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[tor/master] Update hacking file with terse notes on formatting changelog
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 676190e895a94978fbda82527f7ba2dbf8ccda80 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 23:44:48 2011 -0400 Update hacking file with terse notes on formatting changelog --- doc/HACKING | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index b612953..6407ff2 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -414,10 +414,43 @@ Here are the steps Roger takes when putting out a new Tor release: and as a directory authority. See if it has any obvious bugs, and resolve those. +1.5) As applicable, merge the maint-X branch into the release-X branch. + 2) Gather the changes/* files into a changelog entry, rewriting many of them and reordering to focus on what users and funders would find interesting and understandable. + 2.1) Make sure that everything that wants a bug number has one. + 2.2) Concatenate them. + 2.3) Sort them by section. Within each section, try to make the + first entry or two and the last entry most interesting: they're + the ones that skimmers tend to read. + + 2.4) Clean them up + + Standard idioms: + "Fixes bug 9999; Bugfix on 0.3.3.3-alpha." + + One period after a space. + + Make stuff very terse + + Describe the user-visible problem right away + + Mention relevant config options by name. If they're rare or unusual, + remind people what they're for + + Avoid starting lines with open-paren + + Present and imperative tense: not past. + + 2.5) Merge them in. + + 2.6) Clean everything one last time. + + 2.7) Run it through fmt to make it pretty. + + 3) Compose a short release blurb to highlight the user-facing changes. Insert said release blurb into the ChangeLog stanza. If it's a stable release, add it to the ReleaseNotes file too. If we're adding

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[tor/master] Clean up a warning a bit
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit dbd73b9689e8008adc149472ca5c02692a49923d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 29 11:14:53 2011 -0400 Clean up a warning a bit --- src/or/config.c | 7 +++---- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 8671822..666a1bd 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3488,10 +3488,9 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->CookieAuthFileGroupReadable && !options->CookieAuthFile) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You set the CookieAuthFileGroupReadable but did " - "not configure a the path for the cookie file via " - "CookieAuthFile. This means your cookie will not be group " - "readable."); + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "CookieAuthFileGroupReadable is set, but will have " + "no effect: you must specify an explicit CookieAuthFile to " + "have it group-readable."); } if (options->UseEntryGuards && ! options->NumEntryGuards)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit c48d6da24c403f6a9f8240035e8c1114cdd2eb13 Merge: daede6f dbd73b9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 29 11:15:11 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' doc/HACKING | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/config.c | 7 +++---- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Clean up a warning a bit
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit dbd73b9689e8008adc149472ca5c02692a49923d Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 29 11:14:53 2011 -0400 Clean up a warning a bit --- src/or/config.c | 7 +++---- 1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 8671822..666a1bd 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3488,10 +3488,9 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, } if (options->CookieAuthFileGroupReadable && !options->CookieAuthFile) { - log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "You set the CookieAuthFileGroupReadable but did " - "not configure a the path for the cookie file via " - "CookieAuthFile. This means your cookie will not be group " - "readable."); + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "CookieAuthFileGroupReadable is set, but will have " + "no effect: you must specify an explicit CookieAuthFile to " + "have it group-readable."); } if (options->UseEntryGuards && ! options->NumEntryGuards)

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r24688: {projects} update the 2011 slide masters (projects/presentations)
by Andrew Lewman 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

Author: phobos Date: 2011-04-29 14:09:29 +0000 (Fri, 29 Apr 2011) New Revision: 24688 Added: projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.pdf projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.tex Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.odp projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.pdf Log: update the 2011 slide masters Added: projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.pdf =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Property changes on: projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.pdf ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type + application/octet-stream Added: projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.tex =================================================================== --- projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.tex (rev 0) +++ projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.tex 2011-04-29 14:09:29 UTC (rev 24688) @@ -0,0 +1,265 @@ +\documentclass{beamer} +\mode<presentation> +\usetheme{Boadilla} +\title{Anonymity & Tor Overview} +\author{Andrew Lewman \\ andrew(a)torproject.org} +\date{\today} +\begin{document} + +\begin{frame} +\maketitle +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[height=3cm]{./images/2009-tor-logo} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What are we talking about?} +\begin{itemize} +\item Crash course on anonymous communications +\item Quick overview of Tor +\item Quick overview of Tor Hidden Services +\item Future directions +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{The Tor Project, Inc.} +501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to the research and development of technologies for online anonymity and privacy +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[height=5cm]{./images/2009-oval_sticker_new} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What is anonymity?} +\includegraphics[width=10cm]{./images/2llg3ts} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't cryptography} +\begin{itemize} +\item Cryptography protects the contents in transit +\item You still know who is talking to whom, how often, and how much data is sent. +\end{itemize} +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/encryption-cc-by-sa} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't steganography} +Attacker can tell Alice is talking to someone, how often, and how much data is sent. +\bigskip + +\begin{center} +\includegraphics[width=5cm]{./images/steganography-cc-by-sa} +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymity isn't just wishful thinking...} +\begin{itemize} +\item "You can't prove it was me!" +\pause \item "Promise you won't look" +\pause \item "Promise you won't remember" +\pause \item "Promise you won't tell" +\pause \item "I didn't write my name on it!" +\pause \item "Isn't the Internet already anonymous?" +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{..since "weak" isn't anonymity.} +\begin{itemize} +\item \textit{"You can't prove it was me!"} Proof is a very \textbf{strong} word. Statistical analysis allows suspicion to become certainty. +\pause \item \textit{"Promise you won't look/remember/tell"} Will other parties have the abilities and incentives to keep these promises? +\pause \item \textit{"I didn't write my name on it!"} Not what we're talking about. +\pause \item \textit{"Isn't the Internet already anonymous?"} Nope! +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Anonymous communication} +\begin{itemize} +\item People have to hide in a crowd of other people ("anonymity loves company") +\item The goal of the system is to make all users look as similar as possible, to give a bigger crowd +\item Hide who is communicating with whom +\item Layered encryption and random delays hide correlation between input traffic and output traffic +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Low versus High-latency anonymous communication systems} +\begin{itemize} +\item Tor is not the first system; ZKS, mixmaster, single-hop proxies, Crowds, Java Anon Proxy. +\item Low-latency systems are vulnerable to end-to-end correlation attacks. +\item High-latency systems are more resistant to end-to-end correlation attacks, but by definition, less interactive. +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Low-latency systems are generally more attractive to today's user} +\begin{itemize} +\item Interactive apps: web, instant messaging, VOIP, ssh, X11, cifs/nfs, video streaming (millions of users) +\item Multi-hour delays: email, nntp, blog posting? (tens of thousands of users?) +\pause \item \begin{center}\begin{Large}And if anonymity loves company...\end{Large}\end{center} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{What is Tor?} +\begin{itemize} +\item online anonymity software and network +\pause \item open source, freely available (3-clause BSD license) +\pause \item active research environment: \\ +Rice, UMN, NSF, NRL, Drexel, Waterloo, Cambridge UK, Bamberg Germany, Boston Univ, Harvard, MIT, RPI, Georgia Tech +\pause \item increasingly diverse toolset: \\ +Tor, Torbutton, Tor Browser Bundle, TA(I)LS LiveCD, Tor Weather, Tor auto-responder, Secure Updater, Orbot, Torora, Tor Check, Arm, Nymble, Tor Control, Tor Wall, TorVM +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{How is Tor different from other systems?} +\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm} +\only<1>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/single_hop_relay}} +\only<2>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/evil_single_hop_relay}} +\only<3>{\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/data_snooping_single_hop_relay}} +\end{overlayarea} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Twitter in Iran: Good.} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/twitter-iran-protests-time} +\flushright{\tiny From http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1905125,00.html} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Twitter in USA: Bad.} +\includegraphics[scale=0.45]{./images/twitter-g20-pittsburgh-gothamist} +\flushright{\tiny from http://gothamist.com/2009/10/05/fbi\_raids\_queens\_home\_in\_g20\_protes.p… +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Who uses Tor?} +\parbox{8cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.35]{./images/anonymousman}} +\parbox{3cm}{\sloppy +\begin{flushleft} +\begin{itemize} +\begin{small} +\item Normal people +\item Law Enforcement +\item Human Rights Activists +\item Business Execs +\item Militaries +\item Abuse Victims +\end{small} +\end{itemize} +\end{flushleft} +} +\end{frame} + + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{estimated 300k to 800k daily users} +\setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/huge-crowd}] +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor hides communication patterns by relaying data through volunteer servers} +\begin{center} +\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm} +\only<1>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-network}} +\only<2>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-selection}} +\only<3>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-safe-path}} +\only<4>{\includegraphics[width=9cm]{./images/tor-keys1}} +\end{overlayarea} +\flushright +\tiny Diagram: Robert Watson +\end{center} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Vidalia Network Map} +\includegraphics[scale=0.4]{./images/vidalia-network-map} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Metrics} +\begin{itemize} +\item Measuring metrics anonymously +\item NSF grant to find out +\item Archive of hourly consensus, ExoneraTor, VisiTor +\item Metrics portal: \\ \url{https://metrics.torproject.org/} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Tor hidden services allow privacy enhanced hosting of services} +\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{./images/hidden-federalist} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{dot onion you say?} +\includegraphics[scale=0.6]{./images/Zookos-triangle} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Hidden services, in text} +\begin{itemize} +\item Distributed Hash Table (DHT) Directory +\pause \item Rendezvous points +\pause \item Anonymity for both the server and client +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Hidden Services, in graphics} +\begin{overlayarea}{9cm}{6cm} +\only<1>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-1}} +\only<2>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-2}} +\only<3>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-3}} +\only<4>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-4}} +\only<5>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-5}} +\only<6>{\includegraphics[scale=0.5]{../../website/trunk/images/THS-6}} +\end{overlayarea} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Operating Systems leak info like a sieve} +\parbox{5cm}{\sloppy \setbeamercolor{background}[\includegraphics[height=7cm]{./images/cropped-hijack-sign-south-africa}} +\parbox{5cm}{\begin{itemize} +\item Applications, network stacks, plugins, oh my.... +\pause some call this "sharing" +\pause \item Did you know Microsoft Word and OpenOffice Writer are browsers? +\pause \item \url{www.decloak.net} is a fine test +\end{itemize} +} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Mobile Operating Systems} +\begin{itemize} +\item Entirely new set of challenges for something designed to know where you are at all times. +\item Orbot: Tor on Android. \url{https://guardianproject.info/apps/} +\item Tor on iphone, maemo/meego, symbian, etc +\item Tor on Windows CE, \url{http://www.gsmk.de} as an example. +\item Guardian Project, \url{https://guardianproject.info/} +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Next steps} +Visit \url{https://www.torproject.org/} for more information, links, and ideas. +\end{frame} + +\begin{frame} +\frametitle{Credits \& Thanks} +\begin{itemize} +\item who uses tor? \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/mattw/2336507468/siz}, Matt Westervelt, CC-BY-SA. +\item danger!, \url{http://flickr.com/photos/hmvh/58185411/sizes/o/}, hmvh, CC-BY-SA. +\item 500k, \url{http://www.flickr.com/photos/lukaskracic/334850378/sizes/l/}, Luka Skracic, used with permission. +\end{itemize} +\end{frame} + +\end{document} Property changes on: projects/presentations/2011-04-21-anonymity.tex ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type + text/x-tex Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.odp =================================================================== (Binary files differ) Modified: projects/presentations/2011-slide-masters.pdf =================================================================== (Binary files differ)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] add another heuristic for changes stanzas
by arma＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 93b0183d3cae436732b48d36aa9b54964854a0a4 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 29 01:35:21 2011 -0400 add another heuristic for changes stanzas --- doc/HACKING | 4 ++++ 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index 6407ff2..6336232 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -444,6 +444,10 @@ interesting and understandable. Present and imperative tense: not past. + If a given changes stanza showed up in a different release (e.g. + maint-0.2.1), be sure to make the stanzas identical (so people can + distinguish if these are the same change). + 2.5) Merge them in. 2.6) Clean everything one last time.

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Update hacking file with terse notes on formatting changelog
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 676190e895a94978fbda82527f7ba2dbf8ccda80 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 23:44:48 2011 -0400 Update hacking file with terse notes on formatting changelog --- doc/HACKING | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/HACKING b/doc/HACKING index b612953..6407ff2 100644 --- a/doc/HACKING +++ b/doc/HACKING @@ -414,10 +414,43 @@ Here are the steps Roger takes when putting out a new Tor release: and as a directory authority. See if it has any obvious bugs, and resolve those. +1.5) As applicable, merge the maint-X branch into the release-X branch. + 2) Gather the changes/* files into a changelog entry, rewriting many of them and reordering to focus on what users and funders would find interesting and understandable. + 2.1) Make sure that everything that wants a bug number has one. + 2.2) Concatenate them. + 2.3) Sort them by section. Within each section, try to make the + first entry or two and the last entry most interesting: they're + the ones that skimmers tend to read. + + 2.4) Clean them up + + Standard idioms: + "Fixes bug 9999; Bugfix on 0.3.3.3-alpha." + + One period after a space. + + Make stuff very terse + + Describe the user-visible problem right away + + Mention relevant config options by name. If they're rare or unusual, + remind people what they're for + + Avoid starting lines with open-paren + + Present and imperative tense: not past. + + 2.5) Merge them in. + + 2.6) Clean everything one last time. + + 2.7) Run it through fmt to make it pretty. + + 3) Compose a short release blurb to highlight the user-facing changes. Insert said release blurb into the ChangeLog stanza. If it's a stable release, add it to the ReleaseNotes file too. If we're adding

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Bump version to 0.2.2.25-alpha
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 10d45f8d45accdd920918e1980ee45fde1a3d8c4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 23:35:07 2011 -0400 Bump version to 0.2.2.25-alpha --- configure.in | 2 +- contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index fd101cb..7bf14bd 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_INIT -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.2.24-alpha) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.2.25-alpha) AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h) AC_CANONICAL_HOST diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 0f87c43..78e4820 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.2.24-alpha" +!define VERSION "0.2.2.25-alpha" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index 1df3758..8d5b969 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -233,5 +233,5 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.2.24-alpha" +#define VERSION "0.2.2.25-alpha"

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[tor/release-0.2.2] Actually, let's sleep on 0.2.2.25-alpha and put it out in the morning
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit d715984a04ed943d50da92478b33cb337342e9d1 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 23:32:38 2011 -0400 Actually, let's sleep on 0.2.2.25-alpha and put it out in the morning (Bump release date) --- ChangeLog | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 83f95cb..7e95671 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Changes in version 0.2.2.25-alpha - 2011-04-28 +Changes in version 0.2.2.25-alpha - 2011-04-29 Tor 0.2.2.25-alpha fixes many bugs: hidden service clients are more robust, routers no longer overreport their bandwidth, Win7 should crash a little less, and NEWNYM (as used by Vidalia's "new identity" button)

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[tor/master] relays checkpoint their state file twice a day
by nickm＠torproject.org 29 Apr '11

29 Apr '11

commit 66de6f7eb8e2948f6c3849dbca20c7b31969b5b7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Apr 28 21:06:25 2011 -0400 relays checkpoint their state file twice a day --- changes/bug3012 | 5 +++++ src/or/config.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3012 b/changes/bug3012 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dfde5fa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3012 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Relays can go for weeks without writing out their state file. A + relay that crashes would lose its bandwidth history (including + capacity estimate), client country statistics, and so on. Now relays + checkpoint the file at least every 12 hours. Addresses bug 3012. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index 9384b3a..dc24140 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -5122,6 +5122,11 @@ or_state_load(void) /** If writing the state to disk fails, try again after this many seconds. */ #define STATE_WRITE_RETRY_INTERVAL 3600 +/** If we're a relay, how often should we checkpoint our state file even + * if nothing else dirties it? This will checkpoint ongoing stats like + * bandwidth used, per-country user stats, etc. */ +#define STATE_RELAY_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL (12*60*60) + /** Write the persistent state to disk. Return 0 for success, <0 on failure. */ int or_state_save(time_t now) @@ -5172,7 +5177,11 @@ or_state_save(time_t now) tor_free(fname); tor_free(contents); - global_state->next_write = TIME_MAX; + if (server_mode(get_options())) + global_state->next_write = now + STATE_RELAY_CHECKPOINT_INTERVAL; + else + global_state->next_write = TIME_MAX; + return 0; }

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