June 2020 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[torspec/master] including prop310 rational
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 91ea21e3a36d5eb96c3e52ffed6466ebd1f05607 Author: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> Date: Sun Jun 7 19:49:58 2020 +0200 including prop310 rational --- guard-spec.txt | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/guard-spec.txt b/guard-spec.txt index db1ae32..4f021b7 100644 --- a/guard-spec.txt +++ b/guard-spec.txt @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ nodes that the client will connect to directly. If they are not compromised, the user's paths are not compromised. - This specification outlines Tor's guard selection algorithm, + This specification outlines Tor's guard housekeeping algorithm, which tries to meet the following goals: - Heuristics and algorithms for determining how and which guards @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ - Tor clients should resist (to the extent possible) attacks that try to force them onto compromised guards. + - Should maintain the load-balancing offered by the path selection + algorithm 2. State instances @@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ specification defines how entry guards specifically should be selected and managed, as opposed to middle or exit nodes. - 3.1.1 Entry guard selection + 3.1.1 Managing entry guards At a high level, a relay listed in a consensus will move through the following states in the process from initial selection to eventual @@ -129,7 +131,8 @@ Relays listed in the latest consensus can be sampled for guard usage if they have the "Guard" flag. Sampling is random but weighted by - bandwidth. + a measured bandwidth multiplied by bandwidth-weights (Wgg if guard only, + Wgd if guard+exit flagged). Once a path is built and a circuit established using this guard, it is marked as confirmed. Until this point, guards are first sampled @@ -143,9 +146,9 @@ 3.1.2 Middle and exit node selection - Middle nodes are selected at random from relays listed in the - latest consensus, weighted by bandwidth. Exit nodes are chosen - similarly but restricted to relays with a sufficiently permissive + Middle nodes are selected at random from relays listed in the latest + consensus, weighted by bandwidth and bandwidth-weights. Exit nodes are + chosen similarly but restricted to relays with a sufficiently permissive exit policy. 3.2 Circuit Building @@ -176,7 +179,7 @@ 4.1. The Sampled Guard Set. [Section:SAMPLED] We maintain a set, {set:SAMPLED_GUARDS}, that persists across - invocations of Tor. It is an unordered subset of the nodes that + invocations of Tor. It is a subset of the nodes ordered by a sample idx that we have seen listed as a guard in the consensus at some point. For each such guard, we record persistently: @@ -230,8 +233,8 @@ (But if the maximum would be smaller than {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE}, we set the maximum at {MIN_FILTERED_SAMPLE}.) - To add a new guard to {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, pick an entry at random - from ({GUARDS} - {SAMPLED_GUARDS}), weighted by bandwidth. + To add a new guard to {SAMPLED_GUARDS}, pick an entry at random from + ({GUARDS} - {SAMPLED_GUARDS}), according to the path selection rules. We remove an entry from {SAMPLED_GUARDS} if: @@ -263,6 +266,17 @@ The second expiration mechanism makes us rotate our guards slowly over time. + Ordering the {SAMPLED_GUARDS} set in the order in which we sampled those + guards and picking guards from that set according to this ordering improves + load-balancing. It is closer to offer the expected usage of the guard nodes + as per the path selection rules. + + The ordering also improves on another objective of this proposal: trying to + resist an adversary pushing clients over compromised guards, since the + adversary would need the clients to exhaust all their initial + {SAMPLED_GUARDS} set before having a chance to use a newly deployed + adversary node. + 4.2. The Usable Sample [Section:FILTERED] @@ -376,12 +390,11 @@ {CONFIRMED_GUARDS} and {FILTERED_GUARDS}, and take the first {N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} elements. If there are fewer than {N_PRIMARY_GUARDS} elements, append additional elements to - PRIMARY_GUARDS chosen _uniformly_ at random from - ({FILTERED_GUARDS} - {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}). + PRIMARY_GUARDS chosen from ({FILTERED_GUARDS} - {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}) in + sample order. Once an element has been added to {PRIMARY_GUARDS}, we do not remove it - until it is replaced by some element from {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}. Confirmed - elements always precede unconfirmed ones in the {PRIMARY_GUARDS} list. + until it is replaced by some element from {CONFIRMED_GUARDS}. Note that {PRIMARY_GUARDS} do not have to be in {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}: they might be unreachable. @@ -475,9 +488,9 @@ is now <usable_if_no_better_guard>. (If all entries have {is_pending} true, pick the first one.) - * Otherwise, if there is no such entry, select a member at - random from {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}. Set its {is_pending} - field to true. The circuit is <usable_if_no_better_guard>. + * Otherwise, if there is no such entry, select a member from + {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS} in sample order. Set its {is_pending} field to + true. The circuit is <usable_if_no_better_guard>. * Otherwise, if USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS is empty, we have exhausted all the sampled guards. In this case we proceed by marking all guards

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[torspec/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/119'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 904430ed73dcb55c836bedfb08fa20cf9b0df5cd Merge: f26e739 91ea21e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 11 13:11:31 2020 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/119' guard-spec.txt | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

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[translation/bridgedb] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 3a928cf8d8b91ed5cdcc81162da35af41de16cfa Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 11 16:45:16 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb --- lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index ef0e12cf6e..9a054e67d7 100644 --- a/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # Aiste G <aiste.gvildyte(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Aiste G <aiste.gvildyte(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Moo, 2015-2020 +# Pijus Kamandulis <pkpjuklas(a)gmail.com>, 2020 # Saule Papeckyte <saule.papeckyte(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # Edgaras7 <system(a)vippsystems.com>, 2014 # Tautvydas Zukauskas <lordmu(a)linuxmail.org>, 2016 @@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2020-05-14 14:21-0700\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-05-21 10:56+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Moo\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-06-11 16:34+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Pijus Kamandulis <pkpjuklas(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Lithuanian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/lt/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ msgstr "Gauti tinklų tiltus!" #: bridgedb/strings.py:107 msgid "Bridge distribution mechanisms" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tinklo tiltų paskirstymo mechanizmas" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "BridgeDB", "HTTPS", and "Moat". #: bridgedb/strings.py:109 @@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ msgstr "" #: bridgedb/strings.py:129 msgid "Reserved" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Rezervuota" #: bridgedb/strings.py:130 #, python-format @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ msgstr "" #: bridgedb/strings.py:174 msgid "(Request IPv6 bridges.)" -msgstr "" +msgstr "(Prašyti IPv6 tinklo tiltų)" #: bridgedb/strings.py:175 msgid "(Request obfs4 obfuscated bridges.)"

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-10.0-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit c5cd695c6803f32c97a4f5ec052155c3d021b379 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:58:12 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34362. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 8f3a9ce838b8..e8a8d37ae373 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ var TorStrings = { }, authPrompt: { description: - getString("authPrompt.description", "%S is requesting your private key."), + getString("authPrompt.description2", "%S is requesting that you authenticate."), keyPlaceholder: getString("authPrompt.keyPlaceholder", "Enter your key"), done: getString("authPrompt.done", "Done"), doneAccessKey: getString("authPrompt.doneAccessKey", "d"),

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-9.5-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit aace250e0ac5bb4b36004aadd0cab2d05c23d5d5 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:58:12 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34362. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 8f3a9ce838b8..e8a8d37ae373 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ var TorStrings = { }, authPrompt: { description: - getString("authPrompt.description", "%S is requesting your private key."), + getString("authPrompt.description2", "%S is requesting that you authenticate."), keyPlaceholder: getString("authPrompt.keyPlaceholder", "Enter your key"), done: getString("authPrompt.done", "Done"), doneAccessKey: getString("authPrompt.doneAccessKey", "d"),

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[torbutton/master] Bug 34362: Improve onion service authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 605e9d398ab026ce53ec8ad106848bfe5ae5e627 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:59:12 2020 -0400 Bug 34362: Improve onion service authentication prompt To avoid misleading users about private key usage, change: example.onion is requesting your private key. to: example.onion is requesting that you authenticate. --- chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties b/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties index 7b6c2d65..53651280 100644 --- a/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties +++ b/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ onionServices.introTimedOut=Failed to connect to the onionsite, possibly due to onionServices.introTimedOut.longDescription=Details: %S — The connection to the requested onion service timed out while trying to build the rendezvous circuit. # # LOCALIZATION NOTE: %S will be replaced with the .onion address. -onionServices.authPrompt.description=%S is requesting your private key. +onionServices.authPrompt.description2=%S is requesting that you authenticate. onionServices.authPrompt.keyPlaceholder=Enter your private key for this onion service onionServices.authPrompt.done=Done onionServices.authPrompt.doneAccessKey=d

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-9.5-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 58ac4b710c63854d6285b437e241e0284b43dbee Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Mon Jun 8 11:11:28 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34369. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 05bbfd63ef60..8f3a9ce838b8 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ var TorStrings = { let retval = { learnMore: getString("learnMore", "Learn more"), - learnMoreURL: `https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.${getLocale()}#_client_authorization`, + learnMoreURL: `https://support.torproject.org/${getLocale()}/onionservices/client-auth/`, errorPage: { browser: getString("errorPage.browser", "Browser"), network: getString("errorPage.network", "Network"),

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-10.0-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 632beb89a79f17bdb0db266196c39b67fc11561f Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Mon Jun 8 11:11:28 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34369. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 05bbfd63ef60..8f3a9ce838b8 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ var TorStrings = { let retval = { learnMore: getString("learnMore", "Learn more"), - learnMoreURL: `https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.${getLocale()}#_client_authorization`, + learnMoreURL: `https://support.torproject.org/${getLocale()}/onionservices/client-auth/`, errorPage: { browser: getString("errorPage.browser", "Browser"), network: getString("errorPage.network", "Network"),

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Refactor some guard state file parsing code into functions.
by asn＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 7bf0587ef1c25d739a8eadf9b747d3a68c99ff51 Author: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> Date: Wed Apr 22 20:36:16 2020 +0200 Refactor some guard state file parsing code into functions. Co-authored-by: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> --- src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index ded7db969..3d2abd920 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -2861,6 +2861,76 @@ entry_guard_encode_for_state(entry_guard_t *guard) } /** + * Extract key=val from the state string <b>s</s> and duplicate the value to + * some string target declared in entry_guard_parse_from_state + */ +static void parse_from_state_set_vals(const char *s, smartlist_t *entries, + smartlist_t *extra, strmap_t *vals) +{ + smartlist_split_string(entries, s, " ", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entries, char *, entry) { + const char *eq = strchr(entry, '='); + if (!eq) { + smartlist_add(extra, entry); + continue; + } + char *key = tor_strndup(entry, eq-entry); + char **target = strmap_get(vals, key); + if (target == NULL || *target != NULL) { + /* unrecognized or already set */ + smartlist_add(extra, entry); + tor_free(key); + continue; + } + + *target = tor_strdup(eq+1); + tor_free(key); + tor_free(entry); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); +} + +/** + * Handle part of the parsing state file logic, focused on time related things + */ +static void parse_from_state_handle_time(entry_guard_t *guard, char *sampled_on, + char *unlisted_since, char *confirmed_on) +{ +#define HANDLE_TIME(field) do { \ + if (field) { \ + int r = parse_iso_time_nospace(field, &field ## _time); \ + if (r < 0) { \ + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Unable to parse %s %s from guard", \ + #field, escaped(field)); \ + field##_time = -1; \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0) + + time_t sampled_on_time = 0; + time_t unlisted_since_time = 0; + time_t confirmed_on_time = 0; + + HANDLE_TIME(sampled_on); + HANDLE_TIME(unlisted_since); + HANDLE_TIME(confirmed_on); + + if (sampled_on_time <= 0) + sampled_on_time = approx_time(); + if (unlisted_since_time < 0) + unlisted_since_time = 0; + if (confirmed_on_time < 0) + confirmed_on_time = 0; + + #undef HANDLE_TIME + + guard->sampled_on_date = sampled_on_time; + guard->unlisted_since_date = unlisted_since_time; + guard->confirmed_on_date = confirmed_on_time; +} + +/** * Given a string generated by entry_guard_encode_for_state(), parse it * (if possible) and return an entry_guard_t object for it. Return NULL * on complete failure. @@ -2920,29 +2990,8 @@ entry_guard_parse_from_state(const char *s) FIELD(pb_unusable_circuits); FIELD(pb_timeouts); #undef FIELD - - smartlist_split_string(entries, s, " ", - SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); - - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entries, char *, entry) { - const char *eq = strchr(entry, '='); - if (!eq) { - smartlist_add(extra, entry); - continue; - } - char *key = tor_strndup(entry, eq-entry); - char **target = strmap_get(vals, key); - if (target == NULL || *target != NULL) { - /* unrecognized or already set */ - smartlist_add(extra, entry); - tor_free(key); - continue; - } - - *target = tor_strdup(eq+1); - tor_free(key); - tor_free(entry); - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + /* Extract from s the key=val that we recognize, put the others in extra*/ + parse_from_state_set_vals(s, entries, extra, vals); smartlist_free(entries); strmap_free(vals, NULL); @@ -2990,38 +3039,7 @@ entry_guard_parse_from_state(const char *s) } /* Process the various time fields. */ - -#define HANDLE_TIME(field) do { \ - if (field) { \ - int r = parse_iso_time_nospace(field, &field ## _time); \ - if (r < 0) { \ - log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Unable to parse %s %s from guard", \ - #field, escaped(field)); \ - field##_time = -1; \ - } \ - } \ - } while (0) - - time_t sampled_on_time = 0; - time_t unlisted_since_time = 0; - time_t confirmed_on_time = 0; - - HANDLE_TIME(sampled_on); - HANDLE_TIME(unlisted_since); - HANDLE_TIME(confirmed_on); - - if (sampled_on_time <= 0) - sampled_on_time = approx_time(); - if (unlisted_since_time < 0) - unlisted_since_time = 0; - if (confirmed_on_time < 0) - confirmed_on_time = 0; - - #undef HANDLE_TIME - - guard->sampled_on_date = sampled_on_time; - guard->unlisted_since_date = unlisted_since_time; - guard->confirmed_on_date = confirmed_on_time; + parse_from_state_handle_time(guard, sampled_on, unlisted_since, confirmed_on); /* Take sampled_by_version verbatim. */ guard->sampled_by_version = sampled_by;

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Fold in a changes file and update exceptions.txt.
by asn＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 52edea121e34dbbecc009a9f18fbc508db247ebe Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Jun 11 13:45:00 2020 +0300 Fold in a changes file and update exceptions.txt. Co-authored-by: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> --- changes/ticket32088 | 13 +++++++++++++ scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket32088 b/changes/ticket32088 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0d4fc7475 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket32088 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major features (Proposal 310, performance + security): + - Implements Proposal 310 - Bandaid on guard selection. + Proposal 310 solves a load-balancing issue within Prop271 which strongly + impact experimental research with Shadow. + Security improvement: Proposal 310 prevents any newly Guard relay to + have a chance to get into the primary list of older Tor clients, + except if the N first sampled guards of these clients are unreachable. + Implements recommendation from 32088. + + Proposal 310 is linked to the CLAPS project researching optimal + client location-aware path selections. This project is a collaboration + between the UCLouvain Crypto Group, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and + Princeton University. diff --git a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt index fc9a05c84..35e860d8b 100644 --- a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt +++ b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt @@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ problem function-size /src/feature/client/addressmap.c:addressmap_rewrite() 109 problem function-size /src/feature/client/bridges.c:rewrite_node_address_for_bridge() 125 problem function-size /src/feature/client/circpathbias.c:pathbias_measure_close_rate() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/dnsserv.c:evdns_server_callback() 153 -problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 3827 +problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 4000 problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits() 155 problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guard_parse_from_state() 246 -problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.h 639 +problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.h 700 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:handle_proxy_line() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:parse_method_line_helper() 110 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:create_managed_proxy_environment() 111

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