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[tor/master] If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 84f0e87c6a6629d047a39f658b7f7c96767219ca Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Apr 3 18:20:19 2011 -0400 If we have chosen an exit that shares a family with all bridges, fail the circuit We could probably do something smarter here, but the situation is unusual enough that it's okay to just fail the circuit. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 7 +++++-- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 4832cae..c58509f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4130,15 +4130,18 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) need_capacity = 0; goto retry; } +#if 0 + /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the + same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win + here. */ if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { /* still no? if we're using bridges, * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ - /* XXXX022-1090 This is probably not what people want. Better to choose - * a new exit. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; } +#endif /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */ }

1 0

[tor/master] warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit f7a5bc16d689e8b919285c66cd0f07a6694bcc69 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Apr 26 22:18:01 2011 -0400 warn if we launch too many circuits for a given stream --- changes/bug1090-launch-warning | 5 +++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 13 ++++++++++++- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1090-launch-warning b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3f3fbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1090-launch-warning @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features: + - Keep track of how many times we launch a new circuit to handle + a given stream. Too many launches could indicate an inconsistency + between our "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our + "attach our stream to one of the available circuits" logic. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cc4a739..fd1cf6b 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1409,7 +1409,18 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(edge_connection_t *conn, extend_info_free(extend_info); - if (desired_circuit_purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + if (desired_circuit_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL) { + /* We just caused a circuit to get built because of this stream. + * If this stream has caused a _lot_ of circuits to be built, that's + * a bad sign: we should tell the user. */ + if (conn->num_circuits_launched < NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD && + ++conn->num_circuits_launched == NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD) + log_warn(LD_BUG, "The application request to %s:%d has launched " + "%d circuits without finding one it likes.", + escaped_safe_str_client(conn->socks_request->address), + conn->socks_request->port, + conn->num_circuits_launched); + } else { /* help predict this next time */ rep_hist_note_used_internal(time(NULL), need_uptime, 1); if (circ) { diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 50a1223..7d354c8 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -1151,6 +1151,13 @@ typedef struct edge_connection_t { * already retried several times. */ uint8_t num_socks_retries; +#define NUM_CIRCUITS_LAUNCHED_THRESHOLD 10 + /** Number of times we've launched a circuit to handle this stream. If + * it gets too high, that could indicate an inconsistency between our + * "launch a circuit to handle this stream" logic and our "attach our + * stream to one of the available circuits" logic. */ + unsigned int num_circuits_launched:4; + /** True iff this connection is for a DNS request only. */ unsigned int is_dns_request:1;

1 0

[tor/master] Fix a check-spaces complaint
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit e03e90bf591f649f7883807f99354634e837ee48 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Apr 8 04:16:26 2011 +0200 Fix a check-spaces complaint --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 5f322ca..1ee57ab 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ addressmap_clear_excluded_trackexithosts(or_options_t *options) if (len < 6) continue; /* malformed. */ dot = target + len - 6; /* dot now points to just before .exit */ - dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit, or NULL */ + dot = strrchr(dot, '.'); /* dot now points to the . before .exit or NULL */ if (!dot) { nodename = tor_strndup(target, len-5); } else {

1 0

[tor/master] handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 4906188b622872899f76cf01167cfef3e09cbffd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:09:24 2011 -0500 handle excludenodes for dir fetch/post If we're picking a random directory node, never pick an excluded one. But if we've chosen a specific one (or all), allow it unless strictnodes is set (in which case warn so the user knows it's their fault). When warning that we won't connect to a strictly excluded node, log what it was we were trying to do at that node. When ExcludeNodes is set but StrictNodes is not set, we only use non-excluded nodes if we can, but fall back to using excluded nodes if none of those nodes is usable. --- src/or/directory.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/or/routerlist.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/directory.c b/src/or/directory.c index 8f33a60..0c095fe 100644 --- a/src/or/directory.c +++ b/src/or/directory.c @@ -253,10 +253,13 @@ directories_have_accepted_server_descriptor(void) } /** Start a connection to every suitable directory authority, using - * connection purpose 'purpose' and uploading the payload 'payload' - * (length 'payload_len'). dir_purpose should be one of + * connection purpose dir_purpose and uploading payload + * (of length payload_len). The dir_purpose should be one of * 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR' or 'DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_RENDDESC'. * + * router_purpose describes the type of descriptor we're + * publishing, if we're publishing a descriptor -- e.g. general or bridge. + * * type specifies what sort of dir authorities (V1, V2, * HIDSERV, BRIDGE) we should upload to. * @@ -272,6 +275,7 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, const char *payload, size_t payload_len, size_t extrainfo_len) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); int post_via_tor; smartlist_t *dirservers = router_get_trusted_dir_servers(); int found = 0; @@ -287,6 +291,16 @@ directory_post_to_dirservers(uint8_t dir_purpose, uint8_t router_purpose, if ((type & ds->type) == 0) continue; + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, rs)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact authority '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping.", + ds->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + continue; + } + found = 1; /* at least one authority of this type was listed */ if (dir_purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_UPLOAD_DIR) ds->has_accepted_serverdesc = 0; @@ -496,12 +510,14 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, time_t if_modified_since, const rend_data_t *rend_query) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerinfo_t *router; char address_buf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN+1]; struct in_addr in; const char *address; tor_addr_t addr; router = router_get_by_digest(status->identity_digest); + if (!router && anonymized_connection) { log_info(LD_DIR, "Not sending anonymized request to directory '%s'; we " "don't have its router descriptor.", status->nickname); @@ -514,6 +530,17 @@ directory_initiate_command_routerstatus_rend(routerstatus_t *status, address = address_buf; } tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); + + if (options->ExcludeNodes && options->StrictNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + log_warn(LD_DIR, "Wanted to contact directory mirror '%s' for %s, but " + "it's in our ExcludedNodes list and StrictNodes is set. " + "Skipping. This choice might make your Tor not work.", + status->nickname, + dir_conn_purpose_to_string(dir_purpose)); + return; + } + directory_initiate_command_rend(address, &addr, status->or_port, status->dir_port, status->version_supports_conditional_consensus, diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 5d9ab8c..29e2e96 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1070,6 +1070,7 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver(authority_type_t type, int flags) static routerstatus_t * router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); routerstatus_t *result; smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *trusted_direct, *trusted_tunnel; @@ -1079,10 +1080,13 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) int requireother = ! (flags & PDS_ALLOW_SELF); int fascistfirewall = ! (flags & PDS_IGNORE_FASCISTFIREWALL); int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!consensus) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); trusted_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1114,6 +1118,11 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) if ((type & EXTRAINFO_CACHE) && !router_supports_extrainfo(status->identity_digest, 0)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, status->addr); @@ -1155,6 +1164,15 @@ router_pick_directory_server_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags) smartlist_free(trusted_tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; } @@ -1165,6 +1183,7 @@ static routerstatus_t * router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, int *n_busy_out) { + or_options_t *options = get_options(); smartlist_t *direct, *tunnel; smartlist_t *overloaded_direct, *overloaded_tunnel; routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); @@ -1175,10 +1194,13 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, const int prefer_tunnel = (flags & _PDS_PREFER_TUNNELED_DIR_CONNS); const int no_serverdesc_fetching =(flags & PDS_NO_EXISTING_SERVERDESC_FETCH); int n_busy = 0; + int try_excluding = 1, n_excluded = 0; if (!trusted_dir_servers) return NULL; + retry_without_exclude: + direct = smartlist_create(); tunnel = smartlist_create(); overloaded_direct = smartlist_create(); @@ -1197,6 +1219,12 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, continue; if (requireother && me && router_digest_is_me(d->digest)) continue; + if (try_excluding && options->ExcludeNodes && + routerset_contains_routerstatus(options->ExcludeNodes, + &d->fake_status)) { + ++n_excluded; + continue; + } /* XXXX IP6 proposal 118 */ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, d->addr); @@ -1243,6 +1271,15 @@ router_pick_trusteddirserver_impl(authority_type_t type, int flags, smartlist_free(tunnel); smartlist_free(overloaded_direct); smartlist_free(overloaded_tunnel); + + if (result == NULL && try_excluding && !options->StrictNodes && n_excluded) { + /* If we got no result, and we are excluding nodes, and StrictNodes is + * not set, try again without excluding nodes. */ + try_excluding = 0; + n_excluded = 0; + goto retry_without_exclude; + } + return result; }

1 0

[tor/master] slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 7e2e8074d52f9ace76d98a62d67a4bf781f06c3b Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:22:53 2011 -0500 slight tweak on circuit_conforms_to_options this function really needs to get a total rewrite (or die) For now, use #if 0 to disable it. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 23 ++++++++++++----------- src/or/circuituse.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index cdf49e3..7b20f7f 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -242,33 +242,34 @@ circuit_get_best(edge_connection_t *conn, int must_be_open, uint8_t purpose, return best ? TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(best) : NULL; } +#if 0 /** Check whether, according to the policies in options, the * circuit circ makes sense. */ -/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes. It should check more. */ +/* XXXX currently only checks Exclude{Exit}Nodes; it should check more. + * Also, it doesn't have the right definition of an exit circuit. Also, + * it's never called. */ int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options) { const crypt_path_t *cpath, *cpath_next = NULL; - for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath && cpath_next != circ->cpath; - cpath = cpath_next) { + /* first check if it includes any excluded nodes */ + for (cpath = circ->cpath; cpath_next != circ->cpath; cpath = cpath_next) { cpath_next = cpath->next; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeNodes, cpath->extend_info)) return 0; + } - if (cpath->next == circ->cpath) { - /* This is apparently the exit node. */ + /* then consider the final hop */ + if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, + circ->cpath->prev->extend_info)) + return 0; - if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(options->ExcludeExitNodes, - cpath->extend_info)) - return 0; - } - } return 1; } +#endif /** Close all circuits that start at us, aren't open, and were born * at least CircuitBuildTimeout seconds ago. diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.h b/src/or/circuituse.h index a121099..9f393ab 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.h +++ b/src/or/circuituse.h @@ -16,8 +16,10 @@ void circuit_expire_building(void); void circuit_remove_handled_ports(smartlist_t *needed_ports); int circuit_stream_is_being_handled(edge_connection_t *conn, uint16_t port, int min); +#if 0 int circuit_conforms_to_options(const origin_circuit_t *circ, const or_options_t *options); +#endif void circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now); void circuit_detach_stream(circuit_t *circ, edge_connection_t *conn);

1 0

[tor/master] don't exit enclave to excluded relays
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 719b5b87dee4910bb3e2d29db6e2012416f60d3d Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 03:57:01 2011 -0500 don't exit enclave to excluded relays --- src/or/routerlist.c | 6 +++++- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 29e2e96..523596d 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1538,6 +1538,8 @@ routerlist_find_my_routerinfo(void) /** Find a router that's up, that has this IP address, and * that allows exit to this address:port, or return NULL if there * isn't a good one. + * Don't exit enclave to excluded relays -- it wouldn't actually + * hurt anything, but this way there are fewer confused users. */ routerinfo_t * router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) @@ -1545,6 +1547,7 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) uint32_t addr; struct in_addr in; tor_addr_t a; + or_options_t *options = get_options(); if (!tor_inet_aton(address, &in)) return NULL; /* it's not an IP already */ @@ -1557,7 +1560,8 @@ router_find_exact_exit_enclave(const char *address, uint16_t port) if (router->addr == addr && router->is_running && compare_tor_addr_to_addr_policy(&a, port, router->exit_policy) == - ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED) + ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED && + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) return router; }); return NULL;

1 0

[tor/master] refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 2b5c39211c2259404ab9bc23a1788b6d529e838f Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 05:29:28 2011 -0500 refuse moria1.exit if moria1 is excluded add a note reminding us to do this for foo.moria1.exit if we decide to. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index fff42be..4c74426 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1610,6 +1610,10 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, tor_assert(!automap); if (s) { if (s[1] != '\0') { + /* XXX022-1090 we should look this up as a relay and see if it's + * in our excluded set, and refuse it here if so. But first, + * figure out what's up with this 'remapped_to_exit' business + * and whether that needs careful treatment. -RD */ conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(s+1); if (remapped_to_exit) /* 5 tries before it expires the addressmap */ conn->chosen_exit_retries = TRACKHOSTEXITS_RETRIES; @@ -1627,11 +1631,14 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn, conn->chosen_exit_name = tor_strdup(socks->address); r = router_get_by_nickname(conn->chosen_exit_name, 1); *socks->address = 0; - if (r) { + if (r && (!options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion || + !routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, + r))) { strlcpy(socks->address, r->address, sizeof(socks->address)); } else { log_warn(LD_APP, - "Unrecognized server in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + "%s relay in exit address '%s.exit'. Refusing.", + r ? "Excluded" : "Unrecognized", safe_str_client(socks->address)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1;

1 0

[tor/master] make formal a constraint that's been true a while now
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 9f47cfc21a8fa91b98a48291c316121135fa3f17 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 05:39:26 2011 -0500 make formal a constraint that's been true a while now --- src/or/config.c | 6 ++++++ 1 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index bd904dc..404e648 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -3189,6 +3189,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("Servers must be able to freely connect to the rest " "of the Internet, so they must not set UseBridges."); + /* If both of these are set, we'll end up with funny behavior where we + * demand enough entrynodes be up and running else we won't build + * circuits, yet we never actually use them. */ + if (options->UseBridges && options->EntryNodes) + REJECT("You cannot set both UseBridges and EntryNodes."); + options->_AllowInvalid = 0; if (options->AllowInvalidNodes) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH(options->AllowInvalidNodes, const char *, cp, {

1 0

[tor/master] the new entrynodes behavior is always strict
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 5d12495d982d076b74ca2c0c88b78b00d2810e71 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:21:25 2011 -0500 the new entrynodes behavior is always strict --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 36 +++++++++++------------------------- 1 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index ebbda21..86406cb 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -4006,14 +4006,10 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_routers, routerinfo_t *, ri, { add_an_entry_guard(ri, 0); }); - /* Finally, the remaining previously configured guards that are not in - * EntryNodes, unless we're strict in which case we drop them */ - if (options->StrictNodes) { - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, - entry_guard_free(e)); - } else { - smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_not_on_list); - } + /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in + * EntryNodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e, + entry_guard_free(e)); smartlist_free(entry_routers); smartlist_free(entry_fps); @@ -4024,7 +4020,7 @@ entry_guards_prepend_from_config(or_options_t *options) /** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a - * list already and we'd prefer to stick to it. + * list already and we must stick to it. */ int entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) @@ -4036,18 +4032,6 @@ entry_list_is_constrained(or_options_t *options) return 0; } -/* Are we dead set against changing our entry guard list, or would we - * change it if it means keeping Tor usable? */ -static int -entry_list_is_totally_static(or_options_t *options) -{ - if (options->EntryNodes && options->StrictNodes) - return 1; - if (options->UseBridges) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If * state is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit -- * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the @@ -4092,6 +4076,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */ if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, r)) continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */ +#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */ if (options->EntryNodes && !routerset_contains_router(options->EntryNodes, r)) { /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */ @@ -4106,6 +4091,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others."); } } +#endif smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, r); if (!entry->made_contact) { /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry @@ -4131,7 +4117,7 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) } if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) { - if (!entry_list_is_totally_static(options)) { + if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) { /* still no? try adding a new entry then */ /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might @@ -4157,9 +4143,9 @@ choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state) goto retry; } if (!r && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) { - /* still no? if we're using bridges or have StrictNodes - * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our - * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */ + /* still no? if we're using bridges, + * and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our + * bridges, then be flexible about families. */ consider_exit_family = 0; goto retry; }

1 0

[tor/master] If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes.
by nickm＠torproject.org 27 Apr '11

27 Apr '11

commit 0ad3836f73cbb6f0aa8b643c43e799d69d378aea Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Mar 11 04:35:08 2011 -0500 If ExitNodes and Exclude{Exit}Nodes overlap, obey Exclude{Exit}Nodes. Also, ExitNodes are always strict. --- src/or/circuitbuild.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- src/or/routerlist.c | 4 +++ src/or/routerlist.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/or/circuitbuild.c index 86406cb..b8a82e8 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -2685,13 +2685,29 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */ } + + if (options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion && + routerset_contains_router(options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */ + } + if (options->ExitNodes && + !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router)) { + n_supported[i] = -1; + continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */ + } + if (router_is_unreliable(router, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0) && - (!options->ExitNodes || - !routerset_contains_router(options->ExitNodes, router))) { + !options->ExitNodes) { /* FFFF Someday, differentiate between a routerset that names * routers, and a routerset that names countries, and only do this * check if they've asked for specific exit relays. Or if the country * they ask for is rare. Or something. */ + /* XXX022-1090 We need to pick a tradeoff here: if we throw it out because + * it's unreliable, users might end up with no exit options even + * though some options are up. If we don't throw it out, users who + * set ExitNodes will have partitioning problems because they'll be + * the only folks willing to use this node. */ n_supported[i] = -1; continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable, unless we have * ExitNodes set, in which case we asked for it */ @@ -2753,21 +2769,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one * at random. */ if (best_support > 0) { - smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(), *use = smartlist_create(); + smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_create(); for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(dir->routers); i++) if (n_supported[i] == best_support) smartlist_add(supporting, smartlist_get(dir->routers, i)); - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); - smartlist_free(use); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); smartlist_free(supporting); } else { /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to @@ -2775,7 +2783,7 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, * at least one predicted exit port. */ int attempt; - smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting, *use; + smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting; if (best_support == -1) { if (need_uptime || need_capacity) { @@ -2792,7 +2800,6 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? " or are Excluded" : ""); } supporting = smartlist_create(); - use = smartlist_create(); needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL)); for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) { /* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port, @@ -2807,25 +2814,13 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, } } - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, options->ExitNodes, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - if (smartlist_len(use) == 0 && options->ExitNodes && - !options->StrictNodes) { /* give up on exitnodes and try again */ - routersets_get_disjunction(use, supporting, NULL, - options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion, 1); - } - /* FFF sometimes the above results in null, when the requested - * exit node is considered down by the consensus. we should pick - * it anyway, since the user asked for it. */ - router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(use, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); + router = routerlist_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT); if (router) break; smartlist_clear(supporting); - smartlist_clear(use); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp)); smartlist_free(needed_ports); - smartlist_free(use); smartlist_free(supporting); } @@ -2834,10 +2829,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(routerlist_t *dir, int need_uptime, log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", router->nickname); return router; } - if (options->ExitNodes && options->StrictNodes) { + if (options->ExitNodes) { log_warn(LD_CIRC, - "No specified exit routers seem to be running, and " - "StrictNodes is set: can't choose an exit."); + "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: " + "can't choose an exit.", + options->_ExcludeExitNodesUnion ? "non-excluded " : ""); } return NULL; } diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 523596d..a9a216b 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -5473,12 +5473,14 @@ routerset_needs_geoip(const routerset_t *set) return set && smartlist_len(set->country_names); } +#if 0 /** Return true iff there are no entries in set. */ static int routerset_is_empty(const routerset_t *set) { return !set || smartlist_len(set->list) == 0; } +#endif /** Helper. Return true iff set contains a router based on the other * provided fields. Return higher values for more specific subentries: a @@ -5594,6 +5596,7 @@ routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, } } +#if 0 /** Add to target every routerinfo_t from source except: * * 1) Don't add it if include is non-empty and the relay isn't in @@ -5624,6 +5627,7 @@ routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, } }); } +#endif /** Remove every routerinfo_t from lst that is in routerset. */ void diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.h b/src/or/routerlist.h index cd0eb95..3bbdc42 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.h +++ b/src/or/routerlist.h @@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ int routerset_contains_extendinfo(const routerset_t *set, void routerset_get_all_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset, const routerset_t *excludeset, int running_only); +#if 0 void routersets_get_disjunction(smartlist_t *target, const smartlist_t *source, const routerset_t *include, const routerset_t *exclude, int running_only); +#endif void routerset_subtract_routers(smartlist_t *out, const routerset_t *routerset); char *routerset_to_string(const routerset_t *routerset);

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