August 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] hs: Render obsolete Tor2web
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 4976eca8261015dd2a214c4f4722dcdbcfed9c64 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 9 16:11:39 2018 -0400 hs: Render obsolete Tor2web Remove support for Tor2web in the code and build system. At this commit, tor doesn't have Tor2web support anymore. Ref: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-July/013295.html Close #26367 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug26367 | 5 +++ configure.ac | 7 --- doc/tor.1.txt | 28 +----------- src/app/config/config.c | 64 ++------------------------- src/app/config/or_options_st.h | 14 ++---- src/core/or/channel.c | 7 --- src/core/or/channelpadding.c | 16 ------- src/core/or/channelpadding.h | 2 - src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 96 ++-------------------------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.h | 8 +--- src/core/or/circuitstats.c | 8 ++-- src/core/or/circuituse.c | 32 +++----------- src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 12 ----- src/core/or/or.h | 4 -- src/feature/dircache/directory.c | 6 +-- src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 14 +----- src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 8 ++-- src/feature/rend/rendmid.c | 2 +- src/test/test_channelpadding.c | 73 +----------------------------- src/test/test_hs.c | 75 ------------------------------- src/test/test_options.c | 52 +--------------------- 21 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 493 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug26367 b/changes/bug26367 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..af098df9c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug26367 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Removed features (hidden service, tor2web): + - Remove Tor2web functionalities. The Tor2webMode and + Tor2webRendezvousPoints options are now obsolete. Note that this feature + was never shipped in vanilla Tor and it was only possible to use this + feature by building the support at compile time. Closes ticket 26367. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 296591f02..fea617708 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -181,13 +181,6 @@ if test "$enable_local_appdata" = "yes"; then [Defined if we default to host local appdata paths on Windows]) fi -# Tor2web mode flag -AC_ARG_ENABLE(tor2web-mode, - AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-tor2web-mode, [support tor2web non-anonymous mode]), -[if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE=1" -fi]) - AC_ARG_ENABLE(tool-name-check, AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-tool-name-check, [check for sanely named toolchain when cross-compiling])) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index f42ad0dd3..f16d9c370 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory - Authorities, Single Onion Services, and Tor2web clients. In these cases, + Authorities, and Single Onion Services. In these cases, the this option is ignored. (Default: 1) [[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__:: @@ -1525,32 +1525,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus. (Default: auto) -[[Tor2webMode]] **Tor2webMode** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services - **non-anonymously**. This option also disables client connections to - non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It **must only** be used when - running a tor2web Hidden Service web proxy. - To enable this option the compile time flag --enable-tor2web-mode must be - specified. Since Tor2webMode is non-anonymous, you can not run an - anonymous Hidden Service on a tor version compiled with Tor2webMode. - (Default: 0) - -[[Tor2webRendezvousPoints]] **Tor2webRendezvousPoints** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and - address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as RPs - in HS circuits; any other nodes will not be used as RPs. - (Example: - Tor2webRendezvousPoints Fastyfasty, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + - + - This feature can only be used if Tor2webMode is also enabled. + - + - ExcludeNodes have higher priority than Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be - picked as RPs. + - + - If no nodes in Tor2webRendezvousPoints are currently available for - use, Tor will choose a random node when building HS circuits. - [[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the diff --git a/src/app/config/config.c b/src/app/config/config.c index 665732ea5..95d6ce354 100644 --- a/src/app/config/config.c +++ b/src/app/config/config.c @@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ static config_abbrev_t option_abbrevs_[] = { PLURAL(AuthDirRejectCC), PLURAL(EntryNode), PLURAL(ExcludeNode), - PLURAL(Tor2webRendezvousPoint), PLURAL(FirewallPort), PLURAL(LongLivedPort), PLURAL(HiddenServiceNode), @@ -597,8 +596,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("Support022HiddenServices"), V(TestSocks, BOOL, "0"), V(TokenBucketRefillInterval, MSEC_INTERVAL, "100 msec"), - V(Tor2webMode, BOOL, "0"), - V(Tor2webRendezvousPoints, ROUTERSET, NULL), + OBSOLETE("Tor2webMode"), + OBSOLETE("Tor2webRendezvousPoints"), OBSOLETE("TLSECGroup"), V(TrackHostExits, CSV, NULL), V(TrackHostExitsExpire, INTERVAL, "30 minutes"), @@ -1697,8 +1696,7 @@ options_need_geoip_info(const or_options_t *options, const char **reason_out) routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeExitNodes) || routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeNodes) || routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer2Nodes) || - routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes) || - routerset_needs_geoip(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); + routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes); if (routerset_usage && reason_out) { *reason_out = "We've been configured to use (or avoid) nodes in certain " @@ -1881,27 +1879,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) "in a non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY."); } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE -/* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - // XXXX This should move into options_validate() - if (!options->Tor2webMode) { - log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was compiled to run in " - "'tor2web mode'. It can only be run with the Tor2webMode torrc " - "option enabled."); - return -1; - } -/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -#else /* !(defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE)) */ - // XXXX This should move into options_validate() - if (options->Tor2webMode) { - log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was not compiled to run in " - "'tor2web mode'. It cannot be run with the Tor2webMode torrc " - "option enabled. To enable Tor2webMode recompile with the " - "--enable-tor2web-mode option."); - return -1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */ if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin && @@ -2163,8 +2140,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) options->HSLayer2Nodes) || !routerset_equal(old_options->HSLayer3Nodes, options->HSLayer3Nodes) || - !routerset_equal(old_options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) || options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Changed to using entry guards or bridges, or changed " @@ -3306,23 +3281,12 @@ options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options, char **msg) options->NATDPort_set || options->DNSPort_set || options->HTTPTunnelPort_set); - if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set && - !options->Tor2webMode) { + if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set) { REJECT("HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is incompatible with using Tor as " "an anonymous client. Please set Socks/Trans/NATD/DNSPort to 0, or " "revert HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to 0."); } - /* If you run a hidden service in non-anonymous mode, the hidden service - * loses anonymity, even if SOCKSPort / Tor2web mode isn't used. */ - if (!rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && - options->RendConfigLines && options->Tor2webMode) { - REJECT("Non-anonymous (Tor2web) mode is incompatible with using Tor as a " - "hidden service. Please remove all HiddenServiceDir lines, or use " - "a version of tor compiled without --enable-tor2web-mode, or use " - "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode."); - } - if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && options->UseEntryGuards) { /* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors; @@ -3807,26 +3771,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("CircuitsAvailableTimeout is too large. Max is 24 hours."); } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) { - /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards - * in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden - * service client code to do things which break the path bias - * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and - * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to - * make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode - * users compatible with tor2web mode. - */ - log_notice(LD_CONFIG, - "Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards."); - options->UseEntryGuards = 0; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - - if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints && !options->Tor2webMode) { - REJECT("Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode."); - } - if (options->EntryNodes && !options->UseEntryGuards) { REJECT("If EntryNodes is set, UseEntryGuards must be enabled."); } diff --git a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h index 0c0c5d32b..32b6bc746 100644 --- a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h +++ b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h @@ -256,14 +256,6 @@ struct or_options_t { int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent * through a Tor circuit? */ - /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden - * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related - * circuits.) */ - int Tor2webMode; - - /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */ - routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints; - /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS * circuits. */ routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes; @@ -537,9 +529,9 @@ struct or_options_t { * of fixed nodes? */ int UseEntryGuards_option; /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on - * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or - * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of - * UseEntryGuards_option. */ + * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Single Onion Service, + * it is always false, otherwise we use the value of UseEntryGuards_option. + * */ int UseEntryGuards; int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */ diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c index 476f31d5b..0c204ddfb 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -1882,13 +1882,6 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) if (!get_options()->ConnectionPadding) { /* Disable if torrc disabled */ channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); - } else if (get_options()->Tor2webMode && - !networkstatus_get_param(NULL, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1)) { - /* Disable if we're using tor2web and the consensus disabled padding - * for tor2web */ - channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); } else if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) && !networkstatus_get_param(NULL, CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM, diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c index b8cfd33d5..1a8f8209d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c @@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static int consensus_nf_conntimeout_clients; static int consensus_nf_pad_before_usage; /** Should we pad relay-to-relay connections? */ static int consensus_nf_pad_relays; -/** Should we pad tor2web connections? */ -static int consensus_nf_pad_tor2web; /** Should we pad rosos connections? */ static int consensus_nf_pad_single_onion; @@ -141,11 +139,6 @@ channelpadding_new_consensus_params(networkstatus_t *ns) consensus_nf_pad_relays = networkstatus_get_param(ns, "nf_pad_relays", 0, 0, 1); - consensus_nf_pad_tor2web = - networkstatus_get_param(ns, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1); - consensus_nf_pad_single_onion = networkstatus_get_param(ns, CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM, @@ -740,15 +733,6 @@ channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(channel_t *chan) return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD; } - if (options->Tor2webMode && !consensus_nf_pad_tor2web) { - /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still - * think padding is enabled. Negotiate it off. */ - if (chan->padding_enabled) - channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); - - return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD; - } - if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && !consensus_nf_pad_single_onion) { /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h index 7eddbdbe2..7f8cfd4cc 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h @@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ #include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" -#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM "nf_pad_tor2web" -#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT 1 #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM "nf_pad_single_onion" #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_DEFAULT 1 diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index e22ddabde..5c3d20944 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -408,10 +408,10 @@ onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) * edge cases. */ tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ)); if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) { - /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to - * rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol - * does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients - * and Single Onion Services. */ + /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to rend + * points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol does + * not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Single Onion + * Services. */ return 0; } @@ -824,7 +824,6 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ) * accordingly. * Note that TAP handshakes in CREATE cells are only used for direct * connections: - * - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and * - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus. * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void @@ -1985,98 +1984,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags) return NULL; } -#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) -/* The config option Tor2webRendezvousPoints has been set and we need - * to pick an RP out of that set. Make sure that the RP we choose is - * alive, and return it. Return NULL if no usable RP could be found in - * Tor2webRendezvousPoints. */ -STATIC const node_t * -pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, - const or_options_t *options) -{ - const node_t *rp_node = NULL; - const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0; - const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0; - const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0; - - smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_rps = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new(); - - tor_assert(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); - - /* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */ - router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, - 0, 0, 0, - need_desc, - pref_addr, - direct_conn); - - /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted RPs to - * the list whitelisted_live_rps. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) { - if (routerset_contains_node(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, live_node)) { - smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_rps, live_node); - } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node); - - /* Honor ExcludeNodes */ - if (options->ExcludeNodes) { - routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_rps, options->ExcludeNodes); - } - - /* Now pick randomly amongst the whitelisted RPs. No need to waste time - doing bandwidth load balancing, for most use cases - 'whitelisted_live_rps' contains a single OR anyway. */ - rp_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_rps); - - if (!rp_node) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not find a Rendezvous Point that suits " - "the purposes of Tor2webRendezvousPoints. Choosing random one."); - } - - smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_rps); - smartlist_free(all_live_nodes); - - return rp_node; -} -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - /* Pick a Rendezvous Point for our HS circuits according to flags. */ static const node_t * pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* We want to connect directly to the node if we can */ - router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags; - direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR; - direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN; - - /* The user wants us to pick specific RPs. */ - if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) { - const node_t *tor2web_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(direct_flags, - options); - if (tor2web_rp) { - return tor2web_rp; - } - } - - /* Else, if no direct, preferred tor2web RP was found, fall back to choosing - * a random direct node */ - const node_t *node = router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, - direct_flags); - /* Return the direct node (if found), or log a message and fall back to an - * indirect connection. */ - if (node) { - return node; - } else { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Unable to find a random rendezvous point that is reachable via " - "a direct connection, falling back to a 3-hop path."); - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); } diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h index 9f5d99c2a..0c6f2f6ce 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -93,14 +93,10 @@ STATIC int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); -#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) -enum router_crn_flags_t; -STATIC const node_t *pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node( - enum router_crn_flags_t flags, - const or_options_t *options); +#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr); -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ #endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c index 63cd21540..9ebf618b4 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c @@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void) * 2. If the torrc option LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is false. * 3. If we are a directory authority * 4. If we fail to write circuit build time history to our state file. - * 5. If we are compiled or configured in Tor2web mode - * 6. If we are configured in Single Onion mode + * 5. If we are configured in Single Onion mode */ int circuit_build_times_disabled(const or_options_t *options) @@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options, int config_disabled = !options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; int dirauth_disabled = authdir_mode(options); int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0; - /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Tor2web/Single Onion Services are + /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Single Onion Services are * incompatible in two ways: * * - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout results in a low CBT, which @@ -148,12 +147,11 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options, * * If we fix both of these issues someday, we should test * these modes with LearnCircuitBuildTimeout on again. */ - int tor2web_disabled = rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options); int single_onion_disabled = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection( options); if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled || - state_disabled || tor2web_disabled || single_onion_disabled) { + state_disabled || single_onion_disabled) { #if 0 log_debug(LD_CIRC, "CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. " diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c index a3b9eb171..4988a6b62 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c @@ -863,8 +863,7 @@ static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0; /** * As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop * circuits we have around that have been there for at least age - * seconds. Log a few of them. - * Ignores Single Onion Service intro and Tor2web redezvous circuits, they are + * seconds. Log a few of them. Ignores Single Onion Service intro, it is * expected to be long-term one-hop circuits. */ void @@ -889,10 +888,8 @@ circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age) (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)) continue; - /* Tor2web deliberately makes long term one-hop rend connections, - * particularly when Tor2webRendezvousPoints is used. We only ignore - * active rend point connections, if we take a long time to rendezvous, - * that's worth logging. */ + /* We only ignore active rend point connections, if we take a long time + * to rendezvous, that's worth logging. */ if (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) continue; @@ -1999,7 +1996,7 @@ circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose) * Return true for the set of conditions for which it is OK to use * a cannibalized circuit. * - * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or tor2web, or certain purposes. + * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or certain purposes. */ static int circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build, @@ -2008,8 +2005,7 @@ circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build, int need_specific_rp) { - /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit, or - * is a tor2web/special rp. */ + /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */ if (onehop_tunnel || need_specific_rp) { return 0; } @@ -2075,14 +2071,6 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, return NULL; } - /* If Tor2webRendezvousPoints is enabled and we are dealing with an - RP circuit, we want a specific RP node so we shouldn't canibalize - an already existing circuit. */ - if (get_options()->Tor2webRendezvousPoints && - purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) { - need_specific_rp = 1; - } - /* If we can/should cannibalize another circuit to build this one, * then do so. */ if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose, @@ -2485,16 +2473,6 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, else new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose; -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* If tor2Web is on, then hidden service requests should be one-hop. - */ - if (options->Tor2webMode && - (new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND || - new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)) { - want_onehop = 1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* Determine what kind of a circuit to launch, and actually launch it. */ { int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY; diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 8e8a5e21c..2ffd40250 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1835,18 +1835,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, return -1; } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion - * addresses. */ - if (options->Tor2webMode) { - log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname " - "or IP address %s because tor2web mode is enabled.", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); - return -1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address. * If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection. * If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection. diff --git a/src/core/or/or.h b/src/core/or/or.h index 6edfd21df..e485b3a40 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or.h +++ b/src/core/or/or.h @@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define cell_t tor_cell_t #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE -#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1 -#endif - /** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */ #define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_)) diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c index a72317618..230fa69a1 100644 --- a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c +++ b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c @@ -803,10 +803,8 @@ directory_choose_address_routerstatus(const routerstatus_t *status, * allowed by the firewall. * * (When Tor uploads and downloads a hidden service descriptor, it uses - * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, except for Tor2Web, which uses DIRIND_ONEHOP. - * So this code will only modify the address for Tor2Web's HS descriptor - * fetches. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, to avoid - * HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.) + * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, + * to avoid HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.) */ /* Initialise the OR / Dir addresses */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c index 9f62156eb..0b7d602d9 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c @@ -449,12 +449,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64]; const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data; -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - const int tor2web_mode = get_options()->Tor2webMode; - const int how_to_fetch = tor2web_mode ? DIRIND_ONEHOP : DIRIND_ANONYMOUS; -#else const int how_to_fetch = DIRIND_ANONYMOUS; -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ tor_assert(desc_id); tor_assert(rend_query); @@ -1226,15 +1221,12 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, /* Can Tor client code make direct (non-anonymous) connections to introduction * or rendezvous points? - * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED, and is - * configured in Tor2web mode. */ + * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED. */ int rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options) { - /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */ #ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - /* Tor2web */ - return options->Tor2webMode ? 1 : 0; + return 1; #else (void)options; return 0; @@ -1247,9 +1239,7 @@ int rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) { (void)options; - /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */ #ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - /* Tor2web */ return 1; #else return 0; diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c index 5bf947744..567cc5c1e 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c @@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ rend_auth_decode_cookie(const char *cookie_in, uint8_t *cookie_out, * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. * Prefer rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or * rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() whenever possible, so that - * checks are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */ + * checks are specific to Single Onion Services. */ int rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) { @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. * Prefer rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() or * rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() whenever possible, so that checks - * are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */ + * are specific to Single Onion Services. */ int rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) { @@ -1007,9 +1007,9 @@ rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) /* Make sure that tor only builds one-hop circuits when they would not * compromise user anonymity. * - * One-hop circuits are permitted in Tor2web or Single Onion modes. + * One-hop circuits are permitted in Single Onion modes. * - * Tor2web or Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits. + * Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits. * For example, single onion HSDir circuits are 3-hop to prevent denial of * service. */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c index 22cd6c343..0fd6516ea 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, } /* Check if we are configured to accept established rendezvous cells from - * client or in other words tor2web clients. */ + * client or in other words Tor2Web clients. */ if (channel_is_client(circ->p_chan) && dos_should_refuse_single_hop_client()) { /* Note it down for the heartbeat log purposes. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c index 5d696b8b8..de673de54 100644 --- a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c +++ b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c @@ -406,81 +406,12 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg) setup_mock_consensus(); setup_mock_network(); - /* Do we disable padding if tor2webmode or rsos are enabled, and - * the consensus says don't pad? */ - - /* Ensure we can kill tor2web and rsos padding if we want. */ - // First, test that padding works if either is enabled - smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params); - channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); + /* Do we disable padding if rsos is enabled, and the consensus says don't + * pad? */ monotime_coarse_t now; monotime_coarse_get(&now); - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1; - monotime_coarse_add_msec(&client_relay3->next_padding_time, &now, 100); - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED); - tt_assert(client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 0); - - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_ALREADY_SCHEDULED); - - // Wait for the timer - new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC; - monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_coarse_get(&now); - timers_run_pending(); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - - // Then test disabling each via consensus param - smartlist_add(current_md_consensus->net_params, - (void*)"nf_pad_tor2web=0"); - channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); - - // Before the client tries to pad, the relay will still pad: - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - monotime_coarse_add_msec(&relay3_client->next_padding_time, &now, 100); - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0; - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED); - tt_assert(relay3_client->pending_padding_callback); - - // Wait for the timer - new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC; - monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_coarse_get(&now); - timers_run_pending(); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - - // Test client side (it should stop immediately, but send a negotiate) - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - tt_assert(relay3_client->padding_enabled); - tt_assert(client_relay3->padding_enabled); - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1; - /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */ - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled); - - // Test relay side (it should have gotten the negotiation to disable) - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0; - tt_int_op(channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client), OP_EQ, - CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD); - tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled); - - /* Repeat for SOS */ // First, test that padding works if either is enabled smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params); channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c index 135df8e9f..e3599d572 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs.c @@ -354,76 +354,6 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) tor_free(received_msg); } -/* Make sure we always pick the right RP, given a well formatted - * Tor2webRendezvousPoints value. */ -static void -test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg) -{ - or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); - const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL; - router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; - int retval, i; - const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "test003r"; - - (void) arg; - - /* Setup fake routerlist. */ - helper_setup_fake_routerlist(); - - /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */ - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new(); - options->UseMicrodescriptors = 0; - retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - tor2web_rendezvous_str, - "test_tor2web_rp"); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0); - - /* Pick rendezvous point. Make sure the correct one is - picked. Repeat many times to make sure it works properly. */ - for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) { - chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options); - tt_assert(chosen_rp); - tt_str_op(chosen_rp->ri->nickname, OP_EQ, tor2web_rendezvous_str); - } - - done: - routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); -} - -/* Make sure we never pick an RP if Tor2webRendezvousPoints doesn't - * correspond to an actual node. */ -static void -test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg) -{ - or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); - const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL; - router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; - int retval, i; - const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "dummy"; - - (void) arg; - - /* Setup fake routerlist. */ - helper_setup_fake_routerlist(); - - /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */ - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new(); - retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - tor2web_rendezvous_str, - "test_tor2web_rp"); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0); - - /* Pick rendezvous point. Since Tor2webRendezvousPoints was set to a - dummy value, we shouldn't find any eligible RPs. */ - for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) { - chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options); - tt_ptr_op(chosen_rp, OP_EQ, NULL); - } - - done: - routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); -} - /* Make sure rend_data_t is valid at creation, destruction and when * duplicated. */ static void @@ -1046,11 +976,6 @@ struct testcase_t hs_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "hs_desc_event", test_hs_desc_event, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - { "pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node", test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, - { "pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node", - test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, { "hs_auth_cookies", test_hs_auth_cookies, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "single_onion_poisoning_create_dir_none", test_single_onion_poisoning, diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c index 396965401..a0efd7d05 100644 --- a/src/test/test_options.c +++ b/src/test/test_options.c @@ -2424,36 +2424,6 @@ test_options_validate__circuits(void *ignored) } static void -test_options_validate__tor2web(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - char *msg; - options_test_data_t *tdata = NULL; - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\n"); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode."); - tor_free(msg); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\nTor2webMode 1\n"); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tor_free(msg); - - done: - policies_free_all(); - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tor_free(msg); -} - -static void test_options_validate__rend(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; @@ -2566,13 +2536,11 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); free_options_test_data(tdata); - /* Test that SOCKSPort must come with Tor2webMode if - * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */ + /* Test that SOCKSPort if HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */ tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "SOCKSPort 5000\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); @@ -2587,7 +2555,6 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) "SOCKSPort 0\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -2597,27 +2564,13 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "SOCKSPort 5000\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 0\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" - ); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); - free_options_test_data(tdata); - - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "SOCKSPort 5000\n" - "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" - "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 1\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); free_options_test_data(tdata); - /* Test that a hidden service can't be run with Tor2web - * Use HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode instead of Tor2webMode, because - * Tor2webMode requires a compilation #define */ + /* Test that a hidden service can't be run in non anonymous mode. */ tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/\n" @@ -4222,7 +4175,6 @@ struct testcase_t options_tests[] = { LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(path_bias), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(bandwidth), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(circuits), - LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(tor2web), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(rend), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(single_onion), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(accounting),

1 0

[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug26367_035_01'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 48632455a5bd679d5f97c5137f24f91e564abad6 Merge: b1d32a922 8f13c3d3e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:02:04 2018 -0400 Merge branch 'bug26367_035_01' changes/bug26367 | 5 +++ configure.ac | 7 --- doc/tor.1.txt | 28 +----------- src/app/config/config.c | 64 ++------------------------- src/app/config/or_options_st.h | 14 ++---- src/core/or/channel.c | 7 --- src/core/or/channelpadding.c | 16 ------- src/core/or/channelpadding.h | 2 - src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 96 ++-------------------------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.h | 8 +--- src/core/or/circuitstats.c | 8 ++-- src/core/or/circuituse.c | 42 +++--------------- src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 12 ----- src/core/or/or.h | 4 -- src/feature/dircache/directory.c | 6 +-- src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 37 ---------------- src/feature/rend/rendclient.h | 3 -- src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 22 +++------ src/feature/rend/rendmid.c | 2 +- src/test/test_channelpadding.c | 73 +----------------------------- src/test/test_hs.c | 75 ------------------------------- src/test/test_options.c | 52 +--------------------- 22 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 542 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Remove rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit f661d856fd83cb978320bf55ba5dfdee55a666b8 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 12 09:21:52 2018 -0400 hs: Remove rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection By removing Tor2Web, there is no way a client can be non anonymous so we remove that function and the callsites. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/core/or/circuituse.c | 5 ----- src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 14 -------------- src/feature/rend/rendclient.h | 1 - src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 9 ++------- 4 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c index a10791f3a..0f2b1ede3 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c @@ -888,11 +888,6 @@ circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age) (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)) continue; - /* We only ignore active rend point connections, if we take a long time - * to rendezvous, that's worth logging. */ - if (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && - circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) - continue; ocirc = CONST_TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ); if (ocirc->build_state && ocirc->build_state->onehop_tunnel) { diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c index 0b7d602d9..485ffa8be 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c @@ -1219,20 +1219,6 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, return res; } -/* Can Tor client code make direct (non-anonymous) connections to introduction - * or rendezvous points? - * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED. */ -int -rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options) -{ -#ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - return 1; -#else - (void)options; - return 0; -#endif /* defined(NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED) */ -} - /* At compile-time, was non-anonymous mode enabled via * NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED ? */ int diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h index e41faa493..2e7d7aeca 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h @@ -47,7 +47,6 @@ rend_service_authorization_t *rend_client_lookup_service_authorization( const char *onion_address); void rend_service_authorization_free_all(void); -int rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options); int rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options); #endif /* !defined(TOR_RENDCLIENT_H) */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c index 567cc5c1e..6e19d56b3 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c @@ -979,16 +979,11 @@ rend_auth_decode_cookie(const char *cookie_in, uint8_t *cookie_out, /* Is this a rend client or server that allows direct (non-anonymous) * connections? - * Clients must be specifically compiled and configured in this mode. - * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. - * Prefer rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or - * rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() whenever possible, so that - * checks are specific to Single Onion Services. */ + * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode for single onion. */ int rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) { - return (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) - || rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options)); + return rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options); } /* Is this a rend client or server in non-anonymous mode?

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Remove rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 8f13c3d3ed842d8db13bcf9ca6393dbe8e5781e3 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jul 12 09:23:57 2018 -0400 hs: Remove rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled The removal of Tor2Web made this function useless. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 13 ------------- src/feature/rend/rendclient.h | 2 -- src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 9 ++------- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c index 485ffa8be..2c4cec65b 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c @@ -1218,16 +1218,3 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, } return res; } - -/* At compile-time, was non-anonymous mode enabled via - * NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED ? */ -int -rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) -{ - (void)options; -#ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - return 1; -#else - return 0; -#endif /* defined(NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED) */ -} diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h index 2e7d7aeca..0d27d63e6 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.h @@ -47,7 +47,5 @@ rend_service_authorization_t *rend_client_lookup_service_authorization( const char *onion_address); void rend_service_authorization_free_all(void); -int rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options); - #endif /* !defined(TOR_RENDCLIENT_H) */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c index 6e19d56b3..8cb5fd91e 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c @@ -987,16 +987,11 @@ rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) } /* Is this a rend client or server in non-anonymous mode? - * Clients must be specifically compiled in this mode. - * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. - * Prefer rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() or - * rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() whenever possible, so that checks - * are specific to Single Onion Services. */ + * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode for single onion. */ int rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) { - return (rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) - || rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options)); + return rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options); } /* Make sure that tor only builds one-hop circuits when they would not

1 0

[tor/master] fixup! hs: Change default version from 2 to 3
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 4e2dcda092f5c211b371a749e74fa4fcf2e05424 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 15:58:28 2018 -0400 fixup! hs: Change default version from 2 to 3 --- changes/ticket27215 | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket27215 b/changes/ticket27215 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..dcb67900e --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket27215 @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + o Major feature (hidden service): + - For a newly created hidden service, the default version is now 3. Tor + still supports version 2 service but the operator now needs to + specifically set "HiddenServiceVersion 2" in order to create a new + service. + + For existing services, tor now learns the version by reading the key + file so the HiddenServiceVersion is not mandatory in that case. Closes + ticket 27215.

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket27215_035_01'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit b1d32a92239ae1727e22b592ac1908b616ba869a Merge: 219f6ea51 4e2dcda09 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:00:45 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket27215_035_01' changes/ticket27215 | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

1 0

[tor/master] key: Make ed_key_init_from_file() take an or_options_t
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit cb466ee7d6f7f475783847a7201eaa6a3e1c711b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 11:32:57 2018 -0400 key: Make ed_key_init_from_file() take an or_options_t Part of #27215, we need to call the ed_key_init_from_file function during option_validate() which is before the global_options variable is set. This commit make ed_key_init_from_file() stop using get_options() and instead now has a or_options_t parameter. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 4 ++-- src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c | 21 +++++++++++++-------- src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h | 3 ++- src/test/test_routerkeys.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++----------------- 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index 8a9429271..a9364a751 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service) /* Don't ask for key creation, we want to know if we were able to load it or * we had to generate it. Better logging! */ kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, LOG_INFO, NULL, 0, 0, - 0, NULL); + 0, NULL, NULL); if (!kp) { log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to load keys from %s. Generating it...", fname); /* We'll now try to generate the keys and for it we want the strongest @@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service) uint32_t key_flags = INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE | INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG | INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT; kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, key_flags, LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, - NULL); + NULL, NULL); if (!kp) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate keys and save in %s.", fname); goto end; diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c index f12eb3d33..294d452e1 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c +++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c @@ -248,6 +248,9 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted, * fname, with certificate type cert_type. On failure, return * NULL; on success return the keypair. * + * The options is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when + * writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case. + * * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in flags, then create the key (and * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk. * @@ -276,9 +279,6 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted, * secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but * create and save one if needed). * - * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_LOAD_SECRET is set in flags, don't try to load - * a secret key, no matter what. - * * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key * and consider encrypting any new secret key. * @@ -291,6 +291,9 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted, * * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the * secret key file, encrypted or not. + * + * If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master + * secret key and we log a message at severity that we've done so. */ ed25519_keypair_t * ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, @@ -299,7 +302,8 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, time_t now, time_t lifetime, uint8_t cert_type, - struct tor_cert_st **cert_out) + struct tor_cert_st **cert_out, + const or_options_t *options) { char *secret_fname = NULL; char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL; @@ -503,7 +507,8 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if * we just created it. */ - if (created_sk || (have_secret && get_options()->change_key_passphrase)) { + if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL && + options->change_key_passphrase)) { if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey, encrypt_key, secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0 @@ -734,7 +739,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT| INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT, LOG_INFO, - NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert); + NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options); tor_free(fname); check_signing_cert = sign_cert; use_signing = sign; @@ -836,7 +841,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) id = ed_key_init_from_file( fname, flags, - LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL); + LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, options); tor_free(fname); if (!id) { if (need_new_signing_key) { @@ -904,7 +909,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now) flags, LOG_WARN, sign_signing_key_with_id, now, options->SigningKeyLifetime, - CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert); + CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options); tor_free(fname); if (!sign) FAIL("Missing signing key"); diff --git a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h index a6f06f6e2..f52ed0f30 100644 --- a/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h +++ b/src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags, time_t now, time_t lifetime, uint8_t cert_type, - struct tor_cert_st **cert_out); + struct tor_cert_st **cert_out, + const or_options_t *options); ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key, uint32_t flags, time_t now, diff --git a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c index 1a1bf63ba..1a9664aa0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_routerkeys.c +++ b/src/test/test_routerkeys.c @@ -262,13 +262,14 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) unlink(fname2); /* Fail to load a key that isn't there. */ - kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, + NULL); tt_assert(kp1 == NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); /* Create the key if requested to do so. */ kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO, - NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp1 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_1_cert"), &st), OP_LT, 0); @@ -276,24 +277,24 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) /* Fail to load if we say we need a cert */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, LOG_INFO, - NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 == NULL); /* Fail to load if we say the wrong key type */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, - NULL, now, 0, 6, &cert); + NULL, now, 0, 6, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 == NULL); /* Load successfully if we're not picky, whether we say "create" or not. */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO, - NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp1)); ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL; kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, - NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp1)); @@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) /* Now create a key with a cert. */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE| INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT), - LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert); + LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert != NULL); tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_NE, kp2, sizeof(*kp1)); @@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) /* Now verify we can load the cert... */ kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE| INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT), - LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2); + LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL); tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2)); tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, OP_EQ, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL; @@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) /* ... even without create... */ kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, - LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2); + LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL); tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2)); tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, OP_EQ, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len); ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL; @@ -331,13 +332,13 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg) /* ... but that we don't crash or anything if we say we don't want it. */ kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, - LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, NULL); + LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, NULL, NULL); tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2)); ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL; /* Fail if we're told the wrong signing key */ kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, - LOG_INFO, kp2, now, 7200, 7, &cert2); + LOG_INFO, kp2, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL); tt_assert(kp3 == NULL); tt_assert(cert2 == NULL); @@ -368,13 +369,14 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg) unlink(fname2); /* Can't load key that isn't there. */ - kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, + NULL); tt_assert(kp1 == NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); /* Create a split key */ kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, - LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp1 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_cert"), &st), OP_LT, 0); @@ -383,7 +385,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg) /* Load it. */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, - LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp2)); @@ -392,7 +394,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg) /* Okay, try killing the secret key and loading it. */ unlink(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_secret_key")); kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, - LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, OP_EQ, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey)); @@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg) /* Even when we're told to "create", don't create if there's a public key */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, - LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert); + LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 != NULL); tt_assert(cert == NULL); tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, OP_EQ, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey)); @@ -412,7 +414,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg) /* Make sure we fail on a tag mismatch, though */ kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, - LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 99, &cert); + LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 99, &cert, NULL); tt_assert(kp2 == NULL); done:

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Learn service version by trying to load the keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 61ad81c36e46d7b05b66601520c7ff42469f24d7 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 11:38:28 2018 -0400 hs: Learn service version by trying to load the keys In order to switch the default HS version from 2 to 3, we need tor to be smart and be able to decide on the version by trying to load the service keys during configuration validation. Part of #27215 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/feature/hs/hs_config.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++ src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 53 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 1 + src/feature/rend/rendservice.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++ src/feature/rend/rendservice.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_config.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_config.c index 2c25a168a..e97257648 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_config.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_config.c @@ -143,6 +143,24 @@ helper_parse_uint64(const char *opt, const char *value, uint64_t min, return ret; } +/* Return the service version by trying to learn it from the key on disk if + * any. If nothing is found, the current service configured version is + * returned. */ +static int +config_learn_service_version(hs_service_t *service) +{ + int version; + + tor_assert(service); + + version = hs_service_get_version_from_key(service); + if (version < 0) { + version = service->config.version; + } + + return version; +} + /* Return true iff the given options starting at line_ for a hidden service * contains at least one invalid option. Each hidden service option don't * apply to all versions so this function can find out. The line_ MUST start @@ -490,6 +508,12 @@ config_service(const config_line_t *line, const or_options_t *options, 0) < 0) { goto err; } + /* We'll try to learn the service version here by loading the key(s) if + * present. Depending on the key format, we can figure out the service + * version. If we can't find a key, the configuration version will be used + * which has been set previously. */ + service->config.version = config_learn_service_version(service); + /* Different functions are in charge of specific options for a version. We * start just after the service directory line so once we hit another * directory line, the function knows that it has to stop parsing. */ diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index a9364a751..fd981f8e1 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -2884,6 +2884,29 @@ service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list) smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname)); } +/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. */ +static int +service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *fname; + ed25519_keypair_t *kp = NULL; + + tor_assert(directory_path); + + /* Build the v3 key path name and then try to load it. */ + fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix); + kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, + LOG_DEBUG, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL); + if (kp) { + ret = 1; + } + + ed25519_keypair_free(kp); + tor_free(fname); + return ret; +} + /* ========== */ /* Public API */ /* ========== */ @@ -3375,6 +3398,36 @@ hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ) } } +/* Return the service version by looking at the key in the service directory. + * If the key is not found or unrecognized, -1 is returned. Else, the service + * version is returned. */ +int +hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service) +{ + int version = -1; /* Unknown version. */ + const char *directory_path; + + tor_assert(service); + + /* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version + * 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (0). */ + directory_path = service->config.directory_path; + + /* Version 3 check. */ + if (service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) { + version = HS_VERSION_THREE; + goto end; + } + /* Version 2 check. */ + if (rend_service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) { + version = HS_VERSION_TWO; + goto end; + } + + end: + return version; +} + /* Load and/or generate keys for all onion services including the client * authorization if any. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h index 5c5443a35..6ccd93551 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h @@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ void hs_service_free_(hs_service_t *service); unsigned int hs_service_get_num_services(void); void hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list); int hs_service_load_all_keys(void); +int hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service); void hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list, smartlist_t *dir_list); int hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ, diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c index 1a99bd56e..1af9117aa 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.c @@ -1341,6 +1341,29 @@ rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dir(const rend_service_t *s, return 0; } +/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. This is + * used to try to learn the service version during configuration time. */ +int +rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path) +{ + int ret = 0; + char *fname; + crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL; + + tor_assert(directory_path); + + /* Load key */ + fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, private_key_fname); + pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, 0); + if (pk) { + ret = 1; + } + + crypto_pk_free(pk); + tor_free(fname); + return ret; +} + /** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly * including keys for client authorization. * If a service_list is provided, treat it as the list of hidden diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.h b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.h index 709678962..7186289fc 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendservice.h +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendservice.h @@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ int rend_config_service(const struct config_line_t *line_, void rend_service_prune_list(void); void rend_service_free_staging_list(void); int rend_service_load_all_keys(const smartlist_t *service_list); +int rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path); void rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst, smartlist_t *stat_lst); void rend_consider_services_intro_points(time_t now);

1 0

[tor/master] fixup! hs: Learn service version by trying to load the keys
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit d9bfc9e2e351ab7048a09f880d79cc696c8e2c91 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 08:36:28 2018 -0400 fixup! hs: Learn service version by trying to load the keys --- src/feature/hs/hs_service.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c index fd981f8e1..30d01540f 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.c @@ -3410,7 +3410,7 @@ hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service) tor_assert(service); /* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version - * 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (0). */ + * 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (-1). */ directory_path = service->config.directory_path; /* Version 3 check. */

1 0

[tor/master] hs: Change default version from 2 to 3
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit e8557ba00ddbd1fa7882c937f50a8366d9d68746 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Aug 22 11:42:23 2018 -0400 hs: Change default version from 2 to 3 Closes #27215 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- doc/tor.1.txt | 2 +- src/feature/hs/hs_service.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 0c010d94f..c40c27770 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2826,7 +2826,7 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service. [[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **2**|**3**:: A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden - service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 2) + service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 3) [[HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient]] **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__:: If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients diff --git a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h index 6ccd93551..17c654ecf 100644 --- a/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h +++ b/src/feature/hs/hs_service.h @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ /* When loading and configuring a service, this is the default version it will * be configured for as it is possible that no HiddenServiceVersion is * present. */ -#define HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION HS_VERSION_TWO +#define HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION HS_VERSION_THREE /* As described in the specification, service publishes their next descriptor * at a random time between those two values (in seconds). */

1 0