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[tor/release-0.2.1] fold in last two changes files
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit feabf2eb6c79dca34bc9972d696020904da79ecd Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 22:56:57 2011 -0500 fold in last two changes files --- ChangeLog | 13 ++++++++++++- changes/bug1859 | 9 --------- changes/bug2402 | 4 ---- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 869365c..6c8af1c 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -Changes in version 0.2.1.30 - 2011-02-?? +Changes in version 0.2.1.30 - 2011-02-23 o Major bugfixes: - Stop sending a CLOCK_SKEW controller status event whenever we fetch directory information from a relay that has a wrong clock. @@ -25,11 +25,22 @@ Changes in version 0.2.1.30 - 2011-02-?? - Check for and reject overly long directory certificates and directory tokens before they have a chance to hit any assertions. Bugfix on 0.2.1.28. Found by "doorss". + - Bring the logic that gathers routerinfos and assesses the + acceptability of circuits into line. This prevents a Tor OP from + getting locked in a cycle of choosing its local OR as an exit for a + path (due to a .exit request) and then rejecting the circuit because + its OR is not listed yet. It also prevents Tor clients from using an + OR running in the same instance as an exit (due to a .exit request) + if the OR does not meet the same requirements expected of an OR + running elsewhere. Fixes bug 1859; bugfix on 0.1.0.1-rc. o Packaging changes: - Stop shipping the Tor specs files and development proposal documents in the tarball. They are now in a separate git repository at git://git.torproject.org/torspec.git + - Do not include Git version tags as though they are SVN tags when + generating a tarball from inside a repository that has switched + between branches. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402. Changes in version 0.2.1.29 - 2011-01-15 diff --git a/changes/bug1859 b/changes/bug1859 deleted file mode 100644 index 5b139f3..0000000 --- a/changes/bug1859 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,9 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Bring the logic that gathers routerinfos and assesses the - acceptability of circuits into line. This prevents a Tor OP from getting - locked in a cycle of choosing its local OR as an exit for a path (due to - a .exit request) and then rejecting the circuit because its OR is not - listed yet. Also prevent Tor clients from using an OR running in the same - instance as an exit (due to a .exit request) if the OR does not meet the - same requirements expected of an OR running elsewhere. - Fixes bug 1859; bugfix on 0.2.0-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug2402 b/changes/bug2402 deleted file mode 100644 index f16f677..0000000 --- a/changes/bug2402 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (build) - - Do not include Git version tags as though they were SVN tags when - generating a tarball from inside a repository that has switched between - branches. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402.

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[tor/release-0.2.1] bump to 0.2.1.30
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 62d660b1da601c264c4e653a427c653ff87b26e7 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 22:59:30 2011 -0500 bump to 0.2.1.30 --- configure.in | 2 +- contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index c91bce0..4ab7908 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_INIT -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.29) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.30) AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h) AC_CANONICAL_HOST diff --git a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 6da39d1..0aae2c7 100644 --- a/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.2.1.29" +!define VERSION "0.2.1.30" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index df34bd1..5468eaa 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -226,6 +226,6 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.2.1.29" +#define VERSION "0.2.1.30"

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Merge remote branch 'public/bug1859_021' into maint-0.2.1
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 491abbc65e535b5308d6c57ab9ab3900ac2dd2d2 Merge: 7605985 2392290 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 17:19:41 2011 -0500 Merge remote branch 'public/bug1859_021' into maint-0.2.1 changes/bug1859 | 9 +++++++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++- src/or/routerlist.c | 3 --- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --combined src/or/connection_edge.c index 052aa37,f72aa94..5609c1d --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@@ -1,7 -1,7 +1,7 @@@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2010, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@@ -571,7 -571,7 +571,7 @@@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves( !edge_conn->chosen_exit_retries) continue; r1 = router_get_by_nickname(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0); - r2 = router_get_by_nickname(info->nickname, 0); + r2 = router_get_by_digest(info->identity_digest); if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2) continue; tor_assert(edge_conn->socks_request); @@@ -1139,23 -1139,9 +1139,23 @@@ address_is_in_virtual_range(const char return 0; } +/** Increment the value of next_virtual_addr; reset it to the start of the + * virtual address range if it wraps around. + */ +static INLINE void +increment_virtual_addr(void) +{ + ++next_virtual_addr; + if (addr_mask_cmp_bits(next_virtual_addr, virtual_addr_network, + virtual_addr_netmask_bits)) + next_virtual_addr = virtual_addr_network; +} + /** Return a newly allocated string holding an address of type * (one of RESOLVED_TYPE_{IPV4|HOSTNAME}) that has not yet been mapped, * and that is very unlikely to be the address of any real host. + * + * May return NULL if we have run out of virtual addresses. */ static char * addressmap_get_virtual_address(int type) @@@ -1180,26 -1166,25 +1180,26 @@@ /* Don't hand out any .0 or .255 address. */ while ((next_virtual_addr & 0xff) == 0 || (next_virtual_addr & 0xff) == 0xff) { - ++next_virtual_addr; + increment_virtual_addr(); + if (! --available) { + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Ran out of virtual addresses!"); + return NULL; + } } in.s_addr = htonl(next_virtual_addr); tor_inet_ntoa(&in, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (!strmap_get(addressmap, buf)) { - ++next_virtual_addr; + increment_virtual_addr(); break; } - ++next_virtual_addr; + increment_virtual_addr(); --available; - log_info(LD_CONFIG, "%d addrs available", (int)available); - if (! --available) { + // log_info(LD_CONFIG, "%d addrs available", (int)available); + if (! available) { log_warn(LD_CONFIG, "Ran out of virtual addresses!"); return NULL; } - if (addr_mask_cmp_bits(next_virtual_addr, virtual_addr_network, - virtual_addr_netmask_bits)) - next_virtual_addr = virtual_addr_network; } return tor_strdup(buf); } else { @@@ -1214,15 -1199,14 +1214,15 @@@ * allocated string. If another address of the same type is already * mapped to new_address, try to return a copy of that address. * - * The string in new_address may be freed, or inserted into a map - * as appropriate. + * The string in new_address may be freed or inserted into a map + * as appropriate. May return NULL if are out of virtual addresses. **/ const char * addressmap_register_virtual_address(int type, char *new_address) { char **addrp; virtaddress_entry_t *vent; + int vent_needs_to_be_added = 0; tor_assert(new_address); tor_assert(addressmap); @@@ -1231,7 -1215,7 +1231,7 @@@ vent = strmap_get(virtaddress_reversemap, new_address); if (!vent) { vent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(virtaddress_entry_t)); - strmap_set(virtaddress_reversemap, new_address, vent); + vent_needs_to_be_added = 1; } addrp = (type == RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4) ? @@@ -1241,7 -1225,6 +1241,7 @@@ if (ent && ent->new_address && !strcasecmp(new_address, ent->new_address)) { tor_free(new_address); + tor_assert(!vent_needs_to_be_added); return tor_strdup(*addrp); } else log_warn(LD_BUG, @@@ -1253,14 -1236,7 +1253,14 @@@ tor_free(*addrp); *addrp = addressmap_get_virtual_address(type); + if (!*addrp) { + tor_free(vent); + tor_free(new_address); + return NULL; + } log_info(LD_APP, "Registering map from %s to %s", *addrp, new_address); + if (vent_needs_to_be_added) + strmap_set(virtaddress_reversemap, new_address, vent); addressmap_register(*addrp, new_address, 2, ADDRMAPSRC_CONTROLLER); #if 0 @@@ -1439,12 -1415,7 +1439,12 @@@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_att const char *new_addr; new_addr = addressmap_register_virtual_address( RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4, tor_strdup(socks->address)); - tor_assert(new_addr); + if (! new_addr) { + log_warn(LD_APP, "Unable to automap address %s", + escaped_safe_str(socks->address)); + connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_INTERNAL); + return -1; + } log_info(LD_APP, "Automapping %s to %s", escaped_safe_str(socks->address), safe_str(new_addr)); strlcpy(socks->address, new_addr, sizeof(socks->address)); @@@ -1459,8 -1430,7 +1459,8 @@@ tor_snprintf(socks->address, sizeof(socks->address), "REVERSE[%s]", orig_address); connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn, RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME, - strlen(result), result, -1, + strlen(result), (uint8_t*)result, + -1, map_expires); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DONE | @@@ -1592,8 -1562,7 +1592,8 @@@ /* remember _what_ is supposed to have been resolved. */ strlcpy(socks->address, orig_address, sizeof(socks->address)); connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(conn,RESOLVED_TYPE_IPV4,4, - (char*)&answer,-1,map_expires); + (uint8_t*)&answer, + -1,map_expires); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_DONE | END_STREAM_REASON_FLAG_ALREADY_SOCKS_REPLIED); @@@ -2342,7 -2311,7 +2342,7 @@@ voi connection_ap_handshake_socks_resolved(edge_connection_t *conn, int answer_type, size_t answer_len, - const char *answer, + const uint8_t *answer, int ttl, time_t expires) { @@@ -2356,7 -2325,7 +2356,7 @@@ client_dns_set_addressmap(conn->socks_request->address, a, conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl); } else if (answer_type == RESOLVED_TYPE_HOSTNAME && answer_len < 256) { - char *cp = tor_strndup(answer, answer_len); + char *cp = tor_strndup((char*)answer, answer_len); client_dns_set_reverse_addressmap(conn->socks_request->address, cp, conn->chosen_exit_name, ttl); @@@ -2367,14 -2336,14 +2367,14 @@@ if (conn->is_dns_request) { if (conn->dns_server_request) { /* We had a request on our DNS port: answer it. */ - dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, answer, ttl); + dnsserv_resolved(conn, answer_type, answer_len, (char*)answer, ttl); conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1; return; } else { /* This must be a request from the controller. We already sent * a mapaddress if there's a ttl. */ tell_controller_about_resolved_result(conn, answer_type, answer_len, - answer, ttl, expires); + (char*)answer, ttl, expires); conn->socks_request->has_finished = 1; return; } @@@ -2518,8 -2487,6 +2518,8 @@@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell or_circ = TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ); relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); + if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + return -1; /* Note: we have to use relay_send_command_from_edge here, not * connection_edge_end or connection_edge_send_command, since those require @@@ -2543,8 -2510,7 +2543,8 @@@ END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL, NULL); return 0; } - if (parse_addr_port(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + if (parse_addr_port(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, + (char*)(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE), &address,NULL,&port)<0) { log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to parse addr:port in relay begin cell. Closing."); @@@ -2695,8 -2661,6 +2695,8 @@@ connection_exit_begin_resolve(cell_t *c assert_circuit_ok(TO_CIRCUIT(circ)); relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload); + if (rh.length > RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE) + return -1; /* This 'dummy_conn' only exists to remember the stream ID * associated with the resolve request; and to make the @@@ -2707,9 -2671,8 +2707,9 @@@ */ dummy_conn = edge_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_EXIT, AF_INET); dummy_conn->stream_id = rh.stream_id; - dummy_conn->_base.address = tor_strndup(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, - rh.length); + dummy_conn->_base.address = tor_strndup( + (char*)cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE, + rh.length); dummy_conn->_base.port = 0; dummy_conn->_base.state = EXIT_CONN_STATE_RESOLVEFAILED; dummy_conn->_base.purpose = EXIT_PURPOSE_RESOLVE; diff --combined src/or/rendclient.c index 783a661,1f253c1..af91099 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@@ -1,5 -1,5 +1,5 @@@ /* Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2010, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@@ -130,7 -130,7 +130,7 @@@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_ci cpath = rendcirc->build_state->pending_final_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC; - if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new())) { + if (!(cpath->dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND))) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't allocate DH."); goto err; } @@@ -193,7 -193,6 +193,7 @@@ /*XXX maybe give crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt a max_len arg, * to avoid buffer overflows? */ r = crypto_pk_public_hybrid_encrypt(intro_key, payload+DIGEST_LEN, + sizeof(payload)-DIGEST_LEN, tmp, (int)(dh_offset+DH_KEY_LEN), PK_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING, 0); @@@ -244,7 -243,7 +244,7 @@@ rend_client_rendcirc_has_opened(origin_ */ int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, - const char *request, size_t request_len) + const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { origin_circuit_t *rendcirc; (void) request; // XXXX Use this. @@@ -629,7 -628,7 +629,7 @@@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_i * the circuit to C_REND_READY. */ int -rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, +rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { (void) request; @@@ -655,7 -654,7 +655,7 @@@ /** Bob sent us a rendezvous cell; join the circuits. */ int -rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const char *request, +rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len) { crypt_path_t *hop; @@@ -683,8 -682,7 +683,8 @@@ tor_assert(circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath); hop = circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath; tor_assert(hop->dh_handshake_state); - if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, request, DH_KEY_LEN, + if (crypto_dh_compute_secret(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)request, + DH_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN)<0) { log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Couldn't complete DH handshake."); goto err; @@@ -717,10 -715,8 +717,10 @@@ * attach only the connections that are waiting on this circuit, rather * than trying to attach them all. See comments bug 743. */ connection_ap_attach_pending(); + memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); return 0; err: + memset(keys, 0, sizeof(keys)); circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); return -1; } @@@ -814,7 -810,10 +814,10 @@@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { - router = router_get_by_nickname(intro->extend_info->nickname, 0); + if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) + router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->nickname); + else + router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); diff --combined src/or/routerlist.c index 7c8e36e,9622406..fb8fb88 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@@ -1,7 -1,7 +1,7 @@@ /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. - * Copyright (c) 2007-2010, The Tor Project, Inc. */ + * Copyright (c) 2007-2011, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** @@@ -1989,9 -1989,6 +1989,6 @@@ router_get_by_nickname(const char *nick return router_get_by_hexdigest(nickname); if (!strcasecmp(nickname, UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME)) return NULL; - if (server_mode(get_options()) && - !strcasecmp(nickname, get_options()->Nickname)) - return router_get_my_routerinfo(); maybedigest = (strlen(nickname) >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN) && (base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,nickname,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0); @@@ -4676,8 -4673,7 +4673,8 @@@ routerinfo_incompatible_with_extrainfo( if (ei->pending_sig) { char signed_digest[128]; - if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(ri->identity_pkey, signed_digest, + if (crypto_pk_public_checksig(ri->identity_pkey, + signed_digest, sizeof(signed_digest), ei->pending_sig, ei->pending_sig_len) != DIGEST_LEN || memcmp(signed_digest, ei->cache_info.signed_descriptor_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Merge remote branch 'public/bug2402_nothing' into maint-0.2.1
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 7605985b3ff71cee7fabdf023baf298b218d04c1 Merge: 372773d a1073ee Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 15:54:13 2011 -0500 Merge remote branch 'public/bug2402_nothing' into maint-0.2.1 changes/bug2402 | 4 ++++ src/or/config.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --combined src/or/config.c index 8397b23,c5d6540..209a92d --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@@ -827,16 -827,7 +827,7 @@@ static char *_version = NULL const char * get_version(void) { - if (_version == NULL) { - if (strlen(tor_svn_revision)) { - size_t len = strlen(VERSION)+strlen(tor_svn_revision)+8; - _version = tor_malloc(len); - tor_snprintf(_version, len, "%s (r%s)", VERSION, tor_svn_revision); - } else { - _version = tor_strdup(VERSION); - } - } - return _version; + return VERSION; } /** Release additional memory allocated in options @@@ -2878,9 -2869,7 +2869,9 @@@ compute_publishserverdescriptor(or_opti else if (!strcasecmp(string, "bridge")) *auth |= BRIDGE_AUTHORITY; else if (!strcasecmp(string, "hidserv")) - *auth |= HIDSERV_AUTHORITY; + log_warn(LD_CONFIG, + "PublishServerDescriptor hidserv is invalid. See " + "PublishHidServDescriptors."); else if (!strcasecmp(string, "") || !strcmp(string, "0")) /* no authority */; else @@@ -3370,11 -3359,6 +3361,11 @@@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_opti "RelayBandwidthBurst", msg) < 0) return -1; + if (options->RelayBandwidthRate && !options->RelayBandwidthBurst) + options->RelayBandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthRate; + if (options->RelayBandwidthBurst && !options->RelayBandwidthRate) + options->RelayBandwidthRate = options->RelayBandwidthBurst; + if (server_mode(options)) { if (options->BandwidthRate < ROUTER_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH) { r = tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), @@@ -3406,6 -3390,9 +3397,6 @@@ } } - if (options->RelayBandwidthRate && !options->RelayBandwidthBurst) - options->RelayBandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthRate; - if (options->RelayBandwidthRate > options->RelayBandwidthBurst) REJECT("RelayBandwidthBurst must be at least equal " "to RelayBandwidthRate.");

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Remove doc/spec/Makefile.in from list of generated files
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 10ad3442e11fb5a54c19eef7425bc317a9cc0969 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 17:51:03 2011 -0500 Remove doc/spec/Makefile.in from list of generated files --- configure.in | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in index 68c593a..7cdb330 100644 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@ -866,7 +866,7 @@ fi CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $TOR_CPPFLAGS_libevent $TOR_CPPFLAGS_openssl $TOR_CPPFLAGS_zlib" -AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile contrib/osx/Makefile contrib/osx/TorBundleDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorBundleInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorStartupDesc.plist src/config/torrc.sample doc/tor.1 src/Makefile doc/Makefile doc/design-paper/Makefile doc/spec/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh]) +AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile contrib/osx/Makefile contrib/osx/TorBundleDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorBundleInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorStartupDesc.plist src/config/torrc.sample doc/tor.1 src/Makefile doc/Makefile doc/design-paper/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh]) AC_OUTPUT if test -x /usr/bin/perl && test -x ./contrib/updateVersions.pl ; then

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit f10ec55b25ab103df3c67d6ae9d760188c32ee9d Merge: 6168d2e 10ad344 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 22 22:54:33 2011 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.1' into release-0.2.1 changes/bug1859 | 9 +++++++++ changes/bug2402 | 4 ++++ configure.in | 2 +- src/or/config.c | 11 +---------- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++- src/or/routerlist.c | 3 --- 7 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --combined configure.in index 5514b71,7cdb330..c91bce0 --- a/configure.in +++ b/configure.in @@@ -5,7 -5,7 +5,7 @@@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2008, The Tor Pr dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_INIT -AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.25) +AM_INIT_AUTOMAKE(tor, 0.2.1.29) AM_CONFIG_HEADER(orconfig.h) AC_CANONICAL_HOST @@@ -866,7 -866,7 +866,7 @@@ f CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $TOR_CPPFLAGS_libevent $TOR_CPPFLAGS_openssl $TOR_CPPFLAGS_zlib" - AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile contrib/osx/Makefile contrib/osx/TorBundleDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorBundleInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorStartupDesc.plist src/config/torrc.sample doc/tor.1 src/Makefile doc/Makefile doc/design-paper/Makefile doc/spec/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh]) + AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile tor.spec Doxyfile contrib/tor.sh contrib/torctl contrib/torify contrib/tor.logrotate contrib/Makefile contrib/osx/Makefile contrib/osx/TorBundleDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorBundleInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorDesc.plist contrib/osx/TorInfo.plist contrib/osx/TorStartupDesc.plist src/config/torrc.sample doc/tor.1 src/Makefile doc/Makefile doc/design-paper/Makefile src/config/Makefile src/common/Makefile src/or/Makefile src/win32/Makefile src/tools/Makefile contrib/suse/Makefile contrib/suse/tor.sh]) AC_OUTPUT if test -x /usr/bin/perl && test -x ./contrib/updateVersions.pl ; then

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Issues with router_get_by_nickname()
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit e1d86d381714cb4e85f543fab0ca71f13e58767b Author: Robert Hogan <robert(a)roberthogan.net> Date: Thu Sep 30 21:41:20 2010 +0100 Issues with router_get_by_nickname() https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859 There are two problems in this bug: 1. When an OP makes a .exit request specifying itself as the exit, and the exit is not yet listed, Tor gets all the routerinfos needed for the circuit but discovers in circuit_is_acceptable() that its own routerinfo is not in the routerdigest list and cannot be used. Tor then gets locked in a cycle of repeating these two steps. When gathering the routerinfos for a circuit, specifically when the exit has been chosen by .exit notation, Tor needs to apply the same rules it uses later on when deciding if it can build a circuit with those routerinfos. 2. A different bug arises in the above situation when the Tor instance's routerinfo *is* listed in the routerlist, it shares its nickname with a number of other Tor nodes, and it does not have 'Named' rights to its nickname. So for example, if (i) there are five nodes named Bob in the network, (ii) I am running one of them but am flagged as 'Unnamed' because someone else claimed the 'Bob' nickname first, and (iii) I run my Tor as both client and exit the following can happen to me: - I go to www.evil.com - I click on a link www.evil.com.bob.exit - My request will exit through my own Tor node rather than the 'Named' node Bob or any of the others. - www.evil.com now knows I am actually browsing from the same computer that is running my 'Bob' node So to solve both issues we need to ensure: - When fulfilling a .exit request we only choose a routerinfo if it exists in the routerlist, even when that routerinfo is ours. - When getting a router by nickname we only return our own router information if it is not going to be used for building a circuit. We ensure this by removing the special treatment afforded our own router in router_get_by_nickname(). This means the function will only return the routerinfo of our own router if it is in the routerlist built from authority info and has a unique nickname or is bound to a non-unique nickname. There are some uses of router_get_by_nickname() where we are looking for the router by name because of a configuration directive, specifically local declaration of NodeFamilies and EntryNodes and other routers' declaration of MyFamily. In these cases it is not at first clear if we need to continue returning our own routerinfo even if our router is not listed and/or has a non-unique nickname with the Unnamed flag. The patch treats each of these cases as follows: Other Routers' Declaration of MyFamily This happens in routerlist_add_family(). If another router declares our router in its family and our router has the Unnamed flag or is not in the routerlist yet, should we take advantage of the fact that we know our own routerinfo to add us in anyway? This patch says 'no, treat our own router just like any other'. This is a safe choice because it ensures our client has the same view of the network as other clients. We also have no good way of knowing if our router is Named or not independently of the authorities, so we have to rely on them in this. Local declaration of NodeFamilies Again, we have no way of knowing if the declaration 'NodeFamilies Bob,Alice,Ringo' refers to our router Bob or the Named router Bob, so we have to defer to the authorities and treat our own router like any other. Local declaration of NodeFamilies Again, same as above. There's also no good reason we would want our client to choose it's own router as an entry guard if it does not meet the requirements expected of any other router on the network. In order to reduce the possibility of error, the patch also replaces two instances where we were using router_get_by_nickname() with calls to router_get_by_hexdigest() where the identity digest of the router is available. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- src/or/routerlist.c | 3 --- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index ded02e9..eba83ba 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info) !edge_conn->chosen_exit_retries) continue; r1 = router_get_by_nickname(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0); - r2 = router_get_by_nickname(info->nickname, 0); + r2 = router_get_by_hexdigest(info->identity_digest); if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2) continue; tor_assert(edge_conn->socks_request); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 7023b7f..97fb6f0 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { - router = router_get_by_nickname(intro->extend_info->nickname, 0); + router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname); diff --git a/src/or/routerlist.c b/src/or/routerlist.c index 2fc8073..9622406 100644 --- a/src/or/routerlist.c +++ b/src/or/routerlist.c @@ -1989,9 +1989,6 @@ router_get_by_nickname(const char *nickname, int warn_if_unnamed) return router_get_by_hexdigest(nickname); if (!strcasecmp(nickname, UNNAMED_ROUTER_NICKNAME)) return NULL; - if (server_mode(get_options()) && - !strcasecmp(nickname, get_options()->Nickname)) - return router_get_my_routerinfo(); maybedigest = (strlen(nickname) >= HEX_DIGEST_LEN) && (base16_decode(digest,DIGEST_LEN,nickname,HEX_DIGEST_LEN) == 0);

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Issues with router_get_by_nickname()
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 7488fe5a224bf1c40d22769ff3986361d947d6f7 Author: Robert Hogan <robert(a)roberthogan.net> Date: Sun Oct 17 12:27:57 2010 +0100 Issues with router_get_by_nickname() https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1859 Use router_get_by_digest() instead of router_get_by_hexdigest() in circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves() and rend_client_get_random_intro(), per Nick's comments. Using router_get_by_digest() in rend_client_get_random_intro() will break hidden services published by Tor versions pre 0.1.2.18 and 0.2.07-alpha as they only publish by nickname. This is acceptable however as these versions only publish to authority tor26 and don't work for versions in the 0.2.2.x series anyway. --- src/or/connection_edge.c | 2 +- src/or/rendclient.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index eba83ba..f72aa94 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ circuit_discard_optional_exit_enclaves(extend_info_t *info) !edge_conn->chosen_exit_retries) continue; r1 = router_get_by_nickname(edge_conn->chosen_exit_name, 0); - r2 = router_get_by_hexdigest(info->identity_digest); + r2 = router_get_by_digest(info->identity_digest); if (!r1 || !r2 || r1 != r2) continue; tor_assert(edge_conn->socks_request); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 97fb6f0..ca3f213 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { - router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); + router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname);

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Simplest fix to bug2402: do not include SVN versions
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit a1073ee956021ead19d30c2151510dbaced416a8 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 25 14:08:13 2011 -0500 Simplest fix to bug2402: do not include SVN versions When we stopped using svn, 0.2.1.x lost the ability to notice its svn revision and report it in the version number. However, it kept looking at the micro-revision.i file... so if you switched to master, built tor, then switched to 0.2.1.x, you'd get a micro-revision.i file from master reported as an SVN tag. This patch takes out the "include the svn tag" logic entirely. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402. --- changes/bug2402 | 4 ++++ src/or/config.c | 11 +---------- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug2402 b/changes/bug2402 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f16f677 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug2402 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (build) + - Do not include Git version tags as though they were SVN tags when + generating a tarball from inside a repository that has switched between + branches. Bugfix on 0.2.1.15-rc; fixes bug 2402. diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index f8cfd29..c5d6540 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -827,16 +827,7 @@ static char *_version = NULL; const char * get_version(void) { - if (_version == NULL) { - if (strlen(tor_svn_revision)) { - size_t len = strlen(VERSION)+strlen(tor_svn_revision)+8; - _version = tor_malloc(len); - tor_snprintf(_version, len, "%s (r%s)", VERSION, tor_svn_revision); - } else { - _version = tor_strdup(VERSION); - } - } - return _version; + return VERSION; } /** Release additional memory allocated in options

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[tor/release-0.2.1] Fix a remaining bug in Robert's bug1859 fix.
by arma＠torproject.org 23 Feb '11

23 Feb '11

commit 2392290c1887b732fd2309e57ce04ab71b9b4e69 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 21 11:08:15 2010 -0400 Fix a remaining bug in Robert's bug1859 fix. When intro->extend_info is created for an introduction point, it only starts out with a nickname, not necessarily an identity digest. Thus, doing router_get_by_digest isn't necessarily safe. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 5 ++++- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index ca3f213..1f253c1 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -810,7 +810,10 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query) intro = smartlist_get(entry->parsed->intro_nodes, i); /* Do we need to look up the router or is the extend info complete? */ if (!intro->extend_info->onion_key) { - router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); + if (tor_digest_is_zero(intro->extend_info->identity_digest)) + router = router_get_by_hexdigest(intro->extend_info->nickname); + else + router = router_get_by_digest(intro->extend_info->identity_digest); if (!router) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unknown router with nickname '%s'; trying another.", intro->extend_info->nickname);

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