tor-commits August 2020

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Remove channel_is_canonical_is_reliable()
by asn＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit 435f31aed34e9b58d1e8d9f460e6d2e3c6714fbc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 3 11:25:37 2020 -0400 Remove channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() This function once served to let circuits continue to be built over version-1 link connections. But such connections are long-obsolete, and it's time to remove this check. Closes #40081. --- changes/ticket40081 | 6 ++++++ src/core/or/channel.c | 44 ++++++-------------------------------------- src/core/or/channel.h | 9 +++------ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 32 ++++++++++---------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 ++ src/test/test_channel.c | 13 +++++-------- 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket40081 b/changes/ticket40081 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..683ae33518 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket40081 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor features (security): + - Channels using obsolete versions of the Tor link protocol are no + longer allowed to circumvent address-canonicity checks. + (This is only a minor issue, since such channels have no way to + set ed25519 keys, and therefore should always be rejected.) + Closes ticket 40081. diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c index 3886906875..b3a2d7122b 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -772,10 +772,9 @@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void) connections_to_relay++; total_relay_connections++; - if (chan->is_canonical(chan, 0)) total_canonical++; + if (chan->is_canonical(chan)) total_canonical++; - if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan, 0) - && chan->is_canonical(chan, 1)) { + if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan)) { total_half_canonical++; } } @@ -2431,21 +2430,9 @@ channel_get_for_extend(const char *rsa_id_digest, continue; } - /* Never return a non-canonical connection using a recent link protocol - * if the address is not what we wanted. - * - * The channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() function asks the lower layer - * if we should trust channel_is_canonical(). The below is from the - * comments of the old circuit_or_get_for_extend() and applies when - * the lower-layer transport is channel_tls_t. - * - * (For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting - * set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might - * have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to - * tell us about the right address.) - */ + /* Only return canonical connections or connections where the address + * is the address we wanted. */ if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && - channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) && !channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) { ++n_noncanonical; continue; @@ -2587,16 +2574,12 @@ channel_dump_statistics, (channel_t *chan, int severity)) /* Handle marks */ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, - " * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s " - "%s %s %s", + " * Channel %"PRIu64 " has these marks: %s %s %s %s %s", (chan->global_identifier), channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(chan) ? "bad_for_new_circs" : "!bad_for_new_circs", channel_is_canonical(chan) ? "canonical" : "!canonical", - channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) ? - "is_canonical_is_reliable" : - "!is_canonical_is_reliable", channel_is_client(chan) ? "client" : "!client", channel_is_local(chan) ? @@ -2955,22 +2938,7 @@ channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan) tor_assert(chan); tor_assert(chan->is_canonical); - return chan->is_canonical(chan, 0); -} - -/** - * Test if the canonical flag is reliable. - * - * This function asks if the lower layer thinks it's safe to trust the - * result of channel_is_canonical(). - */ -int -channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan) -{ - tor_assert(chan); - tor_assert(chan->is_canonical); - - return chan->is_canonical(chan, 1); + return chan->is_canonical(chan); } /** diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.h b/src/core/or/channel.h index 97aa000337..78e4d90ea5 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.h +++ b/src/core/or/channel.h @@ -351,12 +351,10 @@ struct channel_s { /** Check if the lower layer has queued writes */ int (*has_queued_writes)(channel_t *); /** - * If the second param is zero, ask the lower layer if this is - * 'canonical', for a transport-specific definition of canonical; if - * it is 1, ask if the answer to the preceding query is safe to rely - * on. + * Ask the lower layer if this is 'canonical', for a transport-specific + * definition of canonical. */ - int (*is_canonical)(channel_t *, int); + int (*is_canonical)(channel_t *); /** Check if this channel matches a specified extend_info_t */ int (*matches_extend_info)(channel_t *, extend_info_t *); /** Check if this channel matches a target address when extending */ @@ -733,7 +731,6 @@ int channel_has_queued_writes(channel_t *chan); int channel_is_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan); void channel_mark_bad_for_new_circs(channel_t *chan); int channel_is_canonical(channel_t *chan); -int channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(channel_t *chan); int channel_is_client(const channel_t *chan); int channel_is_local(channel_t *chan); int channel_is_incoming(channel_t *chan); diff --git a/src/core/or/channeltls.c b/src/core/or/channeltls.c index f874e39946..299ab88576 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); static const char * channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags); static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan); -static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req); +static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan); static int channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, extend_info_t *extend_info); @@ -643,12 +643,11 @@ channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan) /** * Tell the upper layer if we're canonical. * - * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero, - * it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns - * whether that can be relied upon. + * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t: + * it returns whether this is a canonical channel. */ static int -channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req) +channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan) { int answer = 0; channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); @@ -656,24 +655,13 @@ channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req) tor_assert(tlschan); if (tlschan->conn) { - switch (req) { - case 0: - answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical; - break; - case 1: - /* - * Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up - * we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older - * versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor. - */ - answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2); - break; - default: - /* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */ - tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); - } + /* If this bit is set to 0, and link_proto is sufficiently old, then we + * can't actually _rely_ on this being a non-canonical channel. + * Nonetheless, we're going to believe that this is a non-canonical + * channel in this case, since nobody should be using these link protocols + * any more. */ + answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical; } - /* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */ return answer; } diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index f3a5791d6c..1a5025cd71 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -707,6 +707,8 @@ circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, const create_cell_t *create_cell, goto error; } + tor_assert_nonfatal_once(circ->n_chan->is_canonical); + memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t)); r = relayed ? create_cell_format_relayed(&cell, create_cell) : create_cell_format(&cell, create_cell); diff --git a/src/test/test_channel.c b/src/test/test_channel.c index e55b9b0750..afb7db813c 100644 --- a/src/test/test_channel.c +++ b/src/test/test_channel.c @@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ static int dump_statistics_mock_matches = 0; static int test_close_called = 0; static int test_chan_should_be_canonical = 0; static int test_chan_should_match_target = 0; -static int test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable = 0; static int test_chan_listener_close_fn_called = 0; static int test_chan_listener_fn_called = 0; @@ -357,14 +356,10 @@ scheduler_release_channel_mock(channel_t *ch) } static int -test_chan_is_canonical(channel_t *chan, int req) +test_chan_is_canonical(channel_t *chan) { tor_assert(chan); - if (req && test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable) { - return 1; - } - if (test_chan_should_be_canonical) { return 1; } @@ -1381,6 +1376,9 @@ test_channel_for_extend(void *arg) /* Make it older than chan1. */ chan2->timestamp_created = chan1->timestamp_created - 1; + /* Say it's all canonical. */ + test_chan_should_be_canonical = 1; + /* Set channel identities and add it to the channel map. The last one to be * added is made the first one in the list so the lookup will always return * that one first. */ @@ -1475,8 +1473,8 @@ test_channel_for_extend(void *arg) chan2->is_bad_for_new_circs = 0; /* Non canonical channels. */ + test_chan_should_be_canonical = 0; test_chan_should_match_target = 0; - test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable = 1; ret_chan = channel_get_for_extend(digest, &ed_id, &addr, &msg, &launch); tt_assert(!ret_chan); tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Connections all too old, or too non-canonical. " @@ -1567,4 +1565,3 @@ struct testcase_t channel_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES }; -

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Merge branch 'ticket40081_035' into ticket40081_044
by asn＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit aef9c0f5809d2978f16f08ada1f3e482bd4dbb6f Merge: 18d2c7c5d7 435f31aed3 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 3 11:49:09 2020 -0400 Merge branch 'ticket40081_035' into ticket40081_044 Resolves conflicts: src/core/or/channel.c src/test/test_channel.c changes/ticket40081 | 6 ++++++ src/core/or/channel.c | 46 +++++++--------------------------------------- src/core/or/channel.h | 9 +++------ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 32 ++++++++++---------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 ++ src/test/test_channel.c | 12 +++++------- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-) diff --cc src/core/or/channel.c index 09986df404,b3a2d7122b..5ed6bb9272 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@@ -784,13 -771,10 +784,12 @@@ channel_check_for_duplicates(void connections_to_relay++; total_relay_connections++; + if (is_dirauth) + total_dirauth_connections++; - if (chan->is_canonical(chan, 0)) total_canonical++; + if (chan->is_canonical(chan)) total_canonical++; - if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan, 0) - && chan->is_canonical(chan, 1)) { + if (!chan->is_canonical_to_peer && chan->is_canonical(chan)) { total_half_canonical++; } } @@@ -2457,21 -2430,10 +2456,9 @@@ channel_get_for_extend,(const char *rsa continue; } - /* If the connection is using a recent link protocol, only return canonical - * connections, when the address is one of the addresses we wanted. - * - * The channel_is_canonical_is_reliable() function asks the lower layer - * if we should trust channel_is_canonical(). It only applies when - * the lower-layer transport is channel_tls_t. - * - * For old link protocols, we can't rely on is_canonical getting - * set properly if we're talking to the right address, since we might - * have an out-of-date descriptor, and we will get no NETINFO cell to - * tell us about the right address. - */ - if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && - channel_is_canonical_is_reliable(chan) && - !matches_target) { + /* Only return canonical connections or connections where the address + * is the address we wanted. */ - if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && - !channel_matches_target_addr_for_extend(chan, target_addr)) { ++ if (!channel_is_canonical(chan) && !matches_target) { ++n_noncanonical; continue; } diff --cc src/test/test_channel.c index 849cc497fc,afb7db813c..83b69cc80b --- a/src/test/test_channel.c +++ b/src/test/test_channel.c @@@ -1463,10 -1473,9 +1461,10 @@@ test_channel_for_extend(void *arg chan2->is_bad_for_new_circs = 0; /* Non canonical channels. */ + test_chan_should_be_canonical = 0; test_chan_should_match_target = 0; - test_chan_canonical_should_be_reliable = 1; - ret_chan = channel_get_for_extend(digest, &ed_id, &addr, &msg, &launch); + ret_chan = channel_get_for_extend(digest, &ed_id, &ipv4_addr, &ipv6_addr, + &msg, &launch); tt_assert(!ret_chan); tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, "Connections all too old, or too non-canonical. " " Launching a new one.");

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.4' into release-0.4.4
by asn＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit cce39dd915fd6c98468a2565ba67f6cc0c59f4bf Merge: 48cd932ed1 8e9edb93be Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Wed Aug 12 13:23:33 2020 +0300 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.4' into release-0.4.4 changes/ticket40081 | 6 ++++++ src/core/or/channel.c | 46 +++++++--------------------------------------- src/core/or/channel.h | 9 +++------ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 32 ++++++++++---------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 2 ++ src/test/test_channel.c | 12 +++++------- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 74 deletions(-)

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[stem/master] Fix tor-prompt initialization
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit d7eb8827c36876f58ffcd4a3e43a9dc507f4cf91 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Aug 8 16:28:02 2020 -0700 Fix tor-prompt initialization Tor's present commit (67fc69c) isn't providing a bootstrap message with progress above 0% so dropping that requirement. Also fixing... Traceback (most recent call last): File "./tor-prompt", line 8, in <module> stem.interpreter.main() File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/interpreter/__init__.py", line 109, in main password_prompt = True, File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/connection.py", line 285, in connect connection = asyncio.run_coroutine_threadsafe(connect_async(control_port, control_socket, password, password_prompt, chroot_path, controller), loop).result() File "/home/atagar/Python-3.7.0/Lib/concurrent/futures/_base.py", line 432, in result return self.__get_result() File "/home/atagar/Python-3.7.0/Lib/concurrent/futures/_base.py", line 384, in __get_result raise self._exception File "/home/atagar/Desktop/stem/stem/connection.py", line 363, in connect_async raise ValueError("'%s' isn't a valid port" % control_port[1]) ValueError: 'None' isn't a valid port --- stem/interpreter/__init__.py | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/interpreter/__init__.py b/stem/interpreter/__init__.py index a9301329..1445d9bb 100644 --- a/stem/interpreter/__init__.py +++ b/stem/interpreter/__init__.py @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ import stem.util.conf import stem.util.system import stem.util.term +from typing import Tuple, Union from stem.util.term import Attr, Color, format __all__ = [ @@ -85,14 +86,14 @@ def main() -> None: 'ExitPolicy': 'reject *:*', }, tor_cmd = args.tor_path, - completion_percent = 5, + completion_percent = 0, take_ownership = True, ) except OSError as exc: print(format(msg('msg.unable_to_start_tor', error = exc), *ERROR_OUTPUT)) sys.exit(1) - control_port = (args.control_address, args.control_port) + control_port = (args.control_address, args.control_port if args.control_port else 'default') # type: Tuple[str, Union[int, str]] control_socket = args.control_socket # If the user explicitely specified an endpoint then just try to connect to

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[stem/master] Update microdescriptor pydocs
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit 1731720fb8254fa27019f03c36f6701e8d8d62a6 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 11 17:03:58 2020 -0700 Update microdescriptor pydocs This documentation dates back to the dawn of Stem. Thanks to Barkin for pointing out that it is no longer accurate... https://github.com/torproject/stem/issues/68 --- stem/descriptor/microdescriptor.py | 46 +++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/descriptor/microdescriptor.py b/stem/descriptor/microdescriptor.py index 9b5b045d..4967d53e 100644 --- a/stem/descriptor/microdescriptor.py +++ b/stem/descriptor/microdescriptor.py @@ -2,25 +2,14 @@ # See LICENSE for licensing information """ -Parsing for Tor microdescriptors, which contain a distilled version of a -relay's server descriptor. As of Tor version 0.2.3.3-alpha Tor no longer -downloads server descriptors by default, opting for microdescriptors instead. +Microdescriptors are a distilled copy of a relay's server descriptor, +downloaded by Tor clients in lieu of server descriptors to reduce +bandwidth usage. -Unlike most descriptor documents these aren't available on the metrics site -(since they don't contain any information that the server descriptors don't). - -The limited information in microdescriptors make them rather clunky to use -compared with server descriptors. For instance microdescriptors lack the -relay's fingerprint, making it difficut to use them to look up the relay's -other descriptors. - -To do so you need to match the microdescriptor's digest against its -corresponding router status entry. For added fun as of this writing the -controller doesn't even surface those router status entries -(:trac:`7953`). - -For instance, here's an example that prints the nickname and fingerprints of -the exit relays. +Microdescriptors contain a subset of a server descriptor's information +and are rather clunky to use. For instance, microdescriptors lack a +relay's canonical identifier (its fingerprint). To get it you must +pair microdescriptors with the consensus from which they came... :: @@ -29,7 +18,7 @@ the exit relays. from stem.control import Controller from stem.descriptor import parse_file - with Controller.from_port(port = 9051) as controller: + with Controller.from_port() as controller: controller.authenticate() exit_digests = set() @@ -37,25 +26,26 @@ the exit relays. for desc in controller.get_microdescriptors(): if desc.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed(): - exit_digests.add(desc.digest) + exit_digests.add(desc.digest()) - print 'Exit Relays:' + print('Exit Relays:') for desc in parse_file(os.path.join(data_dir, 'cached-microdesc-consensus')): - if desc.digest in exit_digests: - print ' %s (%s)' % (desc.nickname, desc.fingerprint) + if desc.microdescriptor_digest in exit_digests: + print(' %s (%s)' % (desc.nickname, desc.fingerprint)) Doing the same is trivial with server descriptors... :: - from stem.descriptor import parse_file + from stem.control import Controller - print 'Exit Relays:' + with Controller.from_port() as controller: + controller.authenticate() - for desc in parse_file('/home/atagar/.tor/cached-descriptors'): - if desc.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed(): - print ' %s (%s)' % (desc.nickname, desc.fingerprint) + for desc in controller.get_server_descriptors(): + if desc.exit_policy.is_exiting_allowed(): + print(' %s (%s)' % (desc.nickname, desc.fingerprint)) **Module Overview:**

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[stem/master] Generator methods uncallable when synchronous
by atagar＠torproject.org 12 Aug '20

12 Aug '20

commit e3c21a6b3e516af4aef4b66c5beb7fe02e4c84f3 Author: Damian Johnson <atagar(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Aug 9 17:41:36 2020 -0700 Generator methods uncallable when synchronous Our Synchronous mixin failed to mock any async method that yields because inspect.iscoroutinefunction() does not recognize them... ============================================================ import asyncio import inspect class Demo(object): async def async_method(self): return 'hi' async def async_generator(self): yield 'hi' def print_awaitability(func): print('') print('asyncio.iscoroutinefunction: %s' % asyncio.iscoroutinefunction(func)) print('inspect.iscoroutinefunction: %s' % inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func)) print('inspect.isawaitable: %s' % inspect.isawaitable(func)) print('inspect.isasyncgenfunction: %s' % inspect.isasyncgenfunction(func)) print('') print('-' * 60) print('Asynchronous method') print('-' * 60) print_awaitability(Demo.async_method) print('-' * 60) print('Asynchronous generator') print('-' * 60) print_awaitability(Demo.async_generator) ============================================================ % python3.7 demo.py ------------------------------------------------------------ Asynchronous method ------------------------------------------------------------ asyncio.iscoroutinefunction: True inspect.iscoroutinefunction: True inspect.isawaitable: False inspect.isasyncgenfunction: False ------------------------------------------------------------ Asynchronous generator ------------------------------------------------------------ asyncio.iscoroutinefunction: False inspect.iscoroutinefunction: False inspect.isawaitable: False inspect.isasyncgenfunction: True --- stem/util/asyncio.py | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/stem/util/asyncio.py b/stem/util/asyncio.py index 4ee8df3f..e677f13d 100644 --- a/stem/util/asyncio.py +++ b/stem/util/asyncio.py @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ import asyncio import functools import inspect import threading -import typing import unittest.mock from types import TracebackType @@ -87,9 +86,9 @@ class Synchronous(object): for name, func in inspect.getmembers(self): if name in ('__aiter__', '__aenter__', '__aexit__'): pass # async object methods with synchronous counterparts - elif isinstance(func, unittest.mock.Mock) and inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func.side_effect): + elif isinstance(func, unittest.mock.Mock) and (inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func.side_effect) or inspect.isasyncgenfunction(func.side_effect)): setattr(self, name, functools.partial(self._run_async_method, name)) - elif inspect.ismethod(func) and inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func): + elif inspect.ismethod(func) and (inspect.iscoroutinefunction(func) or inspect.isasyncgenfunction(func)): setattr(self, name, functools.partial(self._run_async_method, name)) Synchronous.start(self) @@ -216,9 +215,7 @@ class Synchronous(object): if self._loop is None: Synchronous.start(self) - # convert iterator if indicated by this method's name or type hint - - if method_name == '__aiter__' or (inspect.ismethod(func) and typing.get_type_hints(func).get('return') == AsyncIterator): + if inspect.isasyncgenfunction(func): async def convert_generator(generator: AsyncIterator) -> Iterator: return iter([d async for d in generator])

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[tor/master] Use correct URL for CoreTorReleases in README.
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

commit 2f708079cd912eb70384002ff3ab29ff2d224ed4 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 11 18:43:33 2020 -0400 Use correct URL for CoreTorReleases in README. Closes #40085 --- README | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/README b/README index def546f252..397f6b927e 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Frequently Asked Questions: https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html Release timeline: - https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/wikis/NetworkTeam/CoreTorRelea… + https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/team/-/wikis/NetworkTeam/CoreTorRele… To get started working on Tor development: See the doc/HACKING directory.

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[community/master] Add ASN to Axtel
by gus＠torproject.org 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

commit 1e6f286391a5727c97186757fa54a38e32e78e77 Author: Jacobo <jacobo(a)metahumano.org> Date: Sat Aug 8 23:21:40 2020 -0500 Add ASN to Axtel --- content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index 69e5c5e..1bc19bc 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | **Company/ISP** | **ASN** | **Bridges** | **Relay** | **Exit** | **Comments** | **Last Updated** | |-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------| -| Axtel | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Currently some Guard / Middle and exit nodes are running in Axtel network | 2019 | +| Axtel | AS6503 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Currently some Guard / Middle and exit nodes are running in Axtel network | 2019 | ### Moldova

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[community/master] Changed exit nodes in Axtel to yes
by gus＠torproject.org 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

commit c577dd9b86bee5312b4304618dfb9d14940d6ae5 Author: Jacobo <jacobo(a)metahumano.org> Date: Sat Aug 8 23:19:34 2020 -0500 Changed exit nodes in Axtel to yes --- content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index 4dab46e..69e5c5e 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | **Company/ISP** | **ASN** | **Bridges** | **Relay** | **Exit** | **Comments** | **Last Updated** | |-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------| -| Axtel | - | Yes | Yes | ? | Currently some Guard / Middle nodes are running in Axtel network | 2019 | +| Axtel | - | Yes | Yes | Yes | Currently some Guard / Middle and exit nodes are running in Axtel network | 2019 | ### Moldova

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[community/master] Add Telmex to Good Experiences in Mexico and update Axtel
by gus＠torproject.org 11 Aug '20

11 Aug '20

commit 234106cdb7eb56ba44a2b9b0b3e270da6b239b4a Author: Jacobo <jacobo(a)metahumano.org> Date: Sat Aug 8 23:24:18 2020 -0500 Add Telmex to Good Experiences in Mexico and update Axtel --- .../relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr index 1bc19bc..e6097af 100644 --- a/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr +++ b/content/relay-operations/community-resources/good-bad-isps/contents.lr @@ -151,7 +151,9 @@ For network diversity and stronger anonymity, you should avoid providers and cou | **Company/ISP** | **ASN** | **Bridges** | **Relay** | **Exit** | **Comments** | **Last Updated** | |-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|--------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------| -| Axtel | AS6503 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Currently some Guard / Middle and exit nodes are running in Axtel network | 2019 | +| Axtel | AS6503 | Yes | Yes | Yes | Currently some Guard / Middle and exit nodes are running in Axtel network | 2020 | +| Telmex | AS8151 | No | Yes | No | Currently some Guard / Middle nodes are running in Telmex network | 2020 | + ### Moldova

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