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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ed7c267743f2471a5a16c5ec437efda665f4c6af Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:29 2011 -0400 Note another place that we need to fix a 1090 issue. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 3 +++ 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 4c74426..1f5eb70 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -789,6 +789,9 @@ addressmap_ent_remove(const char *address, addressmap_entry_t *ent) static void clear_trackexithost_mappings(const char *exitname) { + /* XXXX022-1090 We need a variant of this that clears all mappings no longer + permitted because of changes to the ExcludeNodes, ExitNodes, or + ExcludeExitNodes settings. */ char *suffix; size_t suffix_len; if (!addressmap || !exitname)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Do not automatically ignore Fast/Stable for exits when ExitNodes is set
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4851de554d5fc473cc9418b15bfb752e45b7d81d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 17:29:59 2011 -0400 Do not automatically ignore Fast/Stable for exits when ExitNodes is set This once maybe made sense when ExitNodes meant "Here are 3 exits; use them all", but now it more typically means "Here are 3 countries; exit from there." Using non-Fast/Stable exits created a potential partitioning opportunity and an annoying stability problem. (Don't worry about the case where all of our ExitNodes are non-Fast or non-Stable: we handle that later in the function by retrying with need_capacity and need_uptime set to 0.) --- changes/exitnodes_reliable | 7 +++++++ src/or/circuitbuild.c | 18 +++++------------- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/exitnodes_reliable b/changes/exitnodes_reliable new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62ef03a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/exitnodes_reliable @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + o Minor features: + - If ExitNodes is set, still pay attention to the Fast/Stable + status of exits when picking exit nodes. (We used to ignore + these flags when ExitNodes was set, on the grounds that people + who set exitnodes wanted all of those nodes to get used, but + with the ability to pick exits by country and IP range, this + doesn't necessarily make sense any more.) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index b6627a0..714d636 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2697,20 +2697,12 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */ } - if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) && - !options->ExitNodes) { - /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names - * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this - * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country - * they ask for is rare. Or something. */ - /* XXX022-1090 We need to pick a tradeoff here: if we throw it out because - * it's unreliable, users might end up with no exit options even - * though some options are up. If we don't throw it out, users who - * set ExitNodes will have partitioning problems because they'll be - * the only folks willing to use this node. */ + if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) { n_supported[i] = -1; - continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have - * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */ + continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable. Don't worry if + * this makes us reject all the possible routers: if so, + * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and + * need_capacity set to 0. */ } if (!(router->is_valid || options->_AllowInvalid & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) { /* if it's invalid and we don't want it */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Note a slightly less likely way to violate ExcludeNodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e4689d840266088739eee39e9bef84e13c988ce9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Mar 28 16:51:00 2011 -0400 Note a slightly less likely way to violate ExcludeNodes --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 5 +++++ 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index d11b457..42073fb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -933,6 +933,11 @@ circuit_find_to_cannibalize(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *info, "capacity %d, internal %d", purpose, need_uptime, need_capacity, internal); + /* XXX022-1090 We should make sure that when we cannibalize a circuit, it + * contains no excluded nodes. (This is possible if StrictNodes is 0, and + * we thought we needed to use an excluded exit node for, say, a directory + * operation.) -NM */ + for (_circ=global_circuitlist; _circ; _circ = _circ->next) { if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(_circ) && _circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN &&

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 84f0e87c6a6629d047a39f658b7f7c96767219ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:20:19 2011 -0400 If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit We could probably do something smarter here, but the situation is unusual enough that it's okay to just fail the circuit. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +++++-- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4832cae..c58509f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4130,15 +4130,18 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) need_capacity = 0; goto retry; } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ - /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose - * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; } +#endif /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad78bafb71fbd66e83b29aba612d17f7d03e575b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 17:08:59 2011 -0400 Correct the behavior of .exit with ExcludeNodes, StrictNodes, etc. ExcludeExitNodes foo now means that foo.exit doesn't work. If StrictNodes is set, then ExcludeNodes foo also overrides foo.exit. foo.exit , however, still works even if foo is not listed in ExitNodes. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 1f5eb70..f435976 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1497,9 +1497,13 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, hostname_type_t addresstype; or_options_t *options = get_options(); struct in_addr addr_tmp; + /* We set this to true if this is an address we should automatically + * remap to a local address in VirtualAddrNetwork */ int automap = 0; char orig_address[MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN]; time_t map_expires = TIME_MAX; + /* This will be set to true iff the address starts out as a non-.exit + address, and we remap it to one because of an entry in the addressmap. */ int remapped_to_exit = 0; time_t now = time(NULL); @@ -1610,18 +1614,24 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, /* foo.exit -- modify conn->chosen_exit_node to specify the exit * node, and conn->address to hold only the address portion. */ char *s = strrchr(socks->address,'.'); + + /* If StrictNodes is not set, then .exit overrides ExcludeNodes. */ + routerset_t *excludeset = options->StrictNodes ? + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion : options->ExcludeExitNodes; + /*XXX023 make this a node_t. */ + routerinfo_t *router; + tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { + /* The address was of the form "(stuff).(name).exit */ if (s[1] != '\0') { - /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's - * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, - * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business - * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; *s = 0; } else { + /* Oops, the address was (stuff)..exit. That's not okay. */ log_warn(LD_APP,"Malformed exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", safe_str_client(socks->address)); control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", @@ -1630,23 +1640,33 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, return -1; } } else { - routerinfo_t *r; + /* It looks like they just asked for "foo.exit". */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); - r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); - *socks->address = 0; - if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || - !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, - r))) { - strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); - } else { - log_warn(LD_APP, - "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", - r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; + router = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); + if (router) { + *socks->address = 0; + strlcpy(socks->address, router->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } } + /* Now make sure that the chosen exit exists... */ + if (!router) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Unrecognized relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* ...and make sure that it isn't excluded. */ + if (routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) { + log_warn(LD_APP, + "Excluded relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + safe_str_client(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); + return -1; + } + /* XXXX022-1090 Should we also allow foo.bar.exit if ExitNodes is set and + Bar is not listed in it? I say yes, but our revised manpage branch + implies no. */ } if (addresstype != ONION_HOSTNAME) {

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Simplify calls to routerset_equal
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 128582cc1f9fd363f3fb2a96b61fde1701a56970 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 19:13:36 2011 -0400 Simplify calls to routerset_equal The routerset_equal function explicitly handles NULL inputs, so there's no need to check inputs for NULL before calling it. Also fix a bug in routerset_equal where a non-NULL routerset with no entries didn't get counted as equal to a NULL routerset. This was untriggerable, I think, but potentially annoying down the road. --- src/or/config.c | 14 +++++--------- src/or/routerlist.c | 11 +++++++---- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 404e648..44cde85 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1260,15 +1260,11 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check for transitions that need action. */ if (old_options) { if ((options->UseEntryGuards && !old_options->UseEntryGuards) || - (options->ExcludeNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes)) || - (options->ExcludeExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, - options->ExcludeExitNodes)) || - (options->EntryNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes)) || - (options->ExitNodes && - !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes)) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeExitNodes, + options->ExcludeExitNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes, options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExitNodes, options->ExitNodes) || options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Changed to using entry guards, or changed preferred or " diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index a9a216b..d5e8a6b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,14 +5473,12 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } -#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } -#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5659,10 +5657,15 @@ routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *set) int routerset_equal(const routerset_t *old, const routerset_t *new) { - if (old == NULL && new == NULL) + if (routerset_is_empty(old) && routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* Two empty sets are equal */ return 1; - else if (old == NULL || new == NULL) + } else if (routerset_is_empty(old) || routerset_is_empty(new)) { + /* An empty set is equal to nothing else. */ return 0; + } + tor_assert(old != NULL); + tor_assert(new != NULL); if (smartlist_len(old->list) != smartlist_len(new->list)) return 0;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit b59a289365169cca228566826f19838403320cb2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:12:26 2011 -0400 Do not try to download descriptors for bridges in ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 714d636..4832cae 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4539,6 +4539,24 @@ bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, char *digest) smartlist_add(bridge_list, b); } +/** Return true iff routerset contains the bridge bridge. */ +static int +routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset, + const bridge_info_t *bridge) +{ + int result; + extend_info_t *extinfo; + tor_assert(bridge); + if (!routerset) + return 0; + + extinfo = extend_info_alloc( + NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port); + result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo); + extend_info_free(extinfo); + return result; +} + /** If digest is one of our known bridges, return it. */ static bridge_info_t * find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest) @@ -4557,6 +4575,7 @@ static void launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) { char *address; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose( CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, @@ -4564,7 +4583,13 @@ launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge) return; /* it's already on the way */ address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr); - /* XXX022-1090 if we ExcludeNodes this bridge, should this step fail? -RD */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr, bridge->port, 0, 0, /* does not matter */ @@ -4605,6 +4630,12 @@ fetch_bridge_descriptors(or_options_t *options, time_t now) if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now, IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD)) continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */ + if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) { + download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status); + log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.", + safe_str_client(fmt_addr(&bridge->addr))); + continue; + } /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */ download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit ad3da535366aeb9b7441f4881899758bc7475168 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:54:20 2009 -0400 If EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes overlap, obey ExcludeNodes. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 6 ++++-- src/or/config.c | 3 ++- src/or/or.h | 4 ++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 13 ++++++++----- src/or/routerlist.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 2d4d5c0..ebbda21 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2938,6 +2938,7 @@ warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit) description,exit->nickname, rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes", (int)purpose); + /* XXX022-1090 "using anyway" is freaking people out -RD */ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, domain, circ); } @@ -3979,7 +3980,8 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) * Perhaps we should do this calculation once whenever the list of routers * changes or the entrynodes setting changes. */ - routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, 0); + routerset_get_all_routers(entry_routers, options->EntryNodes, + options->ExcludeNodes, 0); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, smartlist_add(entry_fps,ri->cache_info.identity_digest)); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, { @@ -4155,7 +4157,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes + /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9675c73..bd904dc 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -1412,7 +1412,8 @@ options_act(or_options_t *old_options) /* Check if we need to parse and add the EntryNodes config option. */ if (options->EntryNodes && (!old_options || - (!routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes)))) + !routerset_equal(old_options->EntryNodes,options->EntryNodes) || + !routerset_equal(old_options->ExcludeNodes,options->ExcludeNodes))) entry_nodes_should_be_added(); /* Since our options changed, we might need to regenerate and upload our diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 06e6d7f..50a1223 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2387,7 +2387,7 @@ typedef struct { * ORs not to consider as exits. */ /** Union of ExcludeNodes and ExcludeExitNodes */ - struct routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; + routerset_t *_ExcludeExitNodesUnion; int DisableAllSwap; /**< Boolean: Attempt to call mlockall() on our * process for all current and future memory. */ @@ -3487,7 +3487,7 @@ typedef struct trusted_dir_server_t { #define ROUTER_MAX_DECLARED_BANDWIDTH INT32_MAX -/* Flags for pick_directory_server and pick_trusteddirserver. */ +/* Flags for pick_directory_server() and pick_trusteddirserver(). */ /** Flag to indicate that we should not automatically be willing to use * ourself to answer a directory request. * Passed to router_pick_directory_server (et al).*/ diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index c02654f..5d9ab8c 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5516,10 +5516,11 @@ routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, routerstatus_t *rs) } /** Add every known routerinfo_t that is a member of routerset to - * out. If running_only, only add the running ones. */ + * out, but never add any that are part of excludeset. + * If running_only, only add the running ones. */ void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, - int running_only) + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only) { tor_assert(out); if (!routerset || !routerset->list) @@ -5529,12 +5530,13 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, if (routerset_is_list(routerset)) { /* No routers are specified by type; all are given by name or digest. - * we can do a lookup in O(len(list)). */ + * we can do a lookup in O(len(routerset)). */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(routerset->list, const char *, name, { routerinfo_t *router = router_get_by_nickname(name, 1); if (router) { if (!running_only || router->is_running) - smartlist_add(out, router); + if (!routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) + smartlist_add(out, router); } }); } else { @@ -5544,7 +5546,8 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, SMARTLIST_FOREACH(rl->routers, routerinfo_t *, router, { if (running_only && !router->is_running) continue; - if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router)) + if (routerset_contains_router(routerset, router) && + !routerset_contains_router(excludeset, router)) smartlist_add(out, router); }); } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index ca42811..cd0eb95 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ int routerset_contains_routerstatus(const routerset_t *set, int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, const extend_info_t *ei); void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, + const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include,

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 82178a81f6748c9b26bdc8a5da36dd34b689281b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 17 18:52:18 2009 -0400 refuse excluded hidserv nodes if strictnodes Make hidden services more flaky for people who set both ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. Not recommended, especially for hidden service operators. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- src/or/rendservice.c | 14 +++++++++++- 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 8ac909f..90304c3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ #include "rephist.h" #include "routerlist.h" +static extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro_impl( + const rend_data_t *rend_query, const int strict); + /** Called when we've established a circuit to an introduction point: * send the introduction request. */ void @@ -739,10 +742,31 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) extend_info_t * rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + extend_info_t *result; + /* See if we can get a node that complies with ExcludeNodes */ + if ((result = rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 1))) + return result; + /* If not, and StrictNodes is not set, see if we can return any old node + */ + if (!get_options()->StrictNodes) + return rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(rend_query, 0); + return NULL; +} + +/** As rend_client_get_random_intro, except assume that StrictNodes is set + * iff strict is true. + */ +static extend_info_t * +rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_data_t *rend_query, + const int strict) +{ int i; rend_cache_entry_t *entry; rend_intro_point_t *intro; routerinfo_t *router; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + smartlist_t *usable_nodes; + int n_excluded = 0; if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &entry) < 1) { log_warn(LD_REND, @@ -750,13 +774,26 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) safe_str_client(rend_query->onion_address)); return NULL; } + /* We'll keep a separate list of the usable nodes. If this becomes empty, + * no nodes are usable. */ + usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); again: - if (smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes) == 0) + if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { + if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes) { + /* We only want to warn if StrictNodes is really set. Otherwise + * we're just about to retry anyways. + */ + log_warn(LD_REND, "All introduction points for hidden service are " + "at excluded relays, and StrictNodes is set. Skipping."); + } + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return NULL; + } - i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(entry->parsed->intro_nodes)); - intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + i = crypto_rand_int(smartlist_len(usable_nodes)); + intro = smartlist_get(usable_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) @@ -766,13 +803,22 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); goto again; } extend_info_free(intro->extend_info); intro->extend_info = extend_info_from_router(router); } + /* Check if we should refuse to talk to this router. */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && strict && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, + intro->extend_info)) { + n_excluded++; + smartlist_del(usable_nodes, i); + goto again; + } + + smartlist_free(usable_nodes); return extend_info_dup(intro->extend_info); } diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c index 4503982..88f1ba3 100644 --- a/src/or/rendservice.c +++ b/src/or/rendservice.c @@ -848,6 +848,7 @@ clean_accepted_intros(rend_service_t *service, time_t now) /** Respond to an INTRODUCE2 cell by launching a circuit to the chosen * rendezvous point. */ + /* XXX022 this function sure could use some organizing. -RD */ int rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) @@ -875,6 +876,8 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, time_t now = time(NULL); char diffie_hellman_hash[DIGEST_LEN]; time_t *access_time; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); + tor_assert(circuit->rend_data); base32_encode(serviceid, REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1, @@ -1047,6 +1050,15 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request, goto err; } + /* Check if we'd refuse to talk to this router */ + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, extend_info)) { + log_warn(LD_REND, "Client asked to rendezvous at a relay that we " + "exclude, and StrictNodes is set. Refusing service."); + reason = END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL; /* XXX might leak why we refused */ + goto err; + } + r_cookie = ptr; base16_encode(hexcookie,9,r_cookie,4); @@ -1394,7 +1406,7 @@ rend_service_intro_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circuit) /** Called when we get an INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell; mark the circuit as a * live introduction point, and note that the service descriptor is - * now out-of-date.*/ + * now out-of-date. */ int rend_service_intro_established(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,

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