commit 17458a87d73f605fe6a4bb3c23cf2de135eec99c
Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org>
Date: Mon Jun 24 22:08:49 2019 +0200
Prevent UB on signed overflow.
Overflowing a signed integer in C is an undefined behaviour.
It is possible to trigger this undefined behaviour in tor_asprintf on
Windows or systems lacking vasprintf.
On these systems, eiter _vscprintf or vsnprintf is called to retrieve
the required amount of bytes to hold the string. These functions can
return INT_MAX. The easiest way to recreate this is the use of a
specially crafted configuration file, e.g. containing the line:
FirewallPorts AAAAA<in total 2147483610 As>
This line triggers the needed tor_asprintf call which eventually
leads to an INT_MAX return value from _vscprintf or vsnprintf.
The needed byte for \0 is added to the result, triggering the
overflow and therefore the undefined behaviour.
Casting the value to size_t before addition fixes the behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org>
---
src/lib/string/printf.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/lib/string/printf.c b/src/lib/string/printf.c
index 415d4ac4a..00659337e 100644
--- a/src/lib/string/printf.c
+++ b/src/lib/string/printf.c
@@ -117,8 +117,8 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args)
*strp = NULL;
return -1;
}
- strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len + 1);
- r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args);
+ strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len + 1);
+ r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args);
if (r != len) {
tor_free(strp_tmp);
*strp = NULL;
@@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args)
*strp = tor_strdup(buf);
return len;
}
- strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1);
+ strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len+1);
/* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */
- r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args);
+ r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args);
if (r != len) {
tor_free(strp_tmp);
*strp = NULL;