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[metrics-web/master] Create stats/ directory in ExoneraTor db importer.
by karsten＠torproject.org 04 Oct '11

04 Oct '11

commit 2a2b195de0b80f057cafe10477bbb84e531c8340 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Oct 4 10:10:01 2011 +0200 Create stats/ directory in ExoneraTor db importer. --- .../ernie/cron/ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter.java | 1 + 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/org/torproject/ernie/cron/ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter.java b/src/org/torproject/ernie/cron/ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter.java index 95d894b..c89097a 100755 --- a/src/org/torproject/ernie/cron/ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter.java +++ b/src/org/torproject/ernie/cron/ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter.java @@ -494,6 +494,7 @@ public class ExoneraTorDatabaseImporter { /* Write parse history from memory to disk for the next execution. */ private static void writeImportHistoryToDisk() { File parseHistoryFile = new File("stats/exonerator-import-history"); + parseHistoryFile.getParentFile().mkdirs(); try { BufferedWriter bw = new BufferedWriter(new FileWriter( parseHistoryFile));

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[tor/master] Looks like Windows version 6.2 will be Windows 8
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 103c861dfead6640a4bef6e85f740f7c635c7343 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 1 14:44:39 2011 +0200 Looks like Windows version 6.2 will be Windows 8 Thanks to funkstar for the report --- changes/windows_8 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/windows_8 b/changes/windows_8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..405e4fa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/windows_8 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - The next version of Windows will be called Windows 8, and it has a major + version of 6, minor version of 2. Correctly identify that version instead + of calling it "Very recent version". Fixes bug 4153; reported by funkstar. + diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 80b4907..266fc61 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1806,6 +1806,7 @@ get_uname(void) static struct { unsigned major; unsigned minor; const char *version; } win_version_table[] = { + { 6, 2, "Windows 8" }, { 6, 1, "Windows 7" }, { 6, 0, "Windows Vista" }, { 5, 2, "Windows Server 2003" }, @@ -1862,7 +1863,7 @@ get_uname(void) plat, extra); } else { if (info.dwMajorVersion > 6 || - (info.dwMajorVersion==6 && info.dwMinorVersion>1)) + (info.dwMajorVersion==6 && info.dwMinorVersion>2)) tor_snprintf(uname_result, sizeof(uname_result), "Very recent version of Windows [major=%d,minor=%d] %s", (int)info.dwMajorVersion,(int)info.dwMinorVersion,

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 2725a88d5e3ec362a4f866f53c26ca20f943eb49 Merge: 05f672c 103c861 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Oct 3 15:19:00 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/maint-0.2.2' changes/windows_8 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Looks like Windows version 6.2 will be Windows 8
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 103c861dfead6640a4bef6e85f740f7c635c7343 Author: Sebastian Hahn <sebastian(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Oct 1 14:44:39 2011 +0200 Looks like Windows version 6.2 will be Windows 8 Thanks to funkstar for the report --- changes/windows_8 | 5 +++++ src/common/compat.c | 3 ++- 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/windows_8 b/changes/windows_8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..405e4fa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/windows_8 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + - The next version of Windows will be called Windows 8, and it has a major + version of 6, minor version of 2. Correctly identify that version instead + of calling it "Very recent version". Fixes bug 4153; reported by funkstar. + diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 80b4907..266fc61 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -1806,6 +1806,7 @@ get_uname(void) static struct { unsigned major; unsigned minor; const char *version; } win_version_table[] = { + { 6, 2, "Windows 8" }, { 6, 1, "Windows 7" }, { 6, 0, "Windows Vista" }, { 5, 2, "Windows Server 2003" }, @@ -1862,7 +1863,7 @@ get_uname(void) plat, extra); } else { if (info.dwMajorVersion > 6 || - (info.dwMajorVersion==6 && info.dwMinorVersion>1)) + (info.dwMajorVersion==6 && info.dwMinorVersion>2)) tor_snprintf(uname_result, sizeof(uname_result), "Very recent version of Windows [major=%d,minor=%d] %s", (int)info.dwMajorVersion,(int)info.dwMinorVersion,

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[tor/master] Remove an HS's last_hid_serv_requests entries when a conn. attempt ends
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit c5226bfe1c26d2cbcc789c1074d8d925e7c7fea1 Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Tue Sep 20 04:26:09 2011 -0700 Remove an HS's last_hid_serv_requests entries when a conn. attempt ends --- changes/bug3335 | 11 +++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug3335 b/changes/bug3335 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e1e898 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug3335 @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ + o Major bugfixes: + + - When an attempt to connect to a hidden service ends, consider + refetching its hidden service descriptors from each of the HSDir + relays responsible for them immediately. Previously, we would + not consider refetching the service's descriptors from each + HSDir for 15 minutes after the last fetch; this behaviour was + inconvenient if the hidden service was not running during the + first attempt, for example. Bugfix on 0.2.0.18-alpha; fixes bug + 3335. + diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 9088b92..e66b242 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -469,6 +469,33 @@ directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(void) } } +/** Remove all requests related to the hidden service named + * onion_address from the history of times of requests to + * hidden service directories. */ +static void +purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(const char *onion_address) +{ + strmap_iter_t *iter; + strmap_t *last_hid_serv_requests = get_last_hid_serv_requests(); + /* XXX023 tor_assert(strlen(onion_address) == REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32); */ + for (iter = strmap_iter_init(last_hid_serv_requests); + !strmap_iter_done(iter); ) { + const char *key; + void *val; + strmap_iter_get(iter, &key, &val); + /* XXX023 tor_assert(strlen(key) == LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN); */ + if (tor_memeq(key + LAST_HID_SERV_REQUEST_KEY_LEN - + REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32, + onion_address, + REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32)) { + iter = strmap_iter_next_rmv(last_hid_serv_requests, iter); + tor_free(val); + } else { + iter = strmap_iter_next(last_hid_serv_requests, iter); + } + } +} + /** Purge the history of request times to hidden service directories, * so that future lookups of an HS descriptor will not fail because we * accessed all of the HSDir relays responsible for the descriptor @@ -938,6 +965,9 @@ rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address) rend_intro_point_t *, ip, ip->timed_out = 0; ); } + + /* Remove the HS's entries in last_hid_serv_requests. */ + purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(onion_address); } /** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction

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[tor/master] Fix compilation of 3335 and 3825 fixes
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 05f672c8c21ceb4c47731fb3d8f777bf95583b3b Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Oct 3 15:13:38 2011 -0400 Fix compilation of 3335 and 3825 fixes In master, they ran into problems with the edge_conn/entry_conn split. --- src/or/circuituse.c | 5 +++-- src/or/connection_edge.c | 8 +++++--- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 26bc451..9b96218 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1589,11 +1589,12 @@ link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ, /* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */ circ->p_streams = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn); - if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(apconn)) { + if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn))) { /* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means * that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just * succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */ - rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(apconn->rend_data->onion_address); + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended( + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->rend_data->onion_address); } if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */ diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 3393104..40426a9 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ _connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, int line, const char *file) { connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn); + edge_connection_t *edge_conn = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn); tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP); ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */ @@ -78,9 +79,10 @@ _connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, * XXX023 This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing * without ever being attached. That sloppiness should be harmless, * but we should fix it someday anyway. */ - if ((conn->on_circuit != NULL || conn->edge_has_sent_end) && - connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { - rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data->onion_address); + if ((edge_conn->on_circuit != NULL || edge_conn->edge_has_sent_end) && + connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(edge_conn)) { + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended( + edge_conn->rend_data->onion_address); } if (base_conn->marked_for_close) {

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug3335-v2'
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 4aa4bce474e6fb3e52c0aecb48f3e5024576e693 Merge: a7f93b5 c5226bf Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Oct 3 15:06:07 2011 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'rransom-tor/bug3335-v2' Conflicts: src/or/connection_edge.c src/or/rendclient.c changes/bug1297b | 8 ++ changes/bug3335 | 11 +++ changes/bug3825a | 8 ++ src/or/circuitlist.c | 33 +++++++-- src/or/circuituse.c | 7 ++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 12 +++ src/or/or.h | 17 +++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 177 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- src/or/rendclient.h | 13 +++- 9 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/circuituse.c index f7f080d,f2fd6fe..26bc451 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@@ -1583,16 -1458,23 +1583,23 @@@ link_apconn_to_circ(entry_connection_t log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC, "attaching new conn to circ. n_circ_id %d.", circ->_base.n_circ_id); /* reset it, so we can measure circ timeouts */ - apconn->_base.timestamp_lastread = time(NULL); - apconn->next_stream = circ->p_streams; - apconn->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ); + ENTRY_TO_CONN(apconn)->timestamp_lastread = time(NULL); + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->next_stream = circ->p_streams; + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn)->on_circuit = TO_CIRCUIT(circ); /* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */ - circ->p_streams = apconn; + circ->p_streams = ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(apconn); + if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(apconn)) { + /* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means + * that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just + * succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */ + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(apconn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */ tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath)); - apconn->cpath_layer = cpath; - } else { /* use the last hop in the circuit */ + } else { + /* use the last hop in the circuit */ tor_assert(circ->cpath); tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev); tor_assert(circ->cpath->prev->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN); diff --cc src/or/connection_edge.c index f59f44c,0c5ebde..3393104 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@@ -64,16 -62,27 +64,28 @@@ static int connection_ap_supports_optim * has_sent_end to 1, and mark the conn. */ void -_connection_mark_unattached_ap(edge_connection_t *conn, int endreason, +_connection_mark_unattached_ap(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, int line, const char *file) { - tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_AP); - conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */ + connection_t *base_conn = ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn); + tor_assert(base_conn->type == CONN_TYPE_AP); + ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */ + /* If this is a rendezvous stream and it is failing without ever + * being attached to a circuit, assume that an attempt to connect to + * the destination hidden service has just ended. + * + * XXX023 This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing + * without ever being attached. That sloppiness should be harmless, + * but we should fix it someday anyway. */ + if ((conn->on_circuit != NULL || conn->edge_has_sent_end) && + connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + - if (conn->_base.marked_for_close) { + if (base_conn->marked_for_close) { /* This call will warn as appropriate. */ - _connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn), line, file); + _connection_mark_for_close(base_conn, line, file); return; } diff --cc src/or/rendclient.c index 6fe9ba2,e66b242..47fda23 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@@ -505,16 -541,13 +546,17 @@@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *d /* Only select those hidden service directories to which we did not send * a request recently and for which we have a router descriptor here. */ - directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(); /* Clean request history first. */ + + /* Clean request history first. */ + directory_clean_last_hid_serv_requests(now); SMARTLIST_FOREACH(responsible_dirs, routerstatus_t *, dir, { - time_t last = lookup_last_hid_serv_request(dir, desc_id_base32, 0, 0); - if (lookup_last_hid_serv_request(dir, desc_id_base32, rend_query, 0, 0) + - REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD >= now || - !router_get_by_digest(dir->identity_digest)) ++ time_t last = lookup_last_hid_serv_request( ++ dir, desc_id_base32, rend_query, 0, 0); + const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(dir->identity_digest); + if (last + REND_HID_SERV_DIR_REQUERY_PERIOD >= now || + !node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) - SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(responsible_dirs, dir); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(responsible_dirs, dir); }); hs_dir = smartlist_choose(responsible_dirs); @@@ -867,10 -940,36 +951,36 @@@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *que "unavailable (try again later).", safe_str_client(query)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(query); } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(_conn); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(base_conn); } + /** Clear temporary state used only during an attempt to connect to + * the hidden service named onion_address. Called when a + * connection attempt has ended; may be called occasionally at other + * times, and should be reasonably harmless. */ + void + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address) + { + rend_cache_entry_t *cache_entry = NULL; + rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &cache_entry); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Connection attempt for %s has ended; " + "cleaning up temporary state.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); + + /* Clear the timed_out flag on all remaining intro points for this HS. */ + if (cache_entry != NULL) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cache_entry->parsed->intro_nodes, + rend_intro_point_t *, ip, + ip->timed_out = 0; ); + } + + /* Remove the HS's entries in last_hid_serv_requests. */ + purge_hid_serv_from_last_hid_serv_requests(onion_address); + } + /** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction * point for the named hidden service. Return NULL if all introduction points * have been tried and failed.

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[tor/master] Record intro point timeouts in rend_intro_point_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit eaed37d14c6e1dc93a392f62ef2e501f75e4878a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 17 03:19:29 2011 -0700 Record intro point timeouts in rend_intro_point_t --- src/or/circuitlist.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- src/or/or.h | 7 +++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- src/or/rendclient.h | 10 ++++++++-- 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/circuitlist.c b/src/or/circuitlist.c index e9cc9eb..2fc645a 100644 --- a/src/or/circuitlist.c +++ b/src/or/circuitlist.c @@ -1119,9 +1119,8 @@ circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs(void) * - If circ isn't open yet: call circuit_build_failed() if we're * the origin, and in either case call circuit_rep_hist_note_result() * to note stats. - * - If purpose is C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, remove the intro point we - * just tried from our list of intro points for that service - * descriptor. + * - If purpose is C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT, report the intro point + * failure we just had to the hidden service client module. * - Send appropriate destroys and edge_destroys for conns and * streams attached to circ. * - If circ->rend_splice is set (we are the midpoint of a joined @@ -1190,16 +1189,20 @@ _circuit_mark_for_close(circuit_t *circ, int reason, int line, } if (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT) { origin_circuit_t *ocirc = TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); + int timed_out = (reason == END_STREAM_REASON_TIMEOUT); tor_assert(circ->state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN); tor_assert(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit); tor_assert(ocirc->rend_data); /* treat this like getting a nack from it */ - log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). " - "Removing from descriptor.", + log_info(LD_REND, "Failed intro circ %s to %s (awaiting ack). %s", safe_str_client(ocirc->rend_data->onion_address), - safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state))); - rend_client_remove_intro_point(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, - ocirc->rend_data); + safe_str_client(build_state_get_exit_nickname(ocirc->build_state)), + timed_out ? "Recording timeout." : "Removing from descriptor."); + rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(ocirc->build_state->chosen_exit, + ocirc->rend_data, + timed_out ? + INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT : + INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); } if (circ->n_conn) { circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, circ->n_conn); diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 31deb89..32d4b11 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -3463,6 +3463,13 @@ typedef struct rend_intro_point_t { extend_info_t *extend_info; /**< Extend info of this introduction point. */ crypto_pk_env_t *intro_key; /**< Introduction key that replaces the service * key, if this descriptor is V2. */ + + /** (Client side only) Flag indicating that a timeout has occurred + * after sending an INTRODUCE cell to this intro point. After a + * timeout, an intro point should not be tried again during the same + * hidden service connection attempt, but it may be tried again + * during a future connection attempt. */ + unsigned int timed_out : 1; } rend_intro_point_t; /** Information used to connect to a hidden service. Used on both the diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 773ac8d..013d544 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -366,8 +366,9 @@ rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, log_info(LD_REND, "Got nack for %s from %s...", safe_str_client(circ->rend_data->onion_address), safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(circ->build_state->chosen_exit))); - if (rend_client_remove_intro_point(circ->build_state->chosen_exit, - circ->rend_data) > 0) { + if (rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(circ->build_state->chosen_exit, + circ->rend_data, + INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC)>0){ /* There are introduction points left. Re-extend the circuit to * another intro point and try again. */ int result = rend_client_reextend_intro_circuit(circ); @@ -648,16 +649,26 @@ rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn); } -/** Remove failed_intro from ent. If ent now has no intro points, or - * service is unrecognized, then launch a new renddesc fetch. - +/** Mark failed_intro as a failed introduction point for the + * hidden service specified by rend_query. If the HS now has no + * usable intro points, or we do not have an HS descriptor for it, + * then launch a new renddesc fetch. + * + * If failure_type is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC, remove the + * intro point from (our parsed copy of) the HS descriptor. + * + * If failure_type is INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT, mark the + * intro point as 'timed out'; it will not be retried until the + * current hidden service connection attempt has ended or it has + * appeared in a newly fetched rendezvous descriptor. * - * Return -1 if error, 0 if no intro points remain or service + * Return -1 if error, 0 if no usable intro points remain or service * unrecognized, 1 if recognized and some intro points remain. */ int -rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, - const rend_data_t *rend_query) +rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, + const rend_data_t *rend_query, + unsigned int failure_type) { int i, r; rend_cache_entry_t *ent; @@ -680,8 +691,20 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, rend_intro_point_t *intro = smartlist_get(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); if (tor_memeq(failed_intro->identity_digest, intro->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) { - rend_intro_point_free(intro); - smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + switch (failure_type) { + default: + log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unknown failure type %u. Removing intro point.", + failure_type); + tor_fragile_assert(); + /* fall through */ + case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC: + rend_intro_point_free(intro); + smartlist_del(ent->parsed->intro_nodes, i); + break; + case INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT: + intro->timed_out = 1; + break; + } break; } } @@ -911,6 +934,13 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro_impl(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry, usable_nodes = smartlist_create(); smartlist_add_all(usable_nodes, entry->parsed->intro_nodes); + /* Remove the intro points that have timed out during this HS + * connection attempt from our list of usable nodes. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(usable_nodes, rend_intro_point_t *, ip, + if (ip->timed_out) { + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(usable_nodes, ip); + }); + again: if (smartlist_len(usable_nodes) == 0) { if (n_excluded && get_options()->StrictNodes && warnings) { diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index c6cf82b..3421e07 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -22,8 +22,14 @@ int rend_client_introduction_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, void rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query); void rend_client_cancel_descriptor_fetches(void); void rend_client_purge_last_hid_serv_requests(void); -int rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, - const rend_data_t *rend_query); + +#define INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC 0 +#define INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT 1 + +int rend_client_report_intro_point_failure(extend_info_t *failed_intro, + const rend_data_t *rend_query, + unsigned int failure_type); + int rend_client_rendezvous_acked(origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, size_t request_len);

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[tor/master] Refetch an HS's desc if we don't have a usable one
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 6803c1c371b9cfea30c32dc9eaf3f976614a103c Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Sep 28 20:00:24 2011 -0700 Refetch an HS's desc if we don't have a usable one Previously, we wouldn't refetch an HS's descriptor unless we didn't have one at all. That was equivalent to refetching iff we didn't have a usable one, but the next commit will make us keep some non-usable HS descriptors around in our cache. Code bugfix on the release that introduced the v2 HS directory system, because rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc's documentation comment should have described what it actually did, not what its behaviour happened to be equivalent to; no behaviour change in this commit. --- src/or/rendclient.c | 7 ++++--- 1 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 533dfb8..773ac8d 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -574,10 +574,11 @@ rend_client_refetch_v2_renddesc(const rend_data_t *rend_query) "service descriptor, but are not fetching service descriptors."); return; } - /* Before fetching, check if we already have the descriptor here. */ - if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0) { + /* Before fetching, check if we already have a usable descriptor here. */ + if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(rend_query->onion_address, -1, &e) > 0 && + rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(e)) { log_info(LD_REND, "We would fetch a v2 rendezvous descriptor, but we " - "already have that descriptor here. Not fetching."); + "already have a usable descriptor here. Not fetching."); return; } log_debug(LD_REND, "Fetching v2 rendezvous descriptor for service %s",

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[tor/master] Clear the timed_out flag when an HS connection attempt ends
by nickm＠torproject.org 03 Oct '11

03 Oct '11

commit 34a6b8b7e588b6f10e6e87cf876ef6ada49f8b8a Author: Robert Ransom <rransom.8774(a)gmail.com> Date: Sat Sep 17 03:23:26 2011 -0700 Clear the timed_out flag when an HS connection attempt ends --- changes/bug1297b | 8 ++++++++ src/or/circuituse.c | 7 +++++++ src/or/connection_edge.c | 12 ++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/rendclient.h | 2 ++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug1297b b/changes/bug1297b new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b0169d --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug1297b @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor bugfixes: + + - When one of a hidden service's introduction points times out, + consider trying it again during the next attempt to connect to + the HS. Previously, we would not try it again unless a newly + fetched descriptor contained it. Required by fixes for bugs + 1297 and 3825. + diff --git a/src/or/circuituse.c b/src/or/circuituse.c index 0ad8b3b..f2fd6fe 100644 --- a/src/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/or/circuituse.c @@ -1464,6 +1464,13 @@ link_apconn_to_circ(edge_connection_t *apconn, origin_circuit_t *circ, /* assert_connection_ok(conn, time(NULL)); */ circ->p_streams = apconn; + if (connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(apconn)) { + /* We are attaching a stream to a rendezvous circuit. That means + * that an attempt to connect to a hidden service just + * succeeded. Tell rendclient.c. */ + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(apconn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + if (cpath) { /* we were given one; use it */ tor_assert(cpath_is_on_circuit(circ, cpath)); apconn->cpath_layer = cpath; diff --git a/src/or/connection_edge.c b/src/or/connection_edge.c index 8609b02..0c5ebde 100644 --- a/src/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/or/connection_edge.c @@ -68,6 +68,18 @@ _connection_mark_unattached_ap(edge_connection_t *conn, int endreason, tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_AP); conn->edge_has_sent_end = 1; /* no circ yet */ + /* If this is a rendezvous stream and it is failing without ever + * being attached to a circuit, assume that an attempt to connect to + * the destination hidden service has just ended. + * + * XXX023 This condition doesn't limit to only streams failing + * without ever being attached. That sloppiness should be harmless, + * but we should fix it someday anyway. */ + if ((conn->on_circuit != NULL || conn->edge_has_sent_end) && + connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(conn)) { + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(conn->rend_data->onion_address); + } + if (conn->_base.marked_for_close) { /* This call will warn as appropriate. */ _connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn), line, file); diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.c b/src/or/rendclient.c index 013d544..3c1c116 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.c +++ b/src/or/rendclient.c @@ -881,10 +881,33 @@ rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query) "unavailable (try again later).", safe_str_client(query)); connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); + rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(query); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(_conn); } +/** Clear temporary state used only during an attempt to connect to + * the hidden service named onion_address. Called when a + * connection attempt has ended; may be called occasionally at other + * times, and should be reasonably harmless. */ +void +rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address) +{ + rend_cache_entry_t *cache_entry = NULL; + rend_cache_lookup_entry(onion_address, -1, &cache_entry); + + log_info(LD_REND, "Connection attempt for %s has ended; " + "cleaning up temporary state.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); + + /* Clear the timed_out flag on all remaining intro points for this HS. */ + if (cache_entry != NULL) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH(cache_entry->parsed->intro_nodes, + rend_intro_point_t *, ip, + ip->timed_out = 0; ); + } +} + /** Return a newly allocated extend_info_t* for a randomly chosen introduction * point for the named hidden service. Return NULL if all introduction points * have been tried and failed. diff --git a/src/or/rendclient.h b/src/or/rendclient.h index 3421e07..46779b7 100644 --- a/src/or/rendclient.h +++ b/src/or/rendclient.h @@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ int rend_client_receive_rendezvous(origin_circuit_t *circ, size_t request_len); void rend_client_desc_trynow(const char *query); +void rend_client_note_connection_attempt_ended(const char *onion_address); + extend_info_t *rend_client_get_random_intro(const rend_data_t *rend_query); int rend_client_any_intro_points_usable(const rend_cache_entry_t *entry);

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