October 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[translation/tpo-web_completed] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=tpo-web_completed
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 0f1e9fc9629754079a7d444a02ab43de4be43965 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 17:24:13 2019 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=tpo-web_completed --- contents+fr.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+pt-BR.po | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- contents+pt-PT.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+tr.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+zh-CN.po | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- contents.pot | 14 +++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+fr.po b/contents+fr.po index 43e65b073..e7c876289 100644 --- a/contents+fr.po +++ b/contents+fr.po @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: AO <ao(a)localizationlab.org>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: French (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fr/)\n" @@ -56,6 +56,18 @@ msgstr "" " logiciels gratuits et à des réseaux ouverts. [Rencontrez notre " "équipe](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+pt-BR.po b/contents+pt-BR.po index 0fa2345c4..15f02384f 100644 --- a/contents+pt-BR.po +++ b/contents+pt-BR.po @@ -6,21 +6,21 @@ # Anna e só <contraexemplos(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Alexei Gonçalves de Oliveira <alexis(a)gessicahellmann.com>, 2019 # Gus, 2019 -# Chacal E., 2019 -# Communia <ameaneantie(a)riseup.net>, 2019 # Greg Strider <gboufleur(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Danihells <dcdcampos75(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Eduardo Addad de Oliveira <eduardoaddad(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 +# Communia <ameaneantie(a)riseup.net>, 2019 +# Chacal E., 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Eduardo Addad de Oliveira <eduardoaddad(a)hotmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Chacal E., 2019\n" "Language-Team: Portuguese (Brazil) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/pt_BR/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -62,6 +62,18 @@ msgstr "" "privacidade online por meio de software livre e redes abertas. [Conheça " "nossa equipe](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+pt-PT.po b/contents+pt-PT.po index 764aec0b7..f0a4cff26 100644 --- a/contents+pt-PT.po +++ b/contents+pt-PT.po @@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ # Manuela Silva <inactive+h_manuela_rodsilva(a)transifex.com>, 2019 # Hugo9191 <hugoncosta(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 -# Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019 # Manuela Silva <manuelarodsilva(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Manuela Silva <manuelarodsilva(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Portuguese (Portugal) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/pt_PT/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -48,6 +48,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+tr.po b/contents+tr.po index cc8a3bac1..3e0fecb1d 100644 --- a/contents+tr.po +++ b/contents+tr.po @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ # T. E. Kalayci <tekrei(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Lale Fatoş Tunçman <latuna63(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Turkish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/tr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ msgstr "" "Ücretsiz yazılımlar ve açık ağlar sağlayarak insan haklarını geliştiriyoruz ve çevrimiçi kişisel gizliliğinizi koruyoruz.\n" "[Ekibimizle tanışın](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+zh-CN.po b/contents+zh-CN.po index c167932f5..6cbc25e10 100644 --- a/contents+zh-CN.po +++ b/contents+zh-CN.po @@ -6,19 +6,19 @@ # ヨイツの賢狼ホロ, 2019 # Dianyu Liu <liudianyu5(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # ciaran <ciaranchen(a)qq.com>, 2019 -# Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019 -# ff98sha, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # MD Rights <psychi2009(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# ff98sha, 2019 +# Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: MD Rights <psychi2009(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (China) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/zh_CN/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "我们推进人权保护，用自由软件和开放的网络来捍卫你的在线隐私。[我们的团队](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents.pot b/contents.pot index 3bc65c433..ad1dec1ee 100644 --- a/contents.pot +++ b/contents.pot @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" "Language-Team: en <LL(a)li.org>\n" @@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ msgstr "" "We advance human rights and defend your privacy online through free software" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact"

1 0

[translation/tpo-web] https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=tpo-web
by translation＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit f4d61c28c513d2f049b7e8fd63ad831b0bcb3b34 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 17:24:02 2019 +0000 https://gitweb.torproject.org/translation.git/commit/?h=tpo-web --- contents+am.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+ar.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+az.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+be.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+bg.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+bn.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+bo.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+ca.po | 19 +++++++++++++++++-- contents+cs.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+cy.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+da.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+de.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+el.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+en_GB.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+eo.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+es-AR.po | 16 ++++++++++++++-- contents+es.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+et.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+eu.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+fa.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+fi.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+fil.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+fo.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+fr.po | 15 ++++++++++++++- contents+ga.po | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- contents+gl.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+he.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+hi.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+hr.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+hu.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+id.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+is.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+it.po | 18 ++++++++++++++++-- contents+ja.po | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- contents+ka.po | 15 ++++++++++++++- contents+kk.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+km.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+ko.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+lt.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+lv.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+mk.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+ml.po | 16 +++++++++++++++- contents+ms.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+my.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+nb.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+nl.po | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- contents+nn.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+pl.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+pt-BR.po | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- contents+pt-PT.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+ro.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+ru.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+sk.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+sl.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+sq.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+sr.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+sv.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+sw.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+ta.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+th.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+tr.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+uk.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents+ur.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+uz.po | 14 +++++++++++++- contents+vi.po | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- contents+zh-CN.po | 20 ++++++++++++++++---- contents+zh-TW.po | 18 +++++++++++++++--- contents.pot | 14 +++++++++++++- 68 files changed, 960 insertions(+), 129 deletions(-) diff --git a/contents+am.po b/contents+am.po index 0a437de67..dbddf9197 100644 --- a/contents+am.po +++ b/contents+am.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Amharic (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/am/)\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ar.po b/contents+ar.po index d6bcbb8c4..f9f8f85ad 100644 --- a/contents+ar.po +++ b/contents+ar.po @@ -1,20 +1,20 @@ # Translators: # Martus Translations <translations(a)martus.org>, 2019 -# Khaled Hosny, 2019 # ButterflyOfFire, 2019 # Ahmad Gharbeia <gharbeia(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Ahmed A. <6622227a(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Ahmed IB <mee.tbhole(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Khaled Hosny, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Khaled Hosny, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Arabic (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ar/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ msgstr "" "ندعم حقوق الإنسان وندافع عن خصوصيتك على الإنترنت عبر برمجيات مجانية وشبكات " "مفتوحة. [قابل فريقنا](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "تبرع اليوم، وستجاريك موزيلا وتبرع بنفس المبلغ." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+az.po b/contents+az.po index f09be5472..59e31b322 100644 --- a/contents+az.po +++ b/contents+az.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Azerbaijani (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/az/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+be.po b/contents+be.po index e6af0a0a1..c4083b568 100644 --- a/contents+be.po +++ b/contents+be.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Belarusian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/be/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+bg.po b/contents+bg.po index 6e52adde8..8a84a468d 100644 --- a/contents+bg.po +++ b/contents+bg.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Bulgarian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/bg/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+bn.po b/contents+bn.po index 575e4a501..1f4e6de1b 100644 --- a/contents+bn.po +++ b/contents+bn.po @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ # lisa hayat, 2019 # Tabiha Tanha <tabihatanha(a)yandex.com>, 2019 # code smite <codesmite(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# erinm, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Bengali (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/bn/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -50,6 +50,18 @@ msgstr "" "নেটওয়ার্কের মাধ্যমে আপনার গোপনীয়তা রক্ষা করি। [আমাদের দলের সাথে দেখা " "করুন](about/people)।" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "অর্থ সাহায্য করুন, এবং মজিলা সমপরিমাণ সাহায্য করবে। " + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+bo.po b/contents+bo.po index e40febd0a..549f936d0 100644 --- a/contents+bo.po +++ b/contents+bo.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Tibetan (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/bo/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ca.po b/contents+ca.po index 9ae1230f2..ba4f78ac8 100644 --- a/contents+ca.po +++ b/contents+ca.po @@ -4,14 +4,16 @@ # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Ecron <ecron_89(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 +# Benny Beat <bennybeat(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# Marc Ripoll <markripesp(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Ecron <ecron_89(a)hotmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Marc Ripoll <markripesp(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Catalan (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ca/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -49,6 +51,19 @@ msgstr "" "mitjançant programari lliure i xarxes obertes. [Coneixeu el nostre " "equip](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" +"El seguiment, la vigilància i la censura en línia estan a l'ordre del dia." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Dóna avui, i Mozilla donarà el mateix import." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+cs.po b/contents+cs.po index 44c7e5ecc..9d4df35d1 100644 --- a/contents+cs.po +++ b/contents+cs.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Michal Stanke <mstanke(a)mozilla.cz>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Czech (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/cs/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Přispějte hned a Mozilla vás dar zdvojnásobí." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+cy.po b/contents+cy.po index df671dc56..fa2bd1617 100644 --- a/contents+cy.po +++ b/contents+cy.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Welsh (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/cy/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+da.po b/contents+da.po index 26866b753..b7ea66209 100644 --- a/contents+da.po +++ b/contents+da.po @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ # Translators: # KIA <kia___(a)hushmail.com>, 2019 -# scootergrisen, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# scootergrisen, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: scootergrisen, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Danish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/da/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ msgstr "" "Vi fremmer menneskerettigheder og forsvarer dit privatliv online, gennem fri" " software og åbne netværk. [Mød vores team](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Sporing, overvågning og censur bruges meget online." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Giv i dag, og Mozilla vil matche din donation." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+de.po b/contents+de.po index 207e4e969..6d731d1b9 100644 --- a/contents+de.po +++ b/contents+de.po @@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ # c8faa9c4b9d81319c5c2fd62ae3a9956, 2019 # Marcel Haring <getting(a)autistici.org>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 -# Curtis Baltimore <curtisbaltimore(a)protonmail.com>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Curtis Baltimore <curtisbaltimore(a)protonmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Curtis Baltimore <curtisbaltimore(a)protonmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: German (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/de/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -55,6 +55,18 @@ msgstr "" "kostenlose Software und offene Netzwerke. [Lerne unser Team " "kennen](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Verfolgung, Überwachung und Zensur sind online weit verbreitet." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Gib noch heute, und Mozilla wird deiner Spende entsprechen." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+el.po b/contents+el.po index e810cd30b..0584391c9 100644 --- a/contents+el.po +++ b/contents+el.po @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ # Wasilis Mandratzis-Walz <inactive+beonex123(a)transifex.com>, 2019 # Alex <hestia(a)riseup.net>, 2019 # Panagiotis Vasilopoulos, 2019 -# Sofia K., 2019 # LaScapigliata <ditri2000(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 # Adrian Pappas <pappasadrian(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # A Papac <ap909219(a)protonmail.com>, 2019 +# Sofia K., 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: A Papac <ap909219(a)protonmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Sofia K., 2019\n" "Language-Team: Greek (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/el/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Δωρίστε σήμερα και το Mozilla θα δωρίσει το ίδιο ποσό!" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+en_GB.po b/contents+en_GB.po index 4a89b2f1b..fd29679e7 100644 --- a/contents+en_GB.po +++ b/contents+en_GB.po @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ # Translators: # Darren Richardson, 2019 -# Andi Chandler <andi(a)gowling.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Andi Chandler <andi(a)gowling.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Andi Chandler <andi(a)gowling.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: English (United Kingdom) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/en_GB/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+eo.po b/contents+eo.po index 79a029448..b1807238d 100644 --- a/contents+eo.po +++ b/contents+eo.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Esperanto (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/eo/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+es-AR.po b/contents+es-AR.po index c553ab257..522271c32 100644 --- a/contents+es-AR.po +++ b/contents+es-AR.po @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Translators: # ezemelano <melanoeze(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Joaquín Serna, 2019 +# Joaquín Serna <bubuanabelas(a)cryptolab.net>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Zuhualime Akoochimoya, 2019 # @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Zuhualime Akoochimoya, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Spanish (Argentina) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/es_AR/)\n" @@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ msgstr "" "de software libre y redes abiertas. [Conocé a nuestro equipo](acerca " "de/personal)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Dá hoy, y Mozilla emparejará tu donación." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+es.po b/contents+es.po index 26e1c191b..132595487 100644 --- a/contents+es.po +++ b/contents+es.po @@ -4,18 +4,18 @@ # strel, 2019 # Zuhualime Akoochimoya, 2019 # sim, 2019 -# eulalio barbero espinosa <eulaliob(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # David Figuera <dfb(a)fastmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# eulalio barbero espinosa <eulaliob(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: eulalio barbero espinosa <eulaliob(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Spanish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/es/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ msgstr "" " del software libre y las redes abiertas. [Conoce nuestro " "equipo](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "El rastreo, la vigilancia y la censura están muy extendidos en línea." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Dona hoy, y Mozilla igualará tu donación." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+et.po b/contents+et.po index c3ba89a35..7654e436a 100644 --- a/contents+et.po +++ b/contents+et.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Estonian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/et/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+eu.po b/contents+eu.po index 0d63483ac..515f486c7 100644 --- a/contents+eu.po +++ b/contents+eu.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Basque (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/eu/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+fa.po b/contents+fa.po index 2982dde0e..525aa7d93 100644 --- a/contents+fa.po +++ b/contents+fa.po @@ -4,19 +4,19 @@ # Yazdan, 2019 # A.Mehraban <Mehr.Ban(a)chmail.ir>, 2019 # Reza Ghasemi, 2019 -# Vox, 2019 # Goudarz Jafari <goudarz.jafari(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # MYZJ, 2019 +# Vox, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: MYZJ, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Vox, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Persian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fa/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -56,6 +56,18 @@ msgstr "" "از حریم خصوصی خود به صورت آنلاین محافظت می‌کنیم. [دیدار با تیم " "ما](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "امروز کمک کنید و موزیلا با کمک مالی شما همراهی می‌کند." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+fi.po b/contents+fi.po index b9a88f078..eeca6d137 100644 --- a/contents+fi.po +++ b/contents+fi.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Finnish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fi/)\n" @@ -50,6 +50,18 @@ msgstr "" "Edistämme ihmisoikeuksia ja suojelemme sinun verkkoyksityisyyttäsi ilmaisen " "ohjelmiston ja avoimien verkostojen avulla. [Kohtaa tiimimme]" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+fil.po b/contents+fil.po index c59ec0321..28becb8aa 100644 --- a/contents+fil.po +++ b/contents+fil.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Filipino (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fil/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+fo.po b/contents+fo.po index 44107fb74..40d4ffce1 100644 --- a/contents+fo.po +++ b/contents+fo.po @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Faroese (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fo/)\n" @@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+fr.po b/contents+fr.po index 43e65b073..55a88238a 100644 --- a/contents+fr.po +++ b/contents+fr.po @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: AO <ao(a)localizationlab.org>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: French (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/fr/)\n" @@ -56,6 +56,19 @@ msgstr "" " logiciels gratuits et à des réseaux ouverts. [Rencontrez notre " "équipe](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" +"Le pistage, la surveillance et la censure sont très répandus sur Internet." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Faites un don aujourd’hui et Mozilla fera un don équivalent." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ga.po b/contents+ga.po index cdde3fc15..abe9998d0 100644 --- a/contents+ga.po +++ b/contents+ga.po @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ # Translators: # Brian ITCOB Smith <briantcob(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Kevin Scannell <kscanne(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Kevin Scannell <kscanne(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Kevin Scannell <kscanne(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Irish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ga/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -45,6 +45,20 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" +"Tabhair síntiús airgid inniu agus tabharfaidh Mozilla an méid céanna arís " +"dúinn." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+gl.po b/contents+gl.po index ef6ea5262..38ceb5716 100644 --- a/contents+gl.po +++ b/contents+gl.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Galician (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/gl/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+he.po b/contents+he.po index d6ec43e4c..45b1120a5 100644 --- a/contents+he.po +++ b/contents+he.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: ION, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Hebrew (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/he/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "מעקב, ציתות וצנזורה נפוצים ברשת." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "תן היום, ו־Mozilla תשווה את תרומתך." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+hi.po b/contents+hi.po index 2ace4e739..62d3cc6de 100644 --- a/contents+hi.po +++ b/contents+hi.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Hindi (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/hi/)\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+hr.po b/contents+hr.po index 928f08b9c..a65db4806 100644 --- a/contents+hr.po +++ b/contents+hr.po @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ # Translators: # Ljubo Šimić <aske777(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Igor <lyricaltumor(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# erinm, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Croatian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/hr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Donirajte danas i Mozilla će dati jednaku donaciju." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+hu.po b/contents+hu.po index e7620d35c..c58db77ba 100644 --- a/contents+hu.po +++ b/contents+hu.po @@ -1,16 +1,16 @@ # Translators: # AdminLMH <lehetmashogy(a)i2pmail.org>, 2019 -# vargaviktor <viktor.varga(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # István Dávid <istvandavid(a)icloud.com>, 2019 +# vargaviktor <viktor.varga(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: István Dávid <istvandavid(a)icloud.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: vargaviktor <viktor.varga(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Hungarian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/hu/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Adjon ma és a Mozilla is annyival támogat." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+id.po b/contents+id.po index d8c1b4a45..403cbdd92 100644 --- a/contents+id.po +++ b/contents+id.po @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Indonesian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/id/)\n" @@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ msgstr "" "perangkat lunak gratis dan jaringan terbuka. [Temui tim " "kami](tentang/orang)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+is.po b/contents+is.po index 4ac05d03b..2e24cf620 100644 --- a/contents+is.po +++ b/contents+is.po @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ # Translators: -# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Sveinn í Felli <sv1(a)fellsnet.is>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Icelandic (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/is/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -50,6 +50,18 @@ msgstr "" "með vinnu við frjálsan hugbúnað og opin netkerfi. [Sjáðu hver við " "erum](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Eftirlit, ritskoðun og njósnir er útbreiddar hættur á internetinu." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Gefðu í dag - og Mozilla mun jafna framlag þitt." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+it.po b/contents+it.po index 1ef187825..6a6a0991a 100644 --- a/contents+it.po +++ b/contents+it.po @@ -12,14 +12,16 @@ # Random_R, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# mattia_b89 <mattia.b89(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# Fabio Ottone, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Fabio Ottone, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Italian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/it/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -58,6 +60,18 @@ msgstr "" "Promuoviamo i diritti umani e difendiamo la privacy online attraverso " "software libero e reti aperte. [Conosci il nostro team](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Tracciamento, sorveglianza e censura sono ampiamente diffuse in rete." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Dai oggi, e Mozilla ricambierà la tua donazione." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ja.po b/contents+ja.po index 0fd847ad8..583ffbb20 100644 --- a/contents+ja.po +++ b/contents+ja.po @@ -4,16 +4,17 @@ # 323484, 2019 # Windymelt <qwilas(a)mail.3qe.us>, 2019 # ue zaeco, 2019 -# h345u37g3 h345u37g3, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# h345u37g3 h345u37g3, 2019 +# 石上敬祐 <k.130.email(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: 石上敬祐 <k.130.email(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Japanese (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ja/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -49,6 +50,18 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "人権を向上し自由ソフトウェアと開かれたネットワークを通じてオンラインでのプライバシーを守ります。[わたしたちのチーム](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "トラッキング、監視、検閲はネット上で広く行われています。" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "寄付をお願いします。Mozillaはあなたの寄付に裏切りません。" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ka.po b/contents+ka.po index aebc2bc28..eef137bed 100644 --- a/contents+ka.po +++ b/contents+ka.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Georgianization, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Georgian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ka/)\n" @@ -51,6 +51,19 @@ msgstr "" "მონაცემებს ინტერნეტში თავისუფალი პროგრამული უზრუნველყოფითა და ღია ქსელებით. " "[გაიცანით ჩვენი გუნდი](ჩვენ შესახებ/ხალხი)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" +"მეთვალყურეობა, ზედამხედველობა და აკრძალვები მთელ ინტერნეტშია გავრცელებული." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "გაეცით დღესვე და Mozilla გააორმაგებს თქვენს შემოწირულობას." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+kk.po b/contents+kk.po index 7ff221935..de5390ff7 100644 --- a/contents+kk.po +++ b/contents+kk.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Dinmuhamed Esengeldi <esengeldi0202(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Kazakh (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/kk/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+km.po b/contents+km.po index cdeded326..0808c3050 100644 --- a/contents+km.po +++ b/contents+km.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Khmer (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/km/)\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ko.po b/contents+ko.po index 6ef3776d9..3fe76a835 100644 --- a/contents+ko.po +++ b/contents+ko.po @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Korean (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ko/)\n" @@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ msgstr "" "우리는 자유 소프트웨어와 오픈 네트워크를 통하여 인권을 촉진하고 당신의 온라인 개인정보를 보호합니다. [우리 팀을 " "만나볼까요](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+lt.po b/contents+lt.po index 3c21b709e..138d303fe 100644 --- a/contents+lt.po +++ b/contents+lt.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Moo, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Lithuanian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/lt/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Sekimas, stebėjimas ir cenzūra internete yra plačiai paplitę." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Paremkite šiandien ir Mozilla paaukos tiek pat, kiek ir jūs." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+lv.po b/contents+lv.po index 64775cd71..d01bf6d6e 100644 --- a/contents+lv.po +++ b/contents+lv.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Latvian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/lv/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+mk.po b/contents+mk.po index 971189b72..9a701ae90 100644 --- a/contents+mk.po +++ b/contents+mk.po @@ -2,17 +2,17 @@ # dejanb <balalovskid(a)rferl.org>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # erinm, 2019 -# Zarko Gjurov <zarkogjurov(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Liljana Ackovska <liljanagjurova(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Matej Plavevski <matej.plavevski+github(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# Zarko Gjurov <zarkogjurov(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Matej Plavevski <matej.plavevski+github(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Zarko Gjurov <zarkogjurov(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Macedonian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/mk/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Следењето, надзорот, и цензурата се раширени насекаде низ Интернетот." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Донирај денес, и Mozilla ќе ја поврзе Вашата донација." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ml.po b/contents+ml.po index 93dd803ea..3b8f65aeb 100644 --- a/contents+ml.po +++ b/contents+ml.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: ameer pb <ameerpbekm(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Malayalam (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ml/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" +"പിന്തുടരൽ , നോട്ടം കൂടാതെ സെന്‍സര്‍ഷിപ്പ്‌ എന്നിവ ഇന്റർനെറ്റിൽ " +"പരക്കെയുള്ളതാണ് ." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "ഇന്ന് നൽകുക, കൂടാതെ മോസില്ല നിങ്ങളുടെ സംഭാവനയെ ചേർക്കുന്നതാണ് ." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ms.po b/contents+ms.po index 3ba0e65ea..dc525b0ef 100644 --- a/contents+ms.po +++ b/contents+ms.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Malay (Malaysia) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ms_MY/)\n" @@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ msgstr "" " melalui perisian bebas dan rangkaian terbuka. [Ketahui ahli pasukan " "kami](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+my.po b/contents+my.po index 6bb8d32c6..6fca097e8 100644 --- a/contents+my.po +++ b/contents+my.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Burmese (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/my/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+nb.po b/contents+nb.po index 00c0be01f..aacff7179 100644 --- a/contents+nb.po +++ b/contents+nb.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Norwegian Bokmål (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/nb/)\n" @@ -49,6 +49,18 @@ msgstr "" "gjennom gratis programvare og åpne nettverk. [Møt teamet " "vårt](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+nl.po b/contents+nl.po index 456c130e5..d66898b3e 100644 --- a/contents+nl.po +++ b/contents+nl.po @@ -5,16 +5,17 @@ # ducki2p <ducki2p(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # erinm, 2019 -# Meteor 0id, 2019 # Tonnes <tonnes.mb(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# bacovane <bart-ts(a)tushmail.com>, 2019 +# Meteor 0id, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Tonnes <tonnes.mb(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Meteor 0id, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Dutch (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/nl/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +54,18 @@ msgstr "" "We bevorderen mensenrechten en verdedigen uw privacy online door middel van " "vrije software en open netwerken. [Maak kennis met ons team](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Volgen, toezicht en censuur zijn wijdverspreid online." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Geef vandaag, en Mozilla geeft hetzelfde bedrag." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+nn.po b/contents+nn.po index fddf72a6c..7f74abe11 100644 --- a/contents+nn.po +++ b/contents+nn.po @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Norwegian Nynorsk (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/nn/)\n" @@ -44,6 +44,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+pl.po b/contents+pl.po index 77dcbb5e5..bb4c122ae 100644 --- a/contents+pl.po +++ b/contents+pl.po @@ -3,20 +3,20 @@ # Marcin Januchta <marcin.januchta(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Verdulo :-), 2019 # wigatesi, 2019 -# Filip <filipiczesio(a)vp.pl>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Dawid Job <hoek(a)tuta.io>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Waldemar Stoczkowski, 2019 # Dawid Potocki <dpot(a)disroot.org>, 2019 +# Filip <filipiczesio(a)vp.pl>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Dawid Potocki <dpot(a)disroot.org>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Filip <filipiczesio(a)vp.pl>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Polish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/pl/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -56,6 +56,18 @@ msgstr "" "pomocą bezpłatnego oprogramowania i otwartych sieci. [Poznaj nasz zespół](o " "nas/zespół)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Przekaż dziś, a Mozilla podwoi Twoją dotację." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+pt-BR.po b/contents+pt-BR.po index d5149ec29..2743ffc68 100644 --- a/contents+pt-BR.po +++ b/contents+pt-BR.po @@ -6,21 +6,21 @@ # Anna e só <contraexemplos(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Alexei Gonçalves de Oliveira <alexis(a)gessicahellmann.com>, 2019 # Gus, 2019 -# Chacal E., 2019 -# Communia <ameaneantie(a)riseup.net>, 2019 # Greg Strider <gboufleur(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Danihells <dcdcampos75(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Eduardo Addad de Oliveira <eduardoaddad(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 +# Communia <ameaneantie(a)riseup.net>, 2019 +# Chacal E., 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Eduardo Addad de Oliveira <eduardoaddad(a)hotmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Chacal E., 2019\n" "Language-Team: Portuguese (Brazil) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/pt_BR/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -62,6 +62,18 @@ msgstr "" "privacidade online por meio de software livre e redes abertas. [Conheça " "nossa equipe](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Rastreamento, vigilância e censura são comuns online." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Doe hoje, e a Mozilla duplicará a sua doação." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+pt-PT.po b/contents+pt-PT.po index 0288748ee..35448e8b7 100644 --- a/contents+pt-PT.po +++ b/contents+pt-PT.po @@ -4,16 +4,16 @@ # Manuela Silva <inactive+h_manuela_rodsilva(a)transifex.com>, 2019 # Hugo9191 <hugoncosta(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 -# Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019 # Manuela Silva <manuelarodsilva(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Manuela Silva <manuelarodsilva(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Rui <xymarior(a)yandex.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Portuguese (Portugal) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/pt_PT/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ msgstr "" "Internet através de programas e redes abertas. [Conheça a nossa " "equipa](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Doe hoje e a Mozilla irá igualar o seu donativo." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ro.po b/contents+ro.po index cb018428e..d4779b874 100644 --- a/contents+ro.po +++ b/contents+ro.po @@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ # Emma Peel, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # eduard pintilie <eduard.pintilie(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# A C <ana(a)shiftout.net>, 2019 # Vlad Stoica <vlad(a)vlads.me>, 2019 +# A C <ana(a)shiftout.net>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Vlad Stoica <vlad(a)vlads.me>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: A C <ana(a)shiftout.net>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Romanian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ro/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -54,6 +54,18 @@ msgstr "" "Noi promovam drepturile omului si aparam intimitatea virtuala cu programe " "gratis si retele deschise. [cunoaste echipa](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Donează azi, și Mozilla va dona în aceeași măsură." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ru.po b/contents+ru.po index 9bdac41e9..11472793c 100644 --- a/contents+ru.po +++ b/contents+ru.po @@ -7,17 +7,17 @@ # Legenden Rifk <rekytcsgo(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Andrey Kostrikov <yavinav(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# solokot <solokot(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Sergey Smirnov <cj75300(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# solokot <solokot(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Sergey Smirnov <cj75300(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: solokot <solokot(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Russian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ru/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ msgstr "" "свободных программ и открытых сетей. [Познакомьтесь с нашей " "командой](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Отслеживание, наблюдение и цензура широко распространены в интернете." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Пожертвуйте сегодня и Mozilla удвоит ваше пожертвование." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sk.po b/contents+sk.po index cfa518424..b386daf97 100644 --- a/contents+sk.po +++ b/contents+sk.po @@ -3,16 +3,16 @@ # Michal Sykora <michal.sykora.sk(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Marek Čápek <capek.marek(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Lenka Ježková <lenka.jezkova(a)oziveni.cz>, 2019 -# Matúš <mato699(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Matúš <mato699(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Matúš <mato699(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Slovak (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sk/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Stopovanie, sledovanie a cenzúra sú online veľmi rozšírené." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Prispejte dnes, a Mozilla prispeje rovnakou sumou." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sl.po b/contents+sl.po index 4369b7102..c1eaf2749 100644 --- a/contents+sl.po +++ b/contents+sl.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Slovenian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sl/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sq.po b/contents+sq.po index bb0349b13..3c9c36a46 100644 --- a/contents+sq.po +++ b/contents+sq.po @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Albanian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sq/)\n" @@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sr.po b/contents+sr.po index be531c805..768518f8f 100644 --- a/contents+sr.po +++ b/contents+sr.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Aleksa Ristić, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Serbian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sr/)\n" @@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ msgstr "" "Unapređujemo ljudska prava i štitimo Vašu online privatnost putem besplatnog" " softvera i otvorene mreže. [Upoznaj naš tim](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sv.po b/contents+sv.po index b421fefdd..cf71e0357 100644 --- a/contents+sv.po +++ b/contents+sv.po @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ # Anton Strömkvist <inactive+Lumen(a)transifex.com>, 2019 # Martin Coborn <inactive+martincoborn(a)transifex.com>, 2019 # Jonas Franzén, 2019 -# Jonatan Nyberg, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Jonatan Nyberg, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Jonatan Nyberg, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Swedish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sv/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Ge idag, och Mozilla kommer att matcha din donation." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+sw.po b/contents+sw.po index 3e1ee57fc..8a8d6175c 100644 --- a/contents+sw.po +++ b/contents+sw.po @@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Zaituni Njovu <zaituni(a)zainafoundationtz.org>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Swahili (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/sw/)\n" @@ -43,6 +43,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ta.po b/contents+ta.po index cd7dd9727..4f6fc0e1e 100644 --- a/contents+ta.po +++ b/contents+ta.po @@ -2,17 +2,17 @@ # Adam Lynn <adam(a)opentechfund.org>, 2019 # Sivarajah Bagerathan <bagerathan(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Farhath Farook <farhacool123(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Mohammed Ammar K S <ksmammar(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Bala Subramaniyan <balapandu222(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Mohammed Ammar K S <ksmammar(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Mohammed Ammar K S <ksmammar(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Tamil (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ta/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "இன்றே வழங்குங்கள், Mozilla ஈடான தொகையை எங்களுக்கு வழங்கும்." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+th.po b/contents+th.po index d2a195128..1bd1abb95 100644 --- a/contents+th.po +++ b/contents+th.po @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Krittiya Chankasem <ordinaryjane(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Thai (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/th/)\n" @@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ msgstr "" "เราพัฒนาเพื่อปกป้องสิทธิมนุษยชน และปกป้องความเป็นส่วนตัวในการออนไลน์ของคุณ " "ผ่านฟรีซอฟต์แวร์ และ เครือข่ายเปิด. [พบกับเรา](เกี่ยวกับ/ผู้คน)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+tr.po b/contents+tr.po index cc8a3bac1..117035157 100644 --- a/contents+tr.po +++ b/contents+tr.po @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ # T. E. Kalayci <tekrei(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Lale Fatoş Tunçman <latuna63(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 +# Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: Emma Peel, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Kaya Zeren <kayazeren(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Turkish (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/tr/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -52,6 +52,18 @@ msgstr "" "Ücretsiz yazılımlar ve açık ağlar sağlayarak insan haklarını geliştiriyoruz ve çevrimiçi kişisel gizliliğinizi koruyoruz.\n" "[Ekibimizle tanışın](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Çevrimiçi izleme, gözetim ve sansür uygulamaları yaygındır." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Bugün yaptığınız her bağış kadar Mozilla da bağış yapacak." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+uk.po b/contents+uk.po index dede38240..116e3d086 100644 --- a/contents+uk.po +++ b/contents+uk.po @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ # Андрій Бандура <andriykopanytsia(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Любомир <n.lyubomyr(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # nobik <nobikik9(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Sergio Thirdlingson <serge3ling(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Sergio Thirdlingson <serge3ling(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Sergio Thirdlingson <serge3ling(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Ukrainian (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/uk/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Підтримайте сьогодні, і Mozilla віддячить за вашу підтримку." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+ur.po b/contents+ur.po index 4315ce676..10a2061d0 100644 --- a/contents+ur.po +++ b/contents+ur.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Urdu (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/ur/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+uz.po b/contents+uz.po index 7be21f585..56cba8c2e 100644 --- a/contents+uz.po +++ b/contents+uz.po @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" "Last-Translator: Tor Project <support-team-private(a)lists.torproject.org>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Uzbek (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/uz/)\n" @@ -46,6 +46,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+vi.po b/contents+vi.po index 25637f77d..a2e65aa7a 100644 --- a/contents+vi.po +++ b/contents+vi.po @@ -2,16 +2,16 @@ # Nathan Tran, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # Ngo Long <ngotienlong1996(a)gmail.com>, 2019 -# Henry Tran <henry.trancsr(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# Henry Tran <henry.trancsr(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Henry Tran <henry.trancsr(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Vietnamese (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/vi/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -46,6 +46,20 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "" +"Hãy đóng góp ngay hôm nay, và Mozilla sẽ đóng góp tương ứng với phần của " +"bạn." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+zh-CN.po b/contents+zh-CN.po index fbc4953ec..0ac72b4fc 100644 --- a/contents+zh-CN.po +++ b/contents+zh-CN.po @@ -6,19 +6,19 @@ # ヨイツの賢狼ホロ, 2019 # Dianyu Liu <liudianyu5(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # ciaran <ciaranchen(a)qq.com>, 2019 -# Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019 -# ff98sha, 2019 # erinm, 2019 # Emma Peel, 2019 # MD Rights <psychi2009(a)gmail.com>, 2019 +# ff98sha, 2019 +# Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: MD Rights <psychi2009(a)gmail.com>, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: Cloud P <heige.pcloud(a)outlook.com>, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (China) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/zh_CN/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -53,6 +53,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "我们推进人权保护，用自由软件和开放的网络来捍卫你的在线隐私。[我们的团队](about/people)" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "跟踪，监视和审查在网上广泛存在。" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "现在捐款， Mozilla 会匹配你的捐赠。" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents+zh-TW.po b/contents+zh-TW.po index ccafa42c7..8c8a00937 100644 --- a/contents+zh-TW.po +++ b/contents+zh-TW.po @@ -1,18 +1,18 @@ # Translators: # Chi-Hsun Tsai, 2019 # ian chou <ertiach(a)hotmail.com>, 2019 -# 孟邦王, 2019 # Hsiu-Ming Chang <cges30901(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # Bryce Tsao <tsaodingtw(a)gmail.com>, 2019 # erinm, 2019 +# 孟邦王, 2019 # msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: 2019-03-09 10:41+0000\n" -"Last-Translator: erinm, 2019\n" +"Last-Translator: 孟邦王, 2019\n" "Language-Team: Chinese (Taiwan) (https://www.transifex.com/otf/teams/1519/zh_TW/)\n" "MIME-Version: 1.0\n" "Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8\n" @@ -47,6 +47,18 @@ msgid "" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." msgstr "我們推進人權，用自由軟體和開放網路來捍衛您線上的隱私。[我們的團隊](about/people)。" +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "" + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "今日您捐款，Mozilla 也會捐出相同數額。" + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact" diff --git a/contents.pot b/contents.pot index 3bc65c433..ad1dec1ee 100644 --- a/contents.pot +++ b/contents.pot @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ msgid "" msgstr "" "Project-Id-Version: PACKAGE VERSION\n" "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: \n" -"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-18 16:11+CET\n" +"POT-Creation-Date: 2019-10-22 18:47+CET\n" "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" "Language-Team: en <LL(a)li.org>\n" @@ -42,6 +42,18 @@ msgstr "" "We advance human rights and defend your privacy online through free software" " and open networks. [Meet our team](about/people)." +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." +msgstr "Tracking, surveillance, and censorship are widespread online." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." +msgstr "Take back the internet with Tor. Donate now." + +#: https//www.torproject.org/ (content/contents+en.lrpage.body) +msgid "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." +msgstr "Give today, and Mozilla will match your donation." + #: https//www.torproject.org/contact/ #: (content/contact/contents+en.lrpage.title) msgid "Contact"

1 0

[tpo/master] Add new Tor Browser version: 9.0
by boklm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 3ce5cddd3839b0eba9439514f8d4c7a81abf779a Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 19:20:59 2019 +0200 Add new Tor Browser version: 9.0 --- content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr | 4 ++++ databags/versions.ini | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr b/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr index a4f2115..2b6e4a4 100644 --- a/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr +++ b/content/projects/torbrowser/RecommendedTBBVersions/contents.lr @@ -9,6 +9,10 @@ body: "8.5.5-MacOS", "8.5.5-Linux", "8.5.5-Windows", +"9.0", +"9.0-MacOS", +"9.0-Linux", +"9.0-Windows", "9.0a6", "9.0a6-MacOS", "9.0a6-Linux", diff --git a/databags/versions.ini b/databags/versions.ini index 59d6e8d..0abc22c 100644 --- a/databags/versions.ini +++ b/databags/versions.ini @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ [torbrowser-stable] -version = 8.5.5 -win32 = 0.4.1.5 +version = 9.0 +win32 = 0.4.1.6 [torbrowser-stable-android] version = 8.5.6

1 0

[tpo/master] Revert "Set Tor Browser for Android version to 8.5.6"
by boklm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 745c55a89634a9ce35c00e46a483d7641e166810 Author: Nicolas Vigier <boklm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 19:21:40 2019 +0200 Revert "Set Tor Browser for Android version to 8.5.6" This reverts commit b23afc4367808fdd41f4ad584c8b210e81514941. --- databags/versions.ini | 3 --- templates/download-android.html | 2 +- 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/databags/versions.ini b/databags/versions.ini index 0abc22c..721e04e 100644 --- a/databags/versions.ini +++ b/databags/versions.ini @@ -2,9 +2,6 @@ version = 9.0 win32 = 0.4.1.6 -[torbrowser-stable-android] -version = 8.5.6 - [torbrowser-alpha] version = 9.0a8 diff --git a/templates/download-android.html b/templates/download-android.html index 1f8fa2d..cfc933b 100644 --- a/templates/download-android.html +++ b/templates/download-android.html @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ </div> <div class="row my-5"> <div class="col-xl-6 mx-auto text-center"> - {% set t = bag('versions', 'torbrowser-stable-android') %} + {% set t = bag('versions', 'torbrowser-stable') %} <a class="btn btn-lg btn-light text-primary py-1 px-4 my-2" href="https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/{{ t.version }}/tor-browser-{{ t.version }}-android-armv7-multi.apk">{{ _('Download .apk') }} arm</a> <a class="btn btn-primary btn-sm nick mx-3 my-2" href="https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/{{ t.version }}/tor-browser-{{ t.version }}-android-armv7-multi.apk.asc">sig</a> <a class="btn btn-lg btn-light text-primary py-1 px-4 my-2" href="https://dist.torproject.org/torbrowser/{{ t.version }}/tor-browser-{{ t.version }}-android-x86-multi.apk">{{ _('Download .apk') }} x86</a>

1 0

[tor/master] Remove changes files that are already merged in 0.4.2.
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 91413e04b458f41334ea4e25e35829043956b742 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 13:01:25 2019 -0400 Remove changes files that are already merged in 0.4.2. --- changes/bug30344 | 4 ---- changes/bug31652 | 5 ----- changes/bug31734 | 3 --- changes/bug31810 | 4 ---- changes/bug31837 | 5 ----- changes/bug31922 | 4 ---- changes/bug31939 | 3 --- changes/bug31995 | 3 --- changes/bug32124 | 7 ------- changes/ticket29669 | 3 --- changes/ticket30860 | 3 --- changes/ticket31091 | 3 --- changes/ticket31189 | 3 --- changes/ticket31548 | 7 ------- changes/ticket31682 | 3 --- changes/ticket31841 | 5 ----- changes/ticket31859 | 3 --- changes/ticket32058 | 5 ----- changes/ticket32063 | 3 --- changes/ticket32086 | 3 --- changes/ticket32177 | 3 --- 21 files changed, 82 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug30344 b/changes/bug30344 deleted file mode 100644 index 37561bf94..000000000 --- a/changes/bug30344 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (connection): - - Avoid reading data from closed connections, which can cause needless - loops in libevent and infinite loops in Shadow. Fixes bug 30344; bugfix - on 0.1.1.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31652 b/changes/bug31652 deleted file mode 100644 index c4eca7994..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31652 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (onion services): - - When we clean up intro circuits for a v3 onion service, don't remove - circuits that have an established or pending circuit even if ran out of - retries. This way, we don't cleanup the circuit of the last retry. Fixes - bug 31652; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31734 b/changes/bug31734 deleted file mode 100644 index ce989ea5d..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31734 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (error handling): - - Always lock the backtrace buffer before it is used. - Fixes bug 31734; bugfix on 0.2.5.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31810 b/changes/bug31810 deleted file mode 100644 index 628d12f09..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31810 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (process management): - - Remove assertion in the Unix process backend. This assertion would trigger - when a new process is spawned where the executable is not found leading to - a stack trace from the child process. Fixes bug 31810; bugfix on 0.4.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31837 b/changes/bug31837 deleted file mode 100644 index 0f976edfe..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31837 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (testing): - - When testing port rebinding, don't busy-wait for tor to log. Instead, - actually sleep for a short time before polling again. Also improve the - formatting of control commands and log messages. - Fixes bug 31837; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31922 b/changes/bug31922 deleted file mode 100644 index e6f31ce66..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31922 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,4 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (configuration): - - When pkg-config is not installed, or a library that depends on - pkg-config is not found, tell the user what to do to fix the - problem. Fixes bug 31922; bugfix on 0.3.1.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug31939 b/changes/bug31939 deleted file mode 100644 index a36ea495d..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31939 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (tls, logging): - - Log TLS read buffer length bugs once, rather than filling the logs - with similar warnings. Fixes bug 31939; bugfix on 0.3.0.4-rc. diff --git a/changes/bug31995 b/changes/bug31995 deleted file mode 100644 index c7ddd437a..000000000 --- a/changes/bug31995 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (testing): - - Avoid intermittent test failures due to a test that had relied on - inconsistent timing sources. Fixes bug 31995; bugfix on 0.3.1.3-alpha. diff --git a/changes/bug32124 b/changes/bug32124 deleted file mode 100644 index 164b33c7e..000000000 --- a/changes/bug32124 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (build system): - - Stop failing when jemalloc is requested, but tcmalloc is not found. - Fixes bug 32124; bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha. - - Interpret --disable-module-dirauth=no correctly. - Fixes bug 32124; bugfix on 0.3.4.1-alpha. - - Interpret --with-tcmalloc=no correctly. - Fixes bug 32124; bugfix on 0.2.0.20-rc. diff --git a/changes/ticket29669 b/changes/ticket29669 deleted file mode 100644 index f7e98a16c..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket29669 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor feature (hidden service, control port): - - The ADD_ONION key blob keyword "BEST" now defaults from RSA1024 (v2) to - ED25519-V3 (v3). Closes ticket 29669. diff --git a/changes/ticket30860 b/changes/ticket30860 deleted file mode 100644 index b946f735c..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket30860 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Testing: - - Run the chutney IPv6 networks as part of Travis CI. - Closes ticket 30860. diff --git a/changes/ticket31091 b/changes/ticket31091 deleted file mode 100644 index 3cb9a2c37..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31091 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (pluggable transports): - - Remove overly strict assertions that triggers when a pluggable transport - is spawned in an unsuccessful manner. Fixes bug 31091; bugfix on 0.4.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket31189 b/changes/ticket31189 deleted file mode 100644 index 318941c79..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31189 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Documentation: - - Correct the description of "GuardLifetime". Fixes bug 31189; bugfix on - 0.3.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket31548 b/changes/ticket31548 deleted file mode 100644 index fef0b5d01..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31548 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,7 +0,0 @@ - o Major bugfixes (hidden service v3): - - Make onion service always use the exact amount of configured intro points - (or less due to node exlusion). Before, a service could sometimes pick - more intro points than configured with the - HiddenServiceNumIntroductionPoints option. Fixes bug 31548; bugfix on - 0.3.2.1-alpha. - diff --git a/changes/ticket31682 b/changes/ticket31682 deleted file mode 100644 index 9777dec1f..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31682 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3, coverity): - - Fix an implicit conversion from ssize_t to size_t discovered by Coverity. - Fixes bug 31682; bugfix on 0.4.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket31841 b/changes/ticket31841 deleted file mode 100644 index 6e7fbc1da..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31841 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor features (testing): - - When running tests that attempt to look up hostname, replace the libc - name lookup functions with ones that do not actually touch the network. - This way, the tests complete more quickly in the presence of a slow or - missing DNS resolver. Closes ticket 31841. diff --git a/changes/ticket31859 b/changes/ticket31859 deleted file mode 100644 index dbc591e00..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket31859 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Testing: - - Simplify the Travis CI build matrix, and optimise for build time. - Closes ticket 31859. diff --git a/changes/ticket32058 b/changes/ticket32058 deleted file mode 100644 index b40bcda41..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket32058 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (mainloop, periodic events): - - Periodic events enabled flag was not unset properly when shutting down tor - cleanly. This had the side effect to not re-enable periodic events when - tor_api.h is used to relaunch tor after a shutdown. Fixes bug 32058; - bugfix on 0.3.3.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket32063 b/changes/ticket32063 deleted file mode 100644 index 2c0246917..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket32063 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Minor bugfixes (hs-v3, memory leak): - - Fix memory leak in unlikely error code path when encoding HS DoS establish - intro extension cell. Fixes bug 32063; bugfix on 0.4.2.1-alpha. diff --git a/changes/ticket32086 b/changes/ticket32086 deleted file mode 100644 index b9312c2be..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket32086 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Testing: - - Use Windows Server 2019 instead of Windows Server 2016 in our - Appveyor builds. Closes ticket 32086. diff --git a/changes/ticket32177 b/changes/ticket32177 deleted file mode 100644 index 6d6816acd..000000000 --- a/changes/ticket32177 +++ /dev/null @@ -1,3 +0,0 @@ - o Testing: - - Disable all but one Travis CI macOS build, to mitigate slow scheduling - of Travis macOS jobs. Closes ticket 32177.

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.1] Treat an unexpected constant-sized VERSIONS cell as a PROTOCOL_WARN.
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 3c97ab3c24ba4a133377c7ec6ec89cc6903ffb2e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Sep 17 09:09:36 2019 -0400 Treat an unexpected constant-sized VERSIONS cell as a PROTOCOL_WARN. We previously used tor_fragile_assert() to declare that this case could not happen: VERSIONS cells are always supposed to be variable-sized, right? This is incorrect, though. On a v1 link protocol connection, all cells are fixed-sized. There aren't supposed to be any VERSIONS cells with this version of the protocol, but apparently, somebody was messing up. (The v1 link protocol is obsolete, so probably the implementer responsible didn't mean to be using it.) Fixes bug 31107. Bugfix on 0.2.4.4-alpha, when we introduced a tor_fragile_assert() for this case. --- changes/bug31107 | 4 ++++ src/or/channeltls.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/changes/bug31107 b/changes/bug31107 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9652927c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug31107 @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging, protocol violations): + - Do not log a nonfatal assertion failure when receiving a VERSIONS + cell on a connection using the obsolete v1 link protocol. Log a + protocol_warn instead. Fixes bug 31107; bugfix on 0.2.4.4-alpha. diff --git a/src/or/channeltls.c b/src/or/channeltls.c index d44f71913..6f4e413dc 100644 --- a/src/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/or/channeltls.c @@ -1098,7 +1098,15 @@ channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) /* do nothing */ break; case CELL_VERSIONS: - tor_fragile_assert(); + /* A VERSIONS cell should always be a variable-length cell, and + * so should never reach this function (which handles constant-sized + * cells). But if the connection is using the (obsolete) v1 link + * protocol, all cells will be treated as constant-sized, and so + * it's possible we'll reach this code. + */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CHANNEL, + "Received unexpected VERSIONS cell on a channel using link " + "protocol %d; ignoring.", conn->link_proto); break; case CELL_NETINFO: ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed;

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.2] Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit edc3f70635fdead8f4dd777117c82b7319c19fe6 Merge: 5ddc04f49 3c071f300 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 12:54:43 2019 -0400 Merge branch 'maint-0.4.1' into maint-0.4.2

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.1] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 3c071f30029adcbae795150bb7d19ad2f4734658 Merge: d08d29f15 3c97ab3c2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 12:54:37 2019 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1 changes/bug31107 | 4 ++++ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --cc src/core/or/channeltls.c index 2a6edc951,000000000..25f3baf92 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@@ -1,2514 -1,0 +1,2522 @@@ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file channeltls.c + * + * \brief A concrete subclass of channel_t using or_connection_t to transfer + * cells between Tor instances. + * + * This module fills in the various function pointers in channel_t, to + * implement the channel_tls_t channels as used in Tor today. These channels + * are created from channel_tls_connect() and + * channel_tls_handle_incoming(). Each corresponds 1:1 to or_connection_t + * object, as implemented in connection_or.c. These channels transmit cells + * to the underlying or_connection_t by calling + * connection_or_write_*_cell_to_buf(), and receive cells from the underlying + * or_connection_t when connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf() calls + * channel_tls_handle_*_cell(). + * + * Here we also implement the server (responder) side of the v3+ Tor link + * handshake, which uses CERTS and AUTHENTICATE cell to negotiate versions, + * exchange expected and observed IP and time information, and bootstrap a + * level of authentication higher than we have gotten on the raw TLS + * handshake. + * + * NOTE: Since there is currently only one type of channel, there are probably + * more than a few cases where functionality that is currently in + * channeltls.c, connection_or.c, and channel.c ought to be divided up + * differently. The right time to do this is probably whenever we introduce + * our next channel type. + **/ + +/* + * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses + * should touch. + */ +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ + +#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/channeltls.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h" +#include "core/or/command.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h" +#include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" +#include "feature/relay/router.h" +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h" +#include "core/or/scheduler.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" +#include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" +#include "trunnel/netinfo.h" +#include "core/or/channelpadding.h" + +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" +#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" + +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VERSIONS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VPADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_CERTS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_certs_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHENTICATE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHORIZE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0; + +/** Active listener, if any */ +static channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL; + +/* channel_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan); +static const char * channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan); +static void channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan); +static double channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan); +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out); +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags); +static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req); +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info); +static int channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target); +static int channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan); +static size_t channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + cell_t *cell); +static int channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell); +static int channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + var_cell_t *var_cell); + +/* channel_listener_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); + +/** Handle incoming cells for the handshake stuff here rather than + * passing them on up. */ + +static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command); +static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *chan); + +/** + * Do parts of channel_tls_t initialization common to channel_tls_connect() + * and channel_tls_handle_incoming(). + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + channel_t *chan; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + chan = &(tlschan->base_); + channel_init(chan); + chan->magic = TLS_CHAN_MAGIC; + chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING; + chan->close = channel_tls_close_method; + chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method; + chan->free_fn = channel_tls_free_method; + chan->get_overhead_estimate = channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method; + chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method; + chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method; + chan->get_transport_name = channel_tls_get_transport_name_method; + chan->has_queued_writes = channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method; + chan->is_canonical = channel_tls_is_canonical_method; + chan->matches_extend_info = channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method; + chan->matches_target = channel_tls_matches_target_method; + chan->num_bytes_queued = channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method; + chan->num_cells_writeable = channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method; + chan->write_cell = channel_tls_write_cell_method; + chan->write_packed_cell = channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method; + chan->write_var_cell = channel_tls_write_var_cell_method; + + chan->cmux = circuitmux_alloc(); + /* We only have one policy for now so always set it to EWMA. */ + circuitmux_set_policy(chan->cmux, &ewma_policy); +} + +/** + * Start a new TLS channel. + * + * Launch a new OR connection to addr:port and expect to + * handshake with an OR with identity digest id_digest, and wrap + * it in a channel_tls_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "In channel_tls_connect() for channel %p " + "(global id %"PRIu64 ")", + tlschan, + (chan->global_identifier)); + + if (is_local_addr(addr)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_outgoing(chan); + + /* Set up or_connection stuff */ + tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, tlschan); + /* connection_or_connect() will fill in tlschan->conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + chan->reason_for_closing = CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR; + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got orconn %p for channel with global id %"PRIu64, + tlschan->conn, (chan->global_identifier)); + + goto done; + + err: + circuitmux_free(chan->cmux); + tor_free(tlschan); + chan = NULL; + + done: + /* If we got one, we should register it */ + if (chan) channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/** + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener. + * + * Returns the current channel listener for incoming TLS connections, or + * NULL if none has been established + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_get_listener(void) +{ + return channel_tls_listener; +} + +/** + * Start a channel_tls_t listener if necessary. + * + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener, or start one if we haven't yet, + * and return that. + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_start_listener(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *listener; + + if (!channel_tls_listener) { + listener = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*listener)); + channel_init_listener(listener); + listener->state = CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING; + listener->close = channel_tls_listener_close_method; + listener->describe_transport = + channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method; + + channel_tls_listener = listener; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Starting TLS channel listener %p with global id %"PRIu64, + listener, (listener->global_identifier)); + + channel_listener_register(listener); + } else listener = channel_tls_listener; + + return listener; +} + +/** + * Free everything on shutdown. + * + * Not much to do here, since channel_free_all() takes care of a lot, but let's + * get rid of the listener. + */ +void +channel_tls_free_all(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *old_listener = NULL; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Shutting down TLS channels..."); + + if (channel_tls_listener) { + /* + * When we close it, channel_tls_listener will get nulled out, so save + * a pointer so we can free it. + */ + old_listener = channel_tls_listener; + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Closing channel_tls_listener with ID %"PRIu64 + " at %p.", + (old_listener->global_identifier), + old_listener); + channel_listener_unregister(old_listener); + channel_listener_mark_for_close(old_listener); + channel_listener_free(old_listener); + tor_assert(channel_tls_listener == NULL); + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Done shutting down TLS channels"); +} + +/** + * Create a new channel around an incoming or_connection_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + tor_assert(orconn); + tor_assert(!(orconn->chan)); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + /* Link the channel and orconn to each other */ + tlschan->conn = orconn; + orconn->chan = tlschan; + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(orconn)->addr))) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_incoming(chan); + + /* Register it */ + channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/********* + * Casts * + ********/ + +/** + * Cast a channel_tls_t to a channel_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + if (!tlschan) return NULL; + + return &(tlschan->base_); +} + +/** + * Cast a channel_t to a channel_tls_t, with appropriate type-checking + * asserts. + */ +channel_tls_t * +channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan) +{ + if (!chan) return NULL; + + tor_assert(chan->magic == TLS_CHAN_MAGIC); + + return (channel_tls_t *)(chan); +} + +/******************************************** + * Method implementations for channel_tls_t * + *******************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_tls_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) connection_or_close_normally(tlschan->conn, 1); + else { + /* Weird - we'll have to change the state ourselves, I guess */ + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "Tried to close channel_tls_t %p with NULL conn", + tlschan); + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_tls_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel on connection <id>" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + static char *buf = NULL; + uint64_t id; + channel_tls_t *tlschan; + const char *rv = NULL; + + tor_assert(chan); + + tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + id = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->global_identifier; + + if (buf) tor_free(buf); + tor_asprintf(&buf, + "TLS channel (connection %"PRIu64 ")", + (id)); + + rv = buf; + } else { + rv = "TLS channel (no connection)"; + } + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Free a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called by the generic channel layer when freeing a channel_tls_t; + * this happens either on a channel which has already reached + * CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED or CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR from channel_run_cleanup() or + * on shutdown from channel_free_all(). In the latter case we might still + * have an orconn active (which connection_free_all() will get to later), + * so we should null out its channel pointer now. + */ +static void +channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tlschan->conn->chan = NULL; + tlschan->conn = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * Get an estimate of the average TLS overhead for the upper layer. + */ +static double +channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + double overhead = 1.0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + /* Just return 1.0f if we don't have sensible data */ + if (tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted > 0 && + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls >= + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted) { + overhead = ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls)) / + ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted)); + + /* + * Never estimate more than 2.0; otherwise we get silly large estimates + * at the very start of a new TLS connection. + */ + if (overhead > 2.0) + overhead = 2.0; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Estimated overhead ratio for TLS chan %"PRIu64 " is %f", + (chan->global_identifier), overhead); + + return overhead; +} + +/** + * Get the remote address of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_addr method for channel_tls_t; copy the + * remote endpoint of the channel to addr_out and return 1 (always + * succeeds for this transport). + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out) +{ + int rv = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(addr_out); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + rv = 1; + } else tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out); + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Get the name of the pluggable transport used by a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_transport_name for channel_tls_t. If the + * channel uses a pluggable transport, copy its name to + * transport_out and return 0. If the channel did not use a + * pluggable transport, return -1. + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(transport_out); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + if (!tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport) + return -1; + + *transport_out = tor_strdup(tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Get endpoint description of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_descr method for channel_tls_t; it returns + * a text description of the remote endpoint of the channel suitable for use + * in log messages. The req parameter is 0 for the canonical address or 1 for + * the actual address seen. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags) +{ +#define MAX_DESCR_LEN 32 + + static char buf[MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1]; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + connection_t *conn; + const char *answer = NULL; + char *addr_str; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + conn = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn); + switch (flags) { + case 0: + /* Canonical address with port*/ + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", conn->address, conn->port); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL: + /* Actual address with port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Canonical address, no port */ + strlcpy(buf, conn->address, sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL|GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Actual address, no port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + strlcpy(buf, addr_str, sizeof(buf)); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + default: + /* Something's broken in channel.c */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } else { + strlcpy(buf, "(No connection)", sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + } + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we have queued writes. + * + * This implements the has_queued_writes method for channel_tls t_; it returns + * 1 iff we have queued writes on the outbuf of the underlying or_connection_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called has_queued_writes on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + outbuf_len = (tlschan->conn != NULL) ? + connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)) : + 0; + + return (outbuf_len > 0); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we're canonical. + * + * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero, + * it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns + * whether that can be relied upon. + */ +static int +channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req) +{ + int answer = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + switch (req) { + case 0: + answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical; + break; + case 1: + /* + * Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up + * we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older + * versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor. + */ + answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2); + break; + default: + /* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } + /* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */ + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Check if we match an extend_info_t. + * + * This implements the matches_extend_info method for channel_tls_t; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches an extend_info_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(extend_info); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_extend_info on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + return (tor_addr_eq(&(extend_info->addr), + &(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr)) && + (extend_info->port == TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->port)); +} + +/** + * Check if we match a target address; return true iff we do. + * + * This implements the matches_target method for channel_tls t_; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches a target address when extending + * a circuit. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(target); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_target on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + /* real_addr is the address this connection came from. + * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address() + * to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to + * allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would + * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to impersonate/MITM it + * from anywhere on the Internet! (Because they could make long-lived + * TLS connections from anywhere to all relays, and wait for them to + * be used for extends). + */ + return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many bytes we have queued and not yet + * sent. + */ +static size_t +channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + return connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many cells we can accept to write. + * + * This implements the num_cells_writeable method for channel_tls_t; it + * returns an estimate of the number of cells we can accept with + * channel_tls_write_*_cell(). + */ +static int +channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + ssize_t n; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(tlschan->conn->wide_circ_ids); + outbuf_len = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + /* Get the number of cells */ + n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - outbuf_len, cell_network_size); + if (n < 0) n = 0; +#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT + if (n > INT_MAX) n = INT_MAX; +#endif + + return (int)n; +} + +/** + * Write a cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a cell_t, transmit the cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/** + * Write a packed cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_packed_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a packed_cell_t, transmit the packed_cell_t. + * + * Return 0 on success or negative value on error. The caller must free the + * packed cell. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell) +{ + tor_assert(chan); + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(chan->wide_circ_ids); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(packed_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_buf_add(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size, + TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_packed_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Write a variable-length cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_var_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a var_cell_t, transmit the var_cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(var_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(var_cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_var_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/************************************************* + * Method implementations for channel_listener_t * + ************************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_listener_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_listener_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + /* + * Listeners we just go ahead and change state through to CLOSED, but + * make sure to check if they're channel_tls_listener to NULL it out. + */ + if (chan_l == channel_tls_listener) + channel_tls_listener = NULL; + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING); + } + + if (chan_l->incoming_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(chan_l->incoming_list, + channel_t *, ichan) { + channel_mark_for_close(ichan); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ichan); + + smartlist_free(chan_l->incoming_list); + chan_l->incoming_list = NULL; + } + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_listener_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel (listening)" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + return "TLS channel (listening)"; +} + +/******************************************************* + * Functions for handling events on an or_connection_t * + ******************************************************/ + +/** + * Handle an orconn state change. + * + * This function will be called by connection_or.c when the or_connection_t + * associated with this channel_tls_t changes state. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, + or_connection_t *conn, + uint8_t state) +{ + channel_t *base_chan; + + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan == chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn == conn); + + base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan); + + /* Make sure the base connection state makes sense - shouldn't be error + * or closed. */ + + tor_assert(CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(base_chan)); + + /* Did we just go to state open? */ + if (state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + /* + * We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or + * CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this. + */ + channel_change_state_open(base_chan); + /* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */ + if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) { + scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan); + } + } else { + /* + * Not open, so from CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN we go to CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT, + * otherwise no change. + */ + if (CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan)) { + channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT); + } + } +} + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + +/** + * Timing states wrapper. + * + * This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the + * cell that just arrived on chan. Increment *time + * by the number of microseconds used by the call to *func(cell, chan). + */ +static void +channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time, + void (*func)(cell_t *, channel_tls_t *)) +{ + struct timeval start, end; + long time_passed; + + tor_gettimeofday(&start); + + (*func)(cell, chan); + + tor_gettimeofday(&end); + time_passed = tv_udiff(&start, &end) ; + + if (time_passed > 10000) { /* more than 10ms */ + log_debug(LD_OR,"That call just took %ld ms.",time_passed/1000); + } + + if (time_passed < 0) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL,"That call took us back in time!"); + time_passed = 0; + } + + *time += time_passed; +} +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + +/** + * Handle an incoming cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called from connection_or.c to handle an arriving cell; it checks + * for cell types specific to the handshake for this transport protocol and + * handles them, and queues all other cells to the channel_t layer, which + * eventually will hand them off to command.c. + * + * The channel layer itself decides whether the cell should be queued or + * can be handed off immediately to the upper-layer code. It is responsible + * for copying in the case that it queues; we merely pass pointers through + * which we get from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + int handshaking; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \ + ++num ## tp; \ + channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ + channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ + } STMT_END +#else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */ +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + handshaking = (TO_CONN(conn)->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); + + if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) + return; + + /* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */ + /* (VERSIONS should actually be impossible; it's variable-length.) */ + if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS && + cell->command != CELL_NETINFO) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received unexpected cell command %d in chan state %s / " + "conn state %s; closing the connection.", + (int)cell->command, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state)); + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + + if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); + + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); + + switch (cell->command) { + case CELL_PADDING: + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); + ++stats_n_padding_cells_processed; + /* do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_VERSIONS: - tor_fragile_assert(); ++ /* A VERSIONS cell should always be a variable-length cell, and ++ * so should never reach this function (which handles constant-sized ++ * cells). But if the connection is using the (obsolete) v1 link ++ * protocol, all cells will be treated as constant-sized, and so ++ * it's possible we'll reach this code. ++ */ ++ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CHANNEL, ++ "Received unexpected VERSIONS cell on a channel using link " ++ "protocol %d; ignoring.", conn->link_proto); + break; + case CELL_NETINFO: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(netinfo, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(padding_negotiate, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_CREATE: + case CELL_CREATE_FAST: + case CELL_CREATED: + case CELL_CREATED_FAST: + case CELL_RELAY: + case CELL_RELAY_EARLY: + case CELL_DESTROY: + case CELL_CREATE2: + case CELL_CREATED2: + /* + * These are all transport independent and we pass them up through the + * channel_t mechanism. They are ultimately handled in command.c. + */ + channel_process_cell(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), cell); + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Cell of unknown type (%d) received in channeltls.c. " + "Dropping.", + cell->command); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Handle an incoming variable-length cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * Process a var_cell that was just received on conn. Keep + * internal statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far + * this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to + * process each type of cell. All the var_cell commands are handshake- + * related and live below the channel_t layer, so no variable-length + * cells ever get delivered in the current implementation, but I've left + * the mechanism in place for future use. + * + * If we were handing them off to the upper layer, the channel_t queueing + * code would be responsible for memory management, and we'd just be passing + * pointers through from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). That + * caller always frees them after this function returns, so this function + * should never free var_cell. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + /* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better + * name. */ + static int num_versions = 0, num_certs = 0; + static time_t current_second = 0; /* from previous calls to time */ + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (current_second == 0) current_second = now; + if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */ + /* print stats */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "At end of second: %d versions (%d ms), %d certs (%d ms)", + num_versions, versions_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000), + num_certs, certs_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000)); + + num_versions = num_certs = 0; + versions_time = certs_time = 0; + + /* remember which second it is, for next time */ + current_second = now; + } +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(var_cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a var_cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + if (TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close) + return; + + switch (TO_CONN(conn)->state) { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + TO_CONN(conn)->state, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* + * The code in connection_or.c will tell channel_t to close for + * error; it will go to CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING, and then to + * CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR when conn is closed. + */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + /* If we're using bufferevents, it's entirely possible for us to + * notice "hey, data arrived!" before we notice "hey, the handshake + * finished!" And we need to be accepting both at once to handle both + * the v2 and v3 handshakes. */ + /* But that should be happening any longer've disabled bufferevents. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + + /* fall through */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + if (!(command_allowed_before_handshake(var_cell->command))) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* see above comment about CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } else { + if (enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell, chan) < 0) + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_AUTHENTICATE) + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, + var_cell, 1); + break; /* Everything is allowed */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: + if (conn->link_proto < 3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a variable-length cell with command %d in orconn " + "state %s [%d], channel state %s [%d] with link protocol %d; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received var-length cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + return; + } + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + + /* Now handle the cell */ + + switch (var_cell->command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + ++stats_n_versions_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(versions, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_VPADDING: + ++stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed; + /* Do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_CERTS: + ++stats_n_certs_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(certs, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE: + ++stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(auth_challenge, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHENTICATE: + ++stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(authenticate, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + ++stats_n_authorize_cells_processed; + /* Ignored so far. */ + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.", + (int)(var_cell->command)); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Update channel marks after connection_or.c has changed an address. + * + * This is called from connection_or_init_conn_from_address() after the + * connection's _base.addr or real_addr fields have potentially been changed + * so we can recalculate the local mark. Notably, this happens when incoming + * connections are reverse-proxied and we only learn the real address of the + * remote router by looking it up in the consensus after we finish the + * handshake and know an authenticated identity digest. + */ +void +channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_t *chan = NULL; + + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan); + + chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan); + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(conn)->addr))) { + if (!channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } + } else { + if (channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + } +} + +/** + * Check if this cell type is allowed before the handshake is finished. + * + * Return true if command is a cell command that's allowed to start a + * V3 handshake. + */ +static int +command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command) +{ + switch (command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + case CELL_VPADDING: + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Start a V3 handshake on an incoming connection. + * + * Called when we as a server receive an appropriate cell while waiting + * either for a cell or a TLS handshake. Set the connection's state to + * "handshaking_v3', initializes the or_handshake_state field as needed, + * and add the cell to the hash of incoming cells.) + */ +static int +enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + tor_assert(TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || + TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == + OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING); + + if (started_here) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a cell while TLS-handshaking, not in " + "OR_HANDSHAKING_V3, on a connection we originated."); + } + connection_or_block_renegotiation(chan->conn); + chan->conn->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3; + if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(chan->conn, started_here) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return -1; + } + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Process a 'versions' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming VERSIONS cell; the current + * link protocol version must be 0 to indicate that no version has yet been + * negotiated. We compare the versions in the cell to the list of versions + * we support, pick the highest version we have in common, and continue the + * negotiation from there. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int highest_supported_version = 0; + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if ((cell->payload_len % 2) == 1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSION cell with odd payload length %d; " + "closing connection.",cell->payload_len); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto != 0 || + (chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version " + "already set to %d; dropping", + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + switch (chan->conn->base_.state) + { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state"); + return; + } + + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state); + + { + int i; + const uint8_t *cp = cell->payload; + for (i = 0; i < cell->payload_len / 2; ++i, cp += 2) { + uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp)); + if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version) + highest_supported_version = v; + } + } + if (!highest_supported_version) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the " + "list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version == 1) { + /* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS + * cells. */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. " + "That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version < 3 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS " + "handshake. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version != 2 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) { + /* XXXX This should eventually be a log_protocol_warn */ + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link with non-2 protocol after doing a v2 TLS " + "handshake with %s. Closing connection.", + fmt_addr(&chan->conn->base_.addr)); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(highest_supported_version, started_here); + + chan->conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version; + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1; + + if (chan->conn->link_proto == 2) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + const int send_versions = !started_here; + /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */ + const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options()); + /* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */ + const int send_chall = !started_here; + /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell + * right now. */ + const int send_netinfo = !started_here; + const int send_any = + send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo; + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell", + send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "", + send_certs ? " CERTS" : "", + send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "", + send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : ""); + +#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE + if (1) { + connection_or_close_normally(chan->conn, 1); + return; + } +#endif /* defined(DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE) */ + + if (send_versions) { + if (connection_or_send_versions(chan->conn, 1) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + /* We set this after sending the versions cell. */ + /*XXXXX symbolic const.*/ + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; + chan->conn->wide_circ_ids = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids; + + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING; + + if (send_certs) { + if (connection_or_send_certs_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send certs cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_chall) { + if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Process a 'padding_negotiate' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell; + * enable or disable padding accordingly, and read and act on its timeout + * value contents. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + channelpadding_negotiate_t *negotiation; + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto); + return; + } + + if (channelpadding_negotiate_parse(&negotiation, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; " + "dropping.", chan->conn->link_proto); + + return; + } + + channelpadding_update_padding_for_channel(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), + negotiation); + + channelpadding_negotiate_free(negotiation); +} + +/** + * Convert netinfo_addr into corresponding tor_addr. + * Return 0 on success; on failure, return -1 and log a warning. + */ +static int +tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(tor_addr_t *tor_addr, + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr) { + tor_assert(tor_addr); + tor_assert(netinfo_addr); + + uint8_t type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(netinfo_addr); + uint8_t len = netinfo_addr_get_len(netinfo_addr); + + if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && len == 4) { + uint32_t ipv4 = netinfo_addr_get_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(tor_addr, ipv4); + } else if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && len == 16) { + const uint8_t *ipv6_bytes = netinfo_addr_getconstarray_addr_ipv6( + netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(tor_addr, (const char *)ipv6_bytes); + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Cannot read address from NETINFO " + "- wrong type/length."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Helper: compute the absolute value of a time_t. + * + * (we need this because labs() doesn't always work for time_t, since + * long can be shorter than time_t.) + */ +static inline time_t +time_abs(time_t val) +{ + return (val < 0) ? -val : val; +} + +/** + * Process a 'netinfo' cell + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming NETINFO cell; read and act + * on its contents, and set the connection state to "open". + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + time_t timestamp; + uint8_t my_addr_type; + uint8_t my_addr_len; + uint8_t n_other_addrs; + time_t now = time(NULL); + const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + + time_t apparent_skew = 0; + tor_addr_t my_apparent_addr = TOR_ADDR_NULL; + int started_here = 0; + const char *identity_digest = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 2) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1"); + return; + } + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 && + chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping."); + return; + } + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions); + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + identity_digest = chan->conn->identity_digest; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + if (started_here) { + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got a NETINFO cell from server, " + "but no authentication. Closing the connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have + some housekeeping to do.*/ + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id))); + tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); + /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge + * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as + * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */ + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + /* zero, checked above */ + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */ + 0); + } + } + } + + /* Decode the cell. */ + netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = NULL; + + ssize_t parsed = netinfo_cell_parse(&netinfo_cell, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + if (parsed < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Failed to parse NETINFO cell - closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + timestamp = netinfo_cell_get_timestamp(netinfo_cell); + + const netinfo_addr_t *my_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_other_addr(netinfo_cell); + + my_addr_type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(my_addr); + my_addr_len = netinfo_addr_get_len(my_addr); + + if ((now - chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) { + apparent_skew = now - timestamp; + } + /* We used to check: + * if (my_addr_len >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 6) { + * + * This is actually never going to happen, since my_addr_len is at most 255, + * and CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN - 6 is 503. So we know that cp is < end. */ + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&my_apparent_addr, my_addr) == -1) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + return; + } + + if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&my_apparent_addr, me->addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } else if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && + my_addr_len == 16) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr) && + tor_addr_eq(&my_apparent_addr, &me->ipv6_addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } + + n_other_addrs = netinfo_cell_get_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell); + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < n_other_addrs; i++) { + /* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is + * "canonical." */ + + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, i); + + tor_addr_t addr; + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&addr, netinfo_addr) == -1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Bad address in netinfo cell; Skipping."); + continue; + } + /* A relay can connect from anywhere and be canonical, so + * long as it tells you from where it came. This may sound a bit + * concerning... but that's what "canonical" means: that the + * address is one that the relay itself has claimed. The relay + * might be doing something funny, but nobody else is doing a MITM + * on the relay's TCP. + */ + if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &(chan->conn->real_addr))) { + connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1); + break; + } + } + + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + + if (me && !TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer && + channel_is_canonical(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan))) { + const char *descr = + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->get_remote_descr(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), 0); + log_info(LD_OR, + "We made a connection to a relay at %s (fp=%s) but we think " + "they will not consider this connection canonical. They " + "think we are at %s, but we think its %s.", + safe_str(descr), + safe_str(hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)), + safe_str(tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr)), + safe_str(fmt_addr32(me->addr))); + } + + /* Act on apparent skew. */ + /** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */ +#define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600 + if (time_abs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW && + (started_here || + connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->conn->identity_digest))) { + int trusted = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(chan->conn->identity_digest); + clock_skew_warning(TO_CONN(chan->conn), apparent_skew, trusted, LD_GENERAL, + "NETINFO cell", "OR"); + } + + /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently + * trustworthy. */ + + if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) { + /* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE + * cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so + * now. */ + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but " + "was unable to make the OR connection become open.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now " + "open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s. " + "Our address is apparently %s.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto), + hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr))); + } + assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(chan->conn),time(NULL)); +} + +/** Types of certificates that we know how to parse from CERTS cells. Each + * type corresponds to a different encoding format. */ +typedef enum cert_encoding_t { + CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN, /**< We don't recognize this. */ + CERT_ENCODING_X509, /**< It's an RSA key, signed with RSA, encoded in x509. + * (Actually, it might not be RSA. We test that later.) */ + CERT_ENCODING_ED25519, /**< It's something signed with an Ed25519 key, + * encoded asa a tor_cert_t.*/ + CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT, /**< It's an Ed key signed with an RSA key. */ +} cert_encoding_t; + +/** + * Given one of the certificate type codes used in a CERTS cell, + * return the corresponding cert_encoding_t that we should use to parse + * the certificate. + */ +static cert_encoding_t +certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum) +{ + switch (typenum) { + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_X509; + case CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_ED25519; + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID: + return CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT; + default: + return CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/** + * Process a CERTS cell from a channel. + * + * This function is called to process an incoming CERTS cell on a + * channel_tls_t: + * + * If the other side should not have sent us a CERTS cell, or the cell is + * malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't, + * then mark the connection. + * + * If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then + * store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side + * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection. + * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ +#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID + /* These arrays will be sparse, since a cert type can be at most one + * of ed/x509 */ + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + tor_cert_t *ed_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + uint8_t *rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + size_t rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = 0; + + int n_certs, i; + certs_cell_t *cc = NULL; + + int send_netinfo = 0, started_here = 0; + + memset(x509_certs, 0, sizeof(x509_certs)); + memset(ed_certs, 0, sizeof(ed_certs)); + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad CERTS cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto err; \ + } while (0) + + /* Can't use connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(); its conn->tls + * check looks like it breaks + * test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok_server(). */ + started_here = chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell) + ERR("We already got one"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be unreachable, but let's make sure. */ + ERR("We're already authenticated!"); + } + if (cell->payload_len < 1) + ERR("It had no body"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It couldn't be parsed."); + + n_certs = cc->n_certs; + + for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) { + certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i); + + uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type; + uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len; + uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c); + + if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED) + continue; + const cert_encoding_t ct = certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(cert_type); + switch (ct) { + default: + case CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN: + break; + case CERT_ENCODING_X509: { + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!x509_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (x509_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_cert); + ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate"); + } else { + x509_certs[cert_type] = x509_cert; + } + } + break; + } + case CERT_ENCODING_ED25519: { + tor_cert_t *ed_cert = tor_cert_parse(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!ed_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable Ed certificate " + "in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (ed_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_cert_free(ed_cert); + ERR("Duplicate Ed25519 certificate"); + } else { + ed_certs[cert_type] = ed_cert; + } + } + break; + } + + case CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT: { + if (rsa_ed_cc_cert) { + ERR("Duplicate RSA->Ed25519 crosscert"); + } else { + rsa_ed_cc_cert = tor_memdup(cert_body, cert_len); + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = cert_len; + } + break; + } + } + } + + /* Move the certificates we (might) want into the handshake_state->certs + * structure. */ + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID]; + tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH]; + tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = auth_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->link_cert = link_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = id_cert; + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK] = NULL; + + tor_cert_t *ed_id_sign = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_link = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_auth = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign = ed_id_sign; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_link = ed_sign_link; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth = ed_sign_auth; + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH] = NULL; + + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert = rsa_ed_cc_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert_len = + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len; + rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + + int severity; + /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were + * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect + * to one. */ + if (started_here && + router_digest_is_trusted_dir(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest)) + severity = LOG_WARN; + else + severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; + + const ed25519_public_key_t *checked_ed_id = NULL; + const common_digests_t *checked_rsa_id = NULL; + or_handshake_certs_check_both(severity, + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs, + chan->conn->tls, + time(NULL), + &checked_ed_id, + &checked_rsa_id); + + if (!checked_rsa_id) + ERR("Invalid certificate chain!"); + + if (started_here) { + /* No more information is needed. */ + + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + { + const common_digests_t *id_digests = checked_rsa_id; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd; + if (!id_digests) + ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert"); + + identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + if (!identity_rcvd) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert."); + } + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + } + + if (checked_ed_id) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + checked_ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "calling client_learned_peer_id from " + "process_certs_cell"); + + if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + checked_ed_id) < 0) + ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id"); + + log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it with " + "RSA%s", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port, + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : ""); + + if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we + * aren't planning to authenticate at all. At this point we know who we + * are talking to, so we can just send a netinfo now. */ + send_netinfo = 1; + } + } else { + /* We can't call it authenticated till we see an AUTHENTICATE cell. */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got some good RSA%s certificates from %s:%d. " + "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.", + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + /* XXXX check more stuff? */ + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1; + + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto err; + } + } + + err: + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(x509_certs); ++u) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_certs[u]); + } + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(ed_certs); ++u) { + tor_cert_free(ed_certs[u]); + } + tor_free(rsa_ed_cc_cert); + certs_cell_free(cc); +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on a + * channel_tls_t; if we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're + * not the originator of the channel), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing + * a v3 handshake, mark the channel. If the cell is well-formed but we don't + * want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we + * want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int n_types, i, use_type = -1; + auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto done; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here)) + ERR("We didn't originate this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge) + ERR("We already received one"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It was not well-formed."); + + n_types = ac->n_methods; + + /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */ + for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) { + uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i); + if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) { + if (use_type == -1 || + authchallenge_type_is_better(authtype, use_type)) { + use_type = authtype; + } + } + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1; + + if (! public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a + connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we + got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */ + goto done; + } + + if (use_type >= 0) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending " + "authentication type %d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + use_type); + + if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(chan->conn, use_type) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, + "Couldn't send authenticate cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d, but we don't " + "know any of its authentication types. Not authenticating.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + + done: + auth_challenge_cell_free(ac); + +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a + * v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the + * other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right, + * we didn't get a CERTS cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept + * the identity of the router on the other side of the connection. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL; + const uint8_t *auth; + int authlen; + int authtype; + int bodylen; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + var_cell_free(expected_cell); \ + return; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) + ERR("We originated this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate) + ERR("We already got one!"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be impossible given other checks */ + ERR("The peer is already authenticated"); + } + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We never got a certs cell"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an identity certificate"); + if (cell->payload_len < 4) + ERR("Cell was way too short"); + + auth = cell->payload; + { + uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth)); + uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2)); + if (4 + len > cell->payload_len) + ERR("Authenticator was truncated"); + + if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(type)) + ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized"); + authtype = type; + + auth += 4; + authlen = len; + } + + if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1) + ERR("Authenticator was too short"); + + expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body( + chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1); + if (! expected_cell) + ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body"); + + int sig_is_rsa; + if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET || + authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) { + bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 1; + } else { + tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705); + /* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room + * for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */ + tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 0; + } + if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) { + ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected."); + } + + /* Length of random part. */ + if (BUG(bodylen < 24)) { + // LCOV_EXCL_START + ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible"); + // LCOV_EXCL_STOP + } + + if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24)) + ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected"); + + if (sig_is_rsa) { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL) + ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert"); + + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate"); + + crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key( + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert); + char d[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char *signed_data; + size_t keysize; + int signed_len; + + if (! pk) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert."); + } + crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256); + + keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk); + signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize); + signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize, + (char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, + authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + if (signed_len < 0) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid"); + } + if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Not enough data was signed"); + } + /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here, + * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */ + if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed."); + } + tor_free(signed_data); + } else { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate."); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 authentication certificate."); + + const ed25519_public_key_t *authkey = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth->signed_key; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + tor_assert(authlen > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + memcpy(&sig.sig, auth + authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, ED25519_SIG_LEN); + if (ed25519_checksig(&sig, auth, authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, authkey)<0) { + ERR("Ed25519 signature wasn't valid."); + } + } + + /* Okay, we are authenticated. */ + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0; + { + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL; + + if (! sig_is_rsa) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + ed_identity_received = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + ed_identity_received, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */ + tor_assert(id_digests); + + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Calling connection_or_init_conn_from_address for %s " + " from %s, with%s ed25519 id.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + __func__, + ed_identity_received ? "" : "out"); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + ed_identity_received, + 0); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d, type %d: Looks good.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + authtype); + } + + var_cell_free(expected_cell); + +#undef ERR +}

1 0

[tor/maint-0.4.2] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 3c071f30029adcbae795150bb7d19ad2f4734658 Merge: d08d29f15 3c97ab3c2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 12:54:37 2019 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1 changes/bug31107 | 4 ++++ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --cc src/core/or/channeltls.c index 2a6edc951,000000000..25f3baf92 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@@ -1,2514 -1,0 +1,2522 @@@ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file channeltls.c + * + * \brief A concrete subclass of channel_t using or_connection_t to transfer + * cells between Tor instances. + * + * This module fills in the various function pointers in channel_t, to + * implement the channel_tls_t channels as used in Tor today. These channels + * are created from channel_tls_connect() and + * channel_tls_handle_incoming(). Each corresponds 1:1 to or_connection_t + * object, as implemented in connection_or.c. These channels transmit cells + * to the underlying or_connection_t by calling + * connection_or_write_*_cell_to_buf(), and receive cells from the underlying + * or_connection_t when connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf() calls + * channel_tls_handle_*_cell(). + * + * Here we also implement the server (responder) side of the v3+ Tor link + * handshake, which uses CERTS and AUTHENTICATE cell to negotiate versions, + * exchange expected and observed IP and time information, and bootstrap a + * level of authentication higher than we have gotten on the raw TLS + * handshake. + * + * NOTE: Since there is currently only one type of channel, there are probably + * more than a few cases where functionality that is currently in + * channeltls.c, connection_or.c, and channel.c ought to be divided up + * differently. The right time to do this is probably whenever we introduce + * our next channel type. + **/ + +/* + * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses + * should touch. + */ +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ + +#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/channeltls.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h" +#include "core/or/command.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h" +#include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" +#include "feature/relay/router.h" +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h" +#include "core/or/scheduler.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" +#include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" +#include "trunnel/netinfo.h" +#include "core/or/channelpadding.h" + +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" +#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" + +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VERSIONS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VPADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_CERTS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_certs_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHENTICATE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHORIZE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0; + +/** Active listener, if any */ +static channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL; + +/* channel_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan); +static const char * channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan); +static void channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan); +static double channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan); +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out); +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags); +static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req); +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info); +static int channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target); +static int channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan); +static size_t channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + cell_t *cell); +static int channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell); +static int channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + var_cell_t *var_cell); + +/* channel_listener_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); + +/** Handle incoming cells for the handshake stuff here rather than + * passing them on up. */ + +static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command); +static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *chan); + +/** + * Do parts of channel_tls_t initialization common to channel_tls_connect() + * and channel_tls_handle_incoming(). + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + channel_t *chan; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + chan = &(tlschan->base_); + channel_init(chan); + chan->magic = TLS_CHAN_MAGIC; + chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING; + chan->close = channel_tls_close_method; + chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method; + chan->free_fn = channel_tls_free_method; + chan->get_overhead_estimate = channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method; + chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method; + chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method; + chan->get_transport_name = channel_tls_get_transport_name_method; + chan->has_queued_writes = channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method; + chan->is_canonical = channel_tls_is_canonical_method; + chan->matches_extend_info = channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method; + chan->matches_target = channel_tls_matches_target_method; + chan->num_bytes_queued = channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method; + chan->num_cells_writeable = channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method; + chan->write_cell = channel_tls_write_cell_method; + chan->write_packed_cell = channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method; + chan->write_var_cell = channel_tls_write_var_cell_method; + + chan->cmux = circuitmux_alloc(); + /* We only have one policy for now so always set it to EWMA. */ + circuitmux_set_policy(chan->cmux, &ewma_policy); +} + +/** + * Start a new TLS channel. + * + * Launch a new OR connection to addr:port and expect to + * handshake with an OR with identity digest id_digest, and wrap + * it in a channel_tls_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "In channel_tls_connect() for channel %p " + "(global id %"PRIu64 ")", + tlschan, + (chan->global_identifier)); + + if (is_local_addr(addr)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_outgoing(chan); + + /* Set up or_connection stuff */ + tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, tlschan); + /* connection_or_connect() will fill in tlschan->conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + chan->reason_for_closing = CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR; + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got orconn %p for channel with global id %"PRIu64, + tlschan->conn, (chan->global_identifier)); + + goto done; + + err: + circuitmux_free(chan->cmux); + tor_free(tlschan); + chan = NULL; + + done: + /* If we got one, we should register it */ + if (chan) channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/** + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener. + * + * Returns the current channel listener for incoming TLS connections, or + * NULL if none has been established + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_get_listener(void) +{ + return channel_tls_listener; +} + +/** + * Start a channel_tls_t listener if necessary. + * + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener, or start one if we haven't yet, + * and return that. + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_start_listener(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *listener; + + if (!channel_tls_listener) { + listener = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*listener)); + channel_init_listener(listener); + listener->state = CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING; + listener->close = channel_tls_listener_close_method; + listener->describe_transport = + channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method; + + channel_tls_listener = listener; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Starting TLS channel listener %p with global id %"PRIu64, + listener, (listener->global_identifier)); + + channel_listener_register(listener); + } else listener = channel_tls_listener; + + return listener; +} + +/** + * Free everything on shutdown. + * + * Not much to do here, since channel_free_all() takes care of a lot, but let's + * get rid of the listener. + */ +void +channel_tls_free_all(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *old_listener = NULL; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Shutting down TLS channels..."); + + if (channel_tls_listener) { + /* + * When we close it, channel_tls_listener will get nulled out, so save + * a pointer so we can free it. + */ + old_listener = channel_tls_listener; + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Closing channel_tls_listener with ID %"PRIu64 + " at %p.", + (old_listener->global_identifier), + old_listener); + channel_listener_unregister(old_listener); + channel_listener_mark_for_close(old_listener); + channel_listener_free(old_listener); + tor_assert(channel_tls_listener == NULL); + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Done shutting down TLS channels"); +} + +/** + * Create a new channel around an incoming or_connection_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + tor_assert(orconn); + tor_assert(!(orconn->chan)); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + /* Link the channel and orconn to each other */ + tlschan->conn = orconn; + orconn->chan = tlschan; + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(orconn)->addr))) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_incoming(chan); + + /* Register it */ + channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/********* + * Casts * + ********/ + +/** + * Cast a channel_tls_t to a channel_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + if (!tlschan) return NULL; + + return &(tlschan->base_); +} + +/** + * Cast a channel_t to a channel_tls_t, with appropriate type-checking + * asserts. + */ +channel_tls_t * +channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan) +{ + if (!chan) return NULL; + + tor_assert(chan->magic == TLS_CHAN_MAGIC); + + return (channel_tls_t *)(chan); +} + +/******************************************** + * Method implementations for channel_tls_t * + *******************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_tls_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) connection_or_close_normally(tlschan->conn, 1); + else { + /* Weird - we'll have to change the state ourselves, I guess */ + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "Tried to close channel_tls_t %p with NULL conn", + tlschan); + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_tls_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel on connection <id>" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + static char *buf = NULL; + uint64_t id; + channel_tls_t *tlschan; + const char *rv = NULL; + + tor_assert(chan); + + tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + id = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->global_identifier; + + if (buf) tor_free(buf); + tor_asprintf(&buf, + "TLS channel (connection %"PRIu64 ")", + (id)); + + rv = buf; + } else { + rv = "TLS channel (no connection)"; + } + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Free a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called by the generic channel layer when freeing a channel_tls_t; + * this happens either on a channel which has already reached + * CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED or CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR from channel_run_cleanup() or + * on shutdown from channel_free_all(). In the latter case we might still + * have an orconn active (which connection_free_all() will get to later), + * so we should null out its channel pointer now. + */ +static void +channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tlschan->conn->chan = NULL; + tlschan->conn = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * Get an estimate of the average TLS overhead for the upper layer. + */ +static double +channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + double overhead = 1.0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + /* Just return 1.0f if we don't have sensible data */ + if (tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted > 0 && + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls >= + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted) { + overhead = ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls)) / + ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted)); + + /* + * Never estimate more than 2.0; otherwise we get silly large estimates + * at the very start of a new TLS connection. + */ + if (overhead > 2.0) + overhead = 2.0; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Estimated overhead ratio for TLS chan %"PRIu64 " is %f", + (chan->global_identifier), overhead); + + return overhead; +} + +/** + * Get the remote address of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_addr method for channel_tls_t; copy the + * remote endpoint of the channel to addr_out and return 1 (always + * succeeds for this transport). + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out) +{ + int rv = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(addr_out); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + rv = 1; + } else tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out); + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Get the name of the pluggable transport used by a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_transport_name for channel_tls_t. If the + * channel uses a pluggable transport, copy its name to + * transport_out and return 0. If the channel did not use a + * pluggable transport, return -1. + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(transport_out); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + if (!tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport) + return -1; + + *transport_out = tor_strdup(tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Get endpoint description of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_descr method for channel_tls_t; it returns + * a text description of the remote endpoint of the channel suitable for use + * in log messages. The req parameter is 0 for the canonical address or 1 for + * the actual address seen. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags) +{ +#define MAX_DESCR_LEN 32 + + static char buf[MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1]; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + connection_t *conn; + const char *answer = NULL; + char *addr_str; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + conn = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn); + switch (flags) { + case 0: + /* Canonical address with port*/ + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", conn->address, conn->port); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL: + /* Actual address with port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Canonical address, no port */ + strlcpy(buf, conn->address, sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL|GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Actual address, no port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + strlcpy(buf, addr_str, sizeof(buf)); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + default: + /* Something's broken in channel.c */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } else { + strlcpy(buf, "(No connection)", sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + } + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we have queued writes. + * + * This implements the has_queued_writes method for channel_tls t_; it returns + * 1 iff we have queued writes on the outbuf of the underlying or_connection_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called has_queued_writes on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + outbuf_len = (tlschan->conn != NULL) ? + connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)) : + 0; + + return (outbuf_len > 0); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we're canonical. + * + * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero, + * it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns + * whether that can be relied upon. + */ +static int +channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req) +{ + int answer = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + switch (req) { + case 0: + answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical; + break; + case 1: + /* + * Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up + * we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older + * versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor. + */ + answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2); + break; + default: + /* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } + /* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */ + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Check if we match an extend_info_t. + * + * This implements the matches_extend_info method for channel_tls_t; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches an extend_info_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(extend_info); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_extend_info on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + return (tor_addr_eq(&(extend_info->addr), + &(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr)) && + (extend_info->port == TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->port)); +} + +/** + * Check if we match a target address; return true iff we do. + * + * This implements the matches_target method for channel_tls t_; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches a target address when extending + * a circuit. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(target); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_target on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + /* real_addr is the address this connection came from. + * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address() + * to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to + * allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would + * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to impersonate/MITM it + * from anywhere on the Internet! (Because they could make long-lived + * TLS connections from anywhere to all relays, and wait for them to + * be used for extends). + */ + return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many bytes we have queued and not yet + * sent. + */ +static size_t +channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + return connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many cells we can accept to write. + * + * This implements the num_cells_writeable method for channel_tls_t; it + * returns an estimate of the number of cells we can accept with + * channel_tls_write_*_cell(). + */ +static int +channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + ssize_t n; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(tlschan->conn->wide_circ_ids); + outbuf_len = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + /* Get the number of cells */ + n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - outbuf_len, cell_network_size); + if (n < 0) n = 0; +#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT + if (n > INT_MAX) n = INT_MAX; +#endif + + return (int)n; +} + +/** + * Write a cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a cell_t, transmit the cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/** + * Write a packed cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_packed_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a packed_cell_t, transmit the packed_cell_t. + * + * Return 0 on success or negative value on error. The caller must free the + * packed cell. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell) +{ + tor_assert(chan); + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(chan->wide_circ_ids); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(packed_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_buf_add(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size, + TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_packed_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Write a variable-length cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_var_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a var_cell_t, transmit the var_cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(var_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(var_cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_var_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/************************************************* + * Method implementations for channel_listener_t * + ************************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_listener_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_listener_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + /* + * Listeners we just go ahead and change state through to CLOSED, but + * make sure to check if they're channel_tls_listener to NULL it out. + */ + if (chan_l == channel_tls_listener) + channel_tls_listener = NULL; + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING); + } + + if (chan_l->incoming_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(chan_l->incoming_list, + channel_t *, ichan) { + channel_mark_for_close(ichan); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ichan); + + smartlist_free(chan_l->incoming_list); + chan_l->incoming_list = NULL; + } + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_listener_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel (listening)" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + return "TLS channel (listening)"; +} + +/******************************************************* + * Functions for handling events on an or_connection_t * + ******************************************************/ + +/** + * Handle an orconn state change. + * + * This function will be called by connection_or.c when the or_connection_t + * associated with this channel_tls_t changes state. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, + or_connection_t *conn, + uint8_t state) +{ + channel_t *base_chan; + + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan == chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn == conn); + + base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan); + + /* Make sure the base connection state makes sense - shouldn't be error + * or closed. */ + + tor_assert(CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(base_chan)); + + /* Did we just go to state open? */ + if (state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + /* + * We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or + * CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this. + */ + channel_change_state_open(base_chan); + /* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */ + if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) { + scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan); + } + } else { + /* + * Not open, so from CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN we go to CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT, + * otherwise no change. + */ + if (CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan)) { + channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT); + } + } +} + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + +/** + * Timing states wrapper. + * + * This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the + * cell that just arrived on chan. Increment *time + * by the number of microseconds used by the call to *func(cell, chan). + */ +static void +channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time, + void (*func)(cell_t *, channel_tls_t *)) +{ + struct timeval start, end; + long time_passed; + + tor_gettimeofday(&start); + + (*func)(cell, chan); + + tor_gettimeofday(&end); + time_passed = tv_udiff(&start, &end) ; + + if (time_passed > 10000) { /* more than 10ms */ + log_debug(LD_OR,"That call just took %ld ms.",time_passed/1000); + } + + if (time_passed < 0) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL,"That call took us back in time!"); + time_passed = 0; + } + + *time += time_passed; +} +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + +/** + * Handle an incoming cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called from connection_or.c to handle an arriving cell; it checks + * for cell types specific to the handshake for this transport protocol and + * handles them, and queues all other cells to the channel_t layer, which + * eventually will hand them off to command.c. + * + * The channel layer itself decides whether the cell should be queued or + * can be handed off immediately to the upper-layer code. It is responsible + * for copying in the case that it queues; we merely pass pointers through + * which we get from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + int handshaking; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \ + ++num ## tp; \ + channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ + channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ + } STMT_END +#else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */ +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + handshaking = (TO_CONN(conn)->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); + + if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) + return; + + /* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */ + /* (VERSIONS should actually be impossible; it's variable-length.) */ + if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS && + cell->command != CELL_NETINFO) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received unexpected cell command %d in chan state %s / " + "conn state %s; closing the connection.", + (int)cell->command, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state)); + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + + if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); + + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); + + switch (cell->command) { + case CELL_PADDING: + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); + ++stats_n_padding_cells_processed; + /* do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_VERSIONS: - tor_fragile_assert(); ++ /* A VERSIONS cell should always be a variable-length cell, and ++ * so should never reach this function (which handles constant-sized ++ * cells). But if the connection is using the (obsolete) v1 link ++ * protocol, all cells will be treated as constant-sized, and so ++ * it's possible we'll reach this code. ++ */ ++ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CHANNEL, ++ "Received unexpected VERSIONS cell on a channel using link " ++ "protocol %d; ignoring.", conn->link_proto); + break; + case CELL_NETINFO: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(netinfo, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(padding_negotiate, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_CREATE: + case CELL_CREATE_FAST: + case CELL_CREATED: + case CELL_CREATED_FAST: + case CELL_RELAY: + case CELL_RELAY_EARLY: + case CELL_DESTROY: + case CELL_CREATE2: + case CELL_CREATED2: + /* + * These are all transport independent and we pass them up through the + * channel_t mechanism. They are ultimately handled in command.c. + */ + channel_process_cell(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), cell); + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Cell of unknown type (%d) received in channeltls.c. " + "Dropping.", + cell->command); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Handle an incoming variable-length cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * Process a var_cell that was just received on conn. Keep + * internal statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far + * this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to + * process each type of cell. All the var_cell commands are handshake- + * related and live below the channel_t layer, so no variable-length + * cells ever get delivered in the current implementation, but I've left + * the mechanism in place for future use. + * + * If we were handing them off to the upper layer, the channel_t queueing + * code would be responsible for memory management, and we'd just be passing + * pointers through from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). That + * caller always frees them after this function returns, so this function + * should never free var_cell. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + /* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better + * name. */ + static int num_versions = 0, num_certs = 0; + static time_t current_second = 0; /* from previous calls to time */ + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (current_second == 0) current_second = now; + if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */ + /* print stats */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "At end of second: %d versions (%d ms), %d certs (%d ms)", + num_versions, versions_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000), + num_certs, certs_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000)); + + num_versions = num_certs = 0; + versions_time = certs_time = 0; + + /* remember which second it is, for next time */ + current_second = now; + } +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(var_cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a var_cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + if (TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close) + return; + + switch (TO_CONN(conn)->state) { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + TO_CONN(conn)->state, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* + * The code in connection_or.c will tell channel_t to close for + * error; it will go to CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING, and then to + * CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR when conn is closed. + */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + /* If we're using bufferevents, it's entirely possible for us to + * notice "hey, data arrived!" before we notice "hey, the handshake + * finished!" And we need to be accepting both at once to handle both + * the v2 and v3 handshakes. */ + /* But that should be happening any longer've disabled bufferevents. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + + /* fall through */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + if (!(command_allowed_before_handshake(var_cell->command))) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* see above comment about CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } else { + if (enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell, chan) < 0) + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_AUTHENTICATE) + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, + var_cell, 1); + break; /* Everything is allowed */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: + if (conn->link_proto < 3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a variable-length cell with command %d in orconn " + "state %s [%d], channel state %s [%d] with link protocol %d; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received var-length cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + return; + } + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + + /* Now handle the cell */ + + switch (var_cell->command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + ++stats_n_versions_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(versions, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_VPADDING: + ++stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed; + /* Do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_CERTS: + ++stats_n_certs_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(certs, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE: + ++stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(auth_challenge, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHENTICATE: + ++stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(authenticate, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + ++stats_n_authorize_cells_processed; + /* Ignored so far. */ + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.", + (int)(var_cell->command)); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Update channel marks after connection_or.c has changed an address. + * + * This is called from connection_or_init_conn_from_address() after the + * connection's _base.addr or real_addr fields have potentially been changed + * so we can recalculate the local mark. Notably, this happens when incoming + * connections are reverse-proxied and we only learn the real address of the + * remote router by looking it up in the consensus after we finish the + * handshake and know an authenticated identity digest. + */ +void +channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_t *chan = NULL; + + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan); + + chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan); + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(conn)->addr))) { + if (!channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } + } else { + if (channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + } +} + +/** + * Check if this cell type is allowed before the handshake is finished. + * + * Return true if command is a cell command that's allowed to start a + * V3 handshake. + */ +static int +command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command) +{ + switch (command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + case CELL_VPADDING: + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Start a V3 handshake on an incoming connection. + * + * Called when we as a server receive an appropriate cell while waiting + * either for a cell or a TLS handshake. Set the connection's state to + * "handshaking_v3', initializes the or_handshake_state field as needed, + * and add the cell to the hash of incoming cells.) + */ +static int +enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + tor_assert(TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || + TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == + OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING); + + if (started_here) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a cell while TLS-handshaking, not in " + "OR_HANDSHAKING_V3, on a connection we originated."); + } + connection_or_block_renegotiation(chan->conn); + chan->conn->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3; + if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(chan->conn, started_here) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return -1; + } + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Process a 'versions' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming VERSIONS cell; the current + * link protocol version must be 0 to indicate that no version has yet been + * negotiated. We compare the versions in the cell to the list of versions + * we support, pick the highest version we have in common, and continue the + * negotiation from there. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int highest_supported_version = 0; + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if ((cell->payload_len % 2) == 1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSION cell with odd payload length %d; " + "closing connection.",cell->payload_len); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto != 0 || + (chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version " + "already set to %d; dropping", + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + switch (chan->conn->base_.state) + { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state"); + return; + } + + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state); + + { + int i; + const uint8_t *cp = cell->payload; + for (i = 0; i < cell->payload_len / 2; ++i, cp += 2) { + uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp)); + if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version) + highest_supported_version = v; + } + } + if (!highest_supported_version) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the " + "list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version == 1) { + /* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS + * cells. */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. " + "That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version < 3 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS " + "handshake. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version != 2 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) { + /* XXXX This should eventually be a log_protocol_warn */ + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link with non-2 protocol after doing a v2 TLS " + "handshake with %s. Closing connection.", + fmt_addr(&chan->conn->base_.addr)); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(highest_supported_version, started_here); + + chan->conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version; + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1; + + if (chan->conn->link_proto == 2) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + const int send_versions = !started_here; + /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */ + const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options()); + /* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */ + const int send_chall = !started_here; + /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell + * right now. */ + const int send_netinfo = !started_here; + const int send_any = + send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo; + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell", + send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "", + send_certs ? " CERTS" : "", + send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "", + send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : ""); + +#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE + if (1) { + connection_or_close_normally(chan->conn, 1); + return; + } +#endif /* defined(DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE) */ + + if (send_versions) { + if (connection_or_send_versions(chan->conn, 1) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + /* We set this after sending the versions cell. */ + /*XXXXX symbolic const.*/ + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; + chan->conn->wide_circ_ids = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids; + + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING; + + if (send_certs) { + if (connection_or_send_certs_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send certs cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_chall) { + if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Process a 'padding_negotiate' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell; + * enable or disable padding accordingly, and read and act on its timeout + * value contents. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + channelpadding_negotiate_t *negotiation; + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto); + return; + } + + if (channelpadding_negotiate_parse(&negotiation, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; " + "dropping.", chan->conn->link_proto); + + return; + } + + channelpadding_update_padding_for_channel(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), + negotiation); + + channelpadding_negotiate_free(negotiation); +} + +/** + * Convert netinfo_addr into corresponding tor_addr. + * Return 0 on success; on failure, return -1 and log a warning. + */ +static int +tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(tor_addr_t *tor_addr, + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr) { + tor_assert(tor_addr); + tor_assert(netinfo_addr); + + uint8_t type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(netinfo_addr); + uint8_t len = netinfo_addr_get_len(netinfo_addr); + + if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && len == 4) { + uint32_t ipv4 = netinfo_addr_get_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(tor_addr, ipv4); + } else if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && len == 16) { + const uint8_t *ipv6_bytes = netinfo_addr_getconstarray_addr_ipv6( + netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(tor_addr, (const char *)ipv6_bytes); + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Cannot read address from NETINFO " + "- wrong type/length."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Helper: compute the absolute value of a time_t. + * + * (we need this because labs() doesn't always work for time_t, since + * long can be shorter than time_t.) + */ +static inline time_t +time_abs(time_t val) +{ + return (val < 0) ? -val : val; +} + +/** + * Process a 'netinfo' cell + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming NETINFO cell; read and act + * on its contents, and set the connection state to "open". + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + time_t timestamp; + uint8_t my_addr_type; + uint8_t my_addr_len; + uint8_t n_other_addrs; + time_t now = time(NULL); + const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + + time_t apparent_skew = 0; + tor_addr_t my_apparent_addr = TOR_ADDR_NULL; + int started_here = 0; + const char *identity_digest = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 2) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1"); + return; + } + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 && + chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping."); + return; + } + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions); + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + identity_digest = chan->conn->identity_digest; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + if (started_here) { + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got a NETINFO cell from server, " + "but no authentication. Closing the connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have + some housekeeping to do.*/ + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id))); + tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); + /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge + * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as + * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */ + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + /* zero, checked above */ + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */ + 0); + } + } + } + + /* Decode the cell. */ + netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = NULL; + + ssize_t parsed = netinfo_cell_parse(&netinfo_cell, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + if (parsed < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Failed to parse NETINFO cell - closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + timestamp = netinfo_cell_get_timestamp(netinfo_cell); + + const netinfo_addr_t *my_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_other_addr(netinfo_cell); + + my_addr_type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(my_addr); + my_addr_len = netinfo_addr_get_len(my_addr); + + if ((now - chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) { + apparent_skew = now - timestamp; + } + /* We used to check: + * if (my_addr_len >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 6) { + * + * This is actually never going to happen, since my_addr_len is at most 255, + * and CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN - 6 is 503. So we know that cp is < end. */ + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&my_apparent_addr, my_addr) == -1) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + return; + } + + if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&my_apparent_addr, me->addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } else if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && + my_addr_len == 16) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr) && + tor_addr_eq(&my_apparent_addr, &me->ipv6_addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } + + n_other_addrs = netinfo_cell_get_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell); + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < n_other_addrs; i++) { + /* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is + * "canonical." */ + + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, i); + + tor_addr_t addr; + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&addr, netinfo_addr) == -1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Bad address in netinfo cell; Skipping."); + continue; + } + /* A relay can connect from anywhere and be canonical, so + * long as it tells you from where it came. This may sound a bit + * concerning... but that's what "canonical" means: that the + * address is one that the relay itself has claimed. The relay + * might be doing something funny, but nobody else is doing a MITM + * on the relay's TCP. + */ + if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &(chan->conn->real_addr))) { + connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1); + break; + } + } + + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + + if (me && !TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer && + channel_is_canonical(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan))) { + const char *descr = + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->get_remote_descr(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), 0); + log_info(LD_OR, + "We made a connection to a relay at %s (fp=%s) but we think " + "they will not consider this connection canonical. They " + "think we are at %s, but we think its %s.", + safe_str(descr), + safe_str(hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)), + safe_str(tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr)), + safe_str(fmt_addr32(me->addr))); + } + + /* Act on apparent skew. */ + /** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */ +#define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600 + if (time_abs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW && + (started_here || + connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->conn->identity_digest))) { + int trusted = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(chan->conn->identity_digest); + clock_skew_warning(TO_CONN(chan->conn), apparent_skew, trusted, LD_GENERAL, + "NETINFO cell", "OR"); + } + + /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently + * trustworthy. */ + + if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) { + /* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE + * cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so + * now. */ + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but " + "was unable to make the OR connection become open.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now " + "open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s. " + "Our address is apparently %s.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto), + hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr))); + } + assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(chan->conn),time(NULL)); +} + +/** Types of certificates that we know how to parse from CERTS cells. Each + * type corresponds to a different encoding format. */ +typedef enum cert_encoding_t { + CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN, /**< We don't recognize this. */ + CERT_ENCODING_X509, /**< It's an RSA key, signed with RSA, encoded in x509. + * (Actually, it might not be RSA. We test that later.) */ + CERT_ENCODING_ED25519, /**< It's something signed with an Ed25519 key, + * encoded asa a tor_cert_t.*/ + CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT, /**< It's an Ed key signed with an RSA key. */ +} cert_encoding_t; + +/** + * Given one of the certificate type codes used in a CERTS cell, + * return the corresponding cert_encoding_t that we should use to parse + * the certificate. + */ +static cert_encoding_t +certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum) +{ + switch (typenum) { + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_X509; + case CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_ED25519; + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID: + return CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT; + default: + return CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/** + * Process a CERTS cell from a channel. + * + * This function is called to process an incoming CERTS cell on a + * channel_tls_t: + * + * If the other side should not have sent us a CERTS cell, or the cell is + * malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't, + * then mark the connection. + * + * If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then + * store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side + * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection. + * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ +#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID + /* These arrays will be sparse, since a cert type can be at most one + * of ed/x509 */ + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + tor_cert_t *ed_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + uint8_t *rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + size_t rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = 0; + + int n_certs, i; + certs_cell_t *cc = NULL; + + int send_netinfo = 0, started_here = 0; + + memset(x509_certs, 0, sizeof(x509_certs)); + memset(ed_certs, 0, sizeof(ed_certs)); + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad CERTS cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto err; \ + } while (0) + + /* Can't use connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(); its conn->tls + * check looks like it breaks + * test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok_server(). */ + started_here = chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell) + ERR("We already got one"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be unreachable, but let's make sure. */ + ERR("We're already authenticated!"); + } + if (cell->payload_len < 1) + ERR("It had no body"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It couldn't be parsed."); + + n_certs = cc->n_certs; + + for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) { + certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i); + + uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type; + uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len; + uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c); + + if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED) + continue; + const cert_encoding_t ct = certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(cert_type); + switch (ct) { + default: + case CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN: + break; + case CERT_ENCODING_X509: { + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!x509_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (x509_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_cert); + ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate"); + } else { + x509_certs[cert_type] = x509_cert; + } + } + break; + } + case CERT_ENCODING_ED25519: { + tor_cert_t *ed_cert = tor_cert_parse(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!ed_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable Ed certificate " + "in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (ed_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_cert_free(ed_cert); + ERR("Duplicate Ed25519 certificate"); + } else { + ed_certs[cert_type] = ed_cert; + } + } + break; + } + + case CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT: { + if (rsa_ed_cc_cert) { + ERR("Duplicate RSA->Ed25519 crosscert"); + } else { + rsa_ed_cc_cert = tor_memdup(cert_body, cert_len); + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = cert_len; + } + break; + } + } + } + + /* Move the certificates we (might) want into the handshake_state->certs + * structure. */ + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID]; + tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH]; + tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = auth_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->link_cert = link_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = id_cert; + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK] = NULL; + + tor_cert_t *ed_id_sign = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_link = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_auth = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign = ed_id_sign; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_link = ed_sign_link; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth = ed_sign_auth; + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH] = NULL; + + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert = rsa_ed_cc_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert_len = + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len; + rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + + int severity; + /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were + * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect + * to one. */ + if (started_here && + router_digest_is_trusted_dir(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest)) + severity = LOG_WARN; + else + severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; + + const ed25519_public_key_t *checked_ed_id = NULL; + const common_digests_t *checked_rsa_id = NULL; + or_handshake_certs_check_both(severity, + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs, + chan->conn->tls, + time(NULL), + &checked_ed_id, + &checked_rsa_id); + + if (!checked_rsa_id) + ERR("Invalid certificate chain!"); + + if (started_here) { + /* No more information is needed. */ + + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + { + const common_digests_t *id_digests = checked_rsa_id; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd; + if (!id_digests) + ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert"); + + identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + if (!identity_rcvd) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert."); + } + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + } + + if (checked_ed_id) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + checked_ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "calling client_learned_peer_id from " + "process_certs_cell"); + + if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + checked_ed_id) < 0) + ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id"); + + log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it with " + "RSA%s", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port, + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : ""); + + if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we + * aren't planning to authenticate at all. At this point we know who we + * are talking to, so we can just send a netinfo now. */ + send_netinfo = 1; + } + } else { + /* We can't call it authenticated till we see an AUTHENTICATE cell. */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got some good RSA%s certificates from %s:%d. " + "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.", + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + /* XXXX check more stuff? */ + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1; + + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto err; + } + } + + err: + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(x509_certs); ++u) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_certs[u]); + } + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(ed_certs); ++u) { + tor_cert_free(ed_certs[u]); + } + tor_free(rsa_ed_cc_cert); + certs_cell_free(cc); +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on a + * channel_tls_t; if we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're + * not the originator of the channel), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing + * a v3 handshake, mark the channel. If the cell is well-formed but we don't + * want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we + * want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int n_types, i, use_type = -1; + auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto done; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here)) + ERR("We didn't originate this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge) + ERR("We already received one"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It was not well-formed."); + + n_types = ac->n_methods; + + /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */ + for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) { + uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i); + if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) { + if (use_type == -1 || + authchallenge_type_is_better(authtype, use_type)) { + use_type = authtype; + } + } + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1; + + if (! public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a + connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we + got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */ + goto done; + } + + if (use_type >= 0) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending " + "authentication type %d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + use_type); + + if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(chan->conn, use_type) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, + "Couldn't send authenticate cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d, but we don't " + "know any of its authentication types. Not authenticating.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + + done: + auth_challenge_cell_free(ac); + +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a + * v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the + * other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right, + * we didn't get a CERTS cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept + * the identity of the router on the other side of the connection. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL; + const uint8_t *auth; + int authlen; + int authtype; + int bodylen; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + var_cell_free(expected_cell); \ + return; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) + ERR("We originated this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate) + ERR("We already got one!"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be impossible given other checks */ + ERR("The peer is already authenticated"); + } + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We never got a certs cell"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an identity certificate"); + if (cell->payload_len < 4) + ERR("Cell was way too short"); + + auth = cell->payload; + { + uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth)); + uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2)); + if (4 + len > cell->payload_len) + ERR("Authenticator was truncated"); + + if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(type)) + ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized"); + authtype = type; + + auth += 4; + authlen = len; + } + + if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1) + ERR("Authenticator was too short"); + + expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body( + chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1); + if (! expected_cell) + ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body"); + + int sig_is_rsa; + if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET || + authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) { + bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 1; + } else { + tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705); + /* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room + * for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */ + tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 0; + } + if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) { + ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected."); + } + + /* Length of random part. */ + if (BUG(bodylen < 24)) { + // LCOV_EXCL_START + ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible"); + // LCOV_EXCL_STOP + } + + if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24)) + ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected"); + + if (sig_is_rsa) { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL) + ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert"); + + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate"); + + crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key( + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert); + char d[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char *signed_data; + size_t keysize; + int signed_len; + + if (! pk) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert."); + } + crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256); + + keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk); + signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize); + signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize, + (char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, + authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + if (signed_len < 0) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid"); + } + if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Not enough data was signed"); + } + /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here, + * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */ + if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed."); + } + tor_free(signed_data); + } else { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate."); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 authentication certificate."); + + const ed25519_public_key_t *authkey = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth->signed_key; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + tor_assert(authlen > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + memcpy(&sig.sig, auth + authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, ED25519_SIG_LEN); + if (ed25519_checksig(&sig, auth, authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, authkey)<0) { + ERR("Ed25519 signature wasn't valid."); + } + } + + /* Okay, we are authenticated. */ + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0; + { + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL; + + if (! sig_is_rsa) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + ed_identity_received = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + ed_identity_received, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */ + tor_assert(id_digests); + + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Calling connection_or_init_conn_from_address for %s " + " from %s, with%s ed25519 id.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + __func__, + ed_identity_received ? "" : "out"); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + ed_identity_received, + 0); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d, type %d: Looks good.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + authtype); + } + + var_cell_free(expected_cell); + +#undef ERR +}

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1
by nickm＠torproject.org 22 Oct '19

22 Oct '19

commit 3c071f30029adcbae795150bb7d19ad2f4734658 Merge: d08d29f15 3c97ab3c2 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Oct 22 12:54:37 2019 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1330' into maint-0.4.1 changes/bug31107 | 4 ++++ src/core/or/channeltls.c | 10 +++++++++- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --cc src/core/or/channeltls.c index 2a6edc951,000000000..25f3baf92 mode 100644,000000..100644 --- a/src/core/or/channeltls.c +++ b/src/core/or/channeltls.c @@@ -1,2514 -1,0 +1,2522 @@@ +/* * Copyright (c) 2012-2019, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file channeltls.c + * + * \brief A concrete subclass of channel_t using or_connection_t to transfer + * cells between Tor instances. + * + * This module fills in the various function pointers in channel_t, to + * implement the channel_tls_t channels as used in Tor today. These channels + * are created from channel_tls_connect() and + * channel_tls_handle_incoming(). Each corresponds 1:1 to or_connection_t + * object, as implemented in connection_or.c. These channels transmit cells + * to the underlying or_connection_t by calling + * connection_or_write_*_cell_to_buf(), and receive cells from the underlying + * or_connection_t when connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf() calls + * channel_tls_handle_*_cell(). + * + * Here we also implement the server (responder) side of the v3+ Tor link + * handshake, which uses CERTS and AUTHENTICATE cell to negotiate versions, + * exchange expected and observed IP and time information, and bootstrap a + * level of authentication higher than we have gotten on the raw TLS + * handshake. + * + * NOTE: Since there is currently only one type of channel, there are probably + * more than a few cases where functionality that is currently in + * channeltls.c, connection_or.c, and channel.c ought to be divided up + * differently. The right time to do this is probably whenever we introduce + * our next channel type. + **/ + +/* + * Define this so channel.h gives us things only channel_t subclasses + * should touch. + */ +#define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ + +#define CHANNELTLS_PRIVATE + +#include "core/or/or.h" +#include "core/or/channel.h" +#include "core/or/channeltls.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux.h" +#include "core/or/circuitmux_ewma.h" +#include "core/or/command.h" +#include "app/config/config.h" +#include "core/mainloop/connection.h" +#include "core/or/connection_or.h" +#include "feature/control/control.h" +#include "feature/client/entrynodes.h" +#include "trunnel/link_handshake.h" +#include "core/or/relay.h" +#include "feature/stats/rephist.h" +#include "feature/relay/router.h" +#include "feature/relay/routermode.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/dirlist.h" +#include "core/or/scheduler.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" +#include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" +#include "trunnel/netinfo.h" +#include "core/or/channelpadding.h" + +#include "core/or/cell_st.h" +#include "core/or/cell_queue_st.h" +#include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_connection_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_certs_st.h" +#include "core/or/or_handshake_state_st.h" +#include "feature/nodelist/routerinfo_st.h" +#include "core/or/var_cell_st.h" + +#include "lib/tls/tortls.h" +#include "lib/tls/x509.h" + +/** How many CELL_PADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_padding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VERSIONS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_versions_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_NETINFO cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_VPADDING cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_CERTS cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_certs_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHENTICATE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed = 0; +/** How many CELL_AUTHORIZE cells have we received, ever? */ +uint64_t stats_n_authorize_cells_processed = 0; + +/** Active listener, if any */ +static channel_listener_t *channel_tls_listener = NULL; + +/* channel_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan); +static const char * channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan); +static void channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan); +static double channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan); +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out); +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out); +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags); +static int channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req); +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info); +static int channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target); +static int channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan); +static size_t channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan); +static int channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + cell_t *cell); +static int channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell); +static int channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + var_cell_t *var_cell); + +/* channel_listener_tls_t method declarations */ + +static void channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l); + +/** Handle incoming cells for the handshake stuff here rather than + * passing them on up. */ + +static void channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static int command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command); +static int enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *tlschan); +static void channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, + channel_tls_t *chan); + +/** + * Do parts of channel_tls_t initialization common to channel_tls_connect() + * and channel_tls_handle_incoming(). + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_common_init(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + channel_t *chan; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + chan = &(tlschan->base_); + channel_init(chan); + chan->magic = TLS_CHAN_MAGIC; + chan->state = CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING; + chan->close = channel_tls_close_method; + chan->describe_transport = channel_tls_describe_transport_method; + chan->free_fn = channel_tls_free_method; + chan->get_overhead_estimate = channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method; + chan->get_remote_addr = channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method; + chan->get_remote_descr = channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method; + chan->get_transport_name = channel_tls_get_transport_name_method; + chan->has_queued_writes = channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method; + chan->is_canonical = channel_tls_is_canonical_method; + chan->matches_extend_info = channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method; + chan->matches_target = channel_tls_matches_target_method; + chan->num_bytes_queued = channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method; + chan->num_cells_writeable = channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method; + chan->write_cell = channel_tls_write_cell_method; + chan->write_packed_cell = channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method; + chan->write_var_cell = channel_tls_write_var_cell_method; + + chan->cmux = circuitmux_alloc(); + /* We only have one policy for now so always set it to EWMA. */ + circuitmux_set_policy(chan->cmux, &ewma_policy); +} + +/** + * Start a new TLS channel. + * + * Launch a new OR connection to addr:port and expect to + * handshake with an OR with identity digest id_digest, and wrap + * it in a channel_tls_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_connect(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, + const char *id_digest, + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_id) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "In channel_tls_connect() for channel %p " + "(global id %"PRIu64 ")", + tlschan, + (chan->global_identifier)); + + if (is_local_addr(addr)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new outgoing channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_outgoing(chan); + + /* Set up or_connection stuff */ + tlschan->conn = connection_or_connect(addr, port, id_digest, ed_id, tlschan); + /* connection_or_connect() will fill in tlschan->conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + chan->reason_for_closing = CHANNEL_CLOSE_FOR_ERROR; + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got orconn %p for channel with global id %"PRIu64, + tlschan->conn, (chan->global_identifier)); + + goto done; + + err: + circuitmux_free(chan->cmux); + tor_free(tlschan); + chan = NULL; + + done: + /* If we got one, we should register it */ + if (chan) channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/** + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener. + * + * Returns the current channel listener for incoming TLS connections, or + * NULL if none has been established + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_get_listener(void) +{ + return channel_tls_listener; +} + +/** + * Start a channel_tls_t listener if necessary. + * + * Return the current channel_tls_t listener, or start one if we haven't yet, + * and return that. + */ +channel_listener_t * +channel_tls_start_listener(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *listener; + + if (!channel_tls_listener) { + listener = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*listener)); + channel_init_listener(listener); + listener->state = CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_LISTENING; + listener->close = channel_tls_listener_close_method; + listener->describe_transport = + channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method; + + channel_tls_listener = listener; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Starting TLS channel listener %p with global id %"PRIu64, + listener, (listener->global_identifier)); + + channel_listener_register(listener); + } else listener = channel_tls_listener; + + return listener; +} + +/** + * Free everything on shutdown. + * + * Not much to do here, since channel_free_all() takes care of a lot, but let's + * get rid of the listener. + */ +void +channel_tls_free_all(void) +{ + channel_listener_t *old_listener = NULL; + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Shutting down TLS channels..."); + + if (channel_tls_listener) { + /* + * When we close it, channel_tls_listener will get nulled out, so save + * a pointer so we can free it. + */ + old_listener = channel_tls_listener; + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Closing channel_tls_listener with ID %"PRIu64 + " at %p.", + (old_listener->global_identifier), + old_listener); + channel_listener_unregister(old_listener); + channel_listener_mark_for_close(old_listener); + channel_listener_free(old_listener); + tor_assert(channel_tls_listener == NULL); + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Done shutting down TLS channels"); +} + +/** + * Create a new channel around an incoming or_connection_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_handle_incoming(or_connection_t *orconn) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*tlschan)); + channel_t *chan = &(tlschan->base_); + + tor_assert(orconn); + tor_assert(!(orconn->chan)); + + channel_tls_common_init(tlschan); + + /* Link the channel and orconn to each other */ + tlschan->conn = orconn; + orconn->chan = tlschan; + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(orconn)->addr))) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } else { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking new incoming channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + + channel_mark_incoming(chan); + + /* Register it */ + channel_register(chan); + + return chan; +} + +/********* + * Casts * + ********/ + +/** + * Cast a channel_tls_t to a channel_t. + */ +channel_t * +channel_tls_to_base(channel_tls_t *tlschan) +{ + if (!tlschan) return NULL; + + return &(tlschan->base_); +} + +/** + * Cast a channel_t to a channel_tls_t, with appropriate type-checking + * asserts. + */ +channel_tls_t * +channel_tls_from_base(channel_t *chan) +{ + if (!chan) return NULL; + + tor_assert(chan->magic == TLS_CHAN_MAGIC); + + return (channel_tls_t *)(chan); +} + +/******************************************** + * Method implementations for channel_tls_t * + *******************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_tls_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_close_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) connection_or_close_normally(tlschan->conn, 1); + else { + /* Weird - we'll have to change the state ourselves, I guess */ + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "Tried to close channel_tls_t %p with NULL conn", + tlschan); + channel_change_state(chan, CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_tls_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel on connection <id>" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_describe_transport_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + static char *buf = NULL; + uint64_t id; + channel_tls_t *tlschan; + const char *rv = NULL; + + tor_assert(chan); + + tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + id = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->global_identifier; + + if (buf) tor_free(buf); + tor_asprintf(&buf, + "TLS channel (connection %"PRIu64 ")", + (id)); + + rv = buf; + } else { + rv = "TLS channel (no connection)"; + } + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Free a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called by the generic channel layer when freeing a channel_tls_t; + * this happens either on a channel which has already reached + * CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSED or CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR from channel_run_cleanup() or + * on shutdown from channel_free_all(). In the latter case we might still + * have an orconn active (which connection_free_all() will get to later), + * so we should null out its channel pointer now. + */ +static void +channel_tls_free_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tlschan->conn->chan = NULL; + tlschan->conn = NULL; + } +} + +/** + * Get an estimate of the average TLS overhead for the upper layer. + */ +static double +channel_tls_get_overhead_estimate_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + double overhead = 1.0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + /* Just return 1.0f if we don't have sensible data */ + if (tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted > 0 && + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls >= + tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted) { + overhead = ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted_by_tls)) / + ((double)(tlschan->conn->bytes_xmitted)); + + /* + * Never estimate more than 2.0; otherwise we get silly large estimates + * at the very start of a new TLS connection. + */ + if (overhead > 2.0) + overhead = 2.0; + } + + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Estimated overhead ratio for TLS chan %"PRIu64 " is %f", + (chan->global_identifier), overhead); + + return overhead; +} + +/** + * Get the remote address of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_addr method for channel_tls_t; copy the + * remote endpoint of the channel to addr_out and return 1 (always + * succeeds for this transport). + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_remote_addr_method(channel_t *chan, tor_addr_t *addr_out) +{ + int rv = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(addr_out); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + tor_addr_copy(addr_out, &(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + rv = 1; + } else tor_addr_make_unspec(addr_out); + + return rv; +} + +/** + * Get the name of the pluggable transport used by a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_transport_name for channel_tls_t. If the + * channel uses a pluggable transport, copy its name to + * transport_out and return 0. If the channel did not use a + * pluggable transport, return -1. + */ +static int +channel_tls_get_transport_name_method(channel_t *chan, char **transport_out) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(transport_out); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + if (!tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport) + return -1; + + *transport_out = tor_strdup(tlschan->conn->ext_or_transport); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Get endpoint description of a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the get_remote_descr method for channel_tls_t; it returns + * a text description of the remote endpoint of the channel suitable for use + * in log messages. The req parameter is 0 for the canonical address or 1 for + * the actual address seen. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_get_remote_descr_method(channel_t *chan, int flags) +{ +#define MAX_DESCR_LEN 32 + + static char buf[MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1]; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + connection_t *conn; + const char *answer = NULL; + char *addr_str; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + conn = TO_CONN(tlschan->conn); + switch (flags) { + case 0: + /* Canonical address with port*/ + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", conn->address, conn->port); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL: + /* Actual address with port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + tor_snprintf(buf, MAX_DESCR_LEN + 1, + "%s:%u", addr_str, conn->port); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Canonical address, no port */ + strlcpy(buf, conn->address, sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + break; + case GRD_FLAG_ORIGINAL|GRD_FLAG_ADDR_ONLY: + /* Actual address, no port */ + addr_str = tor_addr_to_str_dup(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr)); + strlcpy(buf, addr_str, sizeof(buf)); + tor_free(addr_str); + answer = buf; + break; + default: + /* Something's broken in channel.c */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } else { + strlcpy(buf, "(No connection)", sizeof(buf)); + answer = buf; + } + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we have queued writes. + * + * This implements the has_queued_writes method for channel_tls t_; it returns + * 1 iff we have queued writes on the outbuf of the underlying or_connection_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_has_queued_writes_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called has_queued_writes on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + outbuf_len = (tlschan->conn != NULL) ? + connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)) : + 0; + + return (outbuf_len > 0); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer if we're canonical. + * + * This implements the is_canonical method for channel_tls_t; if req is zero, + * it returns whether this is a canonical channel, and if it is one it returns + * whether that can be relied upon. + */ +static int +channel_tls_is_canonical_method(channel_t *chan, int req) +{ + int answer = 0; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + switch (req) { + case 0: + answer = tlschan->conn->is_canonical; + break; + case 1: + /* + * Is the is_canonical bit reliable? In protocols version 2 and up + * we get the canonical address from a NETINFO cell, but in older + * versions it might be based on an obsolete descriptor. + */ + answer = (tlschan->conn->link_proto >= 2); + break; + default: + /* This shouldn't happen; channel.c is broken if it does */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + } + } + /* else return 0 for tlschan->conn == NULL */ + + return answer; +} + +/** + * Check if we match an extend_info_t. + * + * This implements the matches_extend_info method for channel_tls_t; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches an extend_info_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_extend_info_method(channel_t *chan, + extend_info_t *extend_info) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(extend_info); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_extend_info on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + return (tor_addr_eq(&(extend_info->addr), + &(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->addr)) && + (extend_info->port == TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)->port)); +} + +/** + * Check if we match a target address; return true iff we do. + * + * This implements the matches_target method for channel_tls t_; the upper + * layer wants to know if this channel matches a target address when extending + * a circuit. + */ +static int +channel_tls_matches_target_method(channel_t *chan, + const tor_addr_t *target) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(target); + + /* Never match if we have no conn */ + if (!(tlschan->conn)) { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called matches_target on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return 0; + } + + /* real_addr is the address this connection came from. + * base_.addr is updated by connection_or_init_conn_from_address() + * to be the address in the descriptor. It may be tempting to + * allow either address to be allowed, but if we did so, it would + * enable someone who steals a relay's keys to impersonate/MITM it + * from anywhere on the Internet! (Because they could make long-lived + * TLS connections from anywhere to all relays, and wait for them to + * be used for extends). + */ + return tor_addr_eq(&(tlschan->conn->real_addr), target); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many bytes we have queued and not yet + * sent. + */ +static size_t +channel_tls_num_bytes_queued_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + return connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); +} + +/** + * Tell the upper layer how many cells we can accept to write. + * + * This implements the num_cells_writeable method for channel_tls_t; it + * returns an estimate of the number of cells we can accept with + * channel_tls_write_*_cell(). + */ +static int +channel_tls_num_cells_writeable_method(channel_t *chan) +{ + size_t outbuf_len; + ssize_t n; + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(tlschan->conn); + + cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(tlschan->conn->wide_circ_ids); + outbuf_len = connection_get_outbuf_len(TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + /* Get the number of cells */ + n = CEIL_DIV(OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - outbuf_len, cell_network_size); + if (n < 0) n = 0; +#if SIZEOF_SIZE_T > SIZEOF_INT + if (n > INT_MAX) n = INT_MAX; +#endif + + return (int)n; +} + +/** + * Write a cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a cell_t, transmit the cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_cell_method(channel_t *chan, cell_t *cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/** + * Write a packed cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_packed_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a packed_cell_t, transmit the packed_cell_t. + * + * Return 0 on success or negative value on error. The caller must free the + * packed cell. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_packed_cell_method(channel_t *chan, + packed_cell_t *packed_cell) +{ + tor_assert(chan); + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + size_t cell_network_size = get_cell_network_size(chan->wide_circ_ids); + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(packed_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_buf_add(packed_cell->body, cell_network_size, + TO_CONN(tlschan->conn)); + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_packed_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Write a variable-length cell to a channel_tls_t. + * + * This implements the write_var_cell method for channel_tls_t; given a + * channel_tls_t and a var_cell_t, transmit the var_cell_t. + */ +static int +channel_tls_write_var_cell_method(channel_t *chan, var_cell_t *var_cell) +{ + channel_tls_t *tlschan = BASE_CHAN_TO_TLS(chan); + int written = 0; + + tor_assert(tlschan); + tor_assert(var_cell); + + if (tlschan->conn) { + connection_or_write_var_cell_to_buf(var_cell, tlschan->conn); + ++written; + } else { + log_info(LD_CHANNEL, + "something called write_var_cell on a tlschan " + "(%p with ID %"PRIu64 " but no conn", + chan, (chan->global_identifier)); + } + + return written; +} + +/************************************************* + * Method implementations for channel_listener_t * + ************************************************/ + +/** + * Close a channel_listener_t. + * + * This implements the close method for channel_listener_t. + */ +static void +channel_tls_listener_close_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + /* + * Listeners we just go ahead and change state through to CLOSED, but + * make sure to check if they're channel_tls_listener to NULL it out. + */ + if (chan_l == channel_tls_listener) + channel_tls_listener = NULL; + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSING); + } + + if (chan_l->incoming_list) { + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(chan_l->incoming_list, + channel_t *, ichan) { + channel_mark_for_close(ichan); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ichan); + + smartlist_free(chan_l->incoming_list); + chan_l->incoming_list = NULL; + } + + if (!(chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED || + chan_l->state == CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_ERROR)) { + channel_listener_change_state(chan_l, CHANNEL_LISTENER_STATE_CLOSED); + } +} + +/** + * Describe the transport for a channel_listener_t. + * + * This returns the string "TLS channel (listening)" to the upper + * layer. + */ +static const char * +channel_tls_listener_describe_transport_method(channel_listener_t *chan_l) +{ + tor_assert(chan_l); + + return "TLS channel (listening)"; +} + +/******************************************************* + * Functions for handling events on an or_connection_t * + ******************************************************/ + +/** + * Handle an orconn state change. + * + * This function will be called by connection_or.c when the or_connection_t + * associated with this channel_tls_t changes state. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_state_change_on_orconn(channel_tls_t *chan, + or_connection_t *conn, + uint8_t state) +{ + channel_t *base_chan; + + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan == chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn == conn); + + base_chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan); + + /* Make sure the base connection state makes sense - shouldn't be error + * or closed. */ + + tor_assert(CHANNEL_IS_OPENING(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_MAINT(base_chan) || + CHANNEL_IS_CLOSING(base_chan)); + + /* Did we just go to state open? */ + if (state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN) { + /* + * We can go to CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN from CHANNEL_STATE_OPENING or + * CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT on this. + */ + channel_change_state_open(base_chan); + /* We might have just become writeable; check and tell the scheduler */ + if (connection_or_num_cells_writeable(conn) > 0) { + scheduler_channel_wants_writes(base_chan); + } + } else { + /* + * Not open, so from CHANNEL_STATE_OPEN we go to CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT, + * otherwise no change. + */ + if (CHANNEL_IS_OPEN(base_chan)) { + channel_change_state(base_chan, CHANNEL_STATE_MAINT); + } + } +} + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + +/** + * Timing states wrapper. + * + * This is a wrapper function around the actual function that processes the + * cell that just arrived on chan. Increment *time + * by the number of microseconds used by the call to *func(cell, chan). + */ +static void +channel_tls_time_process_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan, int *time, + void (*func)(cell_t *, channel_tls_t *)) +{ + struct timeval start, end; + long time_passed; + + tor_gettimeofday(&start); + + (*func)(cell, chan); + + tor_gettimeofday(&end); + time_passed = tv_udiff(&start, &end) ; + + if (time_passed > 10000) { /* more than 10ms */ + log_debug(LD_OR,"That call just took %ld ms.",time_passed/1000); + } + + if (time_passed < 0) { + log_info(LD_GENERAL,"That call took us back in time!"); + time_passed = 0; + } + + *time += time_passed; +} +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + +/** + * Handle an incoming cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * This is called from connection_or.c to handle an arriving cell; it checks + * for cell types specific to the handshake for this transport protocol and + * handles them, and queues all other cells to the channel_t layer, which + * eventually will hand them off to command.c. + * + * The channel layer itself decides whether the cell should be queued or + * can be handed off immediately to the upper-layer code. It is responsible + * for copying in the case that it queues; we merely pass pointers through + * which we get from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_cell(cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + int handshaking; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) STMT_BEGIN { \ + ++num ## tp; \ + channel_tls_time_process_cell(cl, cn, & tp ## time , \ + channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell); \ + } STMT_END +#else /* !(defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS)) */ +#define PROCESS_CELL(tp, cl, cn) channel_tls_process_ ## tp ## _cell(cl, cn) +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + handshaking = (TO_CONN(conn)->state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN); + + if (conn->base_.marked_for_close) + return; + + /* Reject all but VERSIONS and NETINFO when handshaking. */ + /* (VERSIONS should actually be impossible; it's variable-length.) */ + if (handshaking && cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS && + cell->command != CELL_NETINFO) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received unexpected cell command %d in chan state %s / " + "conn state %s; closing the connection.", + (int)cell->command, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state)); + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + + if (conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + or_handshake_state_record_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_TOTAL); + + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_TOTAL); + + switch (cell->command) { + case CELL_PADDING: + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_CELL); + if (TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled) + rep_hist_padding_count_read(PADDING_TYPE_ENABLED_CELL); + ++stats_n_padding_cells_processed; + /* do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_VERSIONS: - tor_fragile_assert(); ++ /* A VERSIONS cell should always be a variable-length cell, and ++ * so should never reach this function (which handles constant-sized ++ * cells). But if the connection is using the (obsolete) v1 link ++ * protocol, all cells will be treated as constant-sized, and so ++ * it's possible we'll reach this code. ++ */ ++ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_CHANNEL, ++ "Received unexpected VERSIONS cell on a channel using link " ++ "protocol %d; ignoring.", conn->link_proto); + break; + case CELL_NETINFO: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(netinfo, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_PADDING_NEGOTIATE: + ++stats_n_netinfo_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(padding_negotiate, cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_CREATE: + case CELL_CREATE_FAST: + case CELL_CREATED: + case CELL_CREATED_FAST: + case CELL_RELAY: + case CELL_RELAY_EARLY: + case CELL_DESTROY: + case CELL_CREATE2: + case CELL_CREATED2: + /* + * These are all transport independent and we pass them up through the + * channel_t mechanism. They are ultimately handled in command.c. + */ + channel_process_cell(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), cell); + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Cell of unknown type (%d) received in channeltls.c. " + "Dropping.", + cell->command); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Handle an incoming variable-length cell on a channel_tls_t. + * + * Process a var_cell that was just received on conn. Keep + * internal statistics about how many of each cell we've processed so far + * this second, and the total number of microseconds it took to + * process each type of cell. All the var_cell commands are handshake- + * related and live below the channel_t layer, so no variable-length + * cells ever get delivered in the current implementation, but I've left + * the mechanism in place for future use. + * + * If we were handing them off to the upper layer, the channel_t queueing + * code would be responsible for memory management, and we'd just be passing + * pointers through from connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(). That + * caller always frees them after this function returns, so this function + * should never free var_cell. + */ +void +channel_tls_handle_var_cell(var_cell_t *var_cell, or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_tls_t *chan; + +#ifdef KEEP_TIMING_STATS + /* how many of each cell have we seen so far this second? needs better + * name. */ + static int num_versions = 0, num_certs = 0; + static time_t current_second = 0; /* from previous calls to time */ + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (current_second == 0) current_second = now; + if (now > current_second) { /* the second has rolled over */ + /* print stats */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "At end of second: %d versions (%d ms), %d certs (%d ms)", + num_versions, versions_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000), + num_certs, certs_time / ((now - current_second) * 1000)); + + num_versions = num_certs = 0; + versions_time = certs_time = 0; + + /* remember which second it is, for next time */ + current_second = now; + } +#endif /* defined(KEEP_TIMING_STATS) */ + + tor_assert(var_cell); + tor_assert(conn); + + chan = conn->chan; + + if (!chan) { + log_warn(LD_CHANNEL, + "Got a var_cell_t on an OR connection with no channel"); + return; + } + + if (TO_CONN(conn)->marked_for_close) + return; + + switch (TO_CONN(conn)->state) { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_VERSIONS) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + TO_CONN(conn)->state, + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* + * The code in connection_or.c will tell channel_t to close for + * error; it will go to CHANNEL_STATE_CLOSING, and then to + * CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR when conn is closed. + */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + /* If we're using bufferevents, it's entirely possible for us to + * notice "hey, data arrived!" before we notice "hey, the handshake + * finished!" And we need to be accepting both at once to handle both + * the v2 and v3 handshakes. */ + /* But that should be happening any longer've disabled bufferevents. */ + tor_assert_nonfatal_unreached_once(); + + /* fall through */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + if (!(command_allowed_before_handshake(var_cell->command))) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "closing the connection.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + /* see above comment about CHANNEL_STATE_ERROR */ + connection_or_close_for_error(conn, 0); + return; + } else { + if (enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell, chan) < 0) + return; + } + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + if (var_cell->command != CELL_AUTHENTICATE) + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(conn, conn->handshake_state, + var_cell, 1); + break; /* Everything is allowed */ + case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN: + if (conn->link_proto < 3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received a variable-length cell with command %d in orconn " + "state %s [%d], channel state %s [%d] with link protocol %d; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received var-length cell with command %d in unexpected " + "orconn state \"%s\" [%d], channel state \"%s\" [%d]; " + "ignoring it.", + (int)(var_cell->command), + conn_state_to_string(CONN_TYPE_OR, TO_CONN(conn)->state), + (int)(TO_CONN(conn)->state), + channel_state_to_string(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state), + (int)(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->state)); + return; + } + + /* We note that we're on the internet whenever we read a cell. This is + * a fast operation. */ + entry_guards_note_internet_connectivity(get_guard_selection_info()); + + /* Now handle the cell */ + + switch (var_cell->command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + ++stats_n_versions_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(versions, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_VPADDING: + ++stats_n_vpadding_cells_processed; + /* Do nothing */ + break; + case CELL_CERTS: + ++stats_n_certs_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(certs, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTH_CHALLENGE: + ++stats_n_auth_challenge_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(auth_challenge, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHENTICATE: + ++stats_n_authenticate_cells_processed; + PROCESS_CELL(authenticate, var_cell, chan); + break; + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + ++stats_n_authorize_cells_processed; + /* Ignored so far. */ + break; + default: + log_fn(LOG_INFO, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Variable-length cell of unknown type (%d) received.", + (int)(var_cell->command)); + break; + } +} + +/** + * Update channel marks after connection_or.c has changed an address. + * + * This is called from connection_or_init_conn_from_address() after the + * connection's _base.addr or real_addr fields have potentially been changed + * so we can recalculate the local mark. Notably, this happens when incoming + * connections are reverse-proxied and we only learn the real address of the + * remote router by looking it up in the consensus after we finish the + * handshake and know an authenticated identity digest. + */ +void +channel_tls_update_marks(or_connection_t *conn) +{ + channel_t *chan = NULL; + + tor_assert(conn); + tor_assert(conn->chan); + + chan = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(conn->chan); + + if (is_local_addr(&(TO_CONN(conn)->addr))) { + if (!channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as local", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_local(chan); + } + } else { + if (channel_is_local(chan)) { + log_debug(LD_CHANNEL, + "Marking channel %"PRIu64 " at %p as remote", + (chan->global_identifier), chan); + channel_mark_remote(chan); + } + } +} + +/** + * Check if this cell type is allowed before the handshake is finished. + * + * Return true if command is a cell command that's allowed to start a + * V3 handshake. + */ +static int +command_allowed_before_handshake(uint8_t command) +{ + switch (command) { + case CELL_VERSIONS: + case CELL_VPADDING: + case CELL_AUTHORIZE: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +/** + * Start a V3 handshake on an incoming connection. + * + * Called when we as a server receive an appropriate cell while waiting + * either for a cell or a TLS handshake. Set the connection's state to + * "handshaking_v3', initializes the or_handshake_state field as needed, + * and add the cell to the hash of incoming cells.) + */ +static int +enter_v3_handshake_with_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + tor_assert(TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING || + TO_CONN(chan->conn)->state == + OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING); + + if (started_here) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a cell while TLS-handshaking, not in " + "OR_HANDSHAKING_V3, on a connection we originated."); + } + connection_or_block_renegotiation(chan->conn); + chan->conn->base_.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3; + if (connection_init_or_handshake_state(chan->conn, started_here) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return -1; + } + or_handshake_state_record_var_cell(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state, cell, 1); + return 0; +} + +/** + * Process a 'versions' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming VERSIONS cell; the current + * link protocol version must be 0 to indicate that no version has yet been + * negotiated. We compare the versions in the cell to the list of versions + * we support, pick the highest version we have in common, and continue the + * negotiation from there. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_versions_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int highest_supported_version = 0; + int started_here = 0; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if ((cell->payload_len % 2) == 1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSION cell with odd payload length %d; " + "closing connection.",cell->payload_len); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto != 0 || + (chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a VERSIONS cell on a connection with its version " + "already set to %d; dropping", + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto)); + return; + } + switch (chan->conn->base_.state) + { + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2: + case OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3: + break; + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_HANDSHAKING: + case OR_CONN_STATE_TLS_SERVER_RENEGOTIATING: + default: + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "VERSIONS cell while in unexpected state"); + return; + } + + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state); + + { + int i; + const uint8_t *cp = cell->payload; + for (i = 0; i < cell->payload_len / 2; ++i, cp += 2) { + uint16_t v = ntohs(get_uint16(cp)); + if (is_or_protocol_version_known(v) && v > highest_supported_version) + highest_supported_version = v; + } + } + if (!highest_supported_version) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Couldn't find a version in common between my version list and the " + "list in the VERSIONS cell; closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version == 1) { + /* Negotiating version 1 makes no sense, since version 1 has no VERSIONS + * cells. */ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Used version negotiation protocol to negotiate a v1 connection. " + "That's crazily non-compliant. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version < 3 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link protocol 2 or lower after doing a v3 TLS " + "handshake. Closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } else if (highest_supported_version != 2 && + chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2) { + /* XXXX This should eventually be a log_protocol_warn */ + log_fn(LOG_WARN, LD_OR, + "Negotiated link with non-2 protocol after doing a v2 TLS " + "handshake with %s. Closing connection.", + fmt_addr(&chan->conn->base_.addr)); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + rep_hist_note_negotiated_link_proto(highest_supported_version, started_here); + + chan->conn->link_proto = highest_supported_version; + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions = 1; + + if (chan->conn->link_proto == 2) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; sending NETINFO.", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + const int send_versions = !started_here; + /* If we want to authenticate, send a CERTS cell */ + const int send_certs = !started_here || public_server_mode(get_options()); + /* If we're a host that got a connection, ask for authentication. */ + const int send_chall = !started_here; + /* If our certs cell will authenticate us, we can send a netinfo cell + * right now. */ + const int send_netinfo = !started_here; + const int send_any = + send_versions || send_certs || send_chall || send_netinfo; + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + + log_info(LD_OR, + "Negotiated version %d with %s:%d; %s%s%s%s%s", + highest_supported_version, + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + send_any ? "Sending cells:" : "Waiting for CERTS cell", + send_versions ? " VERSIONS" : "", + send_certs ? " CERTS" : "", + send_chall ? " AUTH_CHALLENGE" : "", + send_netinfo ? " NETINFO" : ""); + +#ifdef DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE + if (1) { + connection_or_close_normally(chan->conn, 1); + return; + } +#endif /* defined(DISABLE_V3_LINKPROTO_SERVERSIDE) */ + + if (send_versions) { + if (connection_or_send_versions(chan->conn, 1) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send versions cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + /* We set this after sending the versions cell. */ + /*XXXXX symbolic const.*/ + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS; + chan->conn->wide_circ_ids = TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->wide_circ_ids; + + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->padding_enabled = + chan->conn->link_proto >= MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING; + + if (send_certs) { + if (connection_or_send_certs_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send certs cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_chall) { + if (connection_or_send_auth_challenge_cell(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send auth_challenge cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + } +} + +/** + * Process a 'padding_negotiate' cell. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell; + * enable or disable padding accordingly, and read and act on its timeout + * value contents. + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_padding_negotiate_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + channelpadding_negotiate_t *negotiation; + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_CHANNEL_PADDING) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto); + return; + } + + if (channelpadding_negotiate_parse(&negotiation, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received malformed PADDING_NEGOTIATE cell on v%d connection; " + "dropping.", chan->conn->link_proto); + + return; + } + + channelpadding_update_padding_for_channel(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), + negotiation); + + channelpadding_negotiate_free(negotiation); +} + +/** + * Convert netinfo_addr into corresponding tor_addr. + * Return 0 on success; on failure, return -1 and log a warning. + */ +static int +tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(tor_addr_t *tor_addr, + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr) { + tor_assert(tor_addr); + tor_assert(netinfo_addr); + + uint8_t type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(netinfo_addr); + uint8_t len = netinfo_addr_get_len(netinfo_addr); + + if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && len == 4) { + uint32_t ipv4 = netinfo_addr_get_addr_ipv4(netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(tor_addr, ipv4); + } else if (type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && len == 16) { + const uint8_t *ipv6_bytes = netinfo_addr_getconstarray_addr_ipv6( + netinfo_addr); + tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(tor_addr, (const char *)ipv6_bytes); + } else { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, "Cannot read address from NETINFO " + "- wrong type/length."); + return -1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/** + * Helper: compute the absolute value of a time_t. + * + * (we need this because labs() doesn't always work for time_t, since + * long can be shorter than time_t.) + */ +static inline time_t +time_abs(time_t val) +{ + return (val < 0) ? -val : val; +} + +/** + * Process a 'netinfo' cell + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming NETINFO cell; read and act + * on its contents, and set the connection state to "open". + */ +static void +channel_tls_process_netinfo_cell(cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + time_t timestamp; + uint8_t my_addr_type; + uint8_t my_addr_len; + uint8_t n_other_addrs; + time_t now = time(NULL); + const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo(); + + time_t apparent_skew = 0; + tor_addr_t my_apparent_addr = TOR_ADDR_NULL; + int started_here = 0; + const char *identity_digest = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 2) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on %s connection; dropping.", + chan->conn->link_proto == 0 ? "non-versioned" : "a v1"); + return; + } + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V2 && + chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Received a NETINFO cell on non-handshaking connection; dropping."); + return; + } + tor_assert(chan->conn->handshake_state && + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_versions); + started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(chan->conn); + identity_digest = chan->conn->identity_digest; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) { + tor_assert(chan->conn->link_proto >= 3); + if (started_here) { + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got a NETINFO cell from server, " + "but no authentication. Closing the connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } else { + /* we're the server. If the client never authenticated, we have + some housekeeping to do.*/ + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated)) { + tor_assert(tor_digest_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id))); + tor_assert(fast_mem_is_zero( + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_ed25519_peer_id.pubkey), 32)); + /* If the client never authenticated, it's a tor client or bridge + * relay, and we must not use it for EXTEND requests (nor could we, as + * there are no authenticated peer IDs) */ + channel_mark_client(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), NULL, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + /* zero, checked above */ + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + NULL, /* Ed25519 ID: Also checked as zero */ + 0); + } + } + } + + /* Decode the cell. */ + netinfo_cell_t *netinfo_cell = NULL; + + ssize_t parsed = netinfo_cell_parse(&netinfo_cell, cell->payload, + CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE); + + if (parsed < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Failed to parse NETINFO cell - closing connection."); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + + timestamp = netinfo_cell_get_timestamp(netinfo_cell); + + const netinfo_addr_t *my_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_other_addr(netinfo_cell); + + my_addr_type = netinfo_addr_get_addr_type(my_addr); + my_addr_len = netinfo_addr_get_len(my_addr); + + if ((now - chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_versions_at) < 180) { + apparent_skew = now - timestamp; + } + /* We used to check: + * if (my_addr_len >= CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE - 6) { + * + * This is actually never going to happen, since my_addr_len is at most 255, + * and CELL_PAYLOAD_LEN - 6 is 503. So we know that cp is < end. */ + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&my_apparent_addr, my_addr) == -1) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + return; + } + + if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV4 && my_addr_len == 4) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + tor_addr_eq_ipv4h(&my_apparent_addr, me->addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } else if (my_addr_type == NETINFO_ADDR_TYPE_IPV6 && + my_addr_len == 16) { + if (!get_options()->BridgeRelay && me && + !tor_addr_is_null(&me->ipv6_addr) && + tor_addr_eq(&my_apparent_addr, &me->ipv6_addr)) { + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer = 1; + } + } + + n_other_addrs = netinfo_cell_get_n_my_addrs(netinfo_cell); + for (uint8_t i = 0; i < n_other_addrs; i++) { + /* Consider all the other addresses; if any matches, this connection is + * "canonical." */ + + const netinfo_addr_t *netinfo_addr = + netinfo_cell_getconst_my_addrs(netinfo_cell, i); + + tor_addr_t addr; + + if (tor_addr_from_netinfo_addr(&addr, netinfo_addr) == -1) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Bad address in netinfo cell; Skipping."); + continue; + } + /* A relay can connect from anywhere and be canonical, so + * long as it tells you from where it came. This may sound a bit + * concerning... but that's what "canonical" means: that the + * address is one that the relay itself has claimed. The relay + * might be doing something funny, but nobody else is doing a MITM + * on the relay's TCP. + */ + if (tor_addr_eq(&addr, &(chan->conn->real_addr))) { + connection_or_set_canonical(chan->conn, 1); + break; + } + } + + netinfo_cell_free(netinfo_cell); + + if (me && !TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->is_canonical_to_peer && + channel_is_canonical(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan))) { + const char *descr = + TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->get_remote_descr(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), 0); + log_info(LD_OR, + "We made a connection to a relay at %s (fp=%s) but we think " + "they will not consider this connection canonical. They " + "think we are at %s, but we think its %s.", + safe_str(descr), + safe_str(hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)), + safe_str(tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr)), + safe_str(fmt_addr32(me->addr))); + } + + /* Act on apparent skew. */ + /** Warn when we get a netinfo skew with at least this value. */ +#define NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW 3600 + if (time_abs(apparent_skew) > NETINFO_NOTICE_SKEW && + (started_here || + connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(chan->conn->identity_digest))) { + int trusted = router_digest_is_trusted_dir(chan->conn->identity_digest); + clock_skew_warning(TO_CONN(chan->conn), apparent_skew, trusted, LD_GENERAL, + "NETINFO cell", "OR"); + } + + /* XXX maybe act on my_apparent_addr, if the source is sufficiently + * trustworthy. */ + + if (! chan->conn->handshake_state->sent_netinfo) { + /* If we were prepared to authenticate, but we never got an AUTH_CHALLENGE + * cell, then we would not previously have sent a NETINFO cell. Do so + * now. */ + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + return; + } + } + + if (connection_or_set_state_open(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; but " + "was unable to make the OR connection become open.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got good NETINFO cell from %s:%d; OR connection is now " + "open, using protocol version %d. Its ID digest is %s. " + "Our address is apparently %s.", + safe_str_client(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (int)(chan->conn->link_proto), + hex_str(identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN), + tor_addr_is_null(&my_apparent_addr) ? + "<none>" : + safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&my_apparent_addr))); + } + assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(chan->conn),time(NULL)); +} + +/** Types of certificates that we know how to parse from CERTS cells. Each + * type corresponds to a different encoding format. */ +typedef enum cert_encoding_t { + CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN, /**< We don't recognize this. */ + CERT_ENCODING_X509, /**< It's an RSA key, signed with RSA, encoded in x509. + * (Actually, it might not be RSA. We test that later.) */ + CERT_ENCODING_ED25519, /**< It's something signed with an Ed25519 key, + * encoded asa a tor_cert_t.*/ + CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT, /**< It's an Ed key signed with an RSA key. */ +} cert_encoding_t; + +/** + * Given one of the certificate type codes used in a CERTS cell, + * return the corresponding cert_encoding_t that we should use to parse + * the certificate. + */ +static cert_encoding_t +certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(int typenum) +{ + switch (typenum) { + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID: + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_X509; + case CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK: + case CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH: + return CERT_ENCODING_ED25519; + case CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID: + return CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT; + default: + return CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/** + * Process a CERTS cell from a channel. + * + * This function is called to process an incoming CERTS cell on a + * channel_tls_t: + * + * If the other side should not have sent us a CERTS cell, or the cell is + * malformed, or it is supposed to authenticate the TLS key but it doesn't, + * then mark the connection. + * + * If the cell has a good cert chain and we're doing a v3 handshake, then + * store the certificates in or_handshake_state. If this is the client side + * of the connection, we then authenticate the server or mark the connection. + * If it's the server side, wait for an AUTHENTICATE cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_certs_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ +#define MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_EDID + /* These arrays will be sparse, since a cert type can be at most one + * of ed/x509 */ + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + tor_cert_t *ed_certs[MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED + 1]; + uint8_t *rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + size_t rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = 0; + + int n_certs, i; + certs_cell_t *cc = NULL; + + int send_netinfo = 0, started_here = 0; + + memset(x509_certs, 0, sizeof(x509_certs)); + memset(ed_certs, 0, sizeof(ed_certs)); + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad CERTS cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto err; \ + } while (0) + + /* Can't use connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(); its conn->tls + * check looks like it breaks + * test_link_handshake_recv_certs_ok_server(). */ + started_here = chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here; + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake!"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell) + ERR("We already got one"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be unreachable, but let's make sure. */ + ERR("We're already authenticated!"); + } + if (cell->payload_len < 1) + ERR("It had no body"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (certs_cell_parse(&cc, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It couldn't be parsed."); + + n_certs = cc->n_certs; + + for (i = 0; i < n_certs; ++i) { + certs_cell_cert_t *c = certs_cell_get_certs(cc, i); + + uint16_t cert_type = c->cert_type; + uint16_t cert_len = c->cert_len; + uint8_t *cert_body = certs_cell_cert_getarray_body(c); + + if (cert_type > MAX_CERT_TYPE_WANTED) + continue; + const cert_encoding_t ct = certs_cell_typenum_to_cert_type(cert_type); + switch (ct) { + default: + case CERT_ENCODING_UNKNOWN: + break; + case CERT_ENCODING_X509: { + tor_x509_cert_t *x509_cert = tor_x509_cert_decode(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!x509_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable certificate in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (x509_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_cert); + ERR("Duplicate x509 certificate"); + } else { + x509_certs[cert_type] = x509_cert; + } + } + break; + } + case CERT_ENCODING_ED25519: { + tor_cert_t *ed_cert = tor_cert_parse(cert_body, cert_len); + if (!ed_cert) { + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, + "Received undecodable Ed certificate " + "in CERTS cell from %s:%d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } else { + if (ed_certs[cert_type]) { + tor_cert_free(ed_cert); + ERR("Duplicate Ed25519 certificate"); + } else { + ed_certs[cert_type] = ed_cert; + } + } + break; + } + + case CERT_ENCODING_RSA_CROSSCERT: { + if (rsa_ed_cc_cert) { + ERR("Duplicate RSA->Ed25519 crosscert"); + } else { + rsa_ed_cc_cert = tor_memdup(cert_body, cert_len); + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len = cert_len; + } + break; + } + } + } + + /* Move the certificates we (might) want into the handshake_state->certs + * structure. */ + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID]; + tor_x509_cert_t *auth_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH]; + tor_x509_cert_t *link_cert = x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert = auth_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->link_cert = link_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert = id_cert; + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_ID] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_AUTH] = + x509_certs[CERTTYPE_RSA1024_ID_LINK] = NULL; + + tor_cert_t *ed_id_sign = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_link = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK]; + tor_cert_t *ed_sign_auth = ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH]; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign = ed_id_sign; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_link = ed_sign_link; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth = ed_sign_auth; + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_ID_SIGN] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_LINK] = + ed_certs[CERTTYPE_ED_SIGN_AUTH] = NULL; + + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert = rsa_ed_cc_cert; + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_rsa_crosscert_len = + rsa_ed_cc_cert_len; + rsa_ed_cc_cert = NULL; + + int severity; + /* Note that this warns more loudly about time and validity if we were + * _trying_ to connect to an authority, not necessarily if we _did_ connect + * to one. */ + if (started_here && + router_digest_is_trusted_dir(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan)->identity_digest)) + severity = LOG_WARN; + else + severity = LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN; + + const ed25519_public_key_t *checked_ed_id = NULL; + const common_digests_t *checked_rsa_id = NULL; + or_handshake_certs_check_both(severity, + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs, + chan->conn->tls, + time(NULL), + &checked_ed_id, + &checked_rsa_id); + + if (!checked_rsa_id) + ERR("Invalid certificate chain!"); + + if (started_here) { + /* No more information is needed. */ + + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + { + const common_digests_t *id_digests = checked_rsa_id; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd; + if (!id_digests) + ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert"); + + identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + if (!identity_rcvd) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from ID cert."); + } + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + } + + if (checked_ed_id) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + checked_ed_id, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, "calling client_learned_peer_id from " + "process_certs_cell"); + + if (connection_or_client_learned_peer_id(chan->conn, + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + checked_ed_id) < 0) + ERR("Problem setting or checking peer id"); + + log_info(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got some good certificates from %s:%d: Authenticated it with " + "RSA%s", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), chan->conn->base_.port, + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : ""); + + if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we initiated the connection and we are not a public server, we + * aren't planning to authenticate at all. At this point we know who we + * are talking to, so we can just send a netinfo now. */ + send_netinfo = 1; + } + } else { + /* We can't call it authenticated till we see an AUTHENTICATE cell. */ + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got some good RSA%s certificates from %s:%d. " + "Waiting for AUTHENTICATE.", + checked_ed_id ? " and Ed25519" : "", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + /* XXXX check more stuff? */ + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell = 1; + + if (send_netinfo) { + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto err; + } + } + + err: + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(x509_certs); ++u) { + tor_x509_cert_free(x509_certs[u]); + } + for (unsigned u = 0; u < ARRAY_LENGTH(ed_certs); ++u) { + tor_cert_free(ed_certs[u]); + } + tor_free(rsa_ed_cc_cert); + certs_cell_free(cc); +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * This function is called to handle an incoming AUTH_CHALLENGE cell on a + * channel_tls_t; if we weren't supposed to get one (for example, because we're + * not the originator of the channel), or it's ill-formed, or we aren't doing + * a v3 handshake, mark the channel. If the cell is well-formed but we don't + * want to authenticate, just drop it. If the cell is well-formed *and* we + * want to authenticate, send an AUTHENTICATE cell and then a NETINFO cell. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_auth_challenge_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + int n_types, i, use_type = -1; + auth_challenge_cell_t *ac = NULL; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + goto done; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not currently doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here)) + ERR("We didn't originate this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge) + ERR("We already received one"); + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We haven't gotten a CERTS cell yet"); + if (cell->circ_id) + ERR("It had a nonzero circuit ID"); + + if (auth_challenge_cell_parse(&ac, cell->payload, cell->payload_len) < 0) + ERR("It was not well-formed."); + + n_types = ac->n_methods; + + /* Now see if there is an authentication type we can use */ + for (i = 0; i < n_types; ++i) { + uint16_t authtype = auth_challenge_cell_get_methods(ac, i); + if (authchallenge_type_is_supported(authtype)) { + if (use_type == -1 || + authchallenge_type_is_better(authtype, use_type)) { + use_type = authtype; + } + } + } + + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_auth_challenge = 1; + + if (! public_server_mode(get_options())) { + /* If we're not a public server then we don't want to authenticate on a + connection we originated, and we already sent a NETINFO cell when we + got the CERTS cell. We have nothing more to do. */ + goto done; + } + + if (use_type >= 0) { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d: Sending " + "authentication type %d", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + use_type); + + if (connection_or_send_authenticate_cell(chan->conn, use_type) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, + "Couldn't send authenticate cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + } else { + log_info(LD_OR, + "Got an AUTH_CHALLENGE cell from %s:%d, but we don't " + "know any of its authentication types. Not authenticating.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port); + } + + if (connection_or_send_netinfo(chan->conn) < 0) { + log_warn(LD_OR, "Couldn't send netinfo cell"); + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); + goto done; + } + + done: + auth_challenge_cell_free(ac); + +#undef ERR +} + +/** + * Process an AUTHENTICATE cell from a channel_tls_t. + * + * If it's ill-formed or we weren't supposed to get one or we're not doing a + * v3 handshake, then mark the connection. If it does not authenticate the + * other side of the connection successfully (because it isn't signed right, + * we didn't get a CERTS cell, etc) mark the connection. Otherwise, accept + * the identity of the router on the other side of the connection. + */ +STATIC void +channel_tls_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, channel_tls_t *chan) +{ + var_cell_t *expected_cell = NULL; + const uint8_t *auth; + int authlen; + int authtype; + int bodylen; + + tor_assert(cell); + tor_assert(chan); + tor_assert(chan->conn); + +#define ERR(s) \ + do { \ + log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL, \ + "Received a bad AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d: %s", \ + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), \ + chan->conn->base_.port, (s)); \ + connection_or_close_for_error(chan->conn, 0); \ + var_cell_free(expected_cell); \ + return; \ + } while (0) + + if (chan->conn->base_.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OR_HANDSHAKING_V3) + ERR("We're not doing a v3 handshake"); + if (chan->conn->link_proto < 3) + ERR("We're not using link protocol >= 3"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->started_here) + ERR("We originated this connection"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate) + ERR("We already got one!"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated) { + /* Should be impossible given other checks */ + ERR("The peer is already authenticated"); + } + if (!(chan->conn->handshake_state->received_certs_cell)) + ERR("We never got a certs cell"); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an identity certificate"); + if (cell->payload_len < 4) + ERR("Cell was way too short"); + + auth = cell->payload; + { + uint16_t type = ntohs(get_uint16(auth)); + uint16_t len = ntohs(get_uint16(auth+2)); + if (4 + len > cell->payload_len) + ERR("Authenticator was truncated"); + + if (! authchallenge_type_is_supported(type)) + ERR("Authenticator type was not recognized"); + authtype = type; + + auth += 4; + authlen = len; + } + + if (authlen < V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN + 1) + ERR("Authenticator was too short"); + + expected_cell = connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body( + chan->conn, authtype, NULL, NULL, 1); + if (! expected_cell) + ERR("Couldn't compute expected AUTHENTICATE cell body"); + + int sig_is_rsa; + if (authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_TLSSECRET || + authtype == AUTHTYPE_RSA_SHA256_RFC5705) { + bodylen = V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 1; + } else { + tor_assert(authtype == AUTHTYPE_ED25519_SHA256_RFC5705); + /* Our earlier check had better have made sure we had room + * for an ed25519 sig (inadvertently) */ + tor_assert(V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + bodylen = authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN; + sig_is_rsa = 0; + } + if (expected_cell->payload_len != bodylen+4) { + ERR("Expected AUTHENTICATE cell body len not as expected."); + } + + /* Length of random part. */ + if (BUG(bodylen < 24)) { + // LCOV_EXCL_START + ERR("Bodylen is somehow less than 24, which should really be impossible"); + // LCOV_EXCL_STOP + } + + if (tor_memneq(expected_cell->payload+4, auth, bodylen-24)) + ERR("Some field in the AUTHENTICATE cell body was not as expected"); + + if (sig_is_rsa) { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign != NULL) + ERR("RSA-signed AUTHENTICATE response provided with an ED25519 cert"); + + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert == NULL) + ERR("We never got an RSA authentication certificate"); + + crypto_pk_t *pk = tor_tls_cert_get_key( + chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->auth_cert); + char d[DIGEST256_LEN]; + char *signed_data; + size_t keysize; + int signed_len; + + if (! pk) { + ERR("Couldn't get RSA key from AUTH cert."); + } + crypto_digest256(d, (char*)auth, V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, DIGEST_SHA256); + + keysize = crypto_pk_keysize(pk); + signed_data = tor_malloc(keysize); + signed_len = crypto_pk_public_checksig(pk, signed_data, keysize, + (char*)auth + V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN, + authlen - V3_AUTH_BODY_LEN); + crypto_pk_free(pk); + if (signed_len < 0) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("RSA signature wasn't valid"); + } + if (signed_len < DIGEST256_LEN) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Not enough data was signed"); + } + /* Note that we deliberately allow *more* than DIGEST256_LEN bytes here, + * in case they're later used to hold a SHA3 digest or something. */ + if (tor_memneq(signed_data, d, DIGEST256_LEN)) { + tor_free(signed_data); + ERR("Signature did not match data to be signed."); + } + tor_free(signed_data); + } else { + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 identity certificate."); + if (chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth == NULL) + ERR("We never got an Ed25519 authentication certificate."); + + const ed25519_public_key_t *authkey = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_sign_auth->signed_key; + ed25519_signature_t sig; + tor_assert(authlen > ED25519_SIG_LEN); + memcpy(&sig.sig, auth + authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, ED25519_SIG_LEN); + if (ed25519_checksig(&sig, auth, authlen - ED25519_SIG_LEN, authkey)<0) { + ERR("Ed25519 signature wasn't valid."); + } + } + + /* Okay, we are authenticated. */ + chan->conn->handshake_state->received_authenticate = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa = 1; + chan->conn->handshake_state->digest_received_data = 0; + { + tor_x509_cert_t *id_cert = chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->id_cert; + crypto_pk_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert); + const common_digests_t *id_digests = tor_x509_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert); + const ed25519_public_key_t *ed_identity_received = NULL; + + if (! sig_is_rsa) { + chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519 = 1; + ed_identity_received = + &chan->conn->handshake_state->certs->ed_id_sign->signing_key; + memcpy(&chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_ed25519_peer_id, + ed_identity_received, sizeof(ed25519_public_key_t)); + } + + /* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */ + tor_assert(id_digests); + + memcpy(chan->conn->handshake_state->authenticated_rsa_peer_id, + id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN); + + channel_set_circid_type(TLS_CHAN_TO_BASE(chan), identity_rcvd, + chan->conn->link_proto < MIN_LINK_PROTO_FOR_WIDE_CIRC_IDS); + crypto_pk_free(identity_rcvd); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Calling connection_or_init_conn_from_address for %s " + " from %s, with%s ed25519 id.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + __func__, + ed_identity_received ? "" : "out"); + + connection_or_init_conn_from_address(chan->conn, + &(chan->conn->base_.addr), + chan->conn->base_.port, + (const char*)(chan->conn->handshake_state-> + authenticated_rsa_peer_id), + ed_identity_received, + 0); + + log_debug(LD_HANDSHAKE, + "Got an AUTHENTICATE cell from %s:%d, type %d: Looks good.", + safe_str(chan->conn->base_.address), + chan->conn->base_.port, + authtype); + } + + var_cell_free(expected_cell); + +#undef ERR +}

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