February 2020 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.4.3] Alphabetized Server Options and Directory Server Options
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 725b0528e3c0d65c5b76dcf7ade7162d666290f8 Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Tue Feb 11 01:41:43 2020 +0530 Alphabetized Server Options and Directory Server Options --- doc/tor.1.txt | 632 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------- 1 file changed, 322 insertions(+), 310 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index a9b9852b7..84ff5841f 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2060,9 +2060,58 @@ different from other Tor clients: == SERVER OPTIONS +// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. +// Please keep them that way! + The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort is non-zero): +[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**:: + Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period + using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule). + Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the + number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or + received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server + could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running. + It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can + be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting + the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the + number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections + and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate + until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers + from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point + in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, + enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since + it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some + of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are + always "available". + + + + Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses + powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not + one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count + GBytes differently. + +[[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**:: + How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we + should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate + using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the + default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent + plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the + received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes. + (Default: max) + +[[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__:: + Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given, + each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one + month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed, + use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The + day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period + runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day + and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day** + is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the + same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. + (Default: "month 1 0:00") + [[Address]] **Address** __address__:: The IPv4 address of this server, or a fully qualified domain name of this server that resolves to an IPv4 address. You can leave this @@ -2088,6 +2137,15 @@ is non-zero): Note: make sure that no MyFamily lines are present in your torrc when relay is configured in bridge mode. +//Out of order because it logically belongs after BridgeRelay. +[[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have + GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client + addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess + which countries have blocked access to it. If ExtraInfoStatistics is + enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) + +//Out of order because it logically belongs after BridgeRelay. [[BridgeDistribution]] **BridgeDistribution** __string__:: If set along with BridgeRelay, Tor will include a new line in its bridge descriptor which indicates to the BridgeDB service how it @@ -2108,21 +2166,11 @@ is non-zero): relay or bridge. (Really, everybody running a relay or bridge should set it.) - -[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a - non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to - exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option, - or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). + - + - If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the - ExitPolicy, ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options are ignored. + - + - If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy, - ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options. If at least one of these options - is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit - policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0. - (Default: auto) +[[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**:: + This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices + that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default, + since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections + more than it should. (Default: 1) [[ExitPolicy]] **ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__:: Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form @@ -2205,12 +2253,6 @@ is non-zero): Since the default exit policy uses accept/reject *, it applies to both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. -[[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**:: - Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised - public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy. - See above entry on ExitPolicy. - (Default: 1) - [[ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces]] **ExitPolicyRejectLocalInterfaces** **0**|**1**:: Reject all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that the relay knows about, at the beginning of your exit policy. This includes any OutboundBindAddress, the @@ -2223,6 +2265,168 @@ is non-zero): to disclose. (Default: 0) +[[ExitPolicyRejectPrivate]] **ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**:: + Reject all private (local) networks, along with the relay's advertised + public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, at the beginning of your exit policy. + See above entry on ExitPolicy. + (Default: 1) + +[[ExitRelay]] **ExitRelay** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + Tells Tor whether to run as an exit relay. If Tor is running as a + non-bridge server, and ExitRelay is set to 1, then Tor allows traffic to + exit according to the ExitPolicy option, the ReducedExitPolicy option, + or the default ExitPolicy (if no other exit policy option is specified). + + + + If ExitRelay is set to 0, no traffic is allowed to exit, and the + ExitPolicy, ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options are ignored. + + + + If ExitRelay is set to "auto", then Tor checks the ExitPolicy, + ReducedExitPolicy, and IPv6Exit options. If at least one of these options + is set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 1. If none of these exit + policy options are set, Tor behaves as if ExitRelay were set to 0. + (Default: auto) + +[[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost, + RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR + connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private + addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and + pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this + option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. + (Default: 0) + +[[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__:: + A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__:: + A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. + +[[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is + a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor + server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this + to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30 + minutes. (Default: 6 hours) + +[[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**:: + If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic. + When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay + is 1. (Default: 0) + +[[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__:: + Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is + running. + (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.) + +[[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the + KeyDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable + by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the + setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the + same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto) + +[[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**:: + Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log + level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's + main event loop. (Default: 0) + +[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: + If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in + this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) + +[[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: + This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it + needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of + memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until + it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too + low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only + affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than + this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable + default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0) + +[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...:: + Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or + organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by + their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints. + This option can be repeated many times, for + convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily + lines are merged into one list. + When two relays both declare that they are in the + same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each + relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to + list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would + compromise its concealment. + + + + When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by + nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. + + + + If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay + **must** list all other relays, as described above. + + + + Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a + brigde. + +[[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__:: + Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 + characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. + If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified + by their identity fingerprints. + +[[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__:: + How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other + parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect + how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0) + +[[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**:: + If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret + key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent + ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary + signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0) + +[[ORPort]] **ORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]:: + Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and + servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. + Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not + run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) + + + + Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort: + **NoAdvertise**;; + By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If + NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This + can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for + example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else. + **NoListen**;; + By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If + NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This + can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port + forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us. + **IPv4Only**;; + If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 + address, only listen to the IPv4 address. + **IPv6Only**;; + If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 + address, only listen to the IPv6 address. + +// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page. +[[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]:: + For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and + IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive. + +[[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**:: + This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as + a relay. You can + choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. + + + + If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its + descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing + out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles + directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its + descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which + means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the + appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning + "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as + if you're a bridge". + [[ReducedExitPolicy]] **ReducedExitPolicy** **0**|**1**:: If set, use a reduced exit policy rather than the default one. + + @@ -2316,167 +2520,45 @@ is non-zero): (Default: 0) -[[IPv6Exit]] **IPv6Exit** **0**|**1**:: - If set, and we are an exit node, allow clients to use us for IPv6 traffic. - When this option is set and ExitRelay is auto, we act as if ExitRelay - is 1. (Default: 0) +[[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this + relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such + nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do + whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus + is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto) -[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: - If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in - this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) - -[[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...:: - Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or - organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by - their (possibly $-prefixed) identity fingerprints. - This option can be repeated many times, for - convenience in defining large families: all fingerprints in all MyFamily - lines are merged into one list. - When two relays both declare that they are in the - same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the same circuit. (Each - relay only needs to list the other servers in its family; it doesn't need to - list itself, but it won't hurt if it does.) Do not list any bridge relay as it would - compromise its concealment. + - + - When listing a node, it's better to list it by fingerprint than by - nickname: fingerprints are more reliable. + - + - If you run more than one relay, the MyFamily option on each relay - **must** list all other relays, as described above. + - + - Note: do not use MyFamily when configuring your Tor instance as a - brigde. - -[[Nickname]] **Nickname** __name__:: - Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 - characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9]. - If not set, **Unnamed** will be used. Relays can always be uniquely identified - by their identity fingerprints. - -[[NumCPUs]] **NumCPUs** __num__:: - How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins and other - parallelizable operations. If this is set to 0, Tor will try to detect - how many CPUs you have, defaulting to 1 if it can't tell. (Default: 0) - -[[ORPort]] **ORPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]:: - Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and - servers. This option is required to be a Tor server. - Set it to "auto" to have Tor pick a port for you. Set it to 0 to not - run an ORPort at all. This option can occur more than once. (Default: 0) + - + - Tor recognizes these flags on each ORPort: - **NoAdvertise**;; - By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If - NoAdvertise is specified, we don't advertise, but listen anyway. This - can be useful if the port everybody will be connecting to (for - example, one that's opened on our firewall) is somewhere else. - **NoListen**;; - By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If - NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This - can be useful if something else (for example, a firewall's port - forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us. - **IPv4Only**;; - If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 - address, only listen to the IPv4 address. - **IPv6Only**;; - If the address is absent, or resolves to both an IPv4 and an IPv6 - address, only listen to the IPv6 address. - -// Anchor only for formatting, not visible in the man page. -[[ORPortFlagsExclusive]]:: - For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive, and - IPv4Only and IPv6Only are mutually exclusive. - -[[PublishServerDescriptor]] **PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v3**|**bridge**,**...**:: - This option specifies which descriptors Tor will publish when acting as - a relay. You can - choose multiple arguments, separated by commas. + - + - If this option is set to 0, Tor will not publish its - descriptors to any directories. (This is useful if you're testing - out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles - directory publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its - descriptors of all type(s) specified. The default is "1", which - means "if running as a relay or bridge, publish descriptors to the - appropriate authorities". Other possibilities are "v3", meaning - "publish as if you're a relay", and "bridge", meaning "publish as - if you're a bridge". - -[[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__:: - When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: - we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM** - seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. - (Default: 30 seconds) - -[[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake, - set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose - some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0) - -[[HeartbeatPeriod]] **HeartbeatPeriod** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - Log a heartbeat message every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is - a log level __notice__ message, designed to let you know your Tor - server is still alive and doing useful things. Settings this - to 0 will disable the heartbeat. Otherwise, it must be at least 30 - minutes. (Default: 6 hours) - -[[MainloopStats]] **MainloopStats** **0**|**1**:: - Log main loop statistics every **HeartbeatPeriod** seconds. This is a log - level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's - main event loop. (Default: 0) +[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, + that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't + changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) -[[AccountingMax]] **AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**|**TBytes**|**KBits**|**MBits**|**GBits**|**TBits**:: - Limits the max number of bytes sent and received within a set time period - using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule). - Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the - number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or - received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server - could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running. - It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can - be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting - the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the - number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections - and circuits. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate - until some time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers - from waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point - in each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, - enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since - it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some - of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are - always "available". + - + - Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses - powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not - one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count - GBytes differently. +[[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**:: + If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems + parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. + Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until + it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1) -[[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**:: - How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we - should hibernate) during a time interval. Set to "max" to calculate - using the higher of either the sent or received bytes (this is the - default functionality). Set to "sum" to calculate using the sent - plus received bytes. Set to "in" to calculate using only the - received bytes. Set to "out" to calculate using only the sent bytes. - (Default: max) +[[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames + containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an + exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve + URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) -[[AccountingStart]] **AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__:: - Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given, - each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one - month to the same day and time of the next. The relay will go at full speed, - use all the quota you specify, then hibernate for the rest of the period. (The - day must be between 1 and 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period - runs from the time __HH:MM__ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day - and time of the next week, with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day** - is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the - same time on the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. - (Default: "month 1 0:00") +[[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine + whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS + requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to + correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does + on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) -[[RefuseUnknownExits]] **RefuseUnknownExits** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - Prevent nodes that don't appear in the consensus from exiting using this - relay. If the option is 1, we always block exit attempts from such - nodes; if it's 0, we never do, and if the option is "auto", then we do - whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus - is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto) +[[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in + outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. + This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. + For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through + 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server + does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) [[ServerDNSResolvConfFile]] **ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__:: Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in @@ -2486,12 +2568,6 @@ is non-zero): (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration or a localhost DNS service in case no nameservers are found in a given configuration.) -[[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**:: - If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems - parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. - Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until - it eventually succeeds. (Default: 1) - [[ServerDNSSearchDomains]] **ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**:: If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain. For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in @@ -2499,13 +2575,6 @@ is non-zero): connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) -[[ServerDNSDetectHijacking]] **ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine - whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS - requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to - correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does - on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) - [[ServerDNSTestAddresses]] **ServerDNSTestAddresses** __hostname__,__hostname__,__...__:: When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless, @@ -2513,33 +2582,32 @@ is non-zero): name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Default: "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org") -[[ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames]] **ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames - containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an - exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve - URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does - on behalf of clients. (Default: 0) +[[ShutdownWaitLength]] **ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__:: + When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: + we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM** + seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. + (Default: 30 seconds) -[[BridgeRecordUsageByCountry]] **BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have - GeoIP data, Tor keeps a per-country count of how many client - addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess - which countries have blocked access to it. If ExtraInfoStatistics is - enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) +[[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**:: + For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a + permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically + generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option + configures their lifetime. + (Default: 30 days) -[[ServerDNSRandomizeCase]] **ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in - outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies. - This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack. - For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through - 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server - does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1) +[[SSLKeyLifetime]] **SSLKeyLifetime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + When creating a link certificate for our outermost SSL handshake, + set its lifetime to this amount of time. If set to 0, Tor will choose + some reasonable random defaults. (Default: 0) -[[GeoIPFile]] **GeoIPFile** __filename__:: - A filename containing IPv4 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. +== STATISTICS OPTIONS -[[GeoIPv6File]] **GeoIPv6File** __filename__:: - A filename containing IPv6 GeoIP data, for use with by-country statistics. +// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. +// Please keep them that way! + +Relays publish most statistics in a document called the +extra-info document. The following options describe the different +types of statistics that Tor collects and writes: [[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**:: Relays only. @@ -2551,14 +2619,14 @@ is non-zero): If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 0) -[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**:: - Relays and bridges only. - When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells - sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts. - These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This - information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding. - If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published - as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) +[[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**:: + Relays only. + When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of + traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24 + hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is + being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is + enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. + (Default: 0) [[DirReqStatistics]] **DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**:: Relays and bridges only. @@ -2587,23 +2655,6 @@ is non-zero): is enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. (Default: 0) -[[ConnDirectionStatistics]] **ConnDirectionStatistics** **0**|**1**:: - Relays only. - When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the amounts of - traffic it passes between itself and other relays to disk every 24 - hours. Enables relay operators to monitor how much their relay is - being used as middle node in the circuit. If ExtraInfoStatistics is - enabled, it will be published as part of extra-info document. - (Default: 0) - -[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**:: - Relays only. - When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated - statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction - point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If - ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further - published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1) - [[ExtraInfoStatistics]] **ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**:: When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities. @@ -2613,61 +2664,22 @@ is non-zero): because they are required by BridgeDB. (Default: 1) -[[ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses]] **ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is enabled, Tor will connect to relays on localhost, - RFC1918 addresses, and so on. In particular, Tor will make direct OR - connections, and Tor routers allow EXTEND requests, to these private - addresses. (Tor will always allow connections to bridges, proxies, and - pluggable transports configured on private addresses.) Enabling this - option can create security issues; you should probably leave it off. - (Default: 0) - -[[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: - This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it - needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of - memory. If it hits this threshold, it will begin killing circuits until - it has recovered at least 10% of this memory. Do not set this option too - low, or your relay may be unreliable under load. This option only - affects some queues, so the actual process size will be larger than - this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable - default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0) - -[[DisableOOSCheck]] **DisableOOSCheck** **0**|**1**:: - This option disables the code that closes connections when Tor notices - that it is running low on sockets. Right now, it is on by default, - since the existing out-of-sockets mechanism tends to kill OR connections - more than it should. (Default: 1) - -[[SigningKeyLifetime]] **SigningKeyLifetime** __N__ **days**|**weeks**|**months**:: - For how long should each Ed25519 signing key be valid? Tor uses a - permanent master identity key that can be kept offline, and periodically - generates new "signing" keys that it uses online. This option - configures their lifetime. - (Default: 30 days) - -[[OfflineMasterKey]] **OfflineMasterKey** **0**|**1**:: - If non-zero, the Tor relay will never generate or load its master secret - key. Instead, you'll have to use "tor --keygen" to manage the permanent - ed25519 master identity key, as well as the corresponding temporary - signing keys and certificates. (Default: 0) - -[[KeyDirectory]] **KeyDirectory** __DIR__:: - Store secret keys in DIR. Can not be changed while tor is - running. - (Default: the "keys" subdirectory of DataDirectory.) - -[[KeyDirectoryGroupReadable]] **KeyDirectoryGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the - KeyDirectory. If the option is set to 1, make the KeyDirectory readable - by the default GID. If the option is "auto", then we use the - setting for DataDirectoryGroupReadable when the KeyDirectory is the - same as the DataDirectory, and 0 otherwise. (Default: auto) - -[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, - that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't - changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) +[[HiddenServiceStatistics]] **HiddenServiceStatistics** **0**|**1**:: + Relays only. + When this option is enabled, a Tor relay writes obfuscated + statistics on its role as hidden-service directory, introduction + point, or rendezvous point to disk every 24 hours. If + ExtraInfoStatistics is also enabled, these statistics are further + published to the directory authorities. (Default: 1) +[[PaddingStatistics]] **PaddingStatistics** **0**|**1**:: + Relays and bridges only. + When this option is enabled, Tor collects statistics for padding cells + sent and received by this relay, in addition to total cell counts. + These statistics are rounded, and omitted if traffic is low. This + information is important for load balancing decisions related to padding. + If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published + as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) == DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS @@ -2675,11 +2687,19 @@ The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with enough bandwidth automatically become directory servers; see DirCache for details.) -[[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__:: - When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on - the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing - to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in - contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html. +[[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**:: + When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except + extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If + **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached. + Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients + connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay + and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1) + +[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__:: + Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the + directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above, + except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by + some entry in the policy is accepted. [[DirPort]] **DirPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__PORT__|**auto** [_flags_]:: If this option is nonzero, advertise the directory service on this port. @@ -2689,19 +2709,11 @@ details.) + The same flags are supported here as are supported by ORPort. -[[DirPolicy]] **DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__:: - Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the - directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above, - except that port specifiers are ignored. Any address not matched by - some entry in the policy is accepted. - -[[DirCache]] **DirCache** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set, Tor caches all current directory documents except - extra info documents, and accepts client requests for them. If - **DownloadExtraInfo** is set, cached extra info documents are also cached. - Setting **DirPort** is not required for **DirCache**, because clients - connect via the ORPort by default. Setting either DirPort or BridgeRelay - and setting DirCache to 0 is not supported. (Default: 1) +[[DirPortFrontPage]] **DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__:: + When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on + the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing + to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in + contrib/operator-tools/tor-exit-notice.html. [[MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs]] **MaxConsensusAgeForDiffs** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: When this option is nonzero, Tor caches will not try to generate

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1689' into maint-0.3.5
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 88723ad1694a96bdbb713ccb5bb47a9f5acdc8bd Merge: 2b6df3da2 9d771ccc8 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 12:18:59 2020 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1689' into maint-0.3.5 .travis.yml | 2 -- changes/ticket33075 | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.3] hs-v3: Remove BUG() that can occur normally
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 88489cd29006f093e1a5572711b26ee1b057e359 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 4 10:13:10 2020 -0500 hs-v3: Remove BUG() that can occur normally Fixes #28992 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket28992 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket28992 b/changes/ticket28992 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..3e45d73e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket28992 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (onion service v3, client): + - Remove a BUG() that is causing a stacktrace for a situation that very + rarely happens but still can. Fixes bug 28992; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c index fd2d26645..b045e1899 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_client.c @@ -596,9 +596,14 @@ send_introduce1(origin_circuit_t *intro_circ, /* We need to find which intro point in the descriptor we are connected to * on intro_circ. */ ip = find_desc_intro_point_by_ident(intro_circ->hs_ident, desc); - if (BUG(ip == NULL)) { - /* If we can find a descriptor from this introduction circuit ident, we - * must have a valid intro point object. Permanent error. */ + if (ip == NULL) { + /* The following is possible if the descriptor was changed while we had + * this introduction circuit open and waiting for the rendezvous circuit to + * be ready. Which results in this situation where we can't find the + * corresponding intro point within the descriptor of the service. */ + log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to find introduction point for service %s " + "while trying to send an INTRODUCE1 cell.", + safe_str_client(onion_address)); goto perm_err; }

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1725' into maint-0.4.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit e0ea7407a4370c977ebbf0b70712c9e5ff7937fa Merge: 0e00d9369 88489cd29 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 14:14:11 2020 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1725' into maint-0.4.3 changes/ticket28992 | 3 +++ src/feature/hs/hs_client.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 0e00d9369fa159bf0c44d0862e3d1f6b0c40ef50 Merge: de31c4757 ff5220536 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 14:13:15 2020 +1000 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into maint-0.4.3 "ours" merge, because simiar BridgeDistribution fixes have already been merged to maint-0.4.3. (See 32753.) The stem changes in 33075 have already been merged to maint-0.4.3, so this "ours" merge does not affect them.

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Addressed minor changes suggested in the ticket
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 809090d24d8576258fab6077e5e54e33e5c78bbe Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Wed Feb 12 23:07:00 2020 +0530 Addressed minor changes suggested in the ticket --- doc/tor.1.txt | 22 +++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 84ff5841f..87b327b9c 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2330,10 +2330,6 @@ is non-zero): level __notice__ message designed to help developers instrumenting Tor's main event loop. (Default: 0) -[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: - If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in - this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) - [[MaxMemInQueues]] **MaxMemInQueues** __N__ **bytes**|**KBytes**|**MBytes**|**GBytes**:: This option configures a threshold above which Tor will assume that it needs to stop queueing or buffering data because it's about to run out of @@ -2344,6 +2340,10 @@ is non-zero): this. If this option is set to 0, Tor will try to pick a reasonable default based on your system's physical memory. (Default: 0) +[[MaxOnionQueueDelay]] **MaxOnionQueueDelay** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: + If we have more onionskins queued for processing than we can process in + this amount of time, reject new ones. (Default: 1750 msec) + [[MyFamily]] **MyFamily** __fingerprint__,__fingerprint__,...:: Declare that this Tor relay is controlled or administered by a group or organization identical or similar to that of the other relays, defined by @@ -2527,11 +2527,6 @@ is non-zero): whatever the authorities suggest in the consensus (and block if the consensus is quiet on the issue). (Default: auto) -[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, - that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't - changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) - [[ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig]] **ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**:: If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers. @@ -2606,8 +2601,8 @@ is non-zero): // Please keep them that way! Relays publish most statistics in a document called the -extra-info document. The following options describe the different -types of statistics that Tor collects and writes: +extra-info document. The following options affect the different +types of statistics that Tor relays collect and publish: [[CellStatistics]] **CellStatistics** **0**|**1**:: Relays only. @@ -2681,6 +2676,11 @@ types of statistics that Tor collects and writes: If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) +[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, + that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't + changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) + == DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit ff52205362f5d60c209f298a3e3679bc65bdf539 Merge: 00fe21472 5298113da Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 12:22:04 2020 +1000 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2 .travis.yml | 2 -- changes/bug32753 | 3 +++ changes/ticket33075 | 4 ++++ src/app/config/config.c | 2 +- src/feature/relay/router.c | 15 ++++++++++----- src/test/test_config.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.3] changes file for ticket 33188
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 0ab859aabecf025dc9adb14d440605a477ce251f Author: Taylor Yu <catalyst(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 12:28:35 2020 -0600 changes file for ticket 33188 --- changes/ticket33188 | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket33188 b/changes/ticket33188 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7bec15b99 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket33188 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Documentation (manpage): + - Alphabetize the Server and Directory server sections of the tor + manpage. Also split Statistics options into their own section + of the manpage. Closes ticket 33188. Work by Swati Thacker as + part of Google Season of Docs.

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1728/head' into maint-0.4.3
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit 3147cbba52c3986c3f59101a7199dc73076d2b00 Merge: e0ea7407a 0ab859aab Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Feb 12 13:48:39 2020 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1728/head' into maint-0.4.3 changes/ticket33188 | 5 + doc/tor.1.txt | 630 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 2 files changed, 326 insertions(+), 309 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.4.3] Moved [[RephistTrackTime]] to General Options.
by nickm＠torproject.org 12 Feb '20

12 Feb '20

commit d33c80f0ee3a6c88c911441673c39c1f266e2209 Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Wed Feb 12 23:17:31 2020 +0530 Moved [[RephistTrackTime]] to General Options. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 87b327b9c..db4dd2755 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -794,6 +794,11 @@ forward slash (/) in the configuration file and on the command line. fetches by the relay (from authority or other relays), because that is considered "client" activity. (Default: 0) +[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, + that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't + changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) + [[RunAsDaemon]] **RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**:: If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option. @@ -2676,11 +2681,6 @@ types of statistics that Tor relays collect and publish: If ExtraInfoStatistics is enabled, it will be published as a part of extra-info document. (Default: 1) -[[RephistTrackTime]] **RephistTrackTime** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - Tells an authority, or other node tracking node reliability and history, - that fine-grained information about nodes can be discarded when it hasn't - changed for a given amount of time. (Default: 24 hours) - == DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS The following options are useful only for directory servers. (Relays with

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