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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 6802499413f8efd98ad4d578e5ef937cb55c1edc Merge: 16cfca5 f08f0e9 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:42:08 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug3228_squashed' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug3228 | 3 +++ src/or/config.c | 23 +++++++++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 8fc02a8e0ca431e4b61e54ed0aa10e7f0215c340 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:21:43 2011 -0700 Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits Fixes another part of bug 1297. --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a index 459ef65..140b94e 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297a +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -5,4 +5,12 @@ creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part of bug 1297. + - Use the same circuit timeout for client-side introduction + circuits as for other four-hop circuits. Previously, + client-side introduction circuits were closed after the same + timeout as single-hop directory-fetch circuits; this was + appropriate with the static circuit build timeout in 0.2.1.x and + earlier, but caused many hidden service access attempts to fail + with the adaptive CBT introduced in 0.2.2.2-alpha. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes another part of bug 1297. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7289aa5..97ac560 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; struct timeval now; - struct timeval introcirc_cutoff; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; tor_gettimeofday(&now); @@ -307,8 +306,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); - introcirc_cutoff = begindir_cutoff; - while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -325,8 +322,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) cutoff = fourhop_cutoff; else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened) cutoff = cannibalize_cutoff; - else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) - cutoff = introcirc_cutoff; else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) cutoff = close_cutoff; else @@ -337,12 +332,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) #if 0 /* some debug logs, to help track bugs */ - if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - victim->timestamp_created <= introcirc_cutoff && - victim->timestamp_created > general_cutoff) - log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Timing out introduction circuit which we " - "would not have done if it had been a general circuit."); - if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) { if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)

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[tor/master] Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 112d204fadab74426cc802e6d998a53f938a5248 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:03:41 2011 -0700 Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires Fixes part of #1297; bugfix on 48e0228f1e031a709c1deb149c7dfd187c3609cf, when circuit_expire_building was changed to assume that timestamp_dirty was set when a circuit changed purpose to _C_REND_READY. (It wasn't.) --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..459ef65 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Apply circuit timeouts to opened hidden-service-related circuits + based on the correct start time. Previously, we would apply the + circuit build timeout based on time since the circuit's + creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the + circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9cac5f3..6ccd957 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2143,6 +2143,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it. * That's a kludge we should fix. + * + * XXX023 The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related + * circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't + * interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should + * document it more thoroughly to make sure of that. */ time_t timestamp_dirty; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 77e11c2..a542339 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */ introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT + * state. */ + introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); return 0; perm_err: @@ -329,6 +333,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */ rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects + * it to specify when a circuit entered the + * _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */ + rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); } else { log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor."); } @@ -674,6 +682,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for " "rendezvous."); circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */ + circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); /* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather * than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 16cfca501ff27dd11daa9dc75ba9f5d99c48bdf5 Merge: 5f182ea 8fc02a8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:25:07 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug1297a | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 4b57ec6e5eabb822506416bc5cf0e291ff9c0053 Merge: 6917728 16cfca5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:33:54 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/circuituse.c changes/bug1297a | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 112d204fadab74426cc802e6d998a53f938a5248 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:03:41 2011 -0700 Set timestamp_dirty on HS circuits as circuit_expire_building requires Fixes part of #1297; bugfix on 48e0228f1e031a709c1deb149c7dfd187c3609cf, when circuit_expire_building was changed to assume that timestamp_dirty was set when a circuit changed purpose to _C_REND_READY. (It wasn't.) --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a new file mode 100644 index 0000000..459ef65 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + - Apply circuit timeouts to opened hidden-service-related circuits + based on the correct start time. Previously, we would apply the + circuit build timeout based on time since the circuit's + creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the + circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part + of bug 1297. + diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 9cac5f3..6ccd957 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2143,6 +2143,11 @@ typedef struct circuit_t { * in time in order to indicate that a circuit shouldn't be used for new * streams, but that it can stay alive as long as it has streams on it. * That's a kludge we should fix. + * + * XXX023 The CBT code uses this field to record when HS-related + * circuits entered certain states. This usage probably won't + * interfere with this field's primary purpose, but we should + * document it more thoroughly to make sure of that. */ time_t timestamp_dirty; diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 77e11c2..a542339 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -275,6 +275,10 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc, /* Now, we wait for an ACK or NAK on this circuit. */ introcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT + * state. */ + introcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); return 0; perm_err: @@ -329,6 +333,10 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, circ->rend_data->onion_address, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY); if (rendcirc) { /* remember the ack */ rendcirc->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects + * it to specify when a circuit entered the + * _C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED state. */ + rendcirc->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); } else { log_info(LD_REND,"...Found no rend circ. Dropping on the floor."); } @@ -674,6 +682,9 @@ rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, log_info(LD_REND,"Got rendezvous ack. This circuit is now ready for " "rendezvous."); circ->_base.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY; + /* Set timestamp_dirty, because circuit_expire_building expects it + * to specify when a circuit entered the _C_REND_READY state. */ + circ->_base.timestamp_dirty = time(NULL); /* XXXX023 This is a pretty brute-force approach. It'd be better to * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather * than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 16cfca501ff27dd11daa9dc75ba9f5d99c48bdf5 Merge: 5f182ea 8fc02a8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon May 30 12:25:07 2011 -0400 Merge branch 'bug1297a' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug1297a | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- src/or/or.h | 5 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 11 +++++++++++ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 8fc02a8e0ca431e4b61e54ed0aa10e7f0215c340 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 08:21:43 2011 -0700 Use the normal four-hop CBT for client intro circuits Fixes another part of bug 1297. --- changes/bug1297a | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 11 ----------- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297a b/changes/bug1297a index 459ef65..140b94e 100644 --- a/changes/bug1297a +++ b/changes/bug1297a @@ -5,4 +5,12 @@ creation; it was supposed to be applied based on time since the circuit entered its current state. Bugfix on 0.0.6; fixes part of bug 1297. + - Use the same circuit timeout for client-side introduction + circuits as for other four-hop circuits. Previously, + client-side introduction circuits were closed after the same + timeout as single-hop directory-fetch circuits; this was + appropriate with the static circuit build timeout in 0.2.1.x and + earlier, but caused many hidden service access attempts to fail + with the adaptive CBT introduced in 0.2.2.2-alpha. Bugfix on + 0.2.2.2-alpha; fixes another part of bug 1297. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 7289aa5..97ac560 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -288,7 +288,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) struct timeval general_cutoff, begindir_cutoff, fourhop_cutoff, cannibalize_cutoff, close_cutoff, extremely_old_cutoff; struct timeval now; - struct timeval introcirc_cutoff; cpath_build_state_t *build_state; tor_gettimeofday(&now); @@ -307,8 +306,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) SET_CUTOFF(close_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms); SET_CUTOFF(extremely_old_cutoff, circ_times.close_ms*2 + 1000); - introcirc_cutoff = begindir_cutoff; - while (next_circ) { struct timeval cutoff; victim = next_circ; @@ -325,8 +322,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) cutoff = fourhop_cutoff; else if (TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(victim)->has_opened) cutoff = cannibalize_cutoff; - else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING) - cutoff = introcirc_cutoff; else if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) cutoff = close_cutoff; else @@ -337,12 +332,6 @@ circuit_expire_building(void) #if 0 /* some debug logs, to help track bugs */ - if (victim->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && - victim->timestamp_created <= introcirc_cutoff && - victim->timestamp_created > general_cutoff) - log_info(LD_REND|LD_CIRC, "Timing out introduction circuit which we " - "would not have done if it had been a general circuit."); - if (victim->purpose >= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING && victim->purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED) { if (!victim->timestamp_dirty)

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[obfsproxy/master] Revive unit tests accordingly (and also shove some unit test bugs under the rug)
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit 2153e2034f0214d023824bc2796efef036d64428 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 06:57:01 2011 +0200 Revive unit tests accordingly (and also shove some unit test bugs under the rug) --- src/test/unittest_obfs2.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/unittest_obfs2.c b/src/test/unittest_obfs2.c index 052c909..9226cdf 100644 --- a/src/test/unittest_obfs2.c +++ b/src/test/unittest_obfs2.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ #include "../util.h" #include "../protocol.h" #include "../protocols/obfs2.h" +#include "../network.h" /* Make sure we can successfully set up a protocol state */ static void @@ -33,18 +34,18 @@ test_proto_setup(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -74,18 +75,18 @@ test_proto_handshake(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -96,17 +97,17 @@ test_proto_handshake(void *data) obfs2_state_t *server_state = server_proto->state; /* We create a client handshake message and pass it to output_buffer */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(client_proto, output_buffer)<0); + tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(client_proto, output_buffer)); /* We simulate the server receiving and processing the client's handshake message, by using proto_recv() on the output_buffer */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer) <0); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); /* Now, we create the server's handshake and pass it to output_buffer */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(server_proto, output_buffer)<0); + tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(server_proto, output_buffer)); /* We simulate the client receiving and processing the server's handshake */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer) <0); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); /* The handshake is now complete. We should have: client's send_crypto == server's recv_crypto @@ -146,18 +147,18 @@ test_proto_transfer(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -168,10 +169,12 @@ test_proto_transfer(void *data) struct evbuffer_iovec v[2]; /* Handshake */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(client_proto, output_buffer)<0); - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer) <0); - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(server_proto, output_buffer)<0); - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer) <0); + tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(client_proto, output_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_handshake(server_proto, output_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(client_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); /* End of Handshake */ /* Now let's pass some data around. */ @@ -182,7 +185,8 @@ test_proto_transfer(void *data) evbuffer_add(dummy_buffer, msg1, 54); proto_send(client_proto, dummy_buffer, output_buffer); - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); n = evbuffer_peek(dummy_buffer, -1, NULL, &v[0], 2); @@ -197,7 +201,8 @@ test_proto_transfer(void *data) evbuffer_add(dummy_buffer, msg2, 55); tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_send(server_proto, dummy_buffer, output_buffer)); - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(client_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); n = evbuffer_peek(dummy_buffer, -1, NULL, &v[1], 2); tt_int_op(0, ==, strncmp(msg2, v[1].iov_base, 55)); @@ -242,18 +247,18 @@ test_proto_splitted_handshake(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -293,7 +298,8 @@ test_proto_splitted_handshake(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msgclient_1, OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8+plength1_msg1); /* Server receives handshake part 1 */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_INCOMPLETE == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(server_state->state == ST_WAIT_FOR_PADDING); @@ -305,7 +311,8 @@ test_proto_splitted_handshake(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msgclient_2, plength1_msg2); /* Server receives handshake part 2 */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(server_state->state == ST_OPEN); @@ -334,7 +341,8 @@ test_proto_splitted_handshake(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msgserver_1, OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8); /* Client receives handshake part 1 */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_INCOMPLETE == proto_recv(client_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(client_state->state == ST_WAIT_FOR_PADDING); @@ -346,7 +354,8 @@ test_proto_splitted_handshake(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msgserver_2, plength2); /* Client receives handshake part 2 */ - tt_int_op(0, <=, proto_recv(client_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD == proto_recv(client_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(client_state->state == ST_OPEN); @@ -395,18 +404,18 @@ test_proto_wrong_handshake_magic(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -437,7 +446,8 @@ test_proto_wrong_handshake_magic(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msg, OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8+plength); - tt_int_op(-1, ==, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(server_state->state == ST_WAIT_FOR_KEY); @@ -474,19 +484,19 @@ test_proto_wrong_handshake_plength(void *data) protocol_params_t *proto_params_serv = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_serv); - proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 1; + proto_params_serv->is_initiator = 0; proto_params_serv->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_serv->shared_secret_len = 7; protocol_params_t *proto_params_client = calloc(1, sizeof(protocol_params_t)); tt_assert(proto_params_client); - proto_params_client->is_initiator = 0; + proto_params_client->is_initiator = 1; proto_params_client->shared_secret = "hahaha"; proto_params_client->shared_secret_len = 7; - client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); - server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + client_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_client); + server_proto = proto_new(OBFS2_PROTOCOL,proto_params_serv); tt_assert(client_proto); tt_assert(server_proto); @@ -515,7 +525,9 @@ test_proto_wrong_handshake_plength(void *data) evbuffer_add(output_buffer, msg, OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8+plength); - tt_int_op(-1, ==, proto_recv(server_proto, output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); + + tt_assert((enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD == proto_recv(server_proto, + output_buffer, dummy_buffer)); tt_assert(server_state->state == ST_WAIT_FOR_KEY);

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[obfsproxy/master] Send pending data right after init_crypto() is done.
by nickm＠torproject.org 31 May '11

31 May '11

commit f3636c411cb1e2ee9a5ffe5854d9b59259ff6b77 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)gmail.com> Date: Sun May 29 06:55:44 2011 +0200 Send pending data right after init_crypto() is done. --- src/network.c | 11 +++++++++-- src/network.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ src/protocol.c | 2 +- src/protocol.h | 8 ++++---- src/protocols/dummy.c | 17 ++++++++++------- src/protocols/obfs2.c | 31 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------- 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/network.c b/src/network.c index cfdd398..f629df9 100644 --- a/src/network.c +++ b/src/network.c @@ -309,12 +309,19 @@ obfuscated_read_cb(struct bufferevent *bev, void *arg) conn_t *conn = arg; struct bufferevent *other; other = (bev == conn->input) ? conn->output : conn->input; + enum recv_ret r; dbg(("Got data on encrypted side\n")); - if (proto_recv(conn->proto, + r = proto_recv(conn->proto, bufferevent_get_input(bev), - bufferevent_get_output(other)) < 0) + bufferevent_get_output(other)); + + if (r == RECV_BAD) conn_free(conn); + else if (r == RECV_OBFS2_PENDING) + proto_send(conn->proto, + bufferevent_get_input(conn->input), + bufferevent_get_output(conn->output)); } static void diff --git a/src/network.h b/src/network.h index 619e45f..d33b377 100644 --- a/src/network.h +++ b/src/network.h @@ -20,6 +20,22 @@ struct socks_state_t; #define LSN_SIMPLE_SERVER 2 #define LSN_SOCKS_CLIENT 3 +enum recv_ret { + /* Everything went fine. */ + RECV_GOOD=0, + /* Something went bad. */ + RECV_BAD, + /* ...need...more...data... */ + RECV_INCOMPLETE, + + /* Originally needed by the obfs2 protocol but it might get other + users in the future. Maybe it should be renamed to something neutral. + It means: + "We have pending data that we have to send. You should do that by + calling proto_send() immediately." */ + RECV_OBFS2_PENDING +}; + typedef struct listener_t listener_t; struct addrinfo; diff --git a/src/protocol.c b/src/protocol.c index 8fff6a3..bcd5330 100644 --- a/src/protocol.c +++ b/src/protocol.c @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ proto_send(struct protocol_t *proto, void *source, void *dest) { return -1; } -int +enum recv_ret proto_recv(struct protocol_t *proto, void *source, void *dest) { assert(proto); if (proto->vtable->recv) diff --git a/src/protocol.h b/src/protocol.h index e4c3e0f..4a17c73 100644 --- a/src/protocol.h +++ b/src/protocol.h @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ typedef struct protocol_vtable { struct evbuffer *dest); /* receive data function */ - int (*recv)(void *state, - struct evbuffer *source, - struct evbuffer *dest); + enum recv_ret (*recv)(void *state, + struct evbuffer *source, + struct evbuffer *dest); } protocol_vtable; @@ -73,6 +73,6 @@ struct protocol_t *proto_new(int protocol, void proto_destroy(struct protocol_t *proto); int proto_handshake(struct protocol_t *proto, void *buf); int proto_send(struct protocol_t *proto, void *source, void *dest); -int proto_recv(struct protocol_t *proto, void *source, void *dest); +enum recv_ret proto_recv(struct protocol_t *proto, void *source, void *dest); #endif diff --git a/src/protocols/dummy.c b/src/protocols/dummy.c index 482c927..ed8d672 100644 --- a/src/protocols/dummy.c +++ b/src/protocols/dummy.c @@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ #include "dummy.h" #include "../util.h" #include "../protocol.h" - +#include "../network.h" static int dummy_send(void *nothing, - struct evbuffer *source, struct evbuffer *dest); -static int dummy_recv(void *nothing, struct evbuffer *source, - struct evbuffer *dest); + struct evbuffer *source, struct evbuffer *dest); +static enum recv_ret dummy_recv(void *nothing, struct evbuffer *source, + struct evbuffer *dest); static protocol_vtable *vtable=NULL; @@ -54,10 +54,13 @@ dummy_send(void *nothing, return evbuffer_add_buffer(dest,source); } -static int +static enum recv_ret dummy_recv(void *nothing, struct evbuffer *source, struct evbuffer *dest) { (void)nothing; - - return evbuffer_add_buffer(dest,source); + + if (evbuffer_add_buffer(dest,source)<0) + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD; + else + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_GOOD; } diff --git a/src/protocols/obfs2.c b/src/protocols/obfs2.c index a8f9155..975458a 100644 --- a/src/protocols/obfs2.c +++ b/src/protocols/obfs2.c @@ -19,13 +19,14 @@ #include "obfs2.h" #include "../util.h" #include "../protocol.h" +#include "../network.h" static void obfs2_state_free(void *state); static int obfs2_send_initial_message(void *state, struct evbuffer *buf); static int obfs2_send(void *state, struct evbuffer *source, struct evbuffer *dest); -static int obfs2_recv(void *state, struct evbuffer *source, - struct evbuffer *dest); +static enum recv_ret obfs2_recv(void *state, struct evbuffer *source, + struct evbuffer *dest); static void *obfs2_state_new(protocol_params_t *params); static int obfs2_state_set_shared_secret(void *s, const char *secret, @@ -358,11 +359,12 @@ init_crypto(void *s) * * Returns x for "don't call again till you have x bytes". 0 for "all ok". -1 * for "fail, close" */ -static int +static enum recv_ret obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, struct evbuffer *dest) { obfs2_state_t *state = s; + enum recv_ret r=0; if (state->state == ST_WAIT_FOR_KEY) { /* We're waiting for the first OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8 bytes to show up @@ -371,7 +373,7 @@ obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, uint32_t magic, plength; if (evbuffer_get_length(source) < OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8) { /* data not here yet */ - return OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8; + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_INCOMPLETE; } evbuffer_remove(source, buf, OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH+8); @@ -384,7 +386,7 @@ obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, /* Now we can set up all the keys from the seed */ if (init_crypto(state) < 0) - return -1; + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD; /* Decrypt the next 8 bytes */ stream_crypt(state->recv_padding_crypto, buf+OBFUSCATE_SEED_LENGTH, 8); @@ -394,9 +396,9 @@ obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, magic = ntohl(magic); plength = ntohl(plength); if (magic != OBFUSCATE_MAGIC_VALUE) - return -1; + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD; if (plength > OBFUSCATE_MAX_PADDING) - return -1; + return (enum recv_ret) RECV_BAD; /* XXX FIXME we should now be sending any 'pending_data_to_send' but we can't send them from here, so we send them with @@ -411,13 +413,19 @@ obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, dbg(("Received key, expecting %d bytes of padding\n", plength)); } + /* If we have pending data to send, we set the return code + appropriately so that we call proto_send() right after we get out of + here! */ + if (state->pending_data_to_send) + r = RECV_OBFS2_PENDING; + /* If we're still looking for padding, start pulling off bytes and discarding them. */ while (state->padding_left_to_read) { int n = state->padding_left_to_read; size_t sourcelen = evbuffer_get_length(source); if (!sourcelen) - return n; + return RECV_INCOMPLETE; if ((size_t) n > evbuffer_get_length(source)) n = evbuffer_get_length(source); evbuffer_drain(source, n); @@ -431,7 +439,12 @@ obfs2_recv(void *s, struct evbuffer *source, dbg(("Processing %d bytes data onto destination buffer\n", (int) evbuffer_get_length(source))); - return crypt_and_transmit(state->recv_crypto, source, dest); + crypt_and_transmit(state->recv_crypto, source, dest); + + if (r != RECV_OBFS2_PENDING) + r = RECV_GOOD; + + return r; } static void

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