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[tor/master] man page entries for AuthDir{Fast, GuardBW}Guarantee
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 97a209ea28f1b64fba51157e3e695c676eb0cf8e Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 18:32:32 2011 -0500 man page entries for AuthDir{Fast,GuardBW}Guarantee --- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ++++++++++ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 703cc82..d91f873 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1284,6 +1284,16 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) +**AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: + Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the + Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or + more. (Default: 20 KB) + +**AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: + Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity + or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement + for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB) + **BridgePassword** __Password__:: If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used for debugging. (Default:

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[tor/master] parameterize bw cutoffs to guarantee Fast and Guard flags
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit c0ec4eafc54d84089536caf51b1367e8d9ddacef Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 16 20:55:33 2011 -0500 parameterize bw cutoffs to guarantee Fast and Guard flags Now it will be easier for researchers to simulate Tor networks with different values. Resolves ticket 4484. --- changes/feature4484 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/or/or.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/feature4484 b/changes/feature4484 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78154e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/feature4484 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor features: + - Add two new config options for directory authorities: + AuthDirFastGuarantee sets a bandwidth threshold for guaranteeing the + Fast flag, and AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee sets a bandwidth threshold + that is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for + the Guard flag. Now it will be easier for researchers to simulate + Tor networks with different values. Resolves ticket 4484. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index ffa763e..94a6538 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(AuthDirBadDir, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirBadExit, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirInvalid, LINELIST, NULL), + V(AuthDirFastGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "20 KB"), + V(AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "250 KB"), V(AuthDirReject, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirRejectUnlisted, BOOL, "0"), V(AuthDirListBadDirs, BOOL, "0"), @@ -3373,6 +3375,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->PerConnBWBurst, "PerConnBWBurst", msg) < 0) return -1; + if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirFastGuarantee, + "AuthDirFastGuarantee", msg) < 0) + return -1; + if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, + "AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee", msg) < 0) + return -1; if (options->RelayBandwidthRate && !options->RelayBandwidthBurst) options->RelayBandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthRate; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index c427fe2..19d9702 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1692,12 +1692,6 @@ should_generate_v2_networkstatus(void) /** If a router's MTBF is at least this value, then it is always stable. * See above. (Corresponds to about 7 days for current decay rates.) */ #define MTBF_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE (60*60*24*5) -/** Similarly, we protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed - * out of the set of Fast nodes. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST ROUTER_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH -/** Similarly, every node with sufficient bandwidth can be considered - * for Guard status. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD (250*1024) /** Similarly, every node with at least this much weighted time known can be * considered familiar enough to be a guard. Corresponds to about 20 days for * current decay rates. @@ -1841,6 +1835,7 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) long *tks; double *mtbfs, *wfus; time_t now = time(NULL); + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* initialize these all here, in case there are no routers */ stable_uptime = 0; @@ -1910,8 +1905,11 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) if (guard_tk > TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR) guard_tk = TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR; - if (fast_bandwidth > BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST) - fast_bandwidth = BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST; + /* Protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed out of the set + * of Fast nodes. */ + if (options->AuthDirFastGuarantee && + fast_bandwidth > options->AuthDirFastGuarantee) + fast_bandwidth = options->AuthDirFastGuarantee; /* Now that we have a time-known that 7/8 routers are known longer than, * fill wfus with the wfu of every such "familiar" router. */ @@ -2335,6 +2333,8 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int unstable_version = !tor_version_as_new_as(ri->platform,"0.1.1.16-rc-cvs"); + uint32_t routerbw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri); + memset(rs, 0, sizeof(routerstatus_t)); rs->is_authority = @@ -2360,10 +2360,10 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, rs->is_valid = ri->is_valid; if (rs->is_fast && - (router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD || - router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= - MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, - guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && + ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee && + routerbw >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee) || + routerbw >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, + guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && (options->GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays || is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform))) { long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known( diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 7d50e1f..c0714ee 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2676,6 +2676,14 @@ typedef struct { * exploitation of CVE-2011-2768 against their clients? */ int GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays; + /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising + * this amount of capacity or more. */ + uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee; + + /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient + * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */ + uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee; + char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when * does it start? */ uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2'
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 6a76007b089a2ca31b67b2ce15dd28edeb416428 Merge: c9f24ed 97a209e Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 18:36:49 2011 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.2.2' Conflicts: src/or/dirserv.c changes/bug4518 | 4 ++++ changes/feature4484 | 8 ++++++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ++++++++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/cpuworker.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- src/or/dirserv.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/or/or.h | 8 ++++++++ 7 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --cc src/or/dirserv.c index e4cbcaa,19d9702..64db94d --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@@ -2397,13 -2357,13 +2397,13 @@@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(router rs->is_named = (naming && (name_status & FP_NAMED)) ? 1 : 0; rs->is_unnamed = (naming && (name_status & FP_UNNAMED)) ? 1 : 0; } - rs->is_valid = ri->is_valid; + rs->is_valid = node->is_valid; - if (rs->is_fast && + if (node->is_fast && - (router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD || - router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= - MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, - guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && + ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee && + routerbw >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee) || + routerbw >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, + guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && (options->GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays || is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform))) { long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known(

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[tor/master] apparently or_options_t likes being a const in master
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 58764d8ec6799fc5ea91bcbb1655071f869bb753 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 18:42:07 2011 -0500 apparently or_options_t likes being a const in master --- src/or/dirserv.c | 2 +- 1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index 64db94d..9885066 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1864,7 +1864,7 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) long *tks; double *mtbfs, *wfus; time_t now = time(NULL); - or_options_t *options = get_options(); + const or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* initialize these all here, in case there are no routers */ stable_uptime = 0;

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] parameterize bw cutoffs to guarantee Fast and Guard flags
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit c0ec4eafc54d84089536caf51b1367e8d9ddacef Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 16 20:55:33 2011 -0500 parameterize bw cutoffs to guarantee Fast and Guard flags Now it will be easier for researchers to simulate Tor networks with different values. Resolves ticket 4484. --- changes/feature4484 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/config.c | 8 ++++++++ src/or/dirserv.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------ src/or/or.h | 8 ++++++++ 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/feature4484 b/changes/feature4484 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78154e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/feature4484 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Minor features: + - Add two new config options for directory authorities: + AuthDirFastGuarantee sets a bandwidth threshold for guaranteeing the + Fast flag, and AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee sets a bandwidth threshold + that is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for + the Guard flag. Now it will be easier for researchers to simulate + Tor networks with different values. Resolves ticket 4484. + diff --git a/src/or/config.c b/src/or/config.c index ffa763e..94a6538 100644 --- a/src/or/config.c +++ b/src/or/config.c @@ -175,6 +175,8 @@ static config_var_t _option_vars[] = { V(AuthDirBadDir, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirBadExit, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirInvalid, LINELIST, NULL), + V(AuthDirFastGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "20 KB"), + V(AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, MEMUNIT, "250 KB"), V(AuthDirReject, LINELIST, NULL), V(AuthDirRejectUnlisted, BOOL, "0"), V(AuthDirListBadDirs, BOOL, "0"), @@ -3373,6 +3375,12 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->PerConnBWBurst, "PerConnBWBurst", msg) < 0) return -1; + if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirFastGuarantee, + "AuthDirFastGuarantee", msg) < 0) + return -1; + if (ensure_bandwidth_cap(&options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee, + "AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee", msg) < 0) + return -1; if (options->RelayBandwidthRate && !options->RelayBandwidthBurst) options->RelayBandwidthBurst = options->RelayBandwidthRate; diff --git a/src/or/dirserv.c b/src/or/dirserv.c index c427fe2..19d9702 100644 --- a/src/or/dirserv.c +++ b/src/or/dirserv.c @@ -1692,12 +1692,6 @@ should_generate_v2_networkstatus(void) /** If a router's MTBF is at least this value, then it is always stable. * See above. (Corresponds to about 7 days for current decay rates.) */ #define MTBF_TO_GUARANTEE_STABLE (60*60*24*5) -/** Similarly, we protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed - * out of the set of Fast nodes. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST ROUTER_REQUIRED_MIN_BANDWIDTH -/** Similarly, every node with sufficient bandwidth can be considered - * for Guard status. */ -#define BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD (250*1024) /** Similarly, every node with at least this much weighted time known can be * considered familiar enough to be a guard. Corresponds to about 20 days for * current decay rates. @@ -1841,6 +1835,7 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) long *tks; double *mtbfs, *wfus; time_t now = time(NULL); + or_options_t *options = get_options(); /* initialize these all here, in case there are no routers */ stable_uptime = 0; @@ -1910,8 +1905,11 @@ dirserv_compute_performance_thresholds(routerlist_t *rl) if (guard_tk > TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR) guard_tk = TIME_KNOWN_TO_GUARANTEE_FAMILIAR; - if (fast_bandwidth > BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST) - fast_bandwidth = BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_FAST; + /* Protect sufficiently fast nodes from being pushed out of the set + * of Fast nodes. */ + if (options->AuthDirFastGuarantee && + fast_bandwidth > options->AuthDirFastGuarantee) + fast_bandwidth = options->AuthDirFastGuarantee; /* Now that we have a time-known that 7/8 routers are known longer than, * fill wfus with the wfu of every such "familiar" router. */ @@ -2335,6 +2333,8 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, const or_options_t *options = get_options(); int unstable_version = !tor_version_as_new_as(ri->platform,"0.1.1.16-rc-cvs"); + uint32_t routerbw = router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri); + memset(rs, 0, sizeof(routerstatus_t)); rs->is_authority = @@ -2360,10 +2360,10 @@ set_routerstatus_from_routerinfo(routerstatus_t *rs, rs->is_valid = ri->is_valid; if (rs->is_fast && - (router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= BANDWIDTH_TO_GUARANTEE_GUARD || - router_get_advertised_bandwidth(ri) >= - MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, - guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && + ((options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee && + routerbw >= options->AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee) || + routerbw >= MIN(guard_bandwidth_including_exits, + guard_bandwidth_excluding_exits)) && (options->GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays || is_router_version_good_for_possible_guard(ri->platform))) { long tk = rep_hist_get_weighted_time_known( diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index 7d50e1f..c0714ee 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -2676,6 +2676,14 @@ typedef struct { * exploitation of CVE-2011-2768 against their clients? */ int GiveGuardFlagTo_CVE_2011_2768_VulnerableRelays; + /** If non-zero, always vote the Fast flag for any relay advertising + * this amount of capacity or more. */ + uint64_t AuthDirFastGuarantee; + + /** If non-zero, this advertised capacity or more is always sufficient + * to satisfy the bandwidth requirement for the Guard flag. */ + uint64_t AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee; + char *AccountingStart; /**< How long is the accounting interval, and when * does it start? */ uint64_t AccountingMax; /**< How many bytes do we allow per accounting

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] man page entries for AuthDir{Fast, GuardBW}Guarantee
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 97a209ea28f1b64fba51157e3e695c676eb0cf8e Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 18:32:32 2011 -0500 man page entries for AuthDir{Fast,GuardBW}Guarantee --- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 ++++++++++ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 703cc82..d91f873 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1284,6 +1284,16 @@ DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5) +**AuthDirFastGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: + Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, always vote the + Fast flag for any relay advertising this amount of capacity or + more. (Default: 20 KB) + +**AuthDirGuardBWGuarantee** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**:: + Authoritative directories only. If non-zero, this advertised capacity + or more is always sufficient to satisfy the bandwidth requirement + for the Guard flag. (Default: 250 KB) + **BridgePassword** __Password__:: If set, contains an HTTP authenticator that tells a bridge authority to serve all requested bridge information. Used for debugging. (Default:

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[tor/master] fold in more changes entries
by arma＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit c9f24edb13faf17dc314be51127736acfc3de17a Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 18:04:01 2011 -0500 fold in more changes entries --- ChangeLog | 7 +++++++ changes/bug3963 | 5 ----- changes/bug4360 | 3 --- changes/bug4521 | 3 --- 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index fada7d8..8efc379 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -45,6 +45,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.8-alpha - 2011-11-21 by Anders Sundman. - Fix parsing of some corner-cases with tor_inet_pton(). Fixes bug 4515; bugfix on 0.2.0.1-alpha; fix by Anders Sundman. + - When configuring, starting, or stopping an NT service, stop + immediately after the service configuration attempt has succeeded + or failed. Fixes bug 3963; bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. - When sending a NETINFO cell, include the original address received for the other side, not its canonical address. Found by "troll_un"; fixes bug 4349; bugfix on 0.2.0.10-alpha. @@ -57,6 +60,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.8-alpha - 2011-11-21 - Fix a memory leak in launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch() that occurred when a client tried to fetch a descriptor for a bridge in ExcludeNodes. Fixes bug 4383; bugfix on 0.2.2.25-alpha. + - Backport fixes for a pair of compilation warnings on Windows. + Fixes bug 4521; bugfix on 0.2.2.28-beta and on 0.2.2.29-beta. - When running as a client, do not print a misleading (and plain wrong) log message that we're collecting "directory request" statistics: clients don't collect statistics. Also don't create a @@ -108,6 +113,8 @@ Changes in version 0.2.3.8-alpha - 2011-11-21 old built-in one. OpenSSL's AES has been better for a while, and relatively few servers should still be on any version of OpenSSL that doesn't have good optimized assembly AES. + - Use the name "CERTS" consistently to refer to the new cell type; + we were calling it CERT in some places and CERTS in others. o Testing: - Numerous new unit tests for functions in util.c and address.c by diff --git a/changes/bug3963 b/changes/bug3963 deleted file mode 100644 index 2fc44a0..0000000 --- a/changes/bug3963 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - When configuring, starting, or stopping an NT service, stop - immediately after the service configuration attempt has succeeded - or failed. Fixes bug3963; bugfix on 0.2.0.7-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/bug4360 b/changes/bug4360 deleted file mode 100644 index 93afa82..0000000 --- a/changes/bug4360 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Code simplification and refactoring: - - Use the name "CERTS" consistently to refer to the new cell type; - we were calling it CERT in some places and CERTS in others. diff --git a/changes/bug4521 b/changes/bug4521 deleted file mode 100644 index 9b0bae9..0000000 --- a/changes/bug4521 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes: - - Backport fixes for a pair of compilation warnings on Windows. - Fixes bug 4521; bugfix on 0.2.2.28-beta and on 0.2.2.29-beta.

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Only call cull_wedged_cpuworkers once every 60 seconds.
by nickm＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 8e388bc39ceb9b1a642359005b320cdc994f8a4e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Nov 19 18:29:42 2011 -0500 Only call cull_wedged_cpuworkers once every 60 seconds. The function is over 10 or 20% on some of Moritz's profiles, depending on how you could. Since it's checking for a multi-hour timeout, this is safe to do. Fixes bug 4518. --- changes/bug4518 | 4 ++++ src/or/cpuworker.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug4518 b/changes/bug4518 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8dcb93b --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug4518 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (performance): + - Avoid frequent calls to the fairly expensive cull_wedged_cpuworkers + function. This was eating up hideously large amounts of time on some + busy servers. Fixes bug 4518. diff --git a/src/or/cpuworker.c b/src/or/cpuworker.c index c5e4863..9d196d3 100644 --- a/src/or/cpuworker.c +++ b/src/or/cpuworker.c @@ -446,9 +446,19 @@ assign_onionskin_to_cpuworker(connection_t *cpuworker, { char qbuf[1]; char tag[TAG_LEN]; + time_t now = approx_time(); + static time_t last_culled_cpuworkers = 0; - cull_wedged_cpuworkers(); - spawn_enough_cpuworkers(); + /* Checking for wedged cpuworkers requires a linear search over all + * connections, so let's do it only once a minute. + */ +#define CULL_CPUWORKERS_INTERVAL 60 + + if (last_culled_cpuworkers + CULL_CPUWORKERS_INTERVAL <= now) { + cull_wedged_cpuworkers(); + spawn_enough_cpuworkers(); + last_culled_cpuworkers = now; + } if (1) { if (num_cpuworkers_busy == num_cpuworkers) {

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[tor/maint-0.2.2] Merge branch 'bug4518' into maint-0.2.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit f4e053d6dff0b868449a8c225c2062b42083733f Merge: b3c988f 8e388bc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 17:25:51 2011 -0500 Merge branch 'bug4518' into maint-0.2.2 changes/bug4518 | 4 ++++ src/or/cpuworker.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[translation/orbot] Update translations for orbot
by translation＠torproject.org 21 Nov '11

21 Nov '11

commit 76cff02303017ea183a33475be3ad7eb25dcba0c Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 21 21:45:04 2011 +0000 Update translations for orbot --- values-it/strings.xml | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/values-it/strings.xml b/values-it/strings.xml index 1bc806f..d100f8d 100644 --- a/values-it/strings.xml +++ b/values-it/strings.xml @@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ <string name="status_activated">Connesso alla rete Tor</string> <string name="status_disabled">\"Orbot è disattivato</string> <string name="status_shutting_down">Orbot si sta spegnendo</string> - <string name="tor_process_starting"></string> - <string name="tor_process_complete"></string> + <string name="tor_process_starting">Avvio client Tor...</string> + <string name="tor_process_complete">completa.</string> <string name="tor_process_waiting"></string> <string name="not_anonymous_yet">ATTENZIONE: Il traffico non è ancora anonimo! Configura le applicazioni per utilizzare il proxy HTTP 127.0.0.1:8118, SOCKS4A o proxy SOCKS5 127.0.0.1:9050</string> <string name="menu_home">Home</string> @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ Visita il nostro sito web https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot o invia una ma <string name="wizard_permissions_no_root_msg"></string> <string name="wizard_tips_title">Orbot-App abilitate</string> <string name="wizard_tips_gibberbot"></string> - <string name="gibberbot_apk_url"></string> + <string name="gibberbot_apk_url">https://market.android.com/details?id=info.guardianproject.otr.app.im</string> <string name="wizard_tips_orweb">ORWEB (Solo Android 1.x) - Browser progettato per la privacy e Orbot</string> <string name="orweb_apk_url">market://search?q=pname:nfo.guardianproject.browser</string> <string name="wizard_transproxy_title"></string> @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ Visita il nostro sito web https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot o invia una ma <string name="pref_use_whispercore_summary"></string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_title">Tipo proxy</string> <string name="pref_proxy_type_summary"></string> - <string name="pref_proxy_type_dialog"></string> + <string name="pref_proxy_type_dialog">Inserisci tipo proxy</string> <string name="pref_proxy_host_title">Host proxy</string> <string name="pref_proxy_host_summary"></string> <string name="pref_proxy_host_dialog"></string> @@ -131,13 +131,13 @@ Visita il nostro sito web https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot o invia una ma <string name="transproxy_enabled_for_tethering_"></string> <string name="warning_error_starting_transparent_proxying_"></string> <string name="transproxy_rules_cleared"></string> - <string name="couldn_t_start_tor_process_"></string> - <string name="privoxy_is_running_on_port_"></string> + <string name="couldn_t_start_tor_process_">Impossibile avviare il processo Tor:</string> + <string name="privoxy_is_running_on_port_">Privoxy è in esecuzione sulla porta: </string> <string name="setting_up_port_based_transparent_proxying_"></string> - <string name="bridge_error"></string> + <string name="bridge_error">Errore bridge</string> <string name="bridge_requires_ip"></string> <string name="send_email_for_bridges"></string> - <string name="error"></string> + <string name="error">Errore</string> <string name="your_reachableaddresses_settings_caused_an_exception_"></string> <string name="your_relay_settings_caused_an_exception_"></string> <string name="exit_nodes"></string> @@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ Visita il nostro sito web https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot o invia una ma <string name="fingerprints_nicks_countries_and_addresses_to_exclude"></string> <string name="enter_exclude_nodes"></string> <string name="strict_nodes"></string> - <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes"></string> + <string name="use_only_these_specified_nodes">Utilizza *solo* i nodi specificati</string> <string name="bridges">Ponti</string> <string name="use_bridges"></string> <string name="enable_alternate_entrance_nodes_into_the_tor_network"></string> - <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges">Indirizzo IP e la porta di ponti</string> + <string name="ip_address_and_port_of_bridges"></string> <string name="enter_bridge_addresses"></string> <string name="relays"></string> <string name="relaying"></string> @@ -166,26 +166,26 @@ Visita il nostro sito web https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot o invia una ma <string name="run_as_a_client_behind_a_firewall_with_restrictive_policies"></string> <string name="reachable_ports"></string> <string name="ports_reachable_behind_a_restrictive_firewall"></string> - <string name="enter_ports"></string> + <string name="enter_ports">Inserisci porte</string> <string name="enable_hidden_services"></string> <string name="run_servers_accessible_via_the_tor_network"></string> <string name="enter_localhost_ports_for_hidden_services"></string> <string name="hidden_service_ports"></string> <string name="the_addressable_name_for_your_hidden_service_generated_automatically_"></string> <string name="enable_debug_log_to_output_must_use_adb_or_alogcat_to_view_"></string> - <string name="project_home"></string> - <string name="project_urls"></string> - <string name="the_tor_license"></string> - <string name="https_torproject_org"></string> - <string name="third_party_software"></string> - <string name="tor_version"></string> - <string name="libevent_version"></string> - <string name="privoxy_version"></string> - <string name="iptables_version"></string> + <string name="project_home">Home progetto:</string> + <string name="project_urls">https://www.torproject.org/docs/android\nhttps://guardianproject.info/apps/…</string> + <string name="the_tor_license">Licenza Tor</string> + <string name="https_torproject_org">https://torproject.org</string> + <string name="third_party_software">Software di terze parti:</string> + <string name="tor_version">Tor v0.2.3.7-alpha: https://www.torproject.org</string> + <string name="libevent_version">LibEvent v1.4.13: http://www.monkey.org/~provos/libevent/</string> + <string name="privoxy_version">Privoxy v3.0.12: http://www.privoxy.org</string> + <string name="iptables_version">Iptables v1.4.7: http://www.netfilter.org</string> <string name="hidden_service_request"></string> <string name="found_existing_tor_process"></string> <string name="something_bad_happened"></string> - <string name="hidden_service_on"></string> + <string name="hidden_service_on">servizio nascosto attivo:</string> <string name="unable_to_read_hidden_service_name"></string> - <string name="unable_to_start_tor"></string> + <string name="unable_to_start_tor">Impossibile avviare Tor:</string> </resources>

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