October 2021 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/main] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into maint-0.4.5
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit d949a2f924bfabd4aacf48e884d99cd6a8db61ef Merge: d0053fdfb5 44e105c27f Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 19 10:29:15 2021 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.5' into maint-0.4.5

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[tor/main] hs: v2 address are now considered a bad hostname
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit d455f9e18a9cef290b9976974065c83f13e16832 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 19 10:43:54 2021 -0400 hs: v2 address are now considered a bad hostname This means that at this commit, tor will stop logging that v2 is deprecated and treat a v2 address as a bad hostname that we can't use. Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40476 | 11 +++++------ src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 24 +----------------------- src/core/or/connection_edge.h | 1 - 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40476 b/changes/ticket40476 index 062e36f9bc..7179d8b1c6 100644 --- a/changes/ticket40476 +++ b/changes/ticket40476 @@ -1,8 +1,7 @@ - o Major feature (onion service v2): - - Tor does NOT allow anymore to create v2 services, to connect as a client - to a v2 service and for a relay to be a v2 HSDir or introduction point. - This effectively disable onion service version 2 tor wide. Closes 40476. - - The control port command HSFETCH and HSPOST don't allow version 2 as well. - It is also not possible to create a v2 service with ADD_ONION. + o Minor feature (onion service v2): + - Onion service v2 address are now not recognized anymore by tor meaning a + bad hostname is returned when attempting to pass it on a SOCKS + connection. No more deprecation log is emitted client side. Closes + ticket 40476. - See https://blog.torproject.org/v2-deprecation-timeline for details on how to transition from v2 to v3. diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 40816dbe66..ea4bf00735 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -2233,7 +2233,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, } /* Now, we handle everything that isn't a .onion address. */ - if (addresstype != ONION_V3_HOSTNAME && addresstype != ONION_V2_HOSTNAME) { + if (addresstype != ONION_V3_HOSTNAME) { /* Not a hidden-service request. It's either a hostname or an IP, * possibly with a .exit that we stripped off. We're going to check * if we're allowed to connect/resolve there, and then launch the @@ -2518,28 +2518,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, return 0; } else { /* If we get here, it's a request for a .onion address! */ - - /* We don't support v2 onions anymore. Log a warning and bail. */ - if (addresstype == ONION_V2_HOSTNAME) { - static bool log_once = false; - if (!log_once) { - log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Tried to connect to a v2 onion address, but " - "this version of Tor no longer supports them. Please " - "encourage the site operator to upgrade. For more " - "information see " - "https://blog.torproject.org/v2-deprecation-timeline."); - log_once = true; - } - control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME HOSTNAME=%s", - escaped(socks->address)); - /* Send back the 0xF6 extended code indicating a bad hostname. This is - * mostly so Tor Browser can make a proper UX with regards to v2 - * addresses. */ - conn->socks_request->socks_extended_error_code = SOCKS5_HS_BAD_ADDRESS; - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL); - return -1; - } - tor_assert(addresstype == ONION_V3_HOSTNAME); tor_assert(!automap); return connection_ap_handle_onion(conn, socks, circ); diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h index 72869f348b..966a9391d8 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.h +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.h @@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ typedef enum hostname_type_t { BAD_HOSTNAME, EXIT_HOSTNAME, NORMAL_HOSTNAME, - ONION_V2_HOSTNAME, ONION_V3_HOSTNAME, } hostname_type_t;

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] test: Fix unit tests after disabling version 2
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 9a6c6e8ec5830d9d7bc2285c8b6ef336e7ab1ef9 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 11:09:48 2021 -0400 test: Fix unit tests after disabling version 2 Some tests were removed because they were testing something not usable anymore. Some tests remains to make sure that things are indeed disabled. Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c | 74 +-------------- src/test/test_entryconn.c | 41 --------- src/test/test_hs_common.c | 9 +- src/test/test_hs_config.c | 199 +++++------------------------------------ src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c | 64 ------------- src/test/test_hs_service.c | 5 +- 6 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 362 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c index 90691fff94..e71bcb9eb2 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c +++ b/src/test/test_dir_handle_get.c @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ test_dir_handle_get_rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_with_invalid_desc_id( fetch_from_buf_http(TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf, &header, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE, NULL, NULL, 1, 0); - tt_str_op(header, OP_EQ, BAD_REQUEST); + tt_str_op(header, OP_EQ, NOT_FOUND); done: UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_); @@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ test_dir_handle_get_rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_not_well_formed(void *data) fetch_from_buf_http(TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf, &header, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE, NULL, NULL, 1, 0); - tt_str_op(header, OP_EQ, BAD_REQUEST); + tt_str_op(header, OP_EQ, NOT_FOUND); done: UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_); @@ -375,75 +375,6 @@ NS(router_get_my_routerinfo)(void) return mock_routerinfo; } -static void -test_dir_handle_get_rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_success(void *data) -{ - dir_connection_t *conn = NULL; - char *header = NULL; - char *body = NULL; - size_t body_used = 0; - char buff[30]; - char req[70]; - rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_t *desc_holder = NULL; - char *service_id = NULL; - char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; - size_t body_len = 0; - (void) data; - - MOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_, connection_write_to_buf_mock); - NS_MOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo); - - rend_cache_init(); - - /* create a valid rend service descriptor */ - #define RECENT_TIME -10 - generate_desc(RECENT_TIME, &desc_holder, &service_id, 3); - - tt_int_op(rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(desc_holder->desc_str), - OP_EQ, 0); - - base32_encode(desc_id_base32, sizeof(desc_id_base32), desc_holder->desc_id, - DIGEST_LEN); - - conn = new_dir_conn(); - - // connection is encrypted - TO_CONN(conn)->linked = 1; - tt_assert(connection_dir_is_encrypted(conn)); - - tor_snprintf(req, sizeof(req), RENDEZVOUS2_GET("%s"), desc_id_base32); - - tt_int_op(directory_handle_command_get(conn, req, NULL, 0), OP_EQ, 0); - - body_len = strlen(desc_holder->desc_str); - fetch_from_buf_http(TO_CONN(conn)->outbuf, &header, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE, - &body, &body_used, body_len+1, 0); - - tt_assert(header); - tt_assert(body); - - tt_ptr_op(strstr(header, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\n"), OP_EQ, header); - tt_assert(strstr(header, "Content-Type: text/plain\r\n")); - tt_assert(strstr(header, "Content-Encoding: identity\r\n")); - tt_assert(strstr(header, "Pragma: no-cache\r\n")); - tor_snprintf(buff, sizeof(buff), "Content-Length: %ld\r\n", (long) body_len); - tt_assert(strstr(header, buff)); - - tt_int_op(body_used, OP_EQ, strlen(body)); - tt_str_op(body, OP_EQ, desc_holder->desc_str); - - done: - UNMOCK(connection_write_to_buf_impl_); - NS_UNMOCK(router_get_my_routerinfo); - - connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(conn)); - tor_free(header); - tor_free(body); - rend_encoded_v2_service_descriptor_free(desc_holder); - tor_free(service_id); - rend_cache_free_all(); -} - #define MICRODESC_GET(digest) GET("/tor/micro/d/" digest) static void test_dir_handle_get_micro_d_not_found(void *data) @@ -2596,7 +2527,6 @@ struct testcase_t dir_handle_get_tests[] = { DIR_HANDLE_CMD(rendezvous2_not_found, 0), DIR_HANDLE_CMD(rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_with_invalid_desc_id, 0), DIR_HANDLE_CMD(rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_not_well_formed, 0), - DIR_HANDLE_CMD(rendezvous2_on_encrypted_conn_success, 0), DIR_HANDLE_CMD(micro_d_not_found, 0), DIR_HANDLE_CMD(micro_d_server_busy, 0), DIR_HANDLE_CMD(micro_d, 0), diff --git a/src/test/test_entryconn.c b/src/test/test_entryconn.c index fc7c5d5800..fec0441234 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entryconn.c +++ b/src/test/test_entryconn.c @@ -728,46 +728,6 @@ test_entryconn_rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion4(void *arg) test_entryconn_rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion_common(arg, 0, 1); } -/** Test that rewrite functions can handle v2 addresses */ -static void -test_entryconn_rewrite_onion_v2(void *arg) -{ - int retval; - entry_connection_t *conn = arg; - - (void) arg; - - rend_cache_init(); - - /* Make a SOCKS request */ - conn->socks_request->command = SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT; - strlcpy(conn->socks_request->address, - "pqeed46efnwmfuid.onion", - sizeof(conn->socks_request->address)); - - /* Make an onion connection using the SOCKS request */ - conn->entry_cfg.onion_traffic = 1; - ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state = AP_CONN_STATE_SOCKS_WAIT; - tt_assert(!ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data); - - /* Handle SOCKS and rewrite! */ - retval = connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(conn, NULL, NULL); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); - - /* Check connection state after rewrite */ - tt_int_op(ENTRY_TO_CONN(conn)->state, OP_EQ, AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); - /* check that the address got rewritten */ - tt_str_op(conn->socks_request->address, OP_EQ, - "pqeed46efnwmfuid"); - /* check that HS information got attached to the connection */ - tt_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data); - tt_assert(!ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident); - - done: - rend_cache_free_all(); - /* 'conn' is cleaned by handler */ -} - /** Test that rewrite functions can handle v3 onion addresses */ static void test_entryconn_rewrite_onion_v3(void *arg) @@ -830,7 +790,6 @@ struct testcase_t entryconn_tests[] = { REWRITE(rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion2), REWRITE(rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion3), REWRITE(rewrite_mapaddress_automap_onion4), - REWRITE(rewrite_onion_v2), REWRITE(rewrite_onion_v3), END_OF_TESTCASES diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_common.c b/src/test/test_hs_common.c index c6104301e1..a763b62356 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_common.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_common.c @@ -792,14 +792,11 @@ test_parse_extended_hostname(void *arg) "www.25njqamcweflpvkl73j4szahhihoc4xt3ktcgjnpaingr5yhkenl5sid.onion"; tt_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address1)); - tt_assert(ONION_V2_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address2)); - tt_str_op(address2,OP_EQ, "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"); + tt_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address2)); tt_assert(EXIT_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address3)); tt_assert(NORMAL_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address4)); - tt_assert(ONION_V2_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address5)); - tt_str_op(address5,OP_EQ, "abcdefghijklmnop"); - tt_assert(ONION_V2_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address6)); - tt_str_op(address6,OP_EQ, "abcdefghijklmnop"); + tt_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address5)); + tt_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address6)); tt_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address7)); tt_assert(ONION_V3_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address8)); tt_str_op(address8, OP_EQ, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_config.c b/src/test/test_hs_config.c index c2c556307d..bd9c1b03ae 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_config.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_config.c @@ -48,7 +48,19 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion must be between 2 and 3"); + expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion must be 3, not 1"); + teardown_capture_of_logs(); + } + + /* Version 2 not accepted anymore. */ + { + const char *conf = + "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"; + setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); + ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); + expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceVersion must be 3, not 2"); teardown_capture_of_logs(); } @@ -56,7 +68,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -70,7 +82,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -84,7 +96,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 2\n"; /* Should be 0 or 1. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -98,7 +110,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 65536\n"; /* One too many. */ setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); @@ -113,10 +125,10 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 81\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -130,7 +142,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 65536\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -143,7 +155,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) { const char *conf = "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1 8000\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); @@ -156,7 +168,7 @@ test_invalid_service(void *arg) /* Out of order directives. */ { const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" + "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" "HiddenServicePort 80\n"; setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); @@ -178,137 +190,12 @@ test_valid_service(void *arg) (void) arg; - /* Mix of v2 and v3. Still valid. */ + /* v3. */ { const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs2\n" "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" - "HiddenServicePort 81\n" - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs3\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 82\n"; - ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - } - - done: - ; -} - -static void -test_invalid_service_v2(void *arg) -{ - int validate_only = 1, ret; - - (void) arg; - - /* Try with a missing port configuration. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n"; - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("with no ports configured."); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - } - - /* Too many introduction points. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" - "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 11\n"; /* One too many. */ - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should " - "be between 0 and 10, not 11"); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - } - - /* Too little introduction points. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" - "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints -1\n"; - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints should " - "be between 0 and 10, not -1"); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - } - - /* Bad authorized client type. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" - "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient blah alice,bob\n"; /* blah is no good. */ - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient contains " - "unrecognized auth-type"); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - } - - done: - ; -} - -static void -test_valid_service_v2(void *arg) -{ - int ret; - - (void) arg; - - /* Valid complex configuration. Basic client authorization. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" - "HiddenServicePort 22 localhost:22\n" -#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - "HiddenServicePort 42 unix:/path/to/socket\n" -#endif - "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient basic alice,bob,eve\n" - "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 1\n" - "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" - "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 0\n" - "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable 1\n" - "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 7\n"; - ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - } - - /* Valid complex configuration. Stealth client authorization. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs2\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 65535\n" - "HiddenServicePort 22 1.1.1.1:22\n" -#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H - "HiddenServicePort 9000 unix:/path/to/socket\n" -#endif - "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient stealth charlie,romeo\n" - "HiddenServiceAllowUnknownPorts 0\n" - "HiddenServiceMaxStreams 42\n" - "HiddenServiceMaxStreamsCloseCircuit 0\n" - "HiddenServiceDirGroupReadable 1\n" - "HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints 8\n"; + "HiddenServicePort 81\n"; ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); } @@ -366,22 +253,6 @@ test_invalid_service_v3(void *arg) teardown_capture_of_logs(); } - /* v2-specific HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient set. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" - "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient stealth client1\n"; - setup_full_capture_of_logs(LOG_WARN); - ret = helper_config_service(conf, validate_only); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - expect_log_msg_containing("Hidden service option " - "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient is incompatible " - "with version 3 of service in " - "/tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1"); - teardown_capture_of_logs(); - } - done: ; } @@ -431,22 +302,6 @@ test_valid_service_v3(void *arg) tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); } - /* Mix of v2 and v3. Still valid. */ - { - const char *conf = - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs1\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 80\n" - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs2\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 3\n" - "HiddenServicePort 81\n" - "HiddenServiceDir /tmp/tor-test-hs-RANDOM/hs3\n" - "HiddenServiceVersion 2\n" - "HiddenServicePort 82\n"; - ret = helper_config_service(conf, 1); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - } - done: ; } @@ -496,12 +351,6 @@ struct testcase_t hs_config_tests[] = { { "valid_service", test_valid_service, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - /* Test case only for version 2. */ - { "invalid_service_v2", test_invalid_service_v2, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, - { "valid_service_v2", test_valid_service_v2, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, - /* Test case only for version 3. */ { "invalid_service_v3", test_invalid_service_v3, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c index 558fc32c54..9493da2995 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_intropoint.c @@ -506,42 +506,6 @@ helper_establish_intro_v3(or_circuit_t *intro_circ) return cell; } -/* Helper function: Send a well-formed v2 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell to - * <b>intro_circ</b>. Return the public key advertised in the cell. */ -static crypto_pk_t * -helper_establish_intro_v2(or_circuit_t *intro_circ) -{ - crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL; - int retval; - uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE]; - ssize_t cell_len = 0; - char circ_nonce[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; - - tt_assert(intro_circ); - - /* Prepare the circuit for the incoming ESTABLISH_INTRO */ - crypto_rand(circ_nonce, sizeof(circ_nonce)); - helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circ_nonce); - - /* Send legacy establish_intro */ - key1 = pk_generate(0); - - /* Use old circ_nonce why not */ - cell_len = rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell( - (char*)cell_body, - sizeof(cell_body), key1, - circ_nonce); - tt_int_op(cell_len, OP_GT, 0); - - /* Receive legacy establish_intro */ - retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, - cell_body, (size_t) cell_len); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); - - done: - return key1; -} - /* Helper function: test circuitmap free_all function outside of * test_intro_point_registration to prevent Coverity from seeing a * double free if the assertion hypothetically fails. @@ -565,16 +529,12 @@ test_circuitmap_free_all(void) static void test_intro_point_registration(void *arg) { - int retval; hs_circuitmap_ht *the_hs_circuitmap = NULL; or_circuit_t *intro_circ = NULL; trn_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t auth_key; - crypto_pk_t *legacy_auth_key = NULL; - or_circuit_t *legacy_intro_circ = NULL; - or_circuit_t *returned_intro_circ = NULL; (void) arg; @@ -610,35 +570,11 @@ test_intro_point_registration(void *arg) tt_ptr_op(intro_circ, OP_EQ, returned_intro_circ); } - /* Create a v2 intro point */ - { - char key_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - - legacy_intro_circ = or_circuit_new(1, NULL); - tt_assert(legacy_intro_circ); - legacy_auth_key = helper_establish_intro_v2(legacy_intro_circ); - tt_assert(legacy_auth_key); - - /* Check that the circuitmap now has two elements */ - the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap(); - tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap); - tt_int_op(2, OP_EQ, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap)); - - /* Check that the new element is our legacy intro circuit. */ - retval = crypto_pk_get_digest(legacy_auth_key, key_digest); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); - returned_intro_circ = - hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2_relay_side((uint8_t*)key_digest); - tt_ptr_op(legacy_intro_circ, OP_EQ, returned_intro_circ); - } - /* XXX Continue test and try to register a second v3 intro point with the * same auth key. Make sure that old intro circuit gets closed. */ done: - crypto_pk_free(legacy_auth_key); circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ)); - circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(legacy_intro_circ)); trn_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell); test_circuitmap_free_all(); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs_service.c b/src/test/test_hs_service.c index c60ab6c930..3a3ef0c01a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs_service.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs_service.c @@ -356,10 +356,7 @@ test_load_keys(void *arg) tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, hsdir_v2, HS_VERSION_TWO); ret = helper_config_service(conf); tor_free(conf); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - /* This one should now be registered into the v2 list. */ - tt_int_op(get_hs_service_staging_list_size(), OP_EQ, 0); - tt_int_op(rend_num_services(), OP_EQ, 1); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); /* v3 service. */ tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, hsdir_v3, HS_VERSION_THREE);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs-v2: Disable version 2 directory
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 59bae7cbee7eeb262b6a86b24efb4536212862cc Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:46:17 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable version 2 directory Relay do not accept both stores and lookups of version 2 descriptor. This effectively disable version 2 HSDir supports for relays. Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/dircache/dircache.c | 58 ++--------------------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c b/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c index 2f8a281cd1..e1f181273a 100644 --- a/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c +++ b/src/feature/dircache/dircache.c @@ -354,8 +354,6 @@ static int handle_get_descriptor(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args); static int handle_get_keys(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args); -static int handle_get_hs_descriptor_v2(dir_connection_t *conn, - const get_handler_args_t *args); static int handle_get_robots(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args); static int handle_get_networkstatus_bridges(dir_connection_t *conn, @@ -371,7 +369,6 @@ static const url_table_ent_t url_table[] = { { "/tor/server/", 1, handle_get_descriptor }, { "/tor/extra/", 1, handle_get_descriptor }, { "/tor/keys/", 1, handle_get_keys }, - { "/tor/rendezvous2/", 1, handle_get_hs_descriptor_v2 }, { "/tor/hs/3/", 1, handle_get_hs_descriptor_v3 }, { "/tor/robots.txt", 0, handle_get_robots }, { "/tor/networkstatus-bridges", 0, handle_get_networkstatus_bridges }, @@ -1325,44 +1322,6 @@ handle_get_keys(dir_connection_t *conn, const get_handler_args_t *args) return 0; } -/** Helper function for GET /tor/rendezvous2/ - */ -static int -handle_get_hs_descriptor_v2(dir_connection_t *conn, - const get_handler_args_t *args) -{ - const char *url = args->url; - if (connection_dir_is_encrypted(conn)) { - /* Handle v2 rendezvous descriptor fetch request. */ - const char *descp; - const char *query = url + strlen("/tor/rendezvous2/"); - if (rend_valid_descriptor_id(query)) { - log_info(LD_REND, "Got a v2 rendezvous descriptor request for ID '%s'", - safe_str(escaped(query))); - switch (rend_cache_lookup_v2_desc_as_dir(query, &descp)) { - case 1: /* valid */ - write_http_response_header(conn, strlen(descp), NO_METHOD, 0); - connection_buf_add(descp, strlen(descp), TO_CONN(conn)); - break; - case 0: /* well-formed but not present */ - write_short_http_response(conn, 404, "Not found"); - break; - case -1: /* not well-formed */ - write_short_http_response(conn, 400, "Bad request"); - break; - } - } else { /* not well-formed */ - write_short_http_response(conn, 400, "Bad request"); - } - goto done; - } else { - /* Not encrypted! */ - write_short_http_response(conn, 404, "Not found"); - } - done: - return 0; -} - /** Helper function for GET /tor/hs/3/<z>. Only for version 3. */ STATIC int @@ -1551,6 +1510,8 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers, char *url = NULL; const or_options_t *options = get_options(); + (void) body_len; + log_debug(LD_DIRSERV,"Received POST command."); conn->base_.state = DIR_CONN_STATE_SERVER_WRITING; @@ -1568,21 +1529,6 @@ directory_handle_command_post,(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers, } log_debug(LD_DIRSERV,"rewritten url as '%s'.", escaped(url)); - /* Handle v2 rendezvous service publish request. */ - if (connection_dir_is_encrypted(conn) && - !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous2/publish")) { - if (rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_dir(body) < 0) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Rejected v2 rend descriptor (body size %d) from %s.", - (int)body_len, conn->base_.address); - write_short_http_response(conn, 400, - "Invalid v2 service descriptor rejected"); - } else { - write_short_http_response(conn, 200, "Service descriptor (v2) stored"); - log_info(LD_REND, "Handled v2 rendezvous descriptor post: accepted"); - } - goto done; - } - /* Handle HS descriptor publish request. */ /* XXX: This should be disabled with a consensus param until we want to * the prop224 be deployed and thus use. */

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs-v2: Disable version 2 HSPOST and HSFETCH command
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit ef7a64e3b874231f6793b563ea36b512ba072c5b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:59:24 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable version 2 HSPOST and HSFETCH command Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/control/control.c | 32 +++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/control/control.c b/src/feature/control/control.c index 8185218a9f..c873d59f5e 100644 --- a/src/feature/control/control.c +++ b/src/feature/control/control.c @@ -4406,12 +4406,10 @@ handle_control_hsfetch(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, const char *body) { int i; - char digest[DIGEST_LEN], *hsaddress = NULL, *arg1 = NULL, *desc_id = NULL; + char *hsaddress = NULL, *arg1 = NULL, *desc_id = NULL; smartlist_t *args = NULL, *hsdirs = NULL; (void) len; /* body is nul-terminated; it's safe to ignore the length */ static const char *hsfetch_command = "HSFETCH"; - static const char *v2_str = "v2-"; - const size_t v2_str_len = strlen(v2_str); rend_data_t *rend_query = NULL; /* Make sure we have at least one argument, the HSAddress. */ @@ -4422,21 +4420,13 @@ handle_control_hsfetch(control_connection_t *conn, uint32_t len, /* Extract the first argument (either HSAddress or DescID). */ arg1 = smartlist_get(args, 0); - /* Test if it's an HS address without the .onion part. */ - if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(arg1)) { - hsaddress = arg1; - } else if (strcmpstart(arg1, v2_str) == 0 && - rend_valid_descriptor_id(arg1 + v2_str_len) && - base32_decode(digest, sizeof(digest), arg1 + v2_str_len, - REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32) == 0) { - /* We have a well formed version 2 descriptor ID. Keep the decoded value - * of the id. */ - desc_id = digest; - } else { - connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "513 Invalid argument \"%s\"\r\n", - arg1); - goto done; - } + + /* We no longer support version 2 on the network and so immediately return an + * error. We do this in order to not remove the code so to minimize the merge + * forward conflicts. */ + connection_printf_to_buf(conn, "513 Invalid argument \"%s\"\r\n", + arg1); + goto done; static const char *opt_server = "SERVER="; @@ -4575,9 +4565,13 @@ handle_control_hspost(control_connection_t *conn, send_control_done(conn); } tor_free(desc_str); - goto done; } + /* As for HSFETCH, we no longer support v2 on the network and so we stop + * right now. Code is not removed in order to minimize the merge forward + * conflicts. */ + goto done; + /* From this point on, it is only v2. */ /* Read the dot encoded descriptor, and parse it. */

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs-v2: Disable version 2 service
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 765bdb9c3331a0fdbf15406db82fa4a29d6651b4 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:32:05 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable version 2 service The minimum service version is raised from 2 to 3 which effectively disable loading or creating an onion service v2. As for ADD_ONION, for version 2, a 551 error is returned: "551 Failed to add Onion Service" Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/control/control.c | 8 +++++--- src/feature/hs/hs_common.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/control/control.c b/src/feature/control/control.c index 26ac12d307..8185218a9f 100644 --- a/src/feature/control/control.c +++ b/src/feature/control/control.c @@ -4653,11 +4653,13 @@ add_onion_helper_add_service(int hs_version, tor_assert(port_cfgs); tor_assert(address_out); + /* Version 2 is disabled. */ + (void) auth_type; + (void) auth_clients; + switch (hs_version) { case HS_VERSION_TWO: - ret = rend_service_add_ephemeral(pk->v2, port_cfgs, max_streams, - max_streams_close_circuit, auth_type, - auth_clients, address_out); + ret = RSAE_INTERNAL; break; case HS_VERSION_THREE: ret = hs_service_add_ephemeral(pk->v3, port_cfgs, max_streams, diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h index a44505930a..94cdf5abc4 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct ed25519_keypair_t; /* Version 3 of the protocol (prop224). */ #define HS_VERSION_THREE 3 /* Earliest and latest version we support. */ -#define HS_VERSION_MIN HS_VERSION_TWO +#define HS_VERSION_MIN HS_VERSION_THREE #define HS_VERSION_MAX HS_VERSION_THREE /** Try to maintain this many intro points per service by default. */

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs-v2: Disable SOCKS connection for v2 addresses
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 13b2b1108f2640e68dc7af95f5c7278984de743c Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:26:37 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable SOCKS connection for v2 addresses This effectively turns off the ability of tor to use HSv2 as a client by invalidating the v2 onion hostname passed through a SOCKS request. Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 84b80313ce..ae9177a2d0 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -4348,9 +4348,6 @@ parse_extended_hostname(char *address) if (q != address) { memmove(address, q, strlen(q) + 1 /* also get \0 */); } - if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(query)) { - return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME; /* success */ - } if (hs_address_is_valid(query)) { return ONION_V3_HOSTNAME; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] changes: Add file for ticket 40476
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 18b5630a7c263711ff1f568e0347f1c66b31cda3 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 11:21:13 2021 -0400 changes: Add file for ticket 40476 Closes #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket40476 | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket40476 b/changes/ticket40476 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..062e36f9bc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40476 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major feature (onion service v2): + - Tor does NOT allow anymore to create v2 services, to connect as a client + to a v2 service and for a relay to be a v2 HSDir or introduction point. + This effectively disable onion service version 2 tor wide. Closes 40476. + - The control port command HSFETCH and HSPOST don't allow version 2 as well. + It is also not possible to create a v2 service with ADD_ONION. + - See https://blog.torproject.org/v2-deprecation-timeline for details on + how to transition from v2 to v3.

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.5] hs-v2: Disable version 2 service
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 765bdb9c3331a0fdbf15406db82fa4a29d6651b4 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:32:05 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable version 2 service The minimum service version is raised from 2 to 3 which effectively disable loading or creating an onion service v2. As for ADD_ONION, for version 2, a 551 error is returned: "551 Failed to add Onion Service" Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/control/control.c | 8 +++++--- src/feature/hs/hs_common.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/control/control.c b/src/feature/control/control.c index 26ac12d307..8185218a9f 100644 --- a/src/feature/control/control.c +++ b/src/feature/control/control.c @@ -4653,11 +4653,13 @@ add_onion_helper_add_service(int hs_version, tor_assert(port_cfgs); tor_assert(address_out); + /* Version 2 is disabled. */ + (void) auth_type; + (void) auth_clients; + switch (hs_version) { case HS_VERSION_TWO: - ret = rend_service_add_ephemeral(pk->v2, port_cfgs, max_streams, - max_streams_close_circuit, auth_type, - auth_clients, address_out); + ret = RSAE_INTERNAL; break; case HS_VERSION_THREE: ret = hs_service_add_ephemeral(pk->v3, port_cfgs, max_streams, diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h index a44505930a..94cdf5abc4 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_common.h @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ struct ed25519_keypair_t; /* Version 3 of the protocol (prop224). */ #define HS_VERSION_THREE 3 /* Earliest and latest version we support. */ -#define HS_VERSION_MIN HS_VERSION_TWO +#define HS_VERSION_MIN HS_VERSION_THREE #define HS_VERSION_MAX HS_VERSION_THREE /** Try to maintain this many intro points per service by default. */

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.5] hs-v2: Disable SOCKS connection for v2 addresses
by dgoulet＠torproject.org 19 Oct '21

19 Oct '21

commit 13b2b1108f2640e68dc7af95f5c7278984de743c Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Sep 30 10:26:37 2021 -0400 hs-v2: Disable SOCKS connection for v2 addresses This effectively turns off the ability of tor to use HSv2 as a client by invalidating the v2 onion hostname passed through a SOCKS request. Part of #40476 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 84b80313ce..ae9177a2d0 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -4348,9 +4348,6 @@ parse_extended_hostname(char *address) if (q != address) { memmove(address, q, strlen(q) + 1 /* also get \0 */); } - if (rend_valid_v2_service_id(query)) { - return ONION_V2_HOSTNAME; /* success */ - } if (hs_address_is_valid(query)) { return ONION_V3_HOSTNAME; }

1 0