June 2020 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[torspec/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/119'
by nickm＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 904430ed73dcb55c836bedfb08fa20cf9b0df5cd Merge: f26e739 91ea21e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 11 13:11:31 2020 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/119' guard-spec.txt | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)

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[translation/bridgedb] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 3a928cf8d8b91ed5cdcc81162da35af41de16cfa Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jun 11 16:45:16 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb --- lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index ef0e12cf6e..9a054e67d7 100644 --- a/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/lt/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ # Aiste G <aiste.gvildyte(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Aiste G <aiste.gvildyte(a)gmail.com>, 2016 # Moo, 2015-2020 +# Pijus Kamandulis <pkpjuklas(a)gmail.com>, 2020 # Saule Papeckyte <saule.papeckyte(a)gmail.com>, 2015 # Edgaras7 <system(a)vippsystems.com>, 2014 # Tautvydas Zukauskas <lordmu(a)linuxmail.org>, 2016 @@ -16,8 +17,8 @@ msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2020-05-14 14:21-0700\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-05-21 10:56+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Moo\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-06-11 16:34+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Pijus Kamandulis <pkpjuklas(a)gmail.com>\n" "Language-Team: Lithuanian (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/lt/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -284,7 +285,7 @@ msgstr "Gauti tinklų tiltus!" #: bridgedb/strings.py:107 msgid "Bridge distribution mechanisms" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Tinklo tiltų paskirstymo mechanizmas" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "BridgeDB", "HTTPS", and "Moat". #: bridgedb/strings.py:109 @@ -325,7 +326,7 @@ msgstr "" #: bridgedb/strings.py:129 msgid "Reserved" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Rezervuota" #: bridgedb/strings.py:130 #, python-format @@ -399,7 +400,7 @@ msgstr "" #: bridgedb/strings.py:174 msgid "(Request IPv6 bridges.)" -msgstr "" +msgstr "(Prašyti IPv6 tinklo tiltų)" #: bridgedb/strings.py:175 msgid "(Request obfs4 obfuscated bridges.)"

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-10.0-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit c5cd695c6803f32c97a4f5ec052155c3d021b379 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:58:12 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34362. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 8f3a9ce838b8..e8a8d37ae373 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ var TorStrings = { }, authPrompt: { description: - getString("authPrompt.description", "%S is requesting your private key."), + getString("authPrompt.description2", "%S is requesting that you authenticate."), keyPlaceholder: getString("authPrompt.keyPlaceholder", "Enter your key"), done: getString("authPrompt.done", "Done"), doneAccessKey: getString("authPrompt.doneAccessKey", "d"),

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-9.5-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit aace250e0ac5bb4b36004aadd0cab2d05c23d5d5 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:58:12 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34362. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 8f3a9ce838b8..e8a8d37ae373 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ var TorStrings = { }, authPrompt: { description: - getString("authPrompt.description", "%S is requesting your private key."), + getString("authPrompt.description2", "%S is requesting that you authenticate."), keyPlaceholder: getString("authPrompt.keyPlaceholder", "Enter your key"), done: getString("authPrompt.done", "Done"), doneAccessKey: getString("authPrompt.doneAccessKey", "d"),

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[torbutton/master] Bug 34362: Improve onion service authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 605e9d398ab026ce53ec8ad106848bfe5ae5e627 Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Tue Jun 9 13:59:12 2020 -0400 Bug 34362: Improve onion service authentication prompt To avoid misleading users about private key usage, change: example.onion is requesting your private key. to: example.onion is requesting that you authenticate. --- chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties b/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties index 7b6c2d65..53651280 100644 --- a/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties +++ b/chrome/locale/en-US/torbutton.properties @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ onionServices.introTimedOut=Failed to connect to the onionsite, possibly due to onionServices.introTimedOut.longDescription=Details: %S — The connection to the requested onion service timed out while trying to build the rendezvous circuit. # # LOCALIZATION NOTE: %S will be replaced with the .onion address. -onionServices.authPrompt.description=%S is requesting your private key. +onionServices.authPrompt.description2=%S is requesting that you authenticate. onionServices.authPrompt.keyPlaceholder=Enter your private key for this onion service onionServices.authPrompt.done=Done onionServices.authPrompt.doneAccessKey=d

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-9.5-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 58ac4b710c63854d6285b437e241e0284b43dbee Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Mon Jun 8 11:11:28 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34369. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 05bbfd63ef60..8f3a9ce838b8 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ var TorStrings = { let retval = { learnMore: getString("learnMore", "Learn more"), - learnMoreURL: `https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.${getLocale()}#_client_authorization`, + learnMoreURL: `https://support.torproject.org/${getLocale()}/onionservices/client-auth/`, errorPage: { browser: getString("errorPage.browser", "Browser"), network: getString("errorPage.network", "Network"),

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-68.9.0esr-10.0-1] fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt
by gk＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 632beb89a79f17bdb0db266196c39b67fc11561f Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Mon Jun 8 11:11:28 2020 -0400 fixup! Bug 30237: Add v3 onion services client authentication prompt Fixes bug 34369. --- browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm index 05bbfd63ef60..8f3a9ce838b8 100644 --- a/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm +++ b/browser/modules/TorStrings.jsm @@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ var TorStrings = { let retval = { learnMore: getString("learnMore", "Learn more"), - learnMoreURL: `https://2019.www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual-dev.html.${getLocale()}#_client_authorization`, + learnMoreURL: `https://support.torproject.org/${getLocale()}/onionservices/client-auth/`, errorPage: { browser: getString("errorPage.browser", "Browser"), network: getString("errorPage.network", "Network"),

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Refactor some guard state file parsing code into functions.
by asn＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 7bf0587ef1c25d739a8eadf9b747d3a68c99ff51 Author: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> Date: Wed Apr 22 20:36:16 2020 +0200 Refactor some guard state file parsing code into functions. Co-authored-by: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> --- src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 128 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index ded7db969..3d2abd920 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -2861,6 +2861,76 @@ entry_guard_encode_for_state(entry_guard_t *guard) } /** + * Extract key=val from the state string s</s> and duplicate the value to + * some string target declared in entry_guard_parse_from_state + */ +static void parse_from_state_set_vals(const char *s, smartlist_t *entries, + smartlist_t *extra, strmap_t *vals) +{ + smartlist_split_string(entries, s, " ", + SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); + + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entries, char *, entry) { + const char *eq = strchr(entry, '='); + if (!eq) { + smartlist_add(extra, entry); + continue; + } + char *key = tor_strndup(entry, eq-entry); + char **target = strmap_get(vals, key); + if (target == NULL || *target != NULL) { + /* unrecognized or already set */ + smartlist_add(extra, entry); + tor_free(key); + continue; + } + + *target = tor_strdup(eq+1); + tor_free(key); + tor_free(entry); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); +} + +/** + * Handle part of the parsing state file logic, focused on time related things + */ +static void parse_from_state_handle_time(entry_guard_t *guard, char *sampled_on, + char *unlisted_since, char *confirmed_on) +{ +#define HANDLE_TIME(field) do { \ + if (field) { \ + int r = parse_iso_time_nospace(field, &field ## _time); \ + if (r < 0) { \ + log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Unable to parse %s %s from guard", \ + #field, escaped(field)); \ + field##_time = -1; \ + } \ + } \ + } while (0) + + time_t sampled_on_time = 0; + time_t unlisted_since_time = 0; + time_t confirmed_on_time = 0; + + HANDLE_TIME(sampled_on); + HANDLE_TIME(unlisted_since); + HANDLE_TIME(confirmed_on); + + if (sampled_on_time <= 0) + sampled_on_time = approx_time(); + if (unlisted_since_time < 0) + unlisted_since_time = 0; + if (confirmed_on_time < 0) + confirmed_on_time = 0; + + #undef HANDLE_TIME + + guard->sampled_on_date = sampled_on_time; + guard->unlisted_since_date = unlisted_since_time; + guard->confirmed_on_date = confirmed_on_time; +} + +/** * Given a string generated by entry_guard_encode_for_state(), parse it * (if possible) and return an entry_guard_t object for it. Return NULL * on complete failure. @@ -2920,29 +2990,8 @@ entry_guard_parse_from_state(const char *s) FIELD(pb_unusable_circuits); FIELD(pb_timeouts); #undef FIELD - - smartlist_split_string(entries, s, " ", - SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0); - - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entries, char *, entry) { - const char *eq = strchr(entry, '='); - if (!eq) { - smartlist_add(extra, entry); - continue; - } - char *key = tor_strndup(entry, eq-entry); - char **target = strmap_get(vals, key); - if (target == NULL || *target != NULL) { - /* unrecognized or already set */ - smartlist_add(extra, entry); - tor_free(key); - continue; - } - - *target = tor_strdup(eq+1); - tor_free(key); - tor_free(entry); - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry); + /* Extract from s the key=val that we recognize, put the others in extra*/ + parse_from_state_set_vals(s, entries, extra, vals); smartlist_free(entries); strmap_free(vals, NULL); @@ -2990,38 +3039,7 @@ entry_guard_parse_from_state(const char *s) } /* Process the various time fields. */ - -#define HANDLE_TIME(field) do { \ - if (field) { \ - int r = parse_iso_time_nospace(field, &field ## _time); \ - if (r < 0) { \ - log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Unable to parse %s %s from guard", \ - #field, escaped(field)); \ - field##_time = -1; \ - } \ - } \ - } while (0) - - time_t sampled_on_time = 0; - time_t unlisted_since_time = 0; - time_t confirmed_on_time = 0; - - HANDLE_TIME(sampled_on); - HANDLE_TIME(unlisted_since); - HANDLE_TIME(confirmed_on); - - if (sampled_on_time <= 0) - sampled_on_time = approx_time(); - if (unlisted_since_time < 0) - unlisted_since_time = 0; - if (confirmed_on_time < 0) - confirmed_on_time = 0; - - #undef HANDLE_TIME - - guard->sampled_on_date = sampled_on_time; - guard->unlisted_since_date = unlisted_since_time; - guard->confirmed_on_date = confirmed_on_time; + parse_from_state_handle_time(guard, sampled_on, unlisted_since, confirmed_on); /* Take sampled_by_version verbatim. */ guard->sampled_by_version = sampled_by;

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Fold in a changes file and update exceptions.txt.
by asn＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit 52edea121e34dbbecc009a9f18fbc508db247ebe Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Jun 11 13:45:00 2020 +0300 Fold in a changes file and update exceptions.txt. Co-authored-by: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> --- changes/ticket32088 | 13 +++++++++++++ scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket32088 b/changes/ticket32088 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0d4fc7475 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket32088 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major features (Proposal 310, performance + security): + - Implements Proposal 310 - Bandaid on guard selection. + Proposal 310 solves a load-balancing issue within Prop271 which strongly + impact experimental research with Shadow. + Security improvement: Proposal 310 prevents any newly Guard relay to + have a chance to get into the primary list of older Tor clients, + except if the N first sampled guards of these clients are unreachable. + Implements recommendation from 32088. + + Proposal 310 is linked to the CLAPS project researching optimal + client location-aware path selections. This project is a collaboration + between the UCLouvain Crypto Group, the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory and + Princeton University. diff --git a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt index fc9a05c84..35e860d8b 100644 --- a/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt +++ b/scripts/maint/practracker/exceptions.txt @@ -182,10 +182,10 @@ problem function-size /src/feature/client/addressmap.c:addressmap_rewrite() 109 problem function-size /src/feature/client/bridges.c:rewrite_node_address_for_bridge() 125 problem function-size /src/feature/client/circpathbias.c:pathbias_measure_close_rate() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/dnsserv.c:evdns_server_callback() 153 -problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 3827 +problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c 4000 problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guards_upgrade_waiting_circuits() 155 problem function-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.c:entry_guard_parse_from_state() 246 -problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.h 639 +problem file-size /src/feature/client/entrynodes.h 700 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:handle_proxy_line() 108 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:parse_method_line_helper() 110 problem function-size /src/feature/client/transports.c:create_managed_proxy_environment() 111

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[tor/release-0.4.4] Pick guards on the order they were sampled (prop310).
by asn＠torproject.org 11 Jun '20

11 Jun '20

commit d2c3b6ea1e7eb0fb351df620517fd2e271899399 Author: George Kadianakis <desnacked(a)riseup.net> Date: Thu Jun 11 13:49:00 2020 +0300 Pick guards on the order they were sampled (prop310). Co-authored-by: Florentin Rochet <florentin.rochet(a)uclouvain.be> --- src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 91 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ src/feature/client/entrynodes.h | 22 ++++++++-- 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index 3d2abd920..64005c1e6 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -47,8 +47,7 @@ * As a persistent ordered list whose elements are taken from the * sampled set, we track a CONFIRMED GUARDS LIST. A guard becomes * confirmed when we successfully build a circuit through it, and decide - * to use that circuit. We order the guards on this list by the order - * in which they became confirmed. + * to use that circuit. * * And as a final group, we have an ordered list of PRIMARY GUARDS, * whose elements are taken from the filtered set. We prefer @@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ * * To build circuits, we take a primary guard if possible -- or a * reachable filtered confirmed guard if no primary guard is possible -- - * or a random reachable filtered guard otherwise. If the guard is + * or the first (by sampled order) filtered guard otherwise. If the guard is * primary, we can use the circuit immediately on success. Otherwise, * the guard is now "pending" -- we won't use its circuit unless all * of the circuits we're trying to build through better guards have @@ -92,14 +91,18 @@ * [x] Whenever we remove a guard from the sample, remove it from the primary * and confirmed lists. * - * [x] When we make a guard confirmed, update the primary list. + * [x] When we make a guard confirmed, update the primary list, and sort them + * by sampled order. * * [x] When we make a guard filtered or unfiltered, update the primary list. * * [x] When we are about to pick a guard, make sure that the primary list is * full. * - * [x] Before calling sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(), make sure + * [x] When we update the confirmed list, or when we re-build the primary list + * and detect a change, we sort those lists by sampled_idx + * + * [x] Before calling first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard(), make sure * that the filtered, primary, and confirmed flags are up-to-date. * * [x] Call entry_guard_consider_retry every time we are about to check @@ -172,6 +175,7 @@ static entry_guard_t *get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(guard_selection_t *gs, const tor_addr_port_t *addrport); static int entry_guard_obeys_restriction(const entry_guard_t *guard, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst); +static int compare_guards_by_sampled_idx(const void **a_, const void **b_); /** Return 0 if we should apply guardfraction information found in the * consensus. A specific consensus can be specified with the @@ -890,6 +894,7 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, tor_free(guard->sampled_by_version); guard->sampled_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION); guard->currently_listed = 1; + guard->sampled_idx = gs->next_sampled_idx++; guard->confirmed_idx = -1; /* non-persistent fields */ @@ -1383,7 +1388,7 @@ sampled_guards_prune_obsolete_entries(guard_selection_t *gs, if (rmv) { ++n_changes; - SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(gs->sampled_entry_guards, guard); + SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT_KEEPORDER(gs->sampled_entry_guards, guard); remove_guard_from_confirmed_and_primary_lists(gs, guard); entry_guard_free(guard); } @@ -1707,7 +1712,7 @@ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(guard_selection_t *gs) } /** - * Return a random guard from the reachable filtered sample guards + * Return the first sampled guard from the reachable filtered sample guards * in gs, subject to the exclusion rules listed in flags. * Return NULL if no such guard can be found. * @@ -1718,7 +1723,7 @@ entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(guard_selection_t *gs) * violate it. **/ STATIC entry_guard_t * -sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, +first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard(guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, unsigned flags) { @@ -1771,7 +1776,17 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, flags, smartlist_len(reachable_filtered_sample)); if (smartlist_len(reachable_filtered_sample)) { - result = smartlist_choose(reachable_filtered_sample); + /** + * Get the first guard of the filtered set builds from + * sampled_entry_guards. Proposal 310 suggests this design to overcome + * performance and security issues linked to the previous selection + * method. The guard selected here should be filtered out if this function + * is called again in the same context. I.e., if we filter guards to add + * them into some list X, then the guards from list X will be filtered out + * when this function is called again. Hence it requires setting exclude + * flags in a appropriate way (depending of the context of the caller). + */ + result = smartlist_get(reachable_filtered_sample, 0); log_info(LD_GUARD, " (Selected %s.)", result ? entry_guard_describe(result) : "<null>"); } @@ -1780,10 +1795,6 @@ sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(guard_selection_t *gs, return result; } -/** - * Helper: compare two entry_guard_t by their confirmed_idx values. - * Used to sort the confirmed list. - */ static int compare_guards_by_confirmed_idx(const void **a_, const void **b_) { @@ -1795,6 +1806,21 @@ compare_guards_by_confirmed_idx(const void **a_, const void **b_) else return 0; } +/** + * Helper: compare two entry_guard_t by their sampled_idx values. + * Used to sort the sampled list + */ +static int +compare_guards_by_sampled_idx(const void **a_, const void **b_) +{ + const entry_guard_t *a = *a_, *b = *b_; + if (a->sampled_idx < b->sampled_idx) + return -1; + else if (a->sampled_idx > b->sampled_idx) + return 1; + else + return 0; +} /** * Find the confirmed guards from among the sampled guards in gs, @@ -1811,7 +1837,7 @@ entry_guards_update_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); smartlist_sort(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, compare_guards_by_confirmed_idx); - + /** Needed to keep a dense array of confirmed_idx */ int any_changed = 0; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { if (guard->confirmed_idx != guard_sl_idx) { @@ -1821,6 +1847,8 @@ entry_guards_update_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs) } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(guard); gs->next_confirmed_idx = smartlist_len(gs->confirmed_entry_guards); + // We need the confirmed list to always be give guards in sampled order + smartlist_sort(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, compare_guards_by_sampled_idx); if (any_changed) { entry_guards_changed_for_guard_selection(gs); @@ -1849,6 +1877,9 @@ make_guard_confirmed(guard_selection_t *gs, entry_guard_t *guard) guard->confirmed_idx = gs->next_confirmed_idx++; smartlist_add(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, guard); + /** The confirmation ordering might not be the sample ording. We need to + * reorder */ + smartlist_sort(gs->confirmed_entry_guards, compare_guards_by_sampled_idx); // This confirmed guard might kick something else out of the primary // guards. @@ -1912,7 +1943,7 @@ entry_guards_update_primary(guard_selection_t *gs) /* Finally, fill out the list with sampled guards. */ while (smartlist_len(new_primary_guards) < N_PRIMARY_GUARDS) { - entry_guard_t *guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, NULL, + entry_guard_t *guard = first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard(gs, NULL, SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED| SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY| SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY); @@ -1943,6 +1974,7 @@ entry_guards_update_primary(guard_selection_t *gs) g->confirmed_idx >= 0 ? " (confirmed)" : "", g->is_filtered_guard ? "" : " (excluded by filter)"); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(g); + smartlist_sort(new_primary_guards, compare_guards_by_sampled_idx); } smartlist_free(old_primary_guards); @@ -2055,10 +2087,15 @@ select_primary_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(gs->primary_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, guard) { entry_guard_consider_retry(guard); - if (! entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) + if (!entry_guard_obeys_restriction(guard, rst)) { + log_info(LD_GUARD, "Entry guard %s doesn't obey restriction, we test the" + " next one", entry_guard_describe(guard)); continue; + } if (guard->is_reachable != GUARD_REACHABLE_NO) { if (need_descriptor && !guard_has_descriptor(guard)) { + log_info(LD_GUARD, "Guard %s does not have a descriptor", + entry_guard_describe(guard)); continue; } *state_out = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_ON_COMPLETION; @@ -2071,9 +2108,11 @@ select_primary_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, if (smartlist_len(usable_primary_guards)) { chosen_guard = smartlist_choose(usable_primary_guards); + log_info(LD_GUARD, + "Selected primary guard %s for circuit from a list size of %d.", + entry_guard_describe(chosen_guard), + smartlist_len(usable_primary_guards)); smartlist_free(usable_primary_guards); - log_info(LD_GUARD, "Selected primary guard %s for circuit.", - entry_guard_describe(chosen_guard)); } smartlist_free(usable_primary_guards); @@ -2118,10 +2157,10 @@ select_confirmed_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, } /** - * For use with a circuit, pick a confirmed usable filtered guard - * at random. Update the last_tried_to_connect time and the - * is_pending fields of the guard as appropriate. Set state_out - * to the new guard-state of the circuit. + * For use with a circuit, pick a usable filtered guard. Update the + * last_tried_to_connect time and the is_pending fields of the + * guard as appropriate. Set state_out to the new guard-state of the + * circuit. */ static entry_guard_t * select_filtered_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, @@ -2134,7 +2173,7 @@ select_filtered_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, unsigned flags = 0; if (need_descriptor) flags |= SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_NO_DESCRIPTOR; - chosen_guard = sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards(gs, + chosen_guard = first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard(gs, rst, SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED | SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_PRIMARY | @@ -2148,7 +2187,7 @@ select_filtered_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, chosen_guard->last_tried_to_connect = approx_time(); *state_out = GUARD_CIRC_STATE_USABLE_IF_NO_BETTER_GUARD; log_info(LD_GUARD, "No primary or confirmed guards available. Selected " - "random guard %s for circuit. Will try other guards before " + "guard %s for circuit. Will try other guards before " "using this circuit.", entry_guard_describe(chosen_guard)); return chosen_guard; @@ -2189,8 +2228,8 @@ select_entry_guard_for_circuit(guard_selection_t *gs, if (chosen_guard) return chosen_guard; - /* "Otherwise, if there is no such entry, select a member at - random from {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS}." */ + /* "Otherwise, if there is no such entry, select a member + * {USABLE_FILTERED_GUARDS} following the sample ordering" */ chosen_guard = select_filtered_guard_for_circuit(gs, usage, rst, state_out); if (chosen_guard == NULL) { diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.h b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.h index 6eede2c8d..a478b92d7 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.h +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.h @@ -117,6 +117,13 @@ struct entry_guard_t { * confirmed guard. */ time_t confirmed_on_date; /* 0 if not confirmed */ /** + * In what order was this guard sampled? Guards with + * lower indices appear earlier on the sampled list, the confirmed list and + * the primary list as a result of Prop 310 + */ + int sampled_idx; + + /** * In what order was this guard confirmed? Guards with lower indices * appear earlier on the confirmed list. If the confirmed list is compacted, * this field corresponds to the index of this guard on the confirmed list. @@ -242,8 +249,9 @@ struct guard_selection_t { * Ordered list (from highest to lowest priority) of guards that we * have successfully contacted and decided to use. Every member of * this list is a member of sampled_entry_guards. Every member should - * have confirmed_on_date set, and have confirmed_idx greater than - * any earlier member of the list. + * have confirmed_on_date set. + * The ordering of the list should be by sampled idx. The reasoning behind + * it is linked to Proposal 310. * * This list is persistent. It is a subset of the elements in * sampled_entry_guards, and its pointers point to elements of @@ -271,6 +279,12 @@ struct guard_selection_t { * confirmed_entry_guards receive? */ int next_confirmed_idx; + /** What sampled_idx value should the next-added member of + * sampled_entry_guards receive? This should follow the size of the sampled + * list until sampled relays get pruned for some reason + */ + int next_sampled_idx; + }; struct entry_guard_handle_t; @@ -523,7 +537,7 @@ STATIC void entry_guard_free_(entry_guard_t *e); STATIC void entry_guards_update_filtered_sets(guard_selection_t *gs); STATIC int entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs); /** - * @name Flags for sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards() + * @name Flags for first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard() */ /**@{*/ #define SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_CONFIRMED (1u<<0) @@ -532,7 +546,7 @@ STATIC int entry_guards_all_primary_guards_are_down(guard_selection_t *gs); #define SAMPLE_NO_UPDATE_PRIMARY (1u<<3) #define SAMPLE_EXCLUDE_NO_DESCRIPTOR (1u<<4) /**@}*/ -STATIC entry_guard_t *sample_reachable_filtered_entry_guards( +STATIC entry_guard_t *first_reachable_filtered_entry_guard( guard_selection_t *gs, const entry_guard_restriction_t *rst, unsigned flags);

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