tor-commits February 2020

tor-commits@lists.torproject.org

22 participants
1454 discussions

[tor/release-0.4.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into release-0.4.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit f8ff2f12d48ede0186f4c921d773bc51d82128e1 Merge: b8bfea163 0c90fc37e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 14:17:10 2020 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.2' into release-0.4.2 changes/ticket33212 | 4 ++++ src/rust/protover/protover.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

1 0

[tor/release-0.4.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 0c90fc37ec7fcee01db6bc5e0784e759a7ec954c Merge: c5e610af0 71c49f735 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 14:17:10 2020 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2 changes/ticket33212 | 4 ++++ src/rust/protover/protover.rs | 2 +- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

1 0

[translation/bridgedb_completed] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 89bca0417743a31a9bb00b1ef58945f6b474bcba Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 18:45:22 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb_completed --- is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index 1374feaeab..613cfe4ea9 100644 --- a/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ # Translations template for bridgedb. -# Copyright (C) 2019 'The Tor Project, Inc.' +# Copyright (C) 2020 'The Tor Project, Inc.' # This file is distributed under the same license as the bridgedb project. # # Translators: -# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2016-2017,2019 +# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2016-2017,2019-2020 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-19 14:51-0700\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2019-11-07 20:27+0000\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2020-02-04 10:59-0800\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-02-10 18:43+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>\n" "Language-Team: Icelandic (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/is/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" @@ -283,62 +283,64 @@ msgstr "" msgid "I need an alternative way of getting bridges!" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:108 +#. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "get transport obfs4". +#: bridgedb/strings.py:109 #, python-format msgid "" -"Another way to get bridges is to send an email to %s. Please note that you must\n" -"send the email using an address from one of the following email providers:\n" -"%s or %s." +"Another way to get bridges is to send an email to %s. Leave the email subject\n" +"empty and write \"get transport obfs4\" in the email's message body. Please note\n" +"that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email\n" +"providers: %s or %s." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:115 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:117 msgid "My bridges don't work! I need help!" msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "Tor Browser". #. TRANSLATORS: The two '%s' are substituted with "Tor Browser Manual" and #. "Support Portal", respectively. -#: bridgedb/strings.py:119 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:121 #, python-format msgid "" "If your Tor Browser cannot connect, please take a look at the %s and our %s." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:123 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:125 msgid "Here are your bridge lines:" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:124 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:126 msgid "Get Bridges!" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:128 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:130 msgid "Please select options for bridge type:" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:129 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:131 msgid "Do you need IPv6 addresses?" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:130 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:132 #, python-format msgid "Do you need a %s?" msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:134 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:136 msgid "Your browser is not displaying images properly." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:135 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:137 msgid "Enter the characters from the image above..." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:139 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:141 msgid "How to start using your bridges" msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "Tor Browser". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:141 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:143 #, python-format msgid "" "To enter bridges into Tor Browser, first go to the %s Tor Browser download\n" @@ -347,21 +349,21 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "Tor". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:146 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:148 msgid "" "When the 'Tor Network Settings' dialogue pops up, click 'Configure' and follow\n" "the wizard until it asks:" msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "Tor". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:150 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:152 msgid "" "Does your Internet Service Provider (ISP) block or otherwise censor connections\n" "to the Tor network?" msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "Tor". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:154 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:156 msgid "" "Select 'Yes' and then click 'Next'. To configure your new bridges, copy and\n" "paste the bridge lines into the text input box. Finally, click 'Connect', and\n" @@ -369,28 +371,28 @@ msgid "" "button in the 'Tor Network Settings' wizard for further assistance." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:162 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:164 msgid "Displays this message." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please try to make it clear that "vanilla" here refers to the #. same non-Pluggable Transport bridges described above as being #. "plain-ol'-vanilla" bridges. -#: bridgedb/strings.py:166 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:168 msgid "Request vanilla bridges." msgstr "" -#: bridgedb/strings.py:167 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:169 msgid "Request IPv6 bridges." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate the word the word "TYPE". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:169 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:171 msgid "Request a Pluggable Transport by TYPE." msgstr "" #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "BridgeDB". #. TRANSLATORS: Please DO NOT translate "GnuPG". -#: bridgedb/strings.py:172 +#: bridgedb/strings.py:174 msgid "Get a copy of BridgeDB's public GnuPG key." msgstr ""

1 0

[translation/bridgedb] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb
by translation＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 3c437d6fd116923237e5c7feb84b040fa7e73fdc Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 18:45:16 2020 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=bridgedb --- is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po b/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po index 282828dfa2..c9ea69db60 100644 --- a/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po +++ b/is/LC_MESSAGES/bridgedb.po @@ -3,14 +3,14 @@ # This file is distributed under the same license as the bridgedb project. # # Translators: -# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2016-2017,2019 +# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2016-2017,2019-2020 msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: Tor Project\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: 'https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/newticket?component=BridgeDB&keywo…'\n" "POT-Creation-Date: 2020-02-04 10:59-0800\n" -"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-02-05 01:11+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: carolyn <carolyn(a)anhalt.org>\n" +"PO-Revision-Date: 2020-02-10 18:43+0000\n" +"Last-Translator: Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>\n" "Language-Team: Icelandic (http://www.transifex.com/otf/torproject/language/is/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -291,7 +291,7 @@ msgid "" "empty and write \"get transport obfs4\" in the email's message body. Please note\n" "that you must send the email using an address from one of the following email\n" "providers: %s or %s." -msgstr "" +msgstr "Önnur leið til að ná í brýr er að senda tölvupóst til %s. Skildu viðfangsefni póstsins\neftir autt og skrifaðu \"get transport obfs4\" í meginmál skilaboðanna.\nAthugaðu að þú verður\nað senda tölvupóstinn með netfangi frá einhverjum að eftirtöldum póstþjónustum:\n%s eða %s." #: bridgedb/strings.py:117 msgid "My bridges don't work! I need help!"

1 0

[tor/master] bump to 0.4.3.2-alpha
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit dab0b1c3a775ad2f0bd5df785cf6b0c56eb18361 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 13:37:59 2020 -0500 bump to 0.4.3.2-alpha --- configure.ac | 4 ++-- contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in | 2 +- src/win32/orconfig.h | 2 +- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index ec5ac4408..e31b5751f 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ dnl Copyright (c) 2007-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. dnl See LICENSE for licensing information AC_PREREQ([2.63]) -AC_INIT([tor],[0.4.3.1-alpha-dev]) +AC_INIT([tor],[0.4.3.2-alpha]) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([src/app/main/tor_main.c]) AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4]) @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ configure_flags="$*" # version number changes. Tor uses it to make sure that it # only shuts down for missing "required protocols" when those protocols # are listed as required by a consensus after this date. -AC_DEFINE(APPROX_RELEASE_DATE, ["2020-01-23"], # for 0.4.3.1-alpha-dev +AC_DEFINE(APPROX_RELEASE_DATE, ["2020-02-10"], # for 0.4.3.2-alpha [Approximate date when this software was released. (Updated when the version changes.)]) # "foreign" means we don't follow GNU package layout standards diff --git a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in index 3a4bd2c4b..6e5775a5e 100644 --- a/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in +++ b/contrib/win32build/tor-mingw.nsi.in @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ !include "LogicLib.nsh" !include "FileFunc.nsh" !insertmacro GetParameters -!define VERSION "0.4.3.1-alpha-dev" +!define VERSION "0.4.3.2-alpha" !define INSTALLER "tor-${VERSION}-win32.exe" !define WEBSITE "https://www.torproject.org/" !define LICENSE "LICENSE" diff --git a/src/win32/orconfig.h b/src/win32/orconfig.h index adcd9df3e..5422c9748 100644 --- a/src/win32/orconfig.h +++ b/src/win32/orconfig.h @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ #define USING_TWOS_COMPLEMENT /* Version number of package */ -#define VERSION "0.4.3.1-alpha-dev" +#define VERSION "0.4.3.2-alpha" #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 #define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR

1 0

[tpo/master] Update job post
by hiro＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 5cba8e965e16d49179b9d45d5dc0d8c97707b010 Author: hiro <hiro(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 19:20:21 2020 +0100 Update job post --- content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr b/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr index 219ce62..66b3522 100644 --- a/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr +++ b/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr @@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ Required Skills & Qualifications: To apply: -Please email a *PDF* of your resume/CV, and a cover letter explaining how your qualifications and experience meet the requirements of this job description. Please include the reasons why you want to work at Tor Project. +Please email a *PDF* of your resume/CV, and a cover letter explaining how your qualifications and experience meet the requirements of this job description. Please include your salary requirements and why you want to work at Tor Project. Email should be sent to hr at torproject dot org with "Executive Assistant " in the subject line. No phone calls, please.

1 0

[tpo/master] Add new job post
by hiro＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 4d90ac726921d434a4a496d22d252c3d923ad61f Author: hiro <hiro(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 10 18:21:07 2020 +0100 Add new job post --- content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr | 110 ++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 66 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr b/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr index 21772ed..219ce62 100644 --- a/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr +++ b/content/about/jobs/executive-assistant/contents.lr @@ -6,78 +6,100 @@ section: about --- section_id: about --- -active: False +active: True --- -title: Backend Engineer for OONI +title: Executive Assistant --- color: primary --- summary: -The Tor Project, Inc. is looking for a dedicated backend engineer to work on OONI (https://ooni.torproject.org/). OONI is the Open Observatory of Network Interference: a free and open source software, global observation network for detecting censorship, surveillance, and traffic manipulation on the internet. +The Tor Project is looking for an Executive Assistant! -You will be working to improve OONI's data processing pipeline and other backend components responsible for recording measurements collected from our growing global user network. You will also be tasked with improving our network measurement methodologies and data analysis heuristics to increase the accuracy of our experiments. +The Executive Assistant is responsible for providing high-level administrative support to the Executive Director. This position will actively manage the ED’s schedule, handle internal and external executive-level communications, and coordinate special projects and events. + +This position is full-time and remote; someone in the Eastern time zone strongly preferred. --- description: -## Backend Engineer for OONI -*January 31, 2018* +## Executive Assistant + +*February 5, 2020* + +The Tor Project is looking for an Executive Assistant! + +The Executive Assistant is responsible for providing high-level administrative support to the Executive Director. This position will actively manage the ED’s schedule, handle internal and external executive-level communications, and coordinate special projects and events. + +This position is full-time and remote; someone in the Eastern time zone strongly preferred. + +You: + +- Technology-competent and/or willing and able to learn new tools. Our team coordinates via IRC (the grandparent of Slack), email, Signal messaging app, and bug trackers, etc. + +- Have an exceptional ability to see ten steps ahead, anticipating and heading off issues before they become problems. + +- Highly skilled at prioritizing ED’s tasks and effectively communicating changing priorities on a daily basis. + +- Problem solver! Plans, strategies, and schedules change: You react quickly, are resilient, and take the initiative to find the best alternatives when these changes arise. + +- Independent: self-directed and able to get the job done; ensure the ED is on track. + +- Proactive: you take initiative in improving processes; you’re always thinking ahead. + +Job Duties: + +- Manage ED’s schedule: schedule meetings, screen for conflicts, and ensure the ED is prepared for important meetings. + +- Arrange travel, prepare expense reports, and handle other administrative tasks. + +- Head up the planning and logistics of twice-yearly organization-wide meetings. + +- Serve as proxy for ED at certain weekly meetings, take notes, and keep track of ED’s action items. + +- Develop and sustain a high level of professionalism among staff and community members. + +- Assist the ED with administering the organization’s travel policy: follow up on travel approvals and expenses and help manage the budget. + +- Assist the ED with reports, presentations, and follow ups with/for major donors and sponsors. -The Tor Project, Inc. is looking for a dedicated backend engineer to work on OONI (https://ooni.torproject.org/). OONI is the Open Observatory of Network Interference: a free and open source software, global observation network for detecting censorship, surveillance, and traffic manipulation on the internet. +Required Skills & Qualifications: -You will be working to improve OONI's data processing pipeline and other backend components responsible for recording measurements collected from our growing global user network. You will also be tasked with improving our network measurement methodologies and data analysis heuristics to increase the accuracy of our experiments. +- Be personable with strong interpersonal and oral/written communication skills; ability or willingness to learn to use various communication tools and function in an asynchronous work environment. -This is a full-time 12-month contract position, starting ASAP (no later than mid-May 2019); contract may be extended. +- Uphold a strict level of confidentiality. -The OONI team is based in Europe. However, this position may be performed remotely. +- Maintain a high level of attention to detail and accuracy. -Here are some of our code repositories: +- Ability to manage multiple tasks, re-prioritize on a daily basis, and meet deadlines. - https://github.com/ooni/api - https://github.com/ooni/pipeline - https://github.com/ooni/orchestra - https://github.com/ooni/collector - https://github.com/ooni/sysadmin +- Be highly organized with exceptional planning skills. -**Required skills and qualifications:** +- Able to work both independently and in a collaborative environment. - - Extensive experience in python or golang. - - Comfortable working remotely. - - Self-directed, self-disciplined, but good at working and communicating with a team. - - Have experience and be comfortable with others reviewing your code and design; have experience and be comfortable reviewing others' code. - - Experience documenting and designing protocols. - - Be comfortable with transparency! +- Ability to track and monitor travel budget spending at the org level. -**Preferred qualifications:** +- Willingness to try new methods, apps, and/or technology. - Experience designing, implementing, and maintaining scalable complex network applications. - Working experience with data processing pipelines. - Possess the confidence to refactor code and write unit-tests. - Familiarity with the challenges of developing and scaling data processing pipelines. - Familiarity with the network measurement field. - Experience with open-source software development, including working with distributed teams across different time-zones containing employees and volunteers of differing skill levels. - Basic familiarity with distributed version control systems. - Contributed significant chunks of code to multiple open-source projects in the past. - Be passionate about internet freedom and interested in contributing to it in a concrete way! +- Take initiative in completing assignments, solving problems, and seeking solutions. -**Other notes:** +- 3 to 5 years experience as Executive Assistant or similar roles. -Academic degrees are great but not required if you have the right experience. +- An interest in free and open source software and/or internet freedom is a bonus but not required. -You should be very good at working remotely at communicating with the team on a daily basis via Slack, IRC, instant messaging, email, and issue trackers. +To apply: -Salary negotiable. +Please email a *PDF* of your resume/CV, and a cover letter explaining how your qualifications and experience meet the requirements of this job description. Please include the reasons why you want to work at Tor Project. -**How to apply:** +Email should be sent to hr at torproject dot org with "Executive Assistant " in the subject line. No phone calls, please. -Please email a *PDF* of your resume/CV, and a cover letter explaining how your qualifications and experience meet the requirements of this job description. Please include the reasons why you want to work on OONI. Please also include link to one or several code samples (of which you are authorized to share), and also your GitHub or GitLab profile, and three professional references. +Other notes: -Email should be sent to jobs at openobservatory dot org with "OONI Backend Engineer" in the subject line. +We offer a competitive benefits package, including a generous PTO policy; 14 paid holidays per year (including the week between Christmas and New Year's, when the office is closed); health, vision, dental, disability, and life insurance; flexible work schedule; and occasional travel opportunities. -**About the project:** +The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in Seattle with paid staff and contractors of around 40 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world. Tor develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online, protecting people from tracking, surveillance, and censorship. -The Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) is a free software project under the Tor Project. OONI collects and processes network measurements with the aim of detecting network interferences, such as censorship, surveillance, and traffic manipulation. Since late 2012, OONI has collected millions of measurements across more than 90 countries around the world. +The Tor Project's mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, support their unrestricted availability and use, and further their scientific and popular understanding. -The Tor Project, Inc., is a 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in Seattle with paid staff and contractors of around 45 engineers and operational support people, plus many volunteers all over the world. Tor develops free and open source software for privacy and freedom online, protecting people from tracking, surveillance, and censorship. The Tor Project is funded in part by government grants and contracts, as well as by individual, foundation, and corporate donations. The Tor Project's mission is to advance human rights and freedoms by creating and deploying free and open source anonymity and privacy technologies, support their unrestricted availability and use, and further their scientific and popular understanding. +We are committed to creating and maintaining a diverse and safe environment, and we are committed to our Social Contract, Membership Values, and our Code of Conduct. -The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer. +The Tor Project, Inc., is an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer. We strongly encourage everyone to apply to this position without regard to race, color, religion, gender, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, national origin, genetics, disability, or age.

1 0

[tor/master] Added Timeout and Node Sections to the Tor Manual
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 304aa4048c6673f3a2f10a1df8285dae7304e496 Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Sat Feb 1 00:07:56 2020 +0530 Added Timeout and Node Sections to the Tor Manual --- doc/tor.1.txt | 540 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------- 1 file changed, 273 insertions(+), 267 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index a5108df80..dde9ffd54 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -998,18 +998,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the documentation of the pluggable transport for details of what arguments it supports. -// Out of order because it logically belongs before the CircuitBuildTimeout option -[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**:: - If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1) - -[[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__:: - - Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't - open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this - value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used. - (Default: 60 seconds) - [[CircuitPadding]] **CircuitPadding** **0**|**1**:: If set to 0, Tor will not pad client circuits with additional cover traffic. Only clients may set this option. This option should be offered @@ -1025,22 +1013,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if via the UI to mobile users for use where bandwidth may be expensive. (Default: 0) -[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__:: - Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for - this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept - open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each - of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely - idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS - connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized - from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes; - Max: 24 hours) - -[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__:: - If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how - many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. - If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a - number like 60. (Default: 0) - [[ClientAutoIPv6ORPort]] **ClientAutoIPv6ORPort** **0**|**1**:: If this option is set to 1, Tor clients randomly prefer a node's IPv4 or IPv6 ORPort. The random preference is set every time a node is loaded @@ -1181,13 +1153,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.) -[[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: - If Tor spends this much time without any client activity, - enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and - directory information is not fetched. - Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes. - (Default: 24 hours) - [[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**:: If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory, it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made @@ -1198,11 +1163,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0) -[[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**:: - If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing) - counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout. - If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1) - [[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**:: If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the information in their @@ -1214,76 +1174,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in the same /16 range. (Default: 1) -[[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes - to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. - Normal circuits include all - circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge - option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and - UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. + - + - The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both - EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See - the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. - -[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address - patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are - 2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must - be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign. - (Example: - ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + - + - By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed - to override in order to keep working. - For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, - but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points, - Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this - behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). + - + - Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection - options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. - Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers - can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + - + - Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose - country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if - no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below. - -// Out of order because it logically belongs after the ExcludeNodes option -[[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address - patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a - node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any - node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this - list too. See - the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify - nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. - -[[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address - patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a - node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See - the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. + - + - Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit - nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, - if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't - be able to browse the web. + - + - Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of - the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those - used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, - those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end - at a non-exit node. To - keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. + - + - The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both - ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. + - + - The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides - this option. - [[FascistFirewall]] **FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**:: If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**). @@ -1297,14 +1187,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443) -[[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: - If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in - ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and - possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to - '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes - and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't - configured or can't be found. (Default: auto) - [[HidServAuth]] **HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]:: Client authorization for a v2 hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16 characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22 @@ -1315,116 +1197,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if services can be configured to require authorization using the **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option. -[[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and - address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the - second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits. - This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes - and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order - to discover your primary guard node. - (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.) - + - (Example: - HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + - + - When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will - look like: - + - C - G - L2 - M - Rend + - C - G - L2 - M - HSDir + - C - G - L2 - M - Intro + - S - G - L2 - M - Rend + - S - G - L2 - M - HSDir + - S - G - L2 - M - Intro + - + - where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node, - L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node. - Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this - option. - + - This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create - paths of the form: - + - C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend + - C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir + - C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro + - S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend + - S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir + - S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro + - + - ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes, - which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be - picked. - + - When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet - and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service - circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present - as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This - is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information - about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points - in the path. - + - This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as - https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and - updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load - balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in - HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. - Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually. - -[[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and - address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the - third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits. - This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes - and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order - to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes. - (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.) - + - (Example: - HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + - + - When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths - will look like: + - C - G - M - L3 - Rend + - C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir + - C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro + - S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend + - S - G - M - L3 - HSDir + - S - G - M - L3 - Intro + - where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node, - L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node. - Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this - option. - + - While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be - combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form: - + - C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend + - C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir + - C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro + - S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend + - S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir + - S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro + - + - ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes, - which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be - picked. - + - When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet - and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service - circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present - as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This - is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information - about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points - in the path. - + - This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as - https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and - updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load - balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in - HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. - Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually. - [[HTTPTunnelPort]] **HTTPTunnelPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for proxy connections using the "HTTP CONNECT" protocol instead of SOCKS. Set this to @@ -1510,26 +1282,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if client streams. A circuit is pending if we have begun constructing it, but it has not yet been completely constructed. (Default: 32) -[[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes - to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits. - Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections - to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. + -+ - This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers - and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it - without care will strongly influence your anonymity. This feature might get - removed in the future. -+ - The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion - service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this - option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes - from this set. -+ - The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both - MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See - the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. - [[NATDPort]] **NATDPort** ['address'**:**]{empty}__port__|**auto** [_isolation flags_]:: Open this port to listen for connections from old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc) using the NATD protocol. @@ -1871,24 +1623,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if line is used, and all earlier flags are ignored. No error is issued for conflicting flags. -[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__:: - Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds - unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: - 2 minutes) - -[[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**:: - If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option - as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if - doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes does not apply to - ExcludeExitNodes, ExitNodes, MiddleNodes, or MapAddress). If StrictNodes - is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, - but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. - Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded - node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests, - connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, - fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download - directory information. (Default: 0) - [[TokenBucketRefillInterval]] **TokenBucketRefillInterval** __NUM__ [**msec**|**second**]:: Set the refill delay interval of Tor's token bucket to NUM milliseconds. NUM must be between 1 and 1000, inclusive. When Tor is out of bandwidth, @@ -2033,6 +1767,278 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. +== TIMEOUT OPTIONS + +The following options are useful for configuring timeouts: + +[[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__:: + Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for + this amount of time. This option governs how long idle circuits are kept + open, as well as the amount of time Tor will keep a circuit open to each + of the recently used ports. This way when the Tor client is entirely + idle, it can expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS + connections. Note that the actual timeout value is uniformly randomized + from the specified value to twice that amount. (Default: 30 minutes; + Max: 24 hours) + +// Out of order because it logically belongs before the CircuitBuildTimeout option +[[LearnCircuitBuildTimeout]] **LearnCircuitBuildTimeout** **0**|**1**:: + If 0, CircuitBuildTimeout adaptive learning is disabled. (Default: 1) + +[[CircuitBuildTimeout]] **CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__:: + Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't + open in that time, give up on it. If LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 1, this + value serves as the initial value to use before a timeout is learned. If + LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is 0, this value is the only value used. + (Default: 60 seconds) + +[[CircuitStreamTimeout]] **CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__:: + If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how + many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit. + If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a + number like 60. (Default: 0) + +[[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: + If Tor spends this much time without any client activity, + enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and + directory information is not fetched. + Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes. + (Default: 24 hours) + +[[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**:: + If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing) + counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout. + If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1) + +[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__:: + Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds + unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: + 2 minutes) + +== ADVANCED OPTIONS + +The following options include Tor nodes: + +[[EntryNodes]] **EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes + to use for the first hop in your normal circuits. + Normal circuits include all + circuits except for direct connections to directory servers. The Bridge + option overrides this option; if you have configured bridges and + UseBridges is 1, the Bridges are used as your entry nodes. + + + + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + EntryNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See + the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. + +[[ExcludeNodes]] **ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address + patterns of nodes to avoid when building a circuit. Country codes are + 2-letter ISO3166 codes, and must + be wrapped in braces; fingerprints may be preceded by a dollar sign. + (Example: + ExcludeNodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + + + + By default, this option is treated as a preference that Tor is allowed + to override in order to keep working. + For example, if you try to connect to a hidden service, + but you have excluded all of the hidden service's introduction points, + Tor will connect to one of them anyway. If you do not want this + behavior, set the StrictNodes option (documented below). + + + + Note also that if you are a relay, this (and the other node selection + options below) only affects your own circuits that Tor builds for you. + Clients can still build circuits through you to any node. Controllers + can tell Tor to build circuits through any node. + + + + Country codes are case-insensitive. The code "\{??}" refers to nodes whose + country can't be identified. No country code, including \{??}, works if + no GeoIPFile can be loaded. See also the GeoIPExcludeUnknown option below. + +// Out of order because it logically belongs after the ExcludeNodes option +[[ExcludeExitNodes]] **ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address + patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. Note that any + node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this + list too. See + the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify + nodes. See also the caveats on the "ExitNodes" option below. + +[[ExitNodes]] **ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, country codes, and address + patterns of nodes to use as exit node---that is, a + node that delivers traffic for you *outside* the Tor network. See + the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. + + + + Note that if you list too few nodes here, or if you exclude too many exit + nodes with ExcludeExitNodes, you can degrade functionality. For example, + if none of the exits you list allows traffic on port 80 or 443, you won't + be able to browse the web. + + + + Note also that not every circuit is used to deliver traffic *outside* of + the Tor network. It is normal to see non-exit circuits (such as those + used to connect to hidden services, those that do directory fetches, + those used for relay reachability self-tests, and so on) that end + at a non-exit node. To + keep a node from being used entirely, see ExcludeNodes and StrictNodes. + + + + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + ExitNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. + + + + The .exit address notation, if enabled via MapAddress, overrides + this option. + +[[GeoIPExcludeUnknown]] **GeoIPExcludeUnknown** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: + If this option is set to 'auto', then whenever any country code is set in + ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes, all nodes with unknown country (\{??} and + possibly \{A1}) are treated as excluded as well. If this option is set to + '1', then all unknown countries are treated as excluded in ExcludeNodes + and ExcludeExitNodes. This option has no effect when a GeoIP file isn't + configured or can't be found. (Default: auto) + +[[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and + address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the + second hop in all client or service-side Onion Service circuits. + This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes + and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order + to discover your primary guard node. + (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the second hop.) + + + (Example: + HSLayer2Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + + + + When this is set, the resulting hidden service paths will + look like: + + + C - G - L2 - M - Rend + + C - G - L2 - M - HSDir + + C - G - L2 - M - Intro + + S - G - L2 - M - Rend + + S - G - L2 - M - HSDir + + S - G - L2 - M - Intro + + + + where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node, + L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node. + Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this + option. + + + This option may be combined with HSLayer3Nodes to create + paths of the form: + + + C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend + + C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir + + C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro + + S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend + + S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir + + S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro + + + + ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer2Nodes, + which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be + picked. + + + When either this option or HSLayer3Nodes are set, the /16 subnet + and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service + circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present + as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This + is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information + about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points + in the path. + + + This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as + https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and + updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load + balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in + HSLayer2Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. + Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually. + +[[HSLayer3Nodes]] **HSLayer3Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and + address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the + third hop in all client and service-side Onion Service circuits. + This option mitigates attacks where the adversary runs middle nodes + and induces your client or service to create many circuits, in order + to discover your primary or Layer2 guard nodes. + (Default: Any node in the network may be used in the third hop.) + + + (Example: + HSLayer3Nodes ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + + + + When this is set by itself, the resulting hidden service paths + will look like: + + C - G - M - L3 - Rend + + C - G - M - L3 - M - HSDir + + C - G - M - L3 - M - Intro + + S - G - M - L3 - M - Rend + + S - G - M - L3 - HSDir + + S - G - M - L3 - Intro + + where C is this client, S is the service, G is the Guard node, + L2 is a node from this option, and M is a random middle node. + Rend, HSDir, and Intro point selection is not affected by this + option. + + + While it is possible to use this option by itself, it should be + combined with HSLayer2Nodes to create paths of the form: + + + C - G - L2 - L3 - Rend + + C - G - L2 - L3 - M - HSDir + + C - G - L2 - L3 - M - Intro + + S - G - L2 - L3 - M - Rend + + S - G - L2 - L3 - HSDir + + S - G - L2 - L3 - Intro + + + + ExcludeNodes have higher priority than HSLayer3Nodes, + which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be + picked. + + + When either this option or HSLayer2Nodes are set, the /16 subnet + and node family restrictions are removed for hidden service + circuits. Additionally, we allow the guard node to be present + as the Rend, HSDir, and IP node, and as the hop before it. This + is done to prevent the adversary from inferring information + about our guard, layer2, and layer3 node choices at later points + in the path. + + + This option is meant to be managed by a Tor controller such as + https://github.com/mikeperry-tor/vanguards that selects and + updates this set of nodes for you. Hence it does not do load + balancing if fewer than 20 nodes are selected, and if no nodes in + HSLayer3Nodes are currently available for use, Tor will not work. + Please use extreme care if you are setting this option manually. + +[[MiddleNodes]] **MiddleNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: + A list of identity fingerprints and country codes of nodes + to use for "middle" hops in your normal circuits. + Normal circuits include all circuits except for direct connections + to directory servers. Middle hops are all hops other than exit and entry. + ++ + This is an **experimental** feature that is meant to be used by researchers + and developers to test new features in the Tor network safely. Using it + without care will strongly influence your anonymity. This feature might get + removed in the future. ++ + The HSLayer2Node and HSLayer3Node options override this option for onion + service circuits, if they are set. The vanguards addon will read this + option, and if set, it will set HSLayer2Nodes and HSLayer3Nodes to nodes + from this set. ++ + The ExcludeNodes option overrides this option: any node listed in both + MiddleNodes and ExcludeNodes is treated as excluded. See + the **ExcludeNodes** option for more information on how to specify nodes. + +[[StrictNodes]] **StrictNodes** **0**|**1**:: + If StrictNodes is set to 1, Tor will treat solely the ExcludeNodes option + as a requirement to follow for all the circuits you generate, even if + doing so will break functionality for you (StrictNodes does not apply to + ExcludeExitNodes, ExitNodes, MiddleNodes, or MapAddress). If StrictNodes + is set to 0, Tor will still try to avoid nodes in the ExcludeNodes list, + but it will err on the side of avoiding unexpected errors. + Specifically, StrictNodes 0 tells Tor that it is okay to use an excluded + node when it is *necessary* to perform relay reachability self-tests, + connect to a hidden service, provide a hidden service to a client, + fulfill a .exit request, upload directory information, or download + directory information. (Default: 0) == SERVER OPTIONS @@ -3652,7 +3658,7 @@ __DataDirectory__/**`approved-routers`**:: __DataDirectory__ for an example fingerprint line. If the status is **!reject** then descriptors from the given identity (fingerprint/pubkey) are rejected by this server. If it is **!invalid** then descriptors are - accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not + accepted but marked in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended. __DataDirectory__/**`v3-status-votes`**::

1 0

[tor/master] Updated introductory text for CIRCUIT TIMEOUT and DORMANT MODE options
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 305934c67b919b7ab16270e4c75531f5e0de7210 Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Fri Feb 7 16:36:09 2020 +0530 Updated introductory text for CIRCUIT TIMEOUT and DORMANT MODE options --- doc/tor.1.txt | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 73f9dd385..a9b9852b7 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1737,7 +1737,8 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if // These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. // Please keep them that way! -The following options are useful for configuring timeouts: +The following options are useful for configuring timeouts related +to building Tor circuits and using them: [[CircuitsAvailableTimeout]] **CircuitsAvailableTimeout** __NUM__:: Tor will attempt to keep at least one open, unused circuit available for @@ -1776,8 +1777,8 @@ The following options are useful for configuring timeouts: // These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. // Please keep them that way! -The following options can be used to configure Tor -when the client is running in dormant mode: +Tor can enter dormant mode to conserve power and network bandwidth. +The following options control when Tor enters and leaves dormant mode: [[DormantCanceledByStartup]] **DormantCanceledByStartup** **0**|**1**:: By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time

1 0

[tor/master] Added a section for Dormant mode options
by nickm＠torproject.org 10 Feb '20

10 Feb '20

commit 05adecf2115fe8e95a888a6ad5cdc0322181a332 Author: swati <swati.thacker(a)oracle.com> Date: Thu Feb 6 21:33:58 2020 +0530 Added a section for Dormant mode options --- doc/tor.1.txt | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 43a014c60..73f9dd385 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1138,31 +1138,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if addresses/ports. See SocksPort for an explanation of isolation flags. (Default: 0) -[[DormantCanceledByStartup]] **DormantCanceledByStartup** **0**|**1**:: - By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time - it was shut down, and in dormant mode if it was dormant. But if - this option is true, Tor treats every startup event as user - activity, and Tor will never start in Dormant mode, even if it has - been unused for a long time on previous runs. (Default: 0) - + - Note: Packagers and application developers should change the value of - this option only with great caution: it has the potential to - create spurious traffic on the network. This option should only - be used if Tor is started by an affirmative user activity (like - clicking on an applcation or running a command), and not if Tor - is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup - process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.) - -[[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**:: - If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory, - it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made - a request. (This mode is recommended if installing a Tor client for a - user who might not actually use it.) If false, Tor bootstraps the first - time it is started, whether it sees a user request or not. - + - After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was - dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0) - [[DownloadExtraInfo]] **DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**:: If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents contain information about servers other than the information in their @@ -1757,7 +1732,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if used IP. For local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed. -== TIMEOUT OPTIONS +== CIRCUIT TIMEOUT OPTIONS // These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. // Please keep them that way! @@ -1791,6 +1766,34 @@ The following options are useful for configuring timeouts: If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a number like 60. (Default: 0) +[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__:: + Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds + unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: + 2 minutes) + +== DORMANT MODE OPTIONS + +// These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted. +// Please keep them that way! + +The following options can be used to configure Tor +when the client is running in dormant mode: + +[[DormantCanceledByStartup]] **DormantCanceledByStartup** **0**|**1**:: + By default, Tor starts in active mode if it was active the last time + it was shut down, and in dormant mode if it was dormant. But if + this option is true, Tor treats every startup event as user + activity, and Tor will never start in Dormant mode, even if it has + been unused for a long time on previous runs. (Default: 0) + + + Note: Packagers and application developers should change the value of + this option only with great caution: it has the potential to + create spurious traffic on the network. This option should only + be used if Tor is started by an affirmative user activity (like + clicking on an applcation or running a command), and not if Tor + is launched for some other reason (for example, by a startup + process, or by an application that launches itself on every login.) + [[DormantClientTimeout]] **DormantClientTimeout** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**:: If Tor spends this much time without any client activity, enter a dormant state where automatic circuits are not built, and @@ -1798,16 +1801,21 @@ The following options are useful for configuring timeouts: Does not affect servers or onion services. Must be at least 10 minutes. (Default: 24 hours) +[[DormantOnFirstStartup]] **DormantOnFirstStartup** **0**|**1**:: + If true, then the first time Tor starts up with a fresh DataDirectory, + it starts in dormant mode, and takes no actions until the user has made + a request. (This mode is recommended if installing a Tor client for a + user who might not actually use it.) If false, Tor bootstraps the first + time it is started, whether it sees a user request or not. + + + After the first time Tor starts, it begins in dormant mode if it was + dormant before, and not otherwise. (Default: 0) + [[DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams]] **DormantTimeoutDisabledByIdleStreams** **0**|**1**:: If true, then any open client stream (even one not reading or writing) counts as client activity for the purpose of DormantClientTimeout. If false, then only network activity counts. (Default: 1) -[[SocksTimeout]] **SocksTimeout** __NUM__:: - Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds - unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default: - 2 minutes) - == NODE SELECTION OPTIONS // These options are in alphabetical order, with exceptions as noted.

1 0

Jump to page:

2025

2024

2023

2022

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

tor-commits February 2020