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r24439: {website} Little more failure with anchor (this time stopped trying to (website/trunk/about/en)
by Damian Johnson 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: atagar Date: 2011-03-25 15:57:24 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24439 Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml Log: Little more failure with anchor (this time stopped trying to race with phobos' push). Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:55:26 UTC (rev 24438) +++ website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:57:24 UTC (rev 24439) @@ -198,6 +198,7 @@ consider spending some time working with us to make Tor better! + <a id="Example"></a> <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Example">Application Examples</a></h2>

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r24438: {website} Minor bug with anchor tag. (website/trunk/about/en)
by Damian Johnson 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: atagar Date: 2011-03-25 15:55:26 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24438 Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml Log: Minor bug with anchor tag. Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:53:52 UTC (rev 24437) +++ website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:55:26 UTC (rev 24438) @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ consider spending some time working with us to make Tor better! - <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Template">Application Examples</a></h2> + <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Example">Application Examples</a></h2> Below are examples of some GSoC applications from previous years we liked.

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r24437: {website} Adding example proposals for GSoC. (in website/trunk/about: . en gsocProposal)
by Damian Johnson 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: atagar Date: 2011-03-25 15:53:52 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24437 Added: website/trunk/about/gsocProposal/ website/trunk/about/gsocProposal/gsoc10-proposal-soat.txt Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml Log: Adding example proposals for GSoC. Modified: website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:06:02 UTC (rev 24436) +++ website/trunk/about/en/gsoc.wml 2011-03-25 15:53:52 UTC (rev 24437) @@ -197,6 +197,22 @@ students. So if you haven't filled up your summer plans yet, please consider spending some time working with us to make Tor better! + + <h2><a class="anchor" href="#Template">Application Examples</a></h2> + + + Below are examples of some GSoC applications from previous years we liked. + The best applications tend to go through several iterations so you're + highly encouraged to send drafts early. + + + <ul> + <li><h4><a href="http://tor.spanning-tree.org/proposal.html">DNSEL Rewrite</a> by Harry Bock</h4></li> + <li><h4><a href="http://kjb.homeunix.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/KevinBerry-GSoC2010-TorP…">Extending Tor Network Metrics</a> by Kevin Berry</h4></li> + <li><h4><a href="../about/gsocProposal/gsoc10-proposal-soat.txt">SOAT Expansion</a> by John Schanck</h4></li> + <li><h4><a href="http://www.atagar.com/misc/gsocBlog09/">Website Pootle Translation</a> by Damian Johnson</h4></li> + </ul> + </div>  <div id = "sidecol"> Added: website/trunk/about/gsocProposal/gsoc10-proposal-soat.txt =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/gsocProposal/gsoc10-proposal-soat.txt (rev 0) +++ website/trunk/about/gsocProposal/gsoc10-proposal-soat.txt 2011-03-25 15:53:52 UTC (rev 24437) @@ -0,0 +1,164 @@ +1. What project would you like to work on? Use our ideas lists as a starting +point or make up your own idea. Your proposal should include high-level +descriptions of what you're going to do, with more details about the parts you +expect to be tricky. Your proposal should also try to break down the project +into tasks of a fairly fine granularity, and convince us you have a plan for +finishing it. + +The Snakes on a Tor exit scanner has the potential to dramatically improve the +safety of Tor users by ferreting out misconfigured and malicious exit nodes. +At present it suffers from certain stability issues which prevent it from being +run for long periods of time, and from an overabundance of false positives in +the results it generates. While I would ideally like to work on designing new +routines for detecting subtle content modifications and for better handling +dynamic content -- the issues of stability and false positives need to be +addressed first. I've begun looking at the SoaT source code and running some +preliminary experiments, identifying several small stability issues. In the +coming weeks I'll begin to collect a body of false positives which I'll study +and design new filters around. The most difficult part of this project may be +determining what actual positive results look like, and developing a threat +model that predicts the kinds of modifications which malicious exit nodes are +likely to make. I'm sure this question has been addressed by members of the Tor +community, so much of my early work this summer will involve talking to +community members to better understand the kinds of malicious exit nodes which +have been seen in the past, and determining how well the current SoaT +implementation performs against these known attacks. + +Timeline: + April 26 - May 24: + + * Start to get an idea of what the threat model looks like, continue + performing stability tests and gathering a diverse collection of results + to study. + + May 24 - June 17: + + * Throw everything I can at SoaT - make it crash and fix the bugs. + * Keep collecting data! + + June 17 - July 17: + + * In depth analysis of false positives. Use both false positives and real + modifications (or modifications generated by myself which emulate the + types of things predicted by the threat model) to develop a data set that + SoaT's filters can be evaluated against offline. + + * Use the data set to improve existing filters and create new ones. + + July 17 - August 2: + Here the timeline splits depending on progress thus far. + Case 1 - There are still too many false positives: + + * Keep developing new filters and tuning old ones. + + Case 2 - False positives have been reduced to an acceptable level: + + * Get SoaT running full time on a dedicated machine. Improve reporting so + that SoaT can communicate its suspicions to the Tor team. + * Start drafting plans for improving the system. + + August 2 - 16: + + * Perform an extensive test of the system and write up a report of where it + * does well and what can be improved. + + +2. Point us to a code sample: something good and clean to demonstrate that you +know what you're doing, ideally from an existing project. + +I'm one of the two lead developers for the Anomos project, the code for which +can be browsed here [https://git.anomos.info/?p=anomos.git;a=summary]. + +Anomos is in Python, and I handle almost all of the network code (which makes +extensive use of SSL), so this project is particularly representative of where +my skill set intersects with that needed to work on SoaT. + + +3. Why do you want to work with The Tor Project / EFF in particular? + +I think Tor is one of the most important free software projects in development +today - I'm very interested in the political issues surrounding access to +information, and have been an EFF member for several years now. Tor has also +been the primary inspiration for my work on Anomos. What particularly attracts +me about Tor is the sustained emphasis its developers have placed on making it +a platform for research. This emphasis has attracted a large community of +skilled anonymity researchers with whom I would be honored to work with and +learn from as I continue my study of anonymity and begin to conduct my own +research. + + +4. Tell us about your experiences in free software development environments. We +especially want to hear examples of how you have collaborated with others +rather than just working on a project by yourself. + +I develop all of my own software under free licenses and make an effort to work +in groups as often as possible. Anomos, the largest project I've worked on, +would not have been possible in a non-free environment. It has received +tremendous support from the community in terms of development, debugging, +translation, documentation, and testing - the project simply would not have +been possible without support from the free software community. I run free +software on all of my computers, and make an active effort to report or patch +bugs whenever possible. + + +5. Will you be working full-time on the project for the summer, or will you +have other commitments too (a second job, classes, etc)? If you won't be +available full-time, please explain, and list timing if you know them for other +major deadlines (e.g. exams). Having other activities isn't a deal-breaker, but +we don't want to be surprised. + +I will be available full-time to work on Tor. I plan on attending a couple +conferences and spending a lot of time outdoors, but that won't take me away +from my work for more than a few days. + + +6. Will your project need more work and/or maintenance after the summer ends? +What are the chances you will stick around and help out with that and other +related projects? + +My project will almost certainly be completed during the summer. That said, +I'm very likely to remain active with the Tor project after the summer. I'm +currently planning on conducting anonymity research as a large part of my +undergraduate thesis work and would love for that work to involve Tor. + + +7. What is your ideal approach to keeping everybody informed of your progress, +problems, and questions over the course of the project? Said another way, how +much of a "manager" will you need your mentor to be? + +Especially when it comes to a project I'm really interested in - I'm extremely +self motivated and require very little management. I generally check in with a +project manager once per week unless a problem or question arises. I make +extensive use of version control software, commit frequently, and keep my work +in a publicly accessible repositories, so my mentor will be able to monitor my +progress at their leisure. I'm also happy to blog or otherwise communicate my +progress on a regular basis to the project community. + + +8. What school are you attending? What year are you, and what's your +major/degree/focus? If you're part of a research group, which one? + +I'm in my third year at Hampshire College studying computer science with a +focus on distributed and peer-to-peer systems. I occasionally work at the +University of Massachusetts, Amherst conducting BitTorrent research under Arun +Venkataramani. + + +9. How can we contact you to ask you further questions? Google doesn't share +your contact details with us automatically, so you should include that in your +application. In addition, what's your IRC nickname? Interacting with us on IRC +will help us get to know you, and help you get to know our community. + + You can email me: john(a)anomos.info + GPG Key ID: 0xA1D39D09 + GPG Fingerprint: 7131 3E78 7500 3BB2 FCDD FA97 91ED 834D A1D3 9D09 + Instant message me via XMPP: john(a)anomos.info + Or talk to me on IRC: susurrusus on OFTC (I idle in #tor) + + +10. Is there anything else we should know that will make us like your project +more? + +The project I've proposed here is just a starting point - I think I have a lot +to bring to the Tor project and that this summer will just be the start of a +lasting academic relationship with the community.

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r24436: {website} Fixing the projects page side nav to match the page contents (website/trunk/projects/en)
by Damian Johnson 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: atagar Date: 2011-03-25 15:06:02 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24436 Modified: website/trunk/projects/en/sidenav.wmi Log: Fixing the projects page side nav to match the page contents (caught by karsten). Modified: website/trunk/projects/en/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/projects/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) +++ website/trunk/projects/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 15:06:02 UTC (rev 24436) @@ -38,14 +38,17 @@ {'url' => 'projects/arm', 'txt' => 'Arm', }, - {'url' => '<wiki>projects/TorBulkExitlist', - 'txt' => 'TorBEL', + {'url' => 'https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/', + 'txt' => 'Orbot', }, - {'url' => 'https://check.torproject.org', - 'txt' => 'TorCheck', + {'url' => 'https://tails.boum.org/', + 'txt' => 'Tails', }, - {'url' => 'projects/gettor', - 'txt' => 'GetTor', + {'url' => 'http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/', + 'txt' => 'TorStatus', + }, + {'url' => 'https://metrics.torproject.org/', + 'txt' => 'Metrics Portal', } ] }];

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r24435: {website} include stable man page from the old website (in website/trunk/docs: ar en fr my pl ru)
by Runa Sandvik 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: runa Date: 2011-03-25 13:08:28 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24435 Modified: website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi Log: include stable man page from the old website Modified: website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/ar/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'ضبط مرآة', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة الثابتة', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة الثابتة', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'تور- دليل الإصدارة ألفا', }, Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', }, Modified: website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/en/tor-manual.wml 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -9,22 +9,2321 @@ <div id="breadcrumbs"> <a href="<page index>">Home » </a> <a href="<page docs/documentation>">Documentation » </a> - <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Dev Manual</a> + <a href="<page docs/tor-doc-osx>">Tor Manual</a> </div> - <div id="maincol"> - <: - die "Missing git clone at $(TORGIT)" unless -d "$(TORGIT)"; - my $man = `GIT_DIR=$(TORGIT) git show $(STABLETAG):doc/tor.1.txt | asciidoc -d manpage -s -o - -`; - die "No manpage because of asciidoc error or file not available from git" unless $man; - print $man; - :> - </div> + <div id="maincol"> + <h2 id="_synopsis">SYNOPSIS</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="paragraph">tor [OPTION value]… + </div> + </div> + <h2 id="_description">DESCRIPTION</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="paragraph">tor is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication + service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and + negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node + knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down + the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals + the downstream node. </div> + + <div class="paragraph">Basically tor provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers"). + Users bounce their TCP streams — web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc — around the + routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have + difficulty tracking the source of the stream.</div> + </div> + <h2 id="_options">OPTIONS</h2> + <div class="sectionbody"> + <div class="dlist"><dl> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + -h, -help + </dt> + <dd> + + Display a short help message and exit. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + -f FILE + </dt> + <dd> + + FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --hash-password + </dt> + <dd> + + Generates a hashed password for control port access. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --list-fingerprint + </dt> + <dd> + + Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --verify-config + </dt> + <dd> + + Verify the configuration file is valid. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --nt-service + </dt> + <dd> + + --service [install|remove|start|stop] Manage the Tor Windows + NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at + <a href="https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService">https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService</a> + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --list-torrc-options + </dt> + <dd> + + List all valid options. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --version + </dt> + <dd> + + Display Tor version and exit. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + --quiet + </dt> + <dd> + + Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so. + (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to + the console, until it has parsed its configuration.) + + </dd> + </dl> + </div> + <div class="paragraph"> + Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option + value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value"). + Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside + quoted values. Options on the command line take precedence over + options found in the configuration file, except indicated otherwise. To + split one configuration entry into multiple lines, use a single \ before + the end of the line. Comments can be used in such multiline entries, but + they must start at the beginning of a line. + </div> + <div class="dlist"><dl> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + BandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB + </dt> + <dd> + + A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to + the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing + bandwidth usage to that same value. If you want to run a relay in the + public network, this needs to be at the very least 20 KB (that is, + 20480 bytes). (Default: 5 MB) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + BandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB + </dt> + <dd> + + Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given + number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + MaxAdvertisedBandwidth N bytes|KB|MB|GB + </dt> + <dd> + + If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our + BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients + who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to + advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server + without impacting network performance. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + RelayBandwidthRate N bytes|KB|MB|GB + </dt> + <dd> + + If not 0, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth + usage for _relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes + per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value. + Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory + requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + RelayBandwidthBurst N bytes|KB|MB|GB + </dt> + <dd> + + If not 0, limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for + _relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction. + (Default: 0) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ConnLimit NUM + </dt> + <dd> + + The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor + process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file + descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n"). + If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. + + You probably don’t need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows + since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ConstrainedSockets 0|1 + </dt> + <dd> + + If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all + sockets to the size specified in ConstrainedSockSize. This is useful for + virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may + be limited. If you’re on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error + creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are + likely experiencing this problem. + + The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for + the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility; + this configuration option is a second-resort. + + The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The + cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates + the problem. + + You should not enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer + space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for + the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip + time on long paths. (Default: 0.) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ConstrainedSockSize N bytes|KB + </dt> + <dd> + + When ConstrainedSockets is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for + all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and + 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ControlPort Port + </dt> + <dd> + + If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those + connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol + (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of + HashedControlPassword or CookieAuthentication, setting this option will + cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This + option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ControlListenAddress IP[:PORT] + </dt> + <dd> + + Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind + to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly + recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you’re doing, + since giving attackers access to your control listener is really + dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple + times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + ControlSocket Path + </dt> + <dd> + + Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP + socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + HashedControlPassword hashed_password + </dt> + <dd> + + Don’t allow any connections on the control port except when the other + process knows the password whose one-way hash is hashed_password. You + can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password + password". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more + than one HashedControlPassword line. + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + CookieAuthentication 0|1 + </dt> + <dd> + + If this option is set to 1, don’t allow any connections on the control port + except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named + "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This + authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem + security. (Default: 0) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> + CookieAuthFile Path + </dt> + <dd> + + If set, this option overrides the default location and file name + for Tor’s cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.) + + </dd> + <dt class="hdlist1"> +CookieAuthFileGroupReadable 0|1|Groupname +</dt> +<dd> + + If this option is set to 0, don’t allow the filesystem group to read the + cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by + the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet + implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory DIR +</dt> +<dd> + + Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirServer [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +</dt> +<dd> + + Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address + and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated + many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are + separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory + is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style + directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is + provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1) + directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will + use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs" + flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is not set. + Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the + "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=port" is given, Tor will use the + given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a + flag "v3ident=fp" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority + whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint fp. + + If no dirserver line is given, Tor will use the default directory + servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor + network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be + distinguishable from other users, because you won’t believe the same + authorities they do. + +</dd> +</dl></div> +<div class="paragraph">AlternateDirAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint </div> +<div class="paragraph">AlternateHSAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint </div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AlternateBridgeAuthority [nickname] [flags] address:port fingerprint +</dt> +<dd> + + As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using + AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but + leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place. + Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service + authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FetchDirInfoEarly 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other + directory caches, even if you don’t meet the normal criteria for fetching + early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FetchHidServDescriptors 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the + rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you’re using a Tor + controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FetchServerDescriptors 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server + descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you. + (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FetchUselessDescriptors 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the + authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless + descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is + useful if you’re using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor + nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HTTPProxy host[:port] +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80 + if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory + servers. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HTTPProxyAuthenticator username:password +</dt> +<dd> + + If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HTTPSProxy host[:port] +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or + host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting + directly to servers. You may want to set FascistFirewall to restrict + the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only + allows connecting to certain ports. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HTTPSProxyAuthenticator username:password +</dt> +<dd> + + If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy + authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS + proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you + want it to support others. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +KeepalivePeriod NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell + every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection + has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of + idleness. (Default: 5 minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] stderr|stdout|syslog +</dt> +<dd> + + Send all messages between minSeverity and maxSeverity to the standard + output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The + "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are + debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases, + since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an + attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all + messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +Log minSeverity[-maxSeverity] file FILENAME +</dt> +<dd> + + As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The + "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file. + Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity + level. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +OutboundBindAddress IP +</dt> +<dd> + + Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This + is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all + of Tor’s outgoing connections to use a single one. This setting will be + ignored for connections to the loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8 and ::1). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +PidFile FILE +</dt> +<dd> + + On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove + FILE. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ProtocolWarnings 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties not + following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity + 'info'. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RunAsDaemon 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect + on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. + (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SafeLogging 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g. + addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can + still be useful, but they don’t leave behind personally identifying + information about what sites a user might have visited. + + If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is + set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +User UID +</dt> +<dd> + + On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HardwareAccel 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when + available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AvoidDiskWrites 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise. + This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support + only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TunnelDirConns 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build + a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort. + (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +PreferTunneledDirConns 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don’t support tunneled + directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_client_options">CLIENT OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if +SocksPort is non-zero):</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AllowInvalidNodes entry|exit|middle|introduction|rendezvous|… +</dt> +<dd> + + If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory + authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it’s not + recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You + can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is + "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExcludeSingleHopRelays 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with + the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set + to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at + higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally + included. Also note that relatively few clients turn off this option, + so using these relays might make your client stand out. + (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +Bridge IP:ORPort [fingerprint] +</dt> +<dd> + + When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at + "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint" + is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that + the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use + fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if + it’s provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +CircuitBuildTimeout NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't + open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +CircuitIdleTimeout NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then + close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all + of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up + making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we’re + receiving, it won’t forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1 + hour.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ClientOnly 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve + directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is + configured. (Usually, you don’t need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at + figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a + useful server.) (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExcludeNodes node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example: + ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, {cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExcludeExitNodes node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any + node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this + list. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +EntryNodes node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames and address + patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are + treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExitNodes node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address + patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These + are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +StrictEntryNodes 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for + the first hop of a circuit. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +StrictExitNodes 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for + the last hop of a circuit. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FascistFirewall 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports + that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see FirewallPorts). + This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with + restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such + a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use + ReachableAddresses instead. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FirewallPorts PORTS +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when + FascistFirewall is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses + instead. (Default: 80, 443) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HidServAuth onion-address auth-cookie [service-name] +</dt> +<dd> + + Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 + characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 + characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal + purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times + for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and + this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden + services can be configured to require authorization using the + HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient option. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ReachableAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +</dt> +<dd> + + A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows + you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except + that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For + example, 'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept + *:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net + 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port + 80 otherwise. (Default: 'accept *:*'.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ReachableDirAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +</dt> +<dd> + + Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP + GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of + ReachableAddresses is used. If HTTPProxy is set then these + connections will go through that proxy. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ReachableORAddresses ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]… +</dt> +<dd> + + Like ReachableAddresses, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey + these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not + set explicitly then the value of ReachableAddresses is used. If + HTTPSProxy is set then these connections will go through that proxy. + + The separation between ReachableORAddresses and + ReachableDirAddresses is only interesting when you are connecting + through proxies (see HTTPProxy and HTTPSProxy). Most proxies limit + TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, + and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory + information) to port 80. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +LongLivedPorts PORTS +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections + (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these + ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node + will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, + 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +MapAddress address newaddress +</dt> +<dd> + + When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress + before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to + www.indymedia.org to exit via torserver (where torserver is the + nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org + www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit". + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NewCircuitPeriod NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 + seconds) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +MaxCircuitDirtiness NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago, + but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10 + minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NodeFamily node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames, + constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use + any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed + when a server doesn’t list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option + can be used multiple times. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +EnforceDistinctSubnets 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on + the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in + the same /16 range. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SocksPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. Set this to 0 if you don’t want to allow application + connections. (Default: 9050) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SocksListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking + applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g. + 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind + to multiple addresses/ports. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SocksPolicy policy,policy,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit + policies below. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SocksTimeout NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds + unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: + 2 minutes.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TrackHostExits host,.domain,… +</dt> +<dd> + + For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent + connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same + exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is treated as + matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it means + match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites + that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if + your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage + of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single + user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it + through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TrackHostExitsExpire NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the + association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is + 1800 seconds (30 minutes). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +UpdateBridgesFromAuthority 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors + from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to + a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +UseBridges 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge" + config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory + guards. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +UseEntryGuards 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try + to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers + increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a + fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NumEntryGuards NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers + as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SafeSocks 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that + use unsafe variants of the socks protocol — ones that only provide an IP + address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first. + Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS. + (Defaults to 0.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestSocks 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for + each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a + safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This + helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking + DNS requests. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +VirtualAddrNetwork Address/bits +</dt> +<dd> + + When Tor needs to assign a virtual (unused) address because of a MAPADDRESS + command from the controller or the AutomapHostsOnResolve feature, Tor + picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default: + 127.192.0.0/10) + + When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool + like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or + "172.16.0.0/12". The default VirtualAddrNetwork address range on a + properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For + local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal + characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be + resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on. + (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FastFirstHopPK 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first + hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have + already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure + keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. + + Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it’s + operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it + doesn’t yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TransPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on PORT (by convention, + 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or + Linux’s IPTables. If you’re planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for + a network, you’ll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the + default setting. You’ll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for + the network you’d like to proxy. (Default: 0). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TransListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default: + 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an + entire network. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NATDPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.) + to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is + only for people who cannot use TransPort. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NATDListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AutomapHostsOnResolve 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address + that ends with one of the suffixes in AutomapHostsSuffixes, we map an + unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address. + This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that + resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AutomapHostsSuffixes SUFFIX,SUFFIX,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with AutomapHostsOnResolve. + The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DNSPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves + them anonymously. (Default: 0). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DNSListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that + tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or + 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don’t + turn it off unless you know what you’re doing. (Default: 1). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DownloadExtraInfo 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents + contain information about servers other than the information in their + regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything + itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +FallbackNetworkstatusFile FILENAME +</dt> +<dd> + + If Tor doesn’t have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this + one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to + learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn’t need to put load on the + authorities. (Default: None). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +WarnPlaintextPorts port,port,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous + connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users + to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default: + 23,109,110,143). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RejectPlaintextPorts port,port,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor + will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None). + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_server_options">SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort +is non-zero):</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +Address address +</dt> +<dd> + + The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g. + moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP + address. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AllowSingleHopExits 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop + proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is + the only hop in the circuit. Note that most clients will refuse to use + servers that set this option, since most clients have + ExcludeSingleHopRelays set. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AssumeReachable 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1, + don’t do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor + immediately. If AuthoritativeDirectory is also set, this option + instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list + all connected servers as running. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +BridgeRelay 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections + from bridge users to the Tor network. It mainly causes Tor to publish a + server descriptor to the bridge database, rather than publishing a relay + descriptor to the public directory authorities. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ContactInfo email_address +</dt> +<dd> + + Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked + up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it’s an + email address. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExitPolicy policy,policy,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form + "accept|reject ADDR[/MASK][:PORT]". If /MASK is + omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving + a host or network you can also use "*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). + PORT can be a single port number, an interval of ports + "FROM_PORT-TO_PORT", or "*". If PORT is omitted, that means + "*". + + For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would + reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept + anything else. + + To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8, + 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and + 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address. + These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit + policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the + ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you’ve done + that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to + internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*", though that + may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its + public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details + about internal and reserved IP address space. + + This directive can be specified multiple times so you don’t have to put it + all on one line. + + Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you + want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with + either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you’re _augmenting_ + (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: + +<div class="literalblock"> +<div class="content"> +<pre><tt>reject *:25^M +reject *:119^M +reject *:135-139^M +reject *:445^M +reject *:563^M +reject *:1214^M +reject *:4661-4666^M +reject *:6346-6429^M +reject *:6699^M +reject *:6881-6999^M +accept *:*</tt></pre> +</div></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address, + at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. + (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +MaxOnionsPending NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject + new ones. (Default: 100) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +MyFamily node,node,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or + organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by + their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare + that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients will not use them in the + same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its + family; it doesn’t need to list itself, but it won’t hurt.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +Nickname name +</dt> +<dd> + + Set the server’s nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 + characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NumCPUs num +</dt> +<dd> + + How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ORPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ORListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and + servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one + specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified + multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +PublishServerDescriptor 0|1|v1|v2|v3|bridge,… +</dt> +<dd> + + This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as + a relay. You can + choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. + + If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its + descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you’re testing + out your server, or if you’re using a Tor controller that handles directory + publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptors of all + type(s) specified. The default is "1", + which means "if running as a server, publish the + appropriate descriptors to the authorities". + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ShutdownWaitLength NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + When we get a SIGINT and we’re a server, we begin shutting down: + we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After NUM + seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi- + ately. (Default: 30 seconds) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AccountingMax N bytes|KB|MB|GB|TB +</dt> +<dd> + + Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting + period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with + AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB + and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 + GB. When the number of bytes gets low, Tor will stop accepting new + connections and circuits. When the number of bytes + is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some + time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at + the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period + before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation + is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a + collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more + useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available". + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AccountingStart day|week|month [day] HH:MM +</dt> +<dd> + + Specify how long accounting periods last. If month is given, each + accounting period runs from the time HH:MM on the dayth day of one + month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and + 28.) If week is given, each accounting period runs from the time HH:MM + of the dayth day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, + with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If day is given, each + accounting period runs from the time HH:MM each day to the same time on + the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to + "month 1 0:00".) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSResolvConfFile filename +</dt> +<dd> + + Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in + filename. The file format is the same as the standard Unix + "resolv.conf" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options, + only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. + (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems + parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. + Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until + it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSSearchDomains 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. + For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in + "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be + connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that + your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSDetectHijacking 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine + whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS + requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to + correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSTestAddresses address,address,… +</dt> +<dd> + + When we’re detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these valid addresses + aren’t getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, + and we’ll reset our exit policy to "reject :". This option only affects + name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to + "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames + containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an + exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve + URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +BridgeRecordUsageByCountry 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have + GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client + addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess + which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +ServerDNSRandomizeCase 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in + outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. + This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. + For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through + 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server + does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +GeoIPFile filename +</dt> +<dd> + + A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry. + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_directory_server_options">DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, +if DirPort is non-zero):</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory + server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of + good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients + already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want + to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at + <a href="mailto:tor-ops@torproject.org">tor-ops(a)torproject.org</a> if you think you should be a directory. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirPortFrontPage FILENAME +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on + the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing + to set up a separate webserver. There’s a sample disclaimer in + contrib/tor-exit-notice.html. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V1AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy + Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V2AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running + 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V3AuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as + described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at + least 0.2.0.x). + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of + Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each + version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2 + authorities provide this service optionally. See RecommendedVersions, + RecommendedClientVersions, and RecommendedServerVersions. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +NamingAuthoritativeDirectory 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has + opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these + opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with + the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint + has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to + accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See + approved-routers in the FILES section below. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HSAuthoritativeDir 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to + AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor also accepts and serves hidden + service descriptors. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HSAuthorityRecordStats 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to HSAuthoritativeDir, + Tor periodically (every 15 minutes) writes statistics about hidden service + usage to a file hsusage in its data directory. (Default: + 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HidServDirectoryV2 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service + descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients + connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +BridgeAuthoritativeDir 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + When this option is set in addition to AuthoritativeDirectory, Tor + accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main + networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2 N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +</dt> +<dd> + + Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by + authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirPort PORT +</dt> +<dd> + + Advertise the directory service on this port. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirListenAddress IP[:PORT] +</dt> +<dd> + + Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to + this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) + This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple + addresses/ports. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirPolicy policy,policy,… +</dt> +<dd> + + Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above. + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_directory_authority_server_options">DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RecommendedVersions STRING +</dt> +<dd> + + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the + directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear + multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When + this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should be set too. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RecommendedClientVersions STRING +</dt> +<dd> + + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions + is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should + be set too. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RecommendedServerVersions STRING +</dt> +<dd> + + STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be + safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2 + directories. If this is not set then the value of RecommendedVersions + is used. When this is set then VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory should + be set too. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DirAllowPrivateAddresses 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address" + elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP + address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirBadDir AddressPattern… +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this + authority publishes, if AuthDirListBadDirs is set. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirBadExit AddressPattern… +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority + publishes, if AuthDirListBadExits is set. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirInvalid AddressPattern… +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this + authority publishes. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirReject AddressPattern… +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that + will never be listed at all in any network status document that this + authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor + submitted for publication by this authority. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirListBadDirs 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set + this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad; + otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared + directory.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirListBadExits 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some + opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to + 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are + effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirRejectUnlisted 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects + all uploaded server descriptors that aren’t explicitly listed in the + fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil + attack. (Default: 0) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will + list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit". + (Default: 2) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies + to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V3AuthVotingInterval N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred voting + interval. Note that voting will actually happen at an interval chosen + by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time + SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V3AuthVoteDelay N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the + other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server’s + preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V3AuthDistDelay N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server’s preferred delay + between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the + signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used + is not the server’s preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. + (Default: 5 minutes.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +V3AuthNIntervalsValid NUM +</dt> +<dd> + + V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals + for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers + increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases + directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the + server’s preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at + least 2. (Default: 3.) + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_hidden_service_options">HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">The following options are used to configure a hidden service.</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceDir DIRECTORY +</dt> +<dd> + + Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service + must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to + specify multiple services. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServicePort VIRTPORT [TARGET] +</dt> +<dd> + + Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this + option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most + recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to + the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or + both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have + multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that + VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +PublishHidServDescriptors 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won’t + advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if + you’re using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you. + (Default: 1) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceVersion version,version,… +</dt> +<dd> + + A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden + service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient auth-type client-name,client-name,… +</dt> +<dd> + + If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients + only. The auth-type can either be 'basic' for a general-purpose + authorization protocol or 'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also + hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are + listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names + are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no + spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for + clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be + found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in + their configuration file using HidServAuth. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +RendPostPeriod N seconds|minutes|hours|days|weeks +</dt> +<dd> + + Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous + service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also + uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 1 hour) + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_testing_network_options">TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingTorNetwork 0|1 +</dt> +<dd> + + If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below, + so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if + non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running. + (Default: 0) + +<div class="literalblock"> +<div class="content"> +<pre><tt>ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1^M +DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1^M +EnforceDistinctSubnets 0^M +AssumeReachable 1^M +AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0^M +AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0^M +ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0^M +ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0^M +V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes^M +V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds^M +V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes^M +TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds^M +TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes^M +TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes</tt></pre> +</div></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first + consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before + the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that + TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 5 minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers + are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires + that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: 30 minutes) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime N minutes|hours +</dt> +<dd> + + Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this + time. Changing this requires that TestingTorNetwork is set. (Default: + 10 minutes) + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_signals">SIGNALS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">Tor catches the following signals:</div> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGTERM +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGINT +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled + slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting. + (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.) + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGHUP +</dt> +<dd> + + The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and + reopening logs), and kill and restart its helper processes if applicable. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGUSR1 +</dt> +<dd> + + Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGUSR2 +</dt> +<dd> + + Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by + sending a SIGHUP. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGCHLD +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it + can clean up. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGPIPE +</dt> +<dd> + + Tor catches this signal and ignores it. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +SIGXFSZ +</dt> +<dd> + + If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it. + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_files">FILES</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="dlist"><dl> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +@CONFDIR@/torrc +</dt> +<dd> + + The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/ +</dt> +<dd> + + The tor process stores keys and other data here. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/cached-status/ +</dt> +<dd> + + The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority. + Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal + identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new +</dt> +<dd> + + These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more + than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines + beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about + a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets + too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/cached-routers and cached-routers.new +</dt> +<dd> + + Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When + Tor can’t find the newer files, it looks here instead. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/state +</dt> +<dd> + + A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in + the file. These include: + +<div class="ulist"><ul> +<li> + +The current entry guards and their status. + +</li> +<li> + +The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see + below). + +</li> +<li> + +When the file was last written + +</li> +<li> + +What version of Tor generated the state file + +</li> +<li> + +A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router + descriptors. + +</li> +</ul></div> +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/bw_accounting +</dt> +<dd> + + Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts + and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file + is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the 'state' file as well. Only + used when bandwidth accounting is enabled. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/control_auth_cookie +</dt> +<dd> + + Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be + overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See + control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is + enabled. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/keys/* +</dt> +<dd> + + Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/fingerprint +</dt> +<dd> + + Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server’s identity key. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/approved-routers +</dt> +<dd> + + Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see + NamingAuthoritativeDirectory). This file lists nickname to identity + bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by + whitespace. See your fingerprint file in the DataDirectory for an + example line. If the nickname is !reject then descriptors from the + given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is + !invalid then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as + not valid, that is, not recommended. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +DataDirectory/router-stability +</dt> +<dd> + + Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for + router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of + how to set their Stable flags. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceDirectory/hostname +</dt> +<dd> + + The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service. + If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file + also contains authorization data for all clients. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceDirectory/private_key +</dt> +<dd> + + The private key for this hidden service. + +</dd> +<dt class="hdlist1"> +HiddenServiceDirectory/client_keys +</dt> +<dd> + + Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by + authorized clients. + +</dd> +</dl></div> +</div> +<h2 id="_see_also">SEE ALSO</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">privoxy(1), tsocks(1), torify(1) </div> +<div class="paragraph">https://www.torproject.org/</div> +</div> +<h2 id="_bugs">BUGS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.</div> +</div> +<h2 id="_authors">AUTHORS</h2> +<div class="sectionbody"> +<div class="paragraph">Roger Dingledine [arma at mit.edu], Nick Mathewson [nickm at alum.mit.edu].</div> +</div> +</div>  - <div id = "sidecol"> +<div id = "sidecol"> #include "side.wmi" #include "info.wmi" - </div> -  </div> + +</div>  -#include <foot.wmi> +#include <foot.wmi> Modified: website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/fr/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', }, Modified: website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/my/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', }, Modified: website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/pl/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', }, Modified: website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi =================================================================== --- website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) +++ website/trunk/docs/ru/sidenav.wmi 2011-03-25 13:08:28 UTC (rev 24435) @@ -61,9 +61,9 @@ {'url' => 'docs/running-a-mirror', 'txt' => 'Configuring a Mirror', }, -# {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', -# 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', -# }, + {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual', + 'txt' => 'Tor -stable Manual', + }, {'url' => 'docs/tor-manual-dev', 'txt' => 'Tor -alpha Manual', },

1 0

[metrics-tasks/master] Add code to extract and transform dirreqs from the metrics-web database.
by karsten＠torproject.org 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

commit 34ff5894093706ceee424968c1ed18cd729ed7d9 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Fri Mar 25 13:45:27 2011 +0100 Add code to extract and transform dirreqs from the metrics-web database. --- task-2718/.gitignore | 2 +- task-2718/README | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ task-2718/convert-dirreqs-sql.R | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/task-2718/.gitignore b/task-2718/.gitignore index 673fa5f..917bb1b 100644 --- a/task-2718/.gitignore +++ b/task-2718/.gitignore @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ -direct-users.csv +*.csv *.pdf diff --git a/task-2718/README b/task-2718/README index 807142a..8c60847 100644 --- a/task-2718/README +++ b/task-2718/README @@ -3,3 +3,25 @@ Here's how you run the censorship detector prototype: $ wget https://metrics.torproject.org/csv/direct-users.csv $ R --slave -f detect-censorship.R +------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +Extracting raw directory requests from the metrics-web database: + +- Export dirreq_stats table from the metrics-web database via psql: + + # \f ',' + # \a + # \t + # \o dirreqs-sql.csv + # SELECT * FROM dirreq_stats ORDER BY statsend; + # \o + # \t + # \a + +- Transform the huge (!) CSV file (104M) from long to wide format. Note + that this takes a while: + + $ R --slave -f convert-dirreqs-sql.R + +- The result is in dirreqs.csv (8.8M). + diff --git a/task-2718/convert-dirreqs-sql.R b/task-2718/convert-dirreqs-sql.R new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e330307 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2718/convert-dirreqs-sql.R @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +library(ggplot2) +data <- read.csv("dirreqs-sql.csv", header = FALSE) +data <- data.frame(fingerprint = data$V1, statsend = data$V2, + seconds = data$V3, country = data$V4, requests = data$V5) +data <- cast(data, fingerprint + statsend + seconds ~ country, + value = "requests") +write.csv(data, file = "dirreqs.csv", quote = FALSE, row.names = FALSE) +

1 0

r24434: {website} move robert and chiiph to the core people page (website/trunk/about/en)
by Roger Dingledine 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: arma Date: 2011-03-25 09:48:18 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24434 Modified: website/trunk/about/en/corepeople.wml website/trunk/about/en/volunteers.wml Log: move robert and chiiph to the core people page Modified: website/trunk/about/en/corepeople.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/en/corepeople.wml 2011-03-25 02:30:48 UTC (rev 24433) +++ website/trunk/about/en/corepeople.wml 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) @@ -136,6 +136,10 @@ Tor network and measures various properties and behaviors. Developer and maintainer of <a href="<page torbutton/index>">Torbutton</a>.</dd> + <dt>Robert Ransom</dt> + <dd>Bug catcher and immensely helpful on irc and the + email lists. Looking into hidden service performance and + robustness.</dd> <dt>Karen Reilly, Development Director</dt> <dd>Responsible for fundraising, advocacy, general marketing, policy outreach programs for Tor. She is also available to @@ -160,6 +164,9 @@ <dd>Works on the artwork and design for various projects, annual reports, and brochures. His other work can be found at <a href="http://jmtodaro.com/">http://jmtodaro.com/</a>.</dd> + <dt>Tomás Touceda</dt> + <dd>Maintenance and new development for Vidalia.</dd> + </dl> </div>  Modified: website/trunk/about/en/volunteers.wml =================================================================== --- website/trunk/about/en/volunteers.wml 2011-03-25 02:30:48 UTC (rev 24433) +++ website/trunk/about/en/volunteers.wml 2011-03-25 09:48:18 UTC (rev 24434) @@ -36,8 +36,6 @@ defenses, and resource management, especially for hidden services.</dd> <dt>Martin Peck</dt><dd>Working on a VM-based transparent proxying approach for Tor clients on Windows.</dd> -<dt>Robert Ransom</dt><dd>Bug catcher and immensely helpful on irc and the -email lists</dd> <dt>rovv (a pseudonym -- he's managed to stay anonymous even from us!)</dt><dd>The most dedicated bug reporter we've ever heard from. He must read Tor source code every day over breakfast.</dd> @@ -46,8 +44,6 @@ href="<wiki>TransparentProxy">transparent proxy</a>. Also maintains the <a href="http://p56soo2ibjkx23xo.onion/">TorDNSEL code</a>.</dd> -<dt>Tomás Touceda</dt><dd>Fantastic developer involved with the Vidalia -project</dd> <dt>Kyle Williams</dt><dd>Developer for JanusVM, a VMWare-based transparent Tor proxy that makes Tor easier to set up and use.</dd>

1 0

[metrics-tasks/master] Add George's censorship detector script.
by karsten＠torproject.org 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

commit f5d257dff6af41dbbe33ab20c5bbb218a38c8cd8 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Fri Mar 25 10:29:38 2011 +0100 Add George's censorship detector script. --- task-2718/detector.py | 306 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 files changed, 306 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/task-2718/detector.py b/task-2718/detector.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0370d02 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2718/detector.py @@ -0,0 +1,306 @@ +## Copyright (c) 2011 George Danezis <gdane(a)microsoft.com> +## +## All rights reserved. +## +## Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +## modification, are permitted (subject to the limitations in the +## disclaimer below) provided that the following conditions are met: +## +## * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +## notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +## +## * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +## notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the +## documentation and/or other materials provided with the +## distribution. +## +## * Neither the name of <Owner Organization> nor the names of its +## contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived +## from this software without specific prior written permission. +## +## NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED LICENSES TO ANY PARTY'S PATENT RIGHTS ARE +## GRANTED BY THIS LICENSE. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT +## HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED +## WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF +## MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE +## DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE +## LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR +## CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF +## SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR +## BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, +## WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE +## OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN +## IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +## +## (Clear BSD license: http://labs.metacarta.com/license-explanation.html#license) + +## This script reads a .csv file of the number of Tor users and finds +## anomalies that might be indicative of censorship. + +# Dep: matplotlib +from pylab import * +import matplotlib + +# Dep: numpy +import numpy + +# Dep: scipy +import scipy.stats +from scipy.stats.distributions import norm +from scipy.stats.distributions import poisson + +# Std lib +from datetime import date +from datetime import timedelta +import os.path + +days = ["Mon", "Tue", "Wed", "Thu", "Fri", "Sat", "Sun"] + +# read the .csv file +class torstatstore: + def __init__(self, file_name): + f = file(file_name) + country_codes = f.readline() + country_codes = country_codes.strip().split(",") + + store = {} + MAX_INDEX = 0 + for i, line in enumerate(f): + MAX_INDEX += 1 + line_parsed = line.strip().split(",") + for j, (ccode, val) in enumerate(zip(country_codes,line_parsed)): + processed_val = None + if ccode == "date": + try: + year, month, day = int(val[:4]), int(val[5:7]), int(val[8:10]) + processed_val = date(year, month, day) + except Exception, e: + print "Parsing error (ignoring line %s):" % j + print "%s" % val,e + break + + elif val != "NA": + processed_val = int(val) + store[(ccode, i)] = processed_val + + # min and max + date_min = store[("date", 0)] + date_max = store[("date", i)] + + all_dates = [] + d = date_min + dt = timedelta(days=1) + while d <= date_max: + all_dates += [d] + d = d + dt + + # Save for later + self.store = store + self.all_dates = all_dates + self.country_codes = country_codes + self.MAX_INDEX = MAX_INDEX + self.date_min = date_min + self.date_max = date_max + + def get_country_series(self, ccode): + assert ccode in self.country_codes + series = {} + for d in self.all_dates: + series[d] = None + for i in range(self.MAX_INDEX): + series[self.store[("date", i)]] = self.store[(ccode, i)] + sx = [] + for d in self.all_dates: + sx += [series[d]] + return sx + + def get_largest(self, number): + exclude = set(["all", "??", "date"]) + l = [(self.store[(c, self.MAX_INDEX-1)], c) for c in self.country_codes if c not in exclude] + l.sort() + l.reverse() + return l[:number] + + def get_largest_locations(self, number): + l = self.get_largest(number) + res = {} + for _, ccode in l[:number]: + res[ccode] = self.get_country_series(ccode) + return res + +# Computes the difference between today and a number of days in the past +def n_day_rel(series, days): + rel = [] + for i, v in enumerate(series): + if series[i] is None: + rel += [None] + continue + + if i - days < 0 or series[i-days] is None or series[i-days] == 0: + rel += [None] + else: + rel += [ float(series[i]) / series[i-days]] + return rel + +# Main model: computes the expected min / max range of number of users +def make_tendencies_minmax(l, INTERVAL = 1): + lminus1 = dict([(ccode, n_day_rel(l[ccode], INTERVAL)) for ccode in l]) + c = lminus1[lminus1.keys()[0]] + dists = [] + minx = [] + maxx = [] + for i in range(len(c)): + vals = [lminus1[ccode][i] for ccode in lminus1.keys() if lminus1[ccode][i] != None] + if len(vals) < 8: + dists += [None] + minx += [None] + maxx += [None] + else: + vals.sort() + median = vals[len(vals)/2] + q1 = vals[len(vals)/4] + q2 = vals[(3*len(vals))/4] + qd = q2 - q1 + vals = [v for v in vals if median - qd*4 < v and v < median + qd*4] + if len(vals) < 8: + dists += [None] + minx += [None] + maxx += [None] + continue + mu, signma = norm.fit(vals) + dists += [(mu, signma)] + maxx += [norm.ppf(0.9999, mu, signma)] + minx += [norm.ppf(1 - 0.9999, mu, signma)] + ## print minx[-1], maxx[-1] + return minx, maxx + +# Makes pretty plots +def raw_plot(series, minc, maxc, labels, xtitle): + assert len(xtitle) == 3 + fname, stitle, slegend = xtitle + + font = {'family' : 'Bitstream Vera Sans', + 'weight' : 'normal', + 'size' : 8} + matplotlib.rc('font', **font) + + ylim( (-max(series)*0.1, max(series)*1.1) ) + plot(labels, series, linewidth=1.0, label="Users") + + wherefill = [] + for mm,mx in zip(minc, maxc): + wherefill += [not (mm == None and mx == None)] + assert mm < mx or (mm == None and mx == None) + + fill_between(labels, minc, maxc, where=wherefill, color="gray", label="Prediction") + + vdown = [] + vup = [] + for i,v in enumerate(series): + if minc[i] != None and v < minc[i]: + vdown += [v] + vup += [None] + elif maxc[i] != None and v > maxc[i]: + vdown += [None] + vup += [v] + else: + vup += [None] + vdown += [None] + + plot(labels, vdown, 'o', ms=10, lw=2, alpha=0.5, mfc='orange', label="Downturns") + plot(labels, vup, 'o', ms=10, lw=2, alpha=0.5, mfc='green', label="Upturns") + + legend(loc=2) + + xlabel('Time (days)') + ylabel('Users') + title(stitle) + grid(True) + F = gcf() + + F.set_size_inches(10,5) + F.savefig(fname, format="png", dpi = (150)) + close() + +def absolute_plot(series, minc, maxc, labels,INTERVAL, xtitle): + in_minc = [] + in_maxc = [] + for i, v in enumerate(series): + if i > 0 and i - INTERVAL >= 0 and series[i] != None and series[i-INTERVAL] != None and series[i-INTERVAL] != 0 and minc[i]!= None and maxc[i]!= None: + in_minc += [minc[i] * poisson.ppf(1-0.9999, series[i-INTERVAL])] + in_maxc += [maxc[i] * poisson.ppf(0.9999, series[i-INTERVAL])] + if not in_minc[-1] < in_maxc[-1]: + print in_minc[-1], in_maxc[-1], series[i-INTERVAL], minc[i], maxc[i] + assert in_minc[-1] < in_maxc[-1] + else: + in_minc += [None] + in_maxc += [None] + raw_plot(series, in_minc, in_maxc, labels, xtitle) + +# Censorship score by jurisdiction +def censor_score(series, minc, maxc, INTERVAL): + upscore = 0 + downscore = 0 + for i, v in enumerate(series): + if i > 0 and i - INTERVAL >= 0 and series[i] != None and series[i-INTERVAL] != None and series[i-INTERVAL] != 0 and minc[i]!= None and maxc[i]!= None: + in_minc = minc[i] * poisson.ppf(1-0.9999, series[i-INTERVAL]) + in_maxc = maxc[i] * poisson.ppf(0.9999, series[i-INTERVAL]) + downscore += 1 if minc[i] != None and v < in_minc else 0 + upscore += 1 if maxc[i] != None and v > in_maxc else 0 + return downscore, upscore + +def plot_target(tss, TARGET, xtitle, minx, maxx, DAYS=365, INTERV = 7): + ctarget = tss.get_country_series(TARGET) + c = n_day_rel(ctarget, INTERV) + absolute_plot(ctarget[-DAYS:], minx[-DAYS:], maxx[-DAYS:], tss.all_dates[-DAYS:],INTERV, xtitle = xtitle) + + +## Make a league table of censorship + nice graphs +def plot_all(tss, minx, maxx, INTERV, DAYS=None, rdir="img"): + rdir = os.path.realpath(rdir) + if not os.path.exists(rdir) or not os.path.isdir(rdir): + print "ERROR: %s does not exist or is not a directory." % rdir + return + + summary_file = file(os.path.join(rdir, "summary.txt"), "w") + + if DAYS == None: + DAYS = 6*31 + + s = tss.get_largest(200) + scores = [] + for num, li in s: + print ".", + ds,us = censor_score(tss.get_country_series(li)[-DAYS:], minx[-DAYS:], maxx[-DAYS:], INTERV) + # print ds, us + scores += [(ds,num, us, li)] + scores.sort() + scores.reverse() + s = "\n=======================\n" + s+= "Report for %s to %s\n" % (tss.all_dates[-DAYS], tss.all_dates[-1]) + s+= "=======================\n" + print s + summary_file.write(s) + for a,nx, b,c in scores: + if a > 0: + s = "%s -- down: %2d (up: %2d affected: %s)" % (c, a, b, nx) + print s + summary_file.write(s + "\n") + xtitle = (os.path.join(rdir, "%03d-%s-censor.png" % (a,c)), "Tor report for %s -- down: %2d (up: %2d affected: %s)" % (c, a, b, nx),"") + plot_target(tss, c,xtitle, minx, maxx, DAYS, INTERV) + summary_file.close() + +def main(): + # Change these to customize script + CSV_FILE = "direct-users.csv" + GRAPH_DIR = "img" + INTERV = 7 + DAYS= 6 * 31 + + tss = torstatstore(CSV_FILE) + l = tss.get_largest_locations(50) + minx, maxx = make_tendencies_minmax(l, INTERV) + plot_all(tss, minx, maxx, INTERV, DAYS, rdir=GRAPH_DIR) + +if __name__ == "__main__": + main()

1 0

r24433: {arm} Couple small fixes: fix: using Tor's internal address when n (arm/trunk/src/interface/connections)
by Damian Johnson 25 Mar '11

25 Mar '11

Author: atagar Date: 2011-03-25 02:30:48 +0000 (Fri, 25 Mar 2011) New Revision: 24433 Modified: arm/trunk/src/interface/connections/connEntry.py Log: Couple small fixes: fix: using Tor's internal address when not expanding (patch by Fabian Keil) fix: sorting scrubbed ip addresses at the end Modified: arm/trunk/src/interface/connections/connEntry.py =================================================================== --- arm/trunk/src/interface/connections/connEntry.py 2011-03-24 10:56:13 UTC (rev 24432) +++ arm/trunk/src/interface/connections/connEntry.py 2011-03-25 02:30:48 UTC (rev 24433) @@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ LABEL_FORMAT = "%s --> %s %s%s" LABEL_MIN_PADDING = 2 # min space between listing label and following data +# sort value for scrubbed ip addresses +SCRUBBED_IP_VAL = 255 ** 4 + CONFIG = {"features.connection.markInitialConnections": True, "features.connection.showExitPort": True, "features.connection.showColumn.fingerprint": True, @@ -149,25 +152,28 @@ Provides the value of a single attribute used for sorting purposes. """ + connLine = self.lines[0] if attr == entries.SortAttr.IP_ADDRESS: - return self.lines[0].sortIpAddr + if connLine.isPrivate(): return SCRUBBED_IP_VAL # orders at the end + return connLine.sortIpAddr elif attr == entries.SortAttr.PORT: - return self.lines[0].sortPort + return connLine.sortPort elif attr == entries.SortAttr.HOSTNAME: - return self.lines[0].foreign.getHostname("") + if connLine.isPrivate(): return "" + return connLine.foreign.getHostname("") elif attr == entries.SortAttr.FINGERPRINT: - return self.lines[0].foreign.getFingerprint() + return connLine.foreign.getFingerprint() elif attr == entries.SortAttr.NICKNAME: - myNickname = self.lines[0].foreign.getNickname() + myNickname = connLine.foreign.getNickname() if myNickname == "UNKNOWN": return "z" * 20 # orders at the end else: return myNickname.lower() elif attr == entries.SortAttr.CATEGORY: - return Category.indexOf(self.lines[0].getType()) + return Category.indexOf(connLine.getType()) elif attr == entries.SortAttr.UPTIME: - return self.lines[0].startTime + return connLine.startTime elif attr == entries.SortAttr.COUNTRY: if connections.isIpAddressPrivate(self.lines[0].foreign.getIpAddr()): return "" - else: return self.lines[0].foreign.getLocale("") + else: return connLine.foreign.getLocale("") else: return entries.ConnectionPanelEntry.getSortValue(self, attr, listingType) @@ -508,7 +514,8 @@ isExpansionType = not myType in (Category.PROGRAM, Category.CONTROL) - srcAddress = myExternalIpAddr + localPort + if isExpansionType: srcAddress = myExternalIpAddr + localPort + else: srcAddress = self.local.getIpAddr() + localPort src = "%-21s" % srcAddress # ip:port = max of 21 characters dst = "%-26s" % dstAddress # ip:port (xx) = max of 26 characters

1 0

[metrics-tasks/master] Add code for bridge churn graph (#2794).
by karsten＠torproject.org 24 Mar '11

24 Mar '11

commit 8dde11c31d385d92d3dc41032438b62b693f6daf Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Thu Mar 24 16:05:35 2011 +0100 Add code for bridge churn graph (#2794). --- task-2794/.gitignore | 4 + task-2794/README | 12 +++ task-2794/StillRunning.java | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ task-2794/still-running-bridges.R | 15 ++++ 4 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/task-2794/.gitignore b/task-2794/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 0000000..939f812 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2794/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +*.csv +*.class +*.png + diff --git a/task-2794/README b/task-2794/README new file mode 100644 index 0000000..311c5b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2794/README @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +Code to create a graph on "Uptimes of bridges that were running Jan 2, +2011, 00:00:00 UTC": + + - Generate assignments.csv and statuses.csv using the #2680 code and put + them in this directory. + + - Compile and run the Java class: + $ javac StillRunning.java && java StillRunning + + - Run the R code (note that this may take a few minutes!): + $ R --slave -f still-running-bridges.R + diff --git a/task-2794/StillRunning.java b/task-2794/StillRunning.java new file mode 100644 index 0000000..111c085 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2794/StillRunning.java @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +import java.io.*; +import java.util.*; +public class StillRunning { + public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { + + /* Parse bridge pool assignments. */ + Map<String, String> assignments = new HashMap<String, String>(); + BufferedReader br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader( + "assignments.csv")); + String line = br.readLine(); + while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) { + String[] parts = line.split(","); + String fingerprint = parts[1]; + String type = parts[2]; + assignments.put(fingerprint, type); + } + br.close(); + + /* Parse running bridges in first status of the second day in the data + * set. */ + br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader("statuses.csv")); + line = br.readLine(); + if (!line.split(",")[15].equals("running")) { + System.out.println("Column 16 should be 'running'"); + System.exit(1); + } + String dayOne = null, lastStatus = null; + List<String> fingerprints = new ArrayList<String>(); + Map<String, String> addresses = new HashMap<String, String>(); + while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) { + String[] parts = line.split(","); + String status = parts[0]; + if (dayOne == null) { + dayOne = status.substring(0, "yyyy-mm-dd".length()); + } else if (status.startsWith(dayOne)) { + continue; + } + String running = parts[15]; + if (!running.equals("TRUE")) { + continue; + } + if (lastStatus != null && !status.equals(lastStatus)) { + break; + } + lastStatus = status; + String fingerprint = parts[1]; + fingerprints.add(fingerprint); + String address = parts[4]; + addresses.put(fingerprint, address); + } + + /* Parse subsequent statuses and count how often these bridges + * occur. */ + Map<String, Integer> + fingerprintAnyCount = new HashMap<String, Integer>(), + fingerprintSameCount = new HashMap<String, Integer>(); + for (String fingerprint : fingerprints) { + fingerprintAnyCount.put(fingerprint, 1); + fingerprintSameCount.put(fingerprint, 1); + } + do { + String[] parts = line.split(","); + String status = parts[0]; + String running = parts[15]; + if (!running.equals("TRUE")) { + continue; + } + String fingerprint = parts[1]; + if (!fingerprints.contains(fingerprint)) { + continue; + } + fingerprintAnyCount.put(fingerprint, + fingerprintAnyCount.get(fingerprint) + 1); + String address = parts[4]; + if (addresses.get(fingerprint).equals(address)) { + fingerprintSameCount.put(fingerprint, + fingerprintSameCount.get(fingerprint) + 1); + } + } while ((line = br.readLine()) != null); + + /* Create two lists of fingerprints, ordered by the number of + * occurrences. */ + SortedMap<String, String> + sortAnyFingerprints = new TreeMap<String, String>(), + sortSameFingerprints = new TreeMap<String, String>(); + for (Map.Entry<String, Integer> e : fingerprintAnyCount.entrySet()) { + sortAnyFingerprints.put(String.format("%05d %s", e.getValue(), + e.getKey()), e.getKey()); + } + List<String> sortedAnyFingerprints = new ArrayList<String>( + sortAnyFingerprints.values()); + for (Map.Entry<String, Integer> e : fingerprintSameCount.entrySet()) { + sortSameFingerprints.put(String.format("%05d %s", e.getValue(), + e.getKey()), e.getKey()); + } + List<String> sortedSameFingerprints = new ArrayList<String>( + sortSameFingerprints.values()); + + /* Write bridges of first status to disk. */ + BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter( + "still-running-bridges.csv")); + bw.write("status,anyid,sameid,type,addresschange\n"); + for (String fingerprint : sortedAnyFingerprints) { + bw.write(lastStatus + "," + + sortedAnyFingerprints.indexOf(fingerprint) + "," + + sortedSameFingerprints.indexOf(fingerprint) + "," + + assignments.get(fingerprint) + ",FALSE\n"); + } + + /* Parse statuses once again and write bridges to disk. */ + br = new BufferedReader(new FileReader("statuses.csv")); + line = br.readLine(); + while ((line = br.readLine()) != null) { + String[] parts = line.split(","); + String status = parts[0]; + if (status.startsWith(dayOne)) { + continue; + } + String running = parts[15]; + if (!running.equals("TRUE")) { + continue; + } + String fingerprint = parts[1]; + if (!fingerprints.contains(fingerprint)) { + continue; + } + String address = parts[4]; + boolean addressChange = !addresses.get(fingerprint).equals(address); + bw.write(status + "," + + sortedAnyFingerprints.indexOf(fingerprint) + "," + + sortedSameFingerprints.indexOf(fingerprint) + "," + + assignments.get(fingerprint) + "," + + (addressChange ? "TRUE" : "FALSE") + "\n"); + } + bw.close(); + br.close(); + } +} + diff --git a/task-2794/still-running-bridges.R b/task-2794/still-running-bridges.R new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8752b07 --- /dev/null +++ b/task-2794/still-running-bridges.R @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +library(ggplot2) +anyip <- read.csv("still-running-bridges.csv", stringsAsFactors = FALSE) +sameip <- anyip[anyip$addresschange == FALSE, ] +data <- rbind( + data.frame(status = anyip$status, bridgeid = anyip$anyid, address = "any IP address"), + data.frame(status = sameip$status, bridgeid = sameip$sameid, address = "same IP address")) +ggplot(data, aes(x = as.POSIXct(status), + y = (max(data$bridgeid) - bridgeid) / max(data$bridgeid))) + +facet_grid(address ~ .) + +geom_point(size = 0.2, colour = "springgreen3") + +scale_x_datetime(name = "") + +scale_y_continuous(name = "", formatter = "percent") + +opts(title = "Uptimes of bridges that were running Jan 2, 2011, 00:00:00 UTC\n") +ggsave(filename = "still-running-bridges.png", width = 8, height = 5, dpi = 72) +

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