received_commits(smartlist_t *commits, + crypto_pk_t *voter_key); sr_commit_t *sr_parse_commit(const smartlist_t *args); sr_srv_t *sr_parse_srv(const smartlist_t *args); char *sr_get_string_for_vote(void); @@ -125,9 +128,22 @@ STATIC int reveal_decode(const char *encoded, sr_commit_t *commit);
STATIC int commit_has_reveal_value(const sr_commit_t *commit);
+STATIC int verify_commit_and_reveal(const sr_commit_t *commit); + STATIC sr_srv_t *get_majority_srv_from_votes(const smartlist_t *votes, int current);
+STATIC void save_commit_to_state(sr_commit_t *commit); +STATIC sr_srv_t *srv_dup(const sr_srv_t *orig); +STATIC int commitments_are_the_same(const sr_commit_t *commit_one, + const sr_commit_t *commit_two); +STATIC int commit_is_authoritative(const sr_commit_t *commit, + const char *voter_key); +STATIC int should_keep_commit(const sr_commit_t *commit, + const char *voter_key, + sr_phase_t phase); +STATIC void save_commit_during_reveal_phase(const sr_commit_t *commit); + #endif /* SHARED_RANDOM_PRIVATE */
#endif /* TOR_SHARED_RANDOM_H */ diff --git a/src/or/shared_random_state.c b/src/or/shared_random_state.c index 87bdfc0..6dd10d6 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random_state.c +++ b/src/or/shared_random_state.c @@ -1160,6 +1160,27 @@ sr_state_delete_commits(void) state_query(SR_STATE_ACTION_DEL_ALL, SR_STATE_OBJ_COMMIT, NULL, NULL); }
+/* Copy the reveal information from <b>commit</b> into <b>saved_commit</b>. + * This <b>saved_commit</b> MUST come from our current SR state. Once modified, + * the disk state is updated. */ +void +sr_state_copy_reveal_info(sr_commit_t *saved_commit, const sr_commit_t *commit) +{ + tor_assert(saved_commit); + tor_assert(commit); + + saved_commit->reveal_ts = commit->reveal_ts; + memcpy(saved_commit->random_number, commit->random_number, + sizeof(saved_commit->random_number)); + + strlcpy(saved_commit->encoded_reveal, commit->encoded_reveal, + sizeof(saved_commit->encoded_reveal)); + state_query(SR_STATE_ACTION_SAVE, 0, NULL, NULL); + log_debug(LD_DIR, "SR: Reveal value learned %s (for commit %s) from %s", + saved_commit->encoded_reveal, saved_commit->encoded_commit, + saved_commit->rsa_identity_fpr); +} + /* Set the fresh SRV flag from our state. This doesn't need to trigger a * disk state synchronization so we directly change the state. */ void @@ -1202,6 +1223,14 @@ sr_state_save(void) state_query(SR_STATE_ACTION_SAVE, 0, NULL, NULL); }
+/* Return 1 iff the state has been initialized that is it exists in memory. + * Return 0 otherwise. */ +int +sr_state_is_initialized(void) +{ + return sr_state == NULL ? 0 : 1; +} + /* Initialize the disk and memory state. * * If save_to_disk is set to 1, the state is immediately saved to disk after diff --git a/src/or/shared_random_state.h b/src/or/shared_random_state.h index d9d9751..499a375 100644 --- a/src/or/shared_random_state.h +++ b/src/or/shared_random_state.h @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ unsigned int sr_state_srv_is_fresh(void); void sr_state_set_fresh_srv(void); void sr_state_unset_fresh_srv(void); int sr_state_init(int save_to_disk, int read_from_disk); +int sr_state_is_initialized(void); void sr_state_save(void); void sr_state_free(void);