commit d1c4cf2f5adbfa3810164d18428ee06ccbed6451 Author: Robert Ransom rransom.8774@gmail.com Date: Tue Sep 18 16:38:01 2012 -0400
Correct comment explaining why tor2web mode should disable entry guards --- src/or/config.c | 16 +++++++--------- 1 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index c77f7fb..affe238 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -2523,15 +2523,13 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, }
if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) { - /* Tor2WebMode is incompatible with EntryGuards in two ways: - * - * - Tor2WebMode uses its guard nodes as rend and intro points. - * This makes tor2web users fingerprintable by their continued - * selection of the same 3 nodes for these circuits (their guard - * nodes). - * - * - Tor2WebMode makes unexpected use of circuit path lengths - * in ways that prevent us from applying the PathBias defense. + /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards + * in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden + * service client code to do things which break the path bias + * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and + * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to + * make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode + * users compatible with tor2web mode. */ log_notice(LD_CONFIG, "Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards.");