October 2019 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.3.5] hs: Always use a 3-hop path when a v3 single onion intro fails
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 229a982405e0fd2f9980d3c1a41c34e0cf26ae26 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 23 14:56:01 2019 +1000 hs: Always use a 3-hop path when a v3 single onion intro fails Previously, we always used a 1-hop path, no matter how many times a v3 single onion intro failed. Fixes bug 23818; bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha. --- src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c index f7996a24f..d74b088f0 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_circuit.c @@ -775,8 +775,15 @@ hs_circ_launch_intro_point(hs_service_t *service, tor_assert(ei); /* Update circuit flags in case of a single onion service that requires a - * direct connection. */ - if (service->config.is_single_onion) { + * direct connection. + * + * We only use a one-hop path on the first attempt. If the first attempt + * fails, we use a 3-hop path for reachability / reliability. + * (Unlike v2, retries is incremented by the caller before it calls this + * function.) + */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(ip->circuit_retries > 0); + if (service->config.is_single_onion && ip->circuit_retries == 1) { circ_flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL; }

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[tor/maint-0.3.5] Prevent UB on signed overflow.
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 0d4a689d3ae8f7e05b3baf8ad71d983a767ef55b Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> Date: Mon Jun 24 22:08:49 2019 +0200 Prevent UB on signed overflow. Overflowing a signed integer in C is an undefined behaviour. It is possible to trigger this undefined behaviour in tor_asprintf on Windows or systems lacking vasprintf. On these systems, eiter _vscprintf or vsnprintf is called to retrieve the required amount of bytes to hold the string. These functions can return INT_MAX. The easiest way to recreate this is the use of a specially crafted configuration file, e.g. containing the line: FirewallPorts AAAAA<in total 2147483610 As> This line triggers the needed tor_asprintf call which eventually leads to an INT_MAX return value from _vscprintf or vsnprintf. The needed byte for \0 is added to the result, triggering the overflow and therefore the undefined behaviour. Casting the value to size_t before addition fixes the behaviour. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> --- src/common/compat.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 975875112..6f7ac7bd7 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -540,8 +540,8 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = NULL; return -1; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len + 1); - r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len + 1); + r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = tor_strdup(buf); return len; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len+1); /* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */ - r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -3543,4 +3543,3 @@ tor_get_avail_disk_space(const char *path) return -1; #endif } -

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[tor/maint-0.2.9] Prevent UB on signed overflow.
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 0d4a689d3ae8f7e05b3baf8ad71d983a767ef55b Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> Date: Mon Jun 24 22:08:49 2019 +0200 Prevent UB on signed overflow. Overflowing a signed integer in C is an undefined behaviour. It is possible to trigger this undefined behaviour in tor_asprintf on Windows or systems lacking vasprintf. On these systems, eiter _vscprintf or vsnprintf is called to retrieve the required amount of bytes to hold the string. These functions can return INT_MAX. The easiest way to recreate this is the use of a specially crafted configuration file, e.g. containing the line: FirewallPorts AAAAA<in total 2147483610 As> This line triggers the needed tor_asprintf call which eventually leads to an INT_MAX return value from _vscprintf or vsnprintf. The needed byte for \0 is added to the result, triggering the overflow and therefore the undefined behaviour. Casting the value to size_t before addition fixes the behaviour. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> --- src/common/compat.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 975875112..6f7ac7bd7 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -540,8 +540,8 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = NULL; return -1; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len + 1); - r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len + 1); + r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = tor_strdup(buf); return len; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len+1); /* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */ - r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -3543,4 +3543,3 @@ tor_get_avail_disk_space(const char *path) return -1; #endif } -

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[tor/maint-0.2.9] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1178' into maint-0.2.9
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 7660a7cf7d4191e44aba0bf3e02a001d7e979d29 Merge: 511aeba8e 97d73db7c Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 23 08:20:45 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1178' into maint-0.2.9 changes/ticket31001 | 6 ++++++ src/common/compat.c | 8 ++++---- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/maint-0.2.9] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1351' into maint-0.2.9
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 8682442c7629c2ede5198a00ab1cf8f4e21991d6 Merge: 7660a7cf7 6ed3d8dbd Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 23 08:32:22 2019 +1000 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/1351' into maint-0.2.9 .travis.yml | 6 ++++-- changes/ticket31372_travis | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --cc .travis.yml index 7c7fcf4f6,759710737..d429e1537 --- a/.travis.yml +++ b/.travis.yml @@@ -8,13 -8,17 +8,15 @@@ compiler os: - linux - - osx -## The build matrix in the following stanza expands into builds for each -## OS and compiler. +## We don't use the build matrix cross-product, because it makes too many jobs +## Instead, we list each job under matrix: include: env: global: - ## The Travis CI environment allows us two cores, so let's use both. - - MAKEFLAGS="-j 2" + ## The Travis CI environment allows us two cores, so let's use both. Also, + ## let's use the "-k" flag so that we get all of the compilation failures, + ## not just the first one. + - MAKEFLAGS="-k -j 2" ## We turn on hardening by default ## Also known as --enable-fragile-hardening in 0.3.0.3-alpha and later - HARDENING_OPTIONS="--enable-expensive-hardening"

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[tor/maint-0.2.9] Try using make -k in Travis configuration
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 6ed3d8dbd180aa72e2c9b3fa4835fb82e0f60556 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Sep 23 15:04:54 2019 -0400 Try using make -k in Travis configuration Frequently, when a patch fails, it has failures in several files. Using the "-k" flag will let us learn all the compilation errors, not just the first one that the compiler hits. Based on a patch by rl1987. --- .travis.yml | 6 ++++-- changes/ticket31372_travis | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/.travis.yml b/.travis.yml index a2bc6395d..759710737 100644 --- a/.travis.yml +++ b/.travis.yml @@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ os: ## OS and compiler. env: global: - ## The Travis CI environment allows us two cores, so let's use both. - - MAKEFLAGS="-j 2" + ## The Travis CI environment allows us two cores, so let's use both. Also, + ## let's use the "-k" flag so that we get all of the compilation failures, + ## not just the first one. + - MAKEFLAGS="-k -j 2" ## We turn on hardening by default ## Also known as --enable-fragile-hardening in 0.3.0.3-alpha and later - HARDENING_OPTIONS="--enable-expensive-hardening" diff --git a/changes/ticket31372_travis b/changes/ticket31372_travis new file mode 100644 index 000000000..403869b2e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket31372_travis @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + o Minor features (continuous integration): + - When building on Travis, pass the "-k" flag to make, so that + we are informed of all compilation failures, not just the first + one or two. Closes part of ticket 31372.

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[tor/maint-0.2.9] Changes file for bug 31001
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 97d73db7c36ec3fac2974726012f76bff63f9dfc Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Jul 19 09:21:08 2019 -0400 Changes file for bug 31001 --- changes/ticket31001 | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket31001 b/changes/ticket31001 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2ce1cbdf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket31001 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (compatibility, standards compliance): + - Fix a bug that would invoke undefined behavior on certain operating + systems when trying to asprintf() a string exactly INT_MAX bytes + long. We don't believe this is exploitable, but it's better + to fix it anyway. Fixes bug 31001; bugfix on 0.2.2.11-alpha. + Found and fixed by Tobias Stoeckmann.

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[tor/master] Remove outdated note.
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 80a198928e14f5932f283206541124209df95fb7 Author: Philipp Winter <phw(a)nymity.ch> Date: Thu Sep 19 12:42:44 2019 -0700 Remove outdated note. BridgeDB supports bridge-distribution lines since version 0.5.0: <https://bugs.torproject.org/23957> --- doc/tor.1.txt | 4 ---- 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index be0a1ed92..1504223b8 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1956,10 +1956,6 @@ is non-zero): would like its bridge address to be given out. Set it to "none" if you want BridgeDB to avoid distributing your bridge address, or "any" to let BridgeDB decide. (Default: any) - + - Note: as of Oct 2017, the BridgeDB part of this option is not yet - implemented. Until BridgeDB is updated to obey this option, your - bridge will make this request, but it will not (yet) be obeyed. [[ContactInfo]] **ContactInfo** __email_address__:: Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line

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[tor/master] clarify in man page: we count by powers of two
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 4233fb7014b0ef5a6830f36608e1779299e07cd8 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Oct 16 06:13:14 2019 -0400 clarify in man page: we count by powers of two Make clear in the man page, in both the bandwidth section and the accountingmax section, that Tor counts in powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024 bytes, not one billion bytes. Resolves ticket 32106. --- changes/bug32106 | 5 +++++ doc/tor.1.txt | 17 +++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug32106 b/changes/bug32106 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c6e8e9586 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug32106 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Minor features (documentation): + - Make clear in the man page, in both the bandwidth section and the + accountingmax section, that Tor counts in powers of two, not + powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024 bytes, not one billion + bytes. Resolves ticket 32106. diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 6b81e19ba..be0a1ed92 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -211,10 +211,14 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS Note that this option, and other bandwidth-limiting options, apply to TCP data only: They do not count TCP headers or DNS traffic. + + + Tor uses powers of two, not powers of ten, so 1 GByte is + 1024*1024*1024 bytes as opposed to 1 billion bytes. + + + With this option, and in other options that take arguments in bytes, KBytes, and so on, other formats are also supported. Notably, "KBytes" can also be written as "kilobytes" or "kb"; "MBytes" can be written as "megabytes" or "MB"; "kbits" can be written as "kilobits"; and so forth. + Case doesn't matter. Tor also accepts "byte" and "bit" in the singular. The prefixes "tera" and "T" are also recognized. If no units are given, we default to bytes. @@ -2292,9 +2296,9 @@ is non-zero): using a given calculation rule (see: AccountingStart, AccountingRule). Useful if you need to stay under a specific bandwidth. By default, the number used for calculation is the max of either the bytes sent or - received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GByte, a server - could send 900 MBytes and receive 800 MBytes and continue running. - It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 GByte. This can + received. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 TByte, a server + could send 900 GBytes and receive 800 GBytes and continue running. + It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1 TByte. This can be changed to use the sum of the both bytes received and sent by setting the AccountingRule option to "sum" (total bandwidth in/out). When the number of bytes remaining gets low, Tor will stop accepting new connections @@ -2305,7 +2309,12 @@ is non-zero): enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are - always "available". + always "available". + + + + Note that (as also described in the Bandwidth section) Tor uses + powers of two, not powers of ten: 1 GByte is 1024*1024*1024, not + one billion. Be careful: some internet service providers might count + GBytes differently. [[AccountingRule]] **AccountingRule** **sum**|**max**|**in**|**out**:: How we determine when our AccountingMax has been reached (when we

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[tor/master] Prevent UB on signed overflow.
by teor＠torproject.org 23 Oct '19

23 Oct '19

commit 0d4a689d3ae8f7e05b3baf8ad71d983a767ef55b Author: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> Date: Mon Jun 24 22:08:49 2019 +0200 Prevent UB on signed overflow. Overflowing a signed integer in C is an undefined behaviour. It is possible to trigger this undefined behaviour in tor_asprintf on Windows or systems lacking vasprintf. On these systems, eiter _vscprintf or vsnprintf is called to retrieve the required amount of bytes to hold the string. These functions can return INT_MAX. The easiest way to recreate this is the use of a specially crafted configuration file, e.g. containing the line: FirewallPorts AAAAA<in total 2147483610 As> This line triggers the needed tor_asprintf call which eventually leads to an INT_MAX return value from _vscprintf or vsnprintf. The needed byte for \0 is added to the result, triggering the overflow and therefore the undefined behaviour. Casting the value to size_t before addition fixes the behaviour. Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias(a)stoeckmann.org> --- src/common/compat.c | 9 ++++----- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/compat.c b/src/common/compat.c index 975875112..6f7ac7bd7 100644 --- a/src/common/compat.c +++ b/src/common/compat.c @@ -540,8 +540,8 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = NULL; return -1; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len + 1); - r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len + 1); + r = _vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -566,9 +566,9 @@ tor_vasprintf(char **strp, const char *fmt, va_list args) *strp = tor_strdup(buf); return len; } - strp_tmp = tor_malloc(len+1); + strp_tmp = tor_malloc((size_t)len+1); /* use of tor_vsnprintf() will ensure string is null terminated */ - r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, len+1, fmt, args); + r = tor_vsnprintf(strp_tmp, (size_t)len+1, fmt, args); if (r != len) { tor_free(strp_tmp); *strp = NULL; @@ -3543,4 +3543,3 @@ tor_get_avail_disk_space(const char *path) return -1; #endif } -

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