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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Fix a log msg
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8e2904e269e039713c2b2e7be10b82e11f239cd0 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:03:50 2011 +0200 Fix a log msg --- src/or/router.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 64cb079..0ef4728 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have " "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. " - "We will cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " + "We cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg); tor_free(msg); }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 6afad6b691d577fba2fe88f2fe9ed76a2f80002d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:58:28 2011 -0400 When cannibalizing a circuit, make sure it has no ExcludeNodes on it This could happen if StrictNodes was 0 and we were forced to pick an excluded node as the last hop of the circuit. --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 ++++++++++++++----- 1 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index 42073fb..ce324ca 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -923,6 +923,7 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, int need_uptime = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) != 0; int need_capacity = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) != 0; int internal = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) != 0; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* Make sure we're not trying to create a onehop circ by * cannibalization. */ @@ -933,11 +934,6 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); - /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it - * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and - * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory - * operation.) -NM */ - for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN && @@ -966,6 +962,19 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, hop=hop->next; } while (hop!=circ->cpath); } + if (options->ExcludeNodes) { + /* Make sure no existing nodes in the circuit are excluded for + * general use. (This may be possible if StrictNodes is 0, and we + * thought we needed to use an otherwise excluded node for, say, a + * directory operation.) */ + crypt_path_t *hop = circ->cpath; + do { + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + hop->extend_info)) + goto next; + hop = hop->next; + } while (hop != circ->cpath); + } if (!best || (best->build_state->need_uptime && !need_uptime)) best = circ; next: ;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 99621bc5a629a81a5a823ce21ac3d967443d0e12 Merge: 8f6cb93 0c40dda Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:45:28 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'arma/bug1090-part1-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] explain an argument in a function comment
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0c40dda3ad824d8a782dafae4c4233a949837df3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:43:11 2011 -0400 explain an argument in a function comment --- src/or/rendclient.c | 3 ++- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index d444611..65e632f 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -764,7 +764,8 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) } /** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set - * iff strict is true. + * iff strict is true. If warnings is false, don't complain + * to the user when we're out of nodes, even if StrictNodes is true. */ static extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 8f6cb933b6a8ee63f2e208ec43933ad27afa2af0 Merge: c49f660 2ac768e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Apr 27 13:44:55 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1090-manpage-squashed' into bug1090-part1-squashed doc/tor.1.txt | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] don't exit enclave to excluded relays
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 719b5b87dee4910bb3e2d29db6e2012416f60d3d Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:57:01 2011 -0500 don't exit enclave to excluded relays --- src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 29e2e96..523596d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void) /** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and * that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there * isn't a good one. + * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually + * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users. */ routerinfo_t * router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) @@ -1545,6 +1547,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) uint32_t addr; struct in_addr in; tor_addr_t a; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in)) return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */ @@ -1557,7 +1560,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) if (router->addr == addr && router->is_running && compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&a, port, router->exit_policy) == - ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED) + ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED && + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) return router; }); return NULL;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit b59a289365169cca228566826f19838403320cb2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:12:26 2011 -0400 Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 714d636..4832cae 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4539,6 +4539,24 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest) smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); } +/** Return true iff routerset contains the bridge bridge. */ +static int +routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset, + const bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + int result; + extend_info_t *extinfo; + tor_assert(bridge); + if (!routerset) + return 0; + + extinfo = extend_info_alloc( + NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port); + result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo); + extend_info_free(extinfo); + return result; +} + /** If digest is one of our known bridges, return it. */ static bridge_info_t * find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest) @@ -4557,6 +4575,7 @@ static void launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) { char *address; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, @@ -4564,7 +4583,13 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; /* it's already on the way */ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr); - /* XXX022-1090 if we ExcludeNodes this bridge, should this step fail? -RD */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, 0, 0, /* does not matter */ @@ -4605,6 +4630,12 @@ fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now) if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now, IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD)) continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + continue; + } /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */ download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] three more cases where maybe we want to exclude
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 5710ea64757cf0b36ab6d97409bbb9213116f949 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 06:19:15 2011 -0500 three more cases where maybe we want to exclude --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 1 + src/or/router.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b8a82e8..4fa87c0 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4570,6 +4570,7 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; /* it's already on the way */ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr); + /* XXX022-1090 if we ExcludeNodes this bridge, should this step fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, 0, 0, /* does not matter */ diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index c15b9b2..6993e1e 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -857,6 +857,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.", !orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth", me->address, me->or_port); + /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me, CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL); } @@ -867,6 +868,7 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) { /* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */ + /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr, me->or_port, me->dir_port, 0, /* does not matter */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] If we're excluded, and StrictNodes is set, do not do self-tests.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ca74badbe95be77bd990c9c4f9c1b26052d4159e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 14:14:45 2011 -0400 If we're excluded, and StrictNodes is set, do not do self-tests. --- src/or/router.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/router.c b/src/or/router.c index 6993e1e..64cb079 100644 --- a/src/or/router.c +++ b/src/or/router.c @@ -850,14 +850,33 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); int orport_reachable = check_whether_orport_reachable(); tor_addr_t addr; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!me) return; + if (routerset_contains_router(options->ExcludeNodes, me) && + options->StrictNodes) { + /* If we've excluded ourself, and StrictNodes is set, we can't test + * ourself. */ + if (test_or || test_dir) { +#define SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL 3600 + static ratelim_t warning_limit=RATELIM_INIT(SELF_EXCLUDED_WARN_INTERVAL); + char *msg; + if ((msg = rate_limit_log(&warning_limit, approx_time()))) { + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Can't peform self-tests for this relay: we have " + "listed ourself in ExcludeNodes, and StrictNodes is set. " + "We will cannot learn whether we are usable, and will not " + "be able to advertise ourself.%s", msg); + tor_free(msg); + } + } + return; + } + if (test_or && (!orport_reachable || !circuit_enough_testing_circs())) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Testing %s of my ORPort: %s:%d.", !orport_reachable ? "reachability" : "bandwidth", me->address, me->or_port); - /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ circuit_launch_by_router(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING, me, CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY|CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL); } @@ -868,7 +887,6 @@ consider_testing_reachability(int test_or, int test_dir) CONN_TYPE_DIR, &addr, me->dir_port, DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC)) { /* ask myself, via tor, for my server descriptor. */ - /* XXX022-1090 If we ExcludeNodes ourself, should this fail? -RD */ directory_initiate_command(me->address, &addr, me->or_port, me->dir_port, 0, /* does not matter */

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