tor-commits March 2021

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2169 discussions

[community/staging] Merge branch 'mega-cable'
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 3e99e4b418ca44483c49e8aae1fcbdf2d9101356 Merge: 5666dcd 80d275a Author: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 18 23:25:20 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'mega-cable' content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

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[community/staging] Use long form for curl header responses
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 8a693b74ac1cebaa2a81460c69969e9ec75f9274 Author: Amin Shah Gilani <amin(a)gilani.me> Date: Tue Jul 14 08:28:53 2020 +0500 Use long form for curl header responses --- content/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/contents.lr b/content/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/contents.lr index b1e1dcf..ae3fbeb 100644 --- a/content/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/contents.lr +++ b/content/onion-services/advanced/onion-location/contents.lr @@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ file_server **Testing it out:** Test it out with: ``` -curl -I https://your-website.tld +curl --head https://your-website.tld ``` and look for the `onion-location` line.

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[community/staging] Remove cyberbunker + update alexhost
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 8885058fd75654ee2834a8a8175defe3940d316b Author: Tom Matt <beather(a)posteo.net> Date: Thu Aug 20 10:38:17 2020 +0000 Remove cyberbunker + update alexhost Removed cyberbunker because they exist no more, updated alexhost policy --- content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index 504fb26..61ff218 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou |-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------| | [MivoCloud](https://www.mivocloud.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | No | - | 09/13/16 | | [Trabia](https://www.trabia.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | - | 08/13/17 | -| [AlexHost](https://alexhost.md/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | - | 07/21/2014 | +| [AlexHost](https://alexhost.md/) | - | Yes | Yes | No | "Tor exit relay is strictly forbidden on our company's servers" | 2020 | ### Netherlands @@ -182,7 +182,6 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | [Netrouting`](http://netrouting.nl/) | - | Yes | Yes | No | ISP has confirmed by e-mail that exit nodes are NOT acceptable. | 2014-10-15 | | [DirectVPS](http://directvps.nl/) | - | Yes | Yes | ? | - | - | | [Versio](http://versio.nl/) | - | Yes | Yes | No | - | 2013 | -| [CyberBunker](http://www.cyberbunker.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Customers can remain anonymous. | - | | [SnelServer](https://www.snelserver.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Abuse complaints must be responded to within 24 hours or the system automatically suspends your account until you do. | 2014 | | [ChmuraNet](https://www.chmuranet.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Allows anonymous users to run tor exits. Abuse issues will be forwarded. Make sure to tell them that you're running an exit | 09/2014 |

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[community/staging] Add Emerald Onion
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit dc15b887f568d260ce9699d8953d7d6d17d1531a Author: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 25 23:54:49 2020 -0400 Add Emerald Onion --- databags/relay-associations.ini | 12 +++++++++++- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/databags/relay-associations.ini b/databags/relay-associations.ini index 01f0b71..ec4a82e 100644 --- a/databags/relay-associations.ini +++ b/databags/relay-associations.ini @@ -28,6 +28,16 @@ active = True display = donate = +[emerald-onion] +link = https://emeraldonion.org/ +image = +label = Emerald Onion +country = US +contact = +active = True +display = +donate = https://emeraldonion.org/donate/ + [hartvoorinternetvrijheid] link = https://www.hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl/ image = @@ -156,4 +166,4 @@ country = Germany contact = https://www.artikel5ev.de/kontakt/ active = True display = -donate = +donate =

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[community/staging] replace CAPTCHA with Captcha
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 1bd7c21c00285eed6a3b3653af3352dd66c2d07b Author: Kim Le <kle2(a)student.unimelb.edu.au> Date: Sat Oct 17 10:52:46 2020 +1100 replace CAPTCHA with Captcha --- content/gsoc/cloudflare-captcha-monitoring/contents.lr | 18 +++++++++--------- .../tor-abuse-templates/contents.lr | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/gsoc/cloudflare-captcha-monitoring/contents.lr b/content/gsoc/cloudflare-captcha-monitoring/contents.lr index f511683..eae7c86 100644 --- a/content/gsoc/cloudflare-captcha-monitoring/contents.lr +++ b/content/gsoc/cloudflare-captcha-monitoring/contents.lr @@ -24,40 +24,40 @@ arma --- difficulty: medium --- -title: Cloudflare CAPTCHA Monitoring +title: Cloudflare Captcha Monitoring --- subtitle: -This project should implement a mechanism to track the rate that Cloudflare fronted webpages return CAPTCHAs to Tor users over time. +This project should implement a mechanism to track the rate that Cloudflare fronted webpages return Captchas to Tor users over time. --- body: # Problem -A large number of Tor users report getting hit by infinite CAPTCHA loops when visiting webpages fronted by Cloudflare. This makes them feel punished for using Tor to protect their privacy and prevents them from legitimately accessing websites. +A large number of Tor users report getting hit by infinite Captcha loops when visiting webpages fronted by Cloudflare. This makes them feel punished for using Tor to protect their privacy and prevents them from legitimately accessing websites. # Proposal -For this project we would like to track in practice how often Cloudflare fronted webpages return CAPTCHAs to Tor clients. +For this project we would like to track in practice how often Cloudflare fronted webpages return Captchas to Tor clients. Our proposed approach consists of: 1. Setting up a very simple static webpage to be fronted by Cloudflare -2. Write a web client to periodically fetch this static webpage via Tor and record how often a CAPTCHA is returned -3. Record and graph CAPTCHA vs real page rates +2. Write a web client to periodically fetch this static webpage via Tor and record how often a Captcha is returned +3. Record and graph Captcha vs real page rates 4. Using the pre-existing architecture, run a second client that does not fetch this webpage via Tor. This will allow us to contrast and compare how Cloudflare responds to Tor Browser vs other browsers. 5. Track and publish these details publicly There are two interesting metrics to track over time: -- the fraction of exit relays that are getting hit with CAPTCHAs, and -- the chance that a Tor client, choosing an exit relay in the normal weighted faction, will get hit by a CAPTCHA. +- the fraction of exit relays that are getting hit with Captchas, and +- the chance that a Tor client, choosing an exit relay in the normal weighted faction, will get hit by a Captcha. Then there are other interesting patterns to look for: - Are certain IP addresses punished consistently and others never punished? -- Is whether you get a CAPTCHA much more probabilistic and transient? +- Is whether you get a Captcha much more probabilistic and transient? - Does that pattern change over time? # Getting Started diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/tor-abuse-templates/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/tor-abuse-templates/contents.lr index 007e0d2..6b4549e 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/tor-abuse-templates/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/tor-abuse-templates/contents.lr @@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ However, be aware that this may be just one jerk amongst many legitimate Tor use You might have luck getting rid of this jerk by temporarily limiting account creation to require Gmail accounts before posting, or by requiring account creation be done over non-Tor before posting. In general, we believe that problems like this are best solved by improving your service to defend against the attack from the Internet at large. -Brute force login attempts can be reduced/slowed by captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. -In fact, Google provides a free captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal +Brute force login attempts can be reduced/slowed by Captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. +In fact, Google provides a free Captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal with this issue: https://code.google.com/apis/recaptcha/intro.html ``` @@ -100,8 +100,8 @@ https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py?ip=YOUR_IP&port=80 In general however, we believe that problems like this are best solved by improving the service to defend against the attack from the Internet at large. -Scraping and robot activity can be reduced/slowed by captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. -In fact, Google provides a free captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal with this issue: https://code.google.com/apis/recaptcha/intro.html +Scraping and robot activity can be reduced/slowed by Captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. +In fact, Google provides a free Captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal with this issue: https://code.google.com/apis/recaptcha/intro.html Slow DoS attacks [aimed to consume the Apache MaxClients limit](http://www.guerilla-ciso.com/archives/2049) can be alleviated by reducing the httpd.conf TimeOut and KeepAliveTimeout config values to 15-30 and raising the ServerLimit and MaxClients values to omething like 3000. @@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ The attacker would probably just chain an open proxy after Tor, or just use open The Tor project does provide an automated DNSRBL for you to query to flag requests from Tor nodes as requiring special treatment: https://www.torproject.org/projects/tordnsel.html.en In general, we believe that problems like this are best solved by improving the service to defend against the attack from the Internet at large rather than specifically tailoring behavior for Tor. -Brute force login attempts can be reduced/slowed by captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. -In fact, Google provides a free captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal with this issue: https://code.google.com/apis/recaptcha/intro.html +Brute force login attempts can be reduced/slowed by Captchas, which is the approach taken by Gmail for this same problem. +In fact, Google provides a free Captcha service, complete with code for easy inclusion in a number of systems to help other sites deal with this issue: https://code.google.com/apis/recaptcha/intro.html ``` ## SSH Bruteforce Attempts

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[community/staging] Merge branch 'fix-screenshot-display-l10n'
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 886ee1ce210bd1243584645ee83d8e31952740b7 Merge: 89c10bb 246edcf Author: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 29 10:14:58 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'fix-screenshot-display-l10n' content/localization/becoming-tor-translator/contents.lr | 7 +++---- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[community/staging] Update contents.lr
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 1858745f2e4d7f1251ec4e9304c5f7a5879e11ee Author: Ri210 <38575103+Ri210(a)users.noreply.github.com> Date: Fri Sep 11 18:07:14 2020 -0400 Update contents.lr Added Vidéotron Ltee --- content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index dfef1a1..cfad8d2 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | [TekSavvy](http://www.teksavvy.ca) | - | Yes | Yes | ? | has a server-friendly Internet Use Policy (e.g., running a Tor relay) and has taken a stand in favor of net neutrality | 2008/12 | | [CloudatCost.ca](http://www.cloudatcost.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | ? | operated by Fibernetics, has liberal abuse handling policies [AUP](http://www.cloudatcost.com/terms.php), however Tor is not explicitly allowed. | 2015/02 | | [oneprovider](http://oneprovider.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | They are reselling dedicated servers in many locations around the world. Abuse handling differs depending on the provider from which they resell. | 2016/06 | +| [Vidéotron Ltee](http://videotron.com/) | AS5769 | Yes | Yes | ? | No mention of Tor in ToS, relays and bridges seem allowed. | - | ### Czech Republic

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[community/staging] Add bold to ipv6 troubleshooting
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit b8b174a14bfa97fd60f4f6d96d3e291ab3de5127 Author: Gustavo Gus <gusgustavo(a)users.noreply.github.com> Date: Tue Sep 1 15:06:54 2020 +0000 Add bold to ipv6 troubleshooting https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/web/community/-/issues/149 --- content/relay-operations/technical-setup/post-install/contents.lr | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/post-install/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/post-install/contents.lr index f7ee53c..d994153 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/post-install/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/technical-setup/post-install/contents.lr @@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ ping6 -c2 2001:858:2:2:aabb:0:563b:1526 && ping6 -c2 2620:13:4000:6000::1000:118 ``` At the end of the output you should see "OK." if that is not the case do not enable IPv6 in your torrc configuration file before IPv6 is indeed working. -If you enable IPv6 without working IPv6 connectivity your entire relay will not be used, regardless if IPv4 is working. +**If you enable IPv6 without working IPv6 connectivity your entire relay will not be used, regardless if IPv4 is working.** If it worked fine, make your Tor relay reachable via IPv6 by adding an additional ORPort line to your configuration (example for ORPort 9001): @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ If you are an exit relay with IPv6 connectivity, tell your tor daemon to allow e IPv6Exit 1 ``` -Note: Tor requires IPv4 connectivity, you can not run a Tor relay on IPv6-only. +**Note: Tor requires IPv4 connectivity, you can not run a Tor relay on IPv6-only.** # 8. Maintaining a relay

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[community/staging] Merge branch 'bridge-note'
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit 89c10bb921b0d102e2a6fc72e2698c08cd7dc62b Merge: 1882f3e 286bf68 Author: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Oct 29 10:09:47 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'bridge-note' content/relay-operations/technical-setup/bridge/contents.lr | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

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[community/staging] Fix goodbad ISP markdown table
by hiro＠torproject.org 21 Mar '21

21 Mar '21

commit bd72532c06db45f52cb7ca8b8b9be5bfb7b136e0 Author: gus <gus(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 13 22:37:25 2020 -0400 Fix goodbad ISP markdown table --- content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index dfb6546..98eca4c 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | [Ethr.net](http://ethr.net/) | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | - | - | | [Evolucix](http://www.evolucix.com) | - | Yes | Yes | No(?) | - | - | | [Future Hosting](http://www.futurehosting.com/) | - | Yes | Yes | No | - | 09/01/14 | -| [Hivelocity](https://www.hivelocity.net/) | - | No | No | No | They are symphathetic, but do not want their IP space "polluted" by Tor abuse requests. | 10/2020 +| [Hivelocity](https://www.hivelocity.net/) | - | No | No | No | They are symphathetic, but do not want their IP space "polluted" by Tor abuse requests. | 10/2020 | | [HostGator](http://www.hostgator.com/) | - | No | No | No | - | - | | [HostHatch](https://hosthatch.com) | AS46562 | Yes | Yes | No | Their vps isp are mixed include: QuadraNet, nLayer, AboveNet, Inteliquent, Atrato Networks and open peering with the entire Any2LA and Atlanta TIE networks. | 05/01/16 | | [HostUS](http://hostus.us/) | AS25926 | Yes | Yes | No | - | 10/16/14 |

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tor-commits March 2021