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[tor/maint-0.2.2] refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 2b5c39211c2259404ab9bc23a1788b6d529e838f Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 05:29:28 2011 -0500 refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded add a note reminding us to do this for foo.moria1.exit if we decide to. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index fff42be..4c74426 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1610,6 +1610,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { if (s[1] != '\0') { + /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's + * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, + * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business + * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; @@ -1627,11 +1631,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); *socks->address = 0; - if (r) { + if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, + r))) { strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } else { log_warn(LD_APP, - "Unrecognized server in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", safe_str_client(socks->address)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit db2fd28308fb019e59280219cf95f09f5208092f Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 16:44:40 2011 -0400 Note that circuit purpose changing can violate ExcludeNodes --- src/or/rendservice.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 88f1ba3..5b85394 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -1352,6 +1352,9 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) log_info(LD_CIRC|LD_REND, "We have just finished an introduction " "circuit, but we already have enough. Redefining purpose to " "general."); + /* XXX022-1090: This can wind up violating ExcludeNodes/ + * ExitNodes/ExcludeExitNodes restrictions. + */ TO_CIRCUIT(circuit)->purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL; circuit_has_opened(circuit); return;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Note a slightly less likely way to violate ExcludeNodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e4689d840266088739eee39e9bef84e13c988ce9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 16:51:00 2011 -0400 Note a slightly less likely way to violate ExcludeNodes --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index d11b457..42073fb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -933,6 +933,11 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); + /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it + * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and + * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory + * operation.) -NM */ + for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 7e2e8074d52f9ace76d98a62d67a4bf781f06c3b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:22:53 2011 -0500 slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options this function really needs to get a total rewrite (or die) For now, use #if 0 to disable it. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- src/or/circuituse.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cdf49e3..7b20f7f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -242,33 +242,34 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose, return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL; } +#if 0 /** Check whether, according to the policies in options, the * circuit circ makes sense. */ -/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */ +/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more. + * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also, + * it's never called. */ int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options) { const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL; - for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath; - cpath = cpath_next) { + /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */ + for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) { cpath_next = cpath->next; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, cpath->extend_info)) return 0; + } - if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) { - /* This is apparently the exit node. */ + /* then consider the final hop */ + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, + circ->cpath->prev->extend_info)) + return 0; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, - cpath->extend_info)) - return 0; - } - } return 1; } +#endif /** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born * at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h index a121099..9f393ab 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/or/circuituse.h @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ void circuit_expire_building(void); void circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports); int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port, int min); +#if 0 int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options); +#endif void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now); void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400 refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "routerlist.h" +static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void @@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + extend_info_t *result; + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + return result; + /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node + */ + if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return NULL; +} + +/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set + * iff strict is true. + */ +static extend_info_t * +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, + const int strict) +{ int i; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *usable_nodes; + int n_excluded = 0; if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { log_warn(LD_REND, @@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); return NULL; } + /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, + * no nodes are usable. */ + usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); again: - if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise + * we're just about to retry anyways. + */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are " + "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping."); + } + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return NULL; + } - i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); + intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) @@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); } + /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + intro->extend_info)) { + n_excluded++; + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } + + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ + /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " + "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ + goto err; + } + r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); @@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a * live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is - * now out-of-date.*/ + * now out-of-date. */ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad3da535366aeb9b7441f4881899758bc7475168 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:54:20 2009 -0400 If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/or.h | 4 ++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 13 ++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2d4d5c0..ebbda21 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2938,6 +2938,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); + /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); } @@ -3979,7 +3980,8 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. */ - routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0); + routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { @@ -4155,7 +4157,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9675c73..bd904dc 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1412,7 +1412,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || - (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes)))) + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 06e6d7f..50a1223 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ typedef struct { * ORs not to consider as exits. */ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t { #define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX -/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */ +/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */ /** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use * ourself to answer a directory request. * Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c02654f..5d9ab8c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5516,10 +5516,11 @@ routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs) } /** Add every known routerinfo_t that is a member of routerset to - * out. If running_only, only add the running ones. */ + * out, but never add any that are part of excludeset. + * If running_only, only add the running ones. */ void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, - int running_only) + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only) { tor_assert(out); if (!routerset || !routerset->list) @@ -5529,12 +5530,13 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) { /* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest. - * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */ + * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, { routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1); if (router) { if (!running_only || router->is_running) - smartlist_add(out, router); + if (!routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) + smartlist_add(out, router); } }); } else { @@ -5544,7 +5546,8 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router, { if (running_only && !router->is_running) continue; - if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router)) + if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router) && + !routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) smartlist_add(out, router); }); } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ca42811..cd0eb95 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, const extend_info_t *ei); void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

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[arm/master] Delaying connection resolution until after init
by atagar＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f75b0c9f47ea4932cbdfea888cab55af7397c5a6 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 09:41:40 2011 -0700 Delaying connection resolution until after init This is a huge performance fix, dropping the startup time from 0.84 seconds to 0.14 (83% improvement). Arm had been fetching connection contents on init, blocking the first redraw. The fix is to both move connection init into its runtime thread *and* delay its execution until after the initial redraw. This hides the call latency in the period that we're usually waiting for user input anyway. There's still perceived latency if the user immediately switches to the connections page, but this is both unavoidable and unusual. --- src/cli/connections/connPanel.py | 13 ++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py index 8339f88..7e12232 100644 --- a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py +++ b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py @@ -71,9 +71,6 @@ class ConnectionPanel(panel.Panel, threading.Thread): # rate limits appResolver queries to once per update self.appResolveSinceUpdate = False - self._update() # populates initial entries - self._resolveApps(False) # resolves initial applications - # mark the initially exitsing connection uptimes as being estimates for entry in self._entries: if isinstance(entry, connEntry.ConnectionEntry): @@ -170,6 +167,16 @@ class ConnectionPanel(panel.Panel, threading.Thread): """ lastDraw = time.time() - 1 + + # Fetches out initial connection results. The wait is so this doesn't + # run during arm's interface initialization (otherwise there's a + # noticeable pause before the first redraw). + self._cond.acquire() + self._cond.wait(0.2) + self._cond.release() + self._update() # populates initial entries + self._resolveApps(False) # resolves initial applications + while not self._halt: currentTime = time.time()

1 0

[arm/master] fix: Proc resolution without a pid gave stacktrace
by atagar＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f72aa4616ea605ac22fe012513d856aaeedb819e Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 08:52:54 2011 -0700 fix: Proc resolution without a pid gave stacktrace When the connection resolver hadn't been configured with a pid and we queried connections by proc resolution there was an uncaught exception. This didn't crash arm - it just resulted in a stacktrace for a split second at startup. This was most easily reproed by running arm on Linux in blind mode, with a sleep command between panel creation and redrawing the screen to keep the stack trace visible for a bit. --- src/util/connections.py | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/util/connections.py b/src/util/connections.py index f632306..c090893 100644 --- a/src/util/connections.py +++ b/src/util/connections.py @@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ class ConnectionResolver(threading.Thread): else: self._rateThresholdBroken = 0 if isDefault: self._subsiquentFailures = 0 - except IOError, exc: + except (ValueError, IOError), exc: # this logs in a couple of cases: # - special failures noted by getConnections (most cases are already # logged via sysTools)

1 0

[arm/master] fix: Blind mode was querying connections
by atagar＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit d47b394d5ddab73d0bc0551daecae4c054d6a9b9 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 09:21:05 2011 -0700 fix: Blind mode was querying connections Initializing the connection panel was inadvertently spawning connection resolution, despite not being visible. Making the panel's update a no-op when there's no pre-instantiated resolver. --- src/cli/connections/connPanel.py | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py index 569f57c..8339f88 100644 --- a/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py +++ b/src/cli/connections/connPanel.py @@ -251,9 +251,13 @@ class ConnectionPanel(panel.Panel, threading.Thread): Fetches the newest resolved connections. """ + self.appResolveSinceUpdate = False + + # if we don't have an initialized resolver then this is a no-op + if not connections.isResolverAlive("tor"): return + connResolver = connections.getResolver("tor") currentResolutionCount = connResolver.getResolutionCount() - self.appResolveSinceUpdate = False if self._lastResourceFetch != currentResolutionCount: self.valsLock.acquire()

1 0