August 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/master] Set the file encoding in checkIncludes.py with Python3
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit b4b8fa4899fcde9983f66a6310878ea47186e5eb Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:25:15 2018 -0400 Set the file encoding in checkIncludes.py with Python3 --- scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py b/scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py index d13ff565c..46a3f3963 100755 --- a/scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py +++ b/scripts/maint/checkIncludes.py @@ -26,6 +26,13 @@ import sys # Global: Have there been any errors? trouble = False +if sys.version_info[0] <= 2: + def open_file(fname): + return open(fname, 'r') +else: + def open_file(fname): + return open(fname, 'r', encoding='utf-8') + def err(msg): """ Declare that an error has happened, and remember that there has been an error. """ @@ -70,7 +77,7 @@ class Rules(object): include, lineno, context)) def applyToFile(self, fname): - with open(fname, 'r') as f: + with open_file(fname) as f: #print(fname) self.applyToLines(iter(f), " of {}".format(fname)) @@ -82,7 +89,7 @@ class Rules(object): def load_include_rules(fname): """ Read a rules file from 'fname', and return it as a Rules object. """ result = Rules(os.path.split(fname)[0]) - with open(fname, 'r') as f: + with open_file(fname) as f: for line in f: line = line.strip() if line.startswith("#") or not line:

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[translation/support-portal] Update translations for support-portal
by translation＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 41f0c2ed051db53d69b5311d982b84fdf6f37e15 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 20:19:36 2018 +0000 Update translations for support-portal --- contents+ru.po | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/contents+ru.po b/contents+ru.po index bf1f286fd..5dac9f6f4 100644 --- a/contents+ru.po +++ b/contents+ru.po @@ -371,6 +371,11 @@ msgid "" "href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/form-990\">blog " "posts</a> on our financial reports." msgstr "" +"Приглашаем посмотреть список всех <a " +"href=\"https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en\">наших " +"спонсоров</a> и серию <a " +"href=\"https://blog.torproject.org/category/tags/form-990\">блог-" +"публикаций</a> о нашей финансовой отчетности." #: http//localhost/operators/operators-3/ #: (content/operators/operators-3/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -434,6 +439,8 @@ msgid "" "If you need other bridges, you can get them at our <a " "href=\"https://bridges.torproject.org/\">Bridges website</a>." msgstr "" +"Если вам нужны другие мосты, можете получить их на нашем <a " +"href=\"https://bridges.torproject.org/\">сайте мостов</a>." #: http//localhost/tbb/tbb-37/ #: (content/tbb/tbb-37/contents+en.lrquestion.description) @@ -455,6 +462,12 @@ msgid "" "href=\"https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/\">Orbot</a> and " "<a href=\"https://guardianproject.info/apps/orfox/\">Orfox</a>." msgstr "" +"Разработчики из <a href=\"https://guardianproject.info/\">The Guardian" +" Project</a> поддерживают приложения на Tor для <a " +"href=\"https://www.torproject.org/docs/android.html.en\">Android</a>:" +" <a href=\"https://guardianproject.info/apps/orbot/\">Orbot</a>" +" и <a " +"href=\"https://guardianproject.info/apps/orfox/\">Orfox</a>. " #: http//localhost/faq/faq-5/ #: (content/faq/faq-5/contents+en.lrquestion.seo_slug)

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[tor/master] make a comment more right
by arma＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 6da8c6e9a544922c3e04ac460ca7fcbdc8a6eaf3 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:13:58 2018 -0400 make a comment more right (from #20874 fix) --- src/core/or/policies.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/policies.c b/src/core/or/policies.c index 7f5d5dd10..d9a07b04a 100644 --- a/src/core/or/policies.c +++ b/src/core/or/policies.c @@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ parse_reachable_addresses(void) } } - /* Prepend a reject *.* to reachable_(or|dir)_addr_policy */ + /* Append a reject *:* to reachable_(or|dir)_addr_policy */ if (!ret && (options->ReachableDirAddresses || options->ReachableORAddresses || options->ReachableAddresses)) {

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[tor/master] doc: Explain how to limit Tor's sockets in the man page
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 40d5b573a4b5ba1f06e0d842dde9e2a8e4dab5d0 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Aug 17 11:20:03 2018 +1000 doc: Explain how to limit Tor's sockets in the man page Closes 22747. --- doc/tor.1.txt | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 0c010d94f..065fbd0e1 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -303,8 +303,15 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. + + - You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows - since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) + Tor relays need thousands of sockets, to connect to every other relay. + If you are running a private bridge, you can reduce the number of sockets + that Tor uses. For example, to limit Tor to 500 sockets, run + "ulimit -n 500" in a shell. Then start tor in the same shell, with + **ConnLimit 500**. You may also need to set **DisableOOSCheck 0**. + + + + Unless you have severely limited sockets, you probably don't need to + adjust **ConnLimit** itself. It has no effect on Windows, since that + platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000) [[DisableNetwork]] **DisableNetwork** **0**|**1**:: When this option is set, we don't listen for or accept any connections

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug22747'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 76843639e58d433e8860e336eff52497d0f1ec35 Merge: b26db5ddd 40d5b573a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:12:01 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'teor/bug22747' doc/tor.1.txt | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] core/mainloop: fix documentation of connection_handle_write_impl()
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 309961138b1ebfa78e0f2b6201e06bae64c57e0d Author: cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 27 01:07:01 2018 +0000 core/mainloop: fix documentation of connection_handle_write_impl() Inaccurate since d9746bd468f551d1ada57d962b20eddd15256ce9. --- src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c index ed789d520..95213f550 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@ -3762,9 +3762,9 @@ update_send_buffer_size(tor_socket_t sock) /** Try to flush more bytes onto conn-\>s. * - * This function gets called either from conn_write_callback() in main.c - * when libevent tells us that conn wants to write, or below - * from connection_buf_add() when an entire TLS record is ready. + * This function is called in connection_handle_write(), which gets + * called from conn_write_callback() in main.c when libevent tells us + * that conn wants to write. * * Update conn-\>timestamp_last_write_allowed to now, and call flush_buf * or flush_buf_tls appropriately. If it succeeds and there are no more

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[tor/master] core/mainloop: more comments documenting connection.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 0cd72a28339e829443f142743bbc1bd8ede0fbde Author: cypherpunks <cypherpunks(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Aug 27 01:32:34 2018 +0000 core/mainloop: more comments documenting connection.c --- src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c index 95213f550..a0902f516 100644 --- a/src/core/mainloop/connection.c +++ b/src/core/mainloop/connection.c @@ -3571,7 +3571,8 @@ connection_buf_read_from_socket(connection_t *conn, ssize_t *max_to_read, * waiting for a TLS renegotiation, the renegotiation started, and * SSL_read returned WANTWRITE. But now SSL_read is saying WANTREAD * again. Stop waiting for write events now, or else we'll - * busy-loop until data arrives for us to read. */ + * busy-loop until data arrives for us to read. + * XXX: remove this when v2 handshakes support is dropped. */ connection_stop_writing(conn); if (!connection_is_reading(conn)) connection_start_reading(conn); @@ -4028,6 +4029,9 @@ connection_handle_write(connection_t *conn, int force) { int res; update_current_time(time(NULL)); + /* connection_handle_write_impl() might call connection_handle_read() + * if we're in the middle of a v2 handshake, in which case it needs this + * flag set. */ conn->in_connection_handle_write = 1; res = connection_handle_write_impl(conn, force); conn->in_connection_handle_write = 0;

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'onionk/connection-comments1'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit b26db5dddb659f76ed3eb51f786ea76f7a5d009d Merge: 48632455a 0cd72a283 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Aug 28 16:07:46 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'onionk/connection-comments1' src/core/mainloop/connection.c | 12 ++++++++---- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] circ: Remove useless param from cannibalization function
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 67cd67611c7d0756d04eab4a04ed913bf3421ae1 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 9 16:13:34 2018 -0400 circ: Remove useless param from cannibalization function Because we just removed Tor2web support, the need_specific_rp is not needed anymore when cannibalizing a circuit. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/core/or/circuituse.c | 9 +++------ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c index 4988a6b62..a10791f3a 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c @@ -2001,12 +2001,11 @@ circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose) static int circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build, int has_extend_info, - int onehop_tunnel, - int need_specific_rp) + int onehop_tunnel) { /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */ - if (onehop_tunnel || need_specific_rp) { + if (onehop_tunnel) { return 0; } @@ -2055,7 +2054,6 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, origin_circuit_t *circ; int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0; int have_path = have_enough_path_info(! (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) ); - int need_specific_rp = 0; /* Keep some stats about our attempts to launch HS rendezvous circuits */ if (purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND) { @@ -2075,8 +2073,7 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, * then do so. */ if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose, extend_info != NULL, - onehop_tunnel, - need_specific_rp)) { + onehop_tunnel)) { /* see if there are appropriate circs available to cannibalize. */ /* XXX if we're planning to add a hop, perhaps we want to look for * internal circs rather than exit circs? -RD */

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[tor/master] hs: Render obsolete Tor2web
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Aug '18

28 Aug '18

commit 4976eca8261015dd2a214c4f4722dcdbcfed9c64 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Jul 9 16:11:39 2018 -0400 hs: Render obsolete Tor2web Remove support for Tor2web in the code and build system. At this commit, tor doesn't have Tor2web support anymore. Ref: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2018-July/013295.html Close #26367 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug26367 | 5 +++ configure.ac | 7 --- doc/tor.1.txt | 28 +----------- src/app/config/config.c | 64 ++------------------------- src/app/config/or_options_st.h | 14 ++---- src/core/or/channel.c | 7 --- src/core/or/channelpadding.c | 16 ------- src/core/or/channelpadding.h | 2 - src/core/or/circuitbuild.c | 96 ++-------------------------------------- src/core/or/circuitbuild.h | 8 +--- src/core/or/circuitstats.c | 8 ++-- src/core/or/circuituse.c | 32 +++----------- src/core/or/connection_edge.c | 12 ----- src/core/or/or.h | 4 -- src/feature/dircache/directory.c | 6 +-- src/feature/rend/rendclient.c | 14 +----- src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c | 8 ++-- src/feature/rend/rendmid.c | 2 +- src/test/test_channelpadding.c | 73 +----------------------------- src/test/test_hs.c | 75 ------------------------------- src/test/test_options.c | 52 +--------------------- 21 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 493 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug26367 b/changes/bug26367 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..af098df9c --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug26367 @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + o Removed features (hidden service, tor2web): + - Remove Tor2web functionalities. The Tor2webMode and + Tor2webRendezvousPoints options are now obsolete. Note that this feature + was never shipped in vanilla Tor and it was only possible to use this + feature by building the support at compile time. Closes ticket 26367. diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 296591f02..fea617708 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -181,13 +181,6 @@ if test "$enable_local_appdata" = "yes"; then [Defined if we default to host local appdata paths on Windows]) fi -# Tor2web mode flag -AC_ARG_ENABLE(tor2web-mode, - AS_HELP_STRING(--enable-tor2web-mode, [support tor2web non-anonymous mode]), -[if test "x$enableval" = "xyes"; then - CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE=1" -fi]) - AC_ARG_ENABLE(tool-name-check, AS_HELP_STRING(--disable-tool-name-check, [check for sanely named toolchain when cross-compiling])) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index f42ad0dd3..f16d9c370 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -1335,7 +1335,7 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a fraction of your paths. Entry Guards can not be used by Directory - Authorities, Single Onion Services, and Tor2web clients. In these cases, + Authorities, and Single Onion Services. In these cases, the this option is ignored. (Default: 1) [[GuardfractionFile]] **GuardfractionFile** __FILENAME__:: @@ -1525,32 +1525,6 @@ The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if Tor will look at the UseOptimisticData parameter in the networkstatus. (Default: auto) -[[Tor2webMode]] **Tor2webMode** **0**|**1**:: - When this option is set, Tor connects to hidden services - **non-anonymously**. This option also disables client connections to - non-hidden-service hostnames through Tor. It **must only** be used when - running a tor2web Hidden Service web proxy. - To enable this option the compile time flag --enable-tor2web-mode must be - specified. Since Tor2webMode is non-anonymous, you can not run an - anonymous Hidden Service on a tor version compiled with Tor2webMode. - (Default: 0) - -[[Tor2webRendezvousPoints]] **Tor2webRendezvousPoints** __node__,__node__,__...__:: - A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and - address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as RPs - in HS circuits; any other nodes will not be used as RPs. - (Example: - Tor2webRendezvousPoints Fastyfasty, ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234CDEF5678ABCD1234, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8) + - + - This feature can only be used if Tor2webMode is also enabled. + - + - ExcludeNodes have higher priority than Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - which means that nodes specified in ExcludeNodes will not be - picked as RPs. + - + - If no nodes in Tor2webRendezvousPoints are currently available for - use, Tor will choose a random node when building HS circuits. - [[HSLayer2Nodes]] **HSLayer2Nodes** __node__,__node__,__...__:: A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes, and address patterns of nodes that are allowed to be used as the diff --git a/src/app/config/config.c b/src/app/config/config.c index 665732ea5..95d6ce354 100644 --- a/src/app/config/config.c +++ b/src/app/config/config.c @@ -173,7 +173,6 @@ static config_abbrev_t option_abbrevs_[] = { PLURAL(AuthDirRejectCC), PLURAL(EntryNode), PLURAL(ExcludeNode), - PLURAL(Tor2webRendezvousPoint), PLURAL(FirewallPort), PLURAL(LongLivedPort), PLURAL(HiddenServiceNode), @@ -597,8 +596,8 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = { OBSOLETE("Support022HiddenServices"), V(TestSocks, BOOL, "0"), V(TokenBucketRefillInterval, MSEC_INTERVAL, "100 msec"), - V(Tor2webMode, BOOL, "0"), - V(Tor2webRendezvousPoints, ROUTERSET, NULL), + OBSOLETE("Tor2webMode"), + OBSOLETE("Tor2webRendezvousPoints"), OBSOLETE("TLSECGroup"), V(TrackHostExits, CSV, NULL), V(TrackHostExitsExpire, INTERVAL, "30 minutes"), @@ -1697,8 +1696,7 @@ options_need_geoip_info(const or_options_t *options, const char **reason_out) routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeExitNodes) || routerset_needs_geoip(options->ExcludeNodes) || routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer2Nodes) || - routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes) || - routerset_needs_geoip(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); + routerset_needs_geoip(options->HSLayer3Nodes); if (routerset_usage && reason_out) { *reason_out = "We've been configured to use (or avoid) nodes in certain " @@ -1881,27 +1879,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) "in a non-anonymous mode. It will provide NO ANONYMITY."); } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE -/* LCOV_EXCL_START */ - // XXXX This should move into options_validate() - if (!options->Tor2webMode) { - log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was compiled to run in " - "'tor2web mode'. It can only be run with the Tor2webMode torrc " - "option enabled."); - return -1; - } -/* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -#else /* !(defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE)) */ - // XXXX This should move into options_validate() - if (options->Tor2webMode) { - log_err(LD_CONFIG, "This copy of Tor was not compiled to run in " - "'tor2web mode'. It cannot be run with the Tor2webMode torrc " - "option enabled. To enable Tor2webMode recompile with the " - "--enable-tor2web-mode option."); - return -1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* If we are a bridge with a pluggable transport proxy but no Extended ORPort, inform the user that they are missing out. */ if (server_mode(options) && options->ServerTransportPlugin && @@ -2163,8 +2140,6 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options) options->HSLayer2Nodes) || !routerset_equal(old_options->HSLayer3Nodes, options->HSLayer3Nodes) || - !routerset_equal(old_options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) || options->StrictNodes != old_options->StrictNodes) { log_info(LD_CIRC, "Changed to using entry guards or bridges, or changed " @@ -3306,23 +3281,12 @@ options_validate_single_onion(or_options_t *options, char **msg) options->NATDPort_set || options->DNSPort_set || options->HTTPTunnelPort_set); - if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set && - !options->Tor2webMode) { + if (rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && client_port_set) { REJECT("HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode is incompatible with using Tor as " "an anonymous client. Please set Socks/Trans/NATD/DNSPort to 0, or " "revert HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode to 0."); } - /* If you run a hidden service in non-anonymous mode, the hidden service - * loses anonymity, even if SOCKSPort / Tor2web mode isn't used. */ - if (!rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(options) && - options->RendConfigLines && options->Tor2webMode) { - REJECT("Non-anonymous (Tor2web) mode is incompatible with using Tor as a " - "hidden service. Please remove all HiddenServiceDir lines, or use " - "a version of tor compiled without --enable-tor2web-mode, or use " - "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode."); - } - if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && options->UseEntryGuards) { /* Single Onion services only use entry guards when uploading descriptors; @@ -3807,26 +3771,6 @@ options_validate(or_options_t *old_options, or_options_t *options, REJECT("CircuitsAvailableTimeout is too large. Max is 24 hours."); } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - if (options->Tor2webMode && options->UseEntryGuards) { - /* tor2web mode clients do not (and should not) use entry guards - * in any meaningful way. Further, tor2web mode causes the hidden - * service client code to do things which break the path bias - * detector, and it's far easier to turn off entry guards (and - * thus the path bias detector with it) than to figure out how to - * make a piece of code which cannot possibly help tor2web mode - * users compatible with tor2web mode. - */ - log_notice(LD_CONFIG, - "Tor2WebMode is enabled; disabling UseEntryGuards."); - options->UseEntryGuards = 0; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - - if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints && !options->Tor2webMode) { - REJECT("Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode."); - } - if (options->EntryNodes && !options->UseEntryGuards) { REJECT("If EntryNodes is set, UseEntryGuards must be enabled."); } diff --git a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h index 0c0c5d32b..32b6bc746 100644 --- a/src/app/config/or_options_st.h +++ b/src/app/config/or_options_st.h @@ -256,14 +256,6 @@ struct or_options_t { int AllDirActionsPrivate; /**< Should every directory action be sent * through a Tor circuit? */ - /** Run in 'tor2web mode'? (I.e. only make client connections to hidden - * services, and use a single hop for all hidden-service-related - * circuits.) */ - int Tor2webMode; - - /** A routerset that should be used when picking RPs for HS circuits. */ - routerset_t *Tor2webRendezvousPoints; - /** A routerset that should be used when picking middle nodes for HS * circuits. */ routerset_t *HSLayer2Nodes; @@ -537,9 +529,9 @@ struct or_options_t { * of fixed nodes? */ int UseEntryGuards_option; /** Internal variable to remember whether we're actually acting on - * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Tor2web client or - * Single Onion Service, it is always false, otherwise we use the value of - * UseEntryGuards_option. */ + * UseEntryGuards_option -- when we're a non-anonymous Single Onion Service, + * it is always false, otherwise we use the value of UseEntryGuards_option. + * */ int UseEntryGuards; int NumEntryGuards; /**< How many entry guards do we try to establish? */ diff --git a/src/core/or/channel.c b/src/core/or/channel.c index 476f31d5b..0c204ddfb 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channel.c +++ b/src/core/or/channel.c @@ -1882,13 +1882,6 @@ channel_do_open_actions(channel_t *chan) if (!get_options()->ConnectionPadding) { /* Disable if torrc disabled */ channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); - } else if (get_options()->Tor2webMode && - !networkstatus_get_param(NULL, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1)) { - /* Disable if we're using tor2web and the consensus disabled padding - * for tor2web */ - channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); } else if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(get_options()) && !networkstatus_get_param(NULL, CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM, diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c index b8cfd33d5..1a8f8209d 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.c +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.c @@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ static int consensus_nf_conntimeout_clients; static int consensus_nf_pad_before_usage; /** Should we pad relay-to-relay connections? */ static int consensus_nf_pad_relays; -/** Should we pad tor2web connections? */ -static int consensus_nf_pad_tor2web; /** Should we pad rosos connections? */ static int consensus_nf_pad_single_onion; @@ -141,11 +139,6 @@ channelpadding_new_consensus_params(networkstatus_t *ns) consensus_nf_pad_relays = networkstatus_get_param(ns, "nf_pad_relays", 0, 0, 1); - consensus_nf_pad_tor2web = - networkstatus_get_param(ns, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM, - CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT, 0, 1); - consensus_nf_pad_single_onion = networkstatus_get_param(ns, CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM, @@ -740,15 +733,6 @@ channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(channel_t *chan) return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD; } - if (options->Tor2webMode && !consensus_nf_pad_tor2web) { - /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still - * think padding is enabled. Negotiate it off. */ - if (chan->padding_enabled) - channelpadding_disable_padding_on_channel(chan); - - return CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD; - } - if (rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && !consensus_nf_pad_single_onion) { /* If the consensus just changed values, this channel may still diff --git a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h index 7eddbdbe2..7f8cfd4cc 100644 --- a/src/core/or/channelpadding.h +++ b/src/core/or/channelpadding.h @@ -13,8 +13,6 @@ #include "trunnel/channelpadding_negotiation.h" -#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_PARAM "nf_pad_tor2web" -#define CHANNELPADDING_TOR2WEB_DEFAULT 1 #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_PARAM "nf_pad_single_onion" #define CHANNELPADDING_SOS_DEFAULT 1 diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c index e22ddabde..5c3d20944 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.c @@ -408,10 +408,10 @@ onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ) * edge cases. */ tor_assert(circuit_get_cpath_len(circ)); if (circuit_can_use_tap(circ)) { - /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to - * rend points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol - * does not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Tor2web clients - * and Single Onion Services. */ + /* Circuits from clients to intro points, and hidden services to rend + * points do not support ntor, because the hidden service protocol does + * not include ntor onion keys. This is also true for Single Onion + * Services. */ return 0; } @@ -824,7 +824,6 @@ circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(const origin_circuit_t *circ) * accordingly. * Note that TAP handshakes in CREATE cells are only used for direct * connections: - * - from Tor2web to intro points not in the client's consensus, and * - from Single Onions to rend points not in the service's consensus. * This is checked in onion_populate_cpath. */ static void @@ -1985,98 +1984,11 @@ choose_good_exit_server_general(router_crn_flags_t flags) return NULL; } -#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) -/* The config option Tor2webRendezvousPoints has been set and we need - * to pick an RP out of that set. Make sure that the RP we choose is - * alive, and return it. Return NULL if no usable RP could be found in - * Tor2webRendezvousPoints. */ -STATIC const node_t * -pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags, - const or_options_t *options) -{ - const node_t *rp_node = NULL; - const int need_desc = (flags & CRN_NEED_DESC) != 0; - const int pref_addr = (flags & CRN_PREF_ADDR) != 0; - const int direct_conn = (flags & CRN_DIRECT_CONN) != 0; - - smartlist_t *whitelisted_live_rps = smartlist_new(); - smartlist_t *all_live_nodes = smartlist_new(); - - tor_assert(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); - - /* Add all running nodes to all_live_nodes */ - router_add_running_nodes_to_smartlist(all_live_nodes, - 0, 0, 0, - need_desc, - pref_addr, - direct_conn); - - /* Filter all_live_nodes to only add live *and* whitelisted RPs to - * the list whitelisted_live_rps. */ - SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(all_live_nodes, node_t *, live_node) { - if (routerset_contains_node(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, live_node)) { - smartlist_add(whitelisted_live_rps, live_node); - } - } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(live_node); - - /* Honor ExcludeNodes */ - if (options->ExcludeNodes) { - routerset_subtract_nodes(whitelisted_live_rps, options->ExcludeNodes); - } - - /* Now pick randomly amongst the whitelisted RPs. No need to waste time - doing bandwidth load balancing, for most use cases - 'whitelisted_live_rps' contains a single OR anyway. */ - rp_node = smartlist_choose(whitelisted_live_rps); - - if (!rp_node) { - log_warn(LD_REND, "Could not find a Rendezvous Point that suits " - "the purposes of Tor2webRendezvousPoints. Choosing random one."); - } - - smartlist_free(whitelisted_live_rps); - smartlist_free(all_live_nodes); - - return rp_node; -} -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ - /* Pick a Rendezvous Point for our HS circuits according to flags. */ static const node_t * pick_rendezvous_node(router_crn_flags_t flags) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* We want to connect directly to the node if we can */ - router_crn_flags_t direct_flags = flags; - direct_flags |= CRN_PREF_ADDR; - direct_flags |= CRN_DIRECT_CONN; - - /* The user wants us to pick specific RPs. */ - if (options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints) { - const node_t *tor2web_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(direct_flags, - options); - if (tor2web_rp) { - return tor2web_rp; - } - } - - /* Else, if no direct, preferred tor2web RP was found, fall back to choosing - * a random direct node */ - const node_t *node = router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, - direct_flags); - /* Return the direct node (if found), or log a message and fall back to an - * indirect connection. */ - if (node) { - return node; - } else { - log_info(LD_REND, - "Unable to find a random rendezvous point that is reachable via " - "a direct connection, falling back to a 3-hop path."); - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags); } diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h index 9f5d99c2a..0c6f2f6ce 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h +++ b/src/core/or/circuitbuild.h @@ -93,14 +93,10 @@ STATIC int onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit_ei, int is_hs_v3_rp_circuit); -#if defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) -enum router_crn_flags_t; -STATIC const node_t *pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node( - enum router_crn_flags_t flags, - const or_options_t *options); +#if defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) unsigned int cpath_get_n_hops(crypt_path_t **head_ptr); -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) || defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ +#endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ #endif /* defined(CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE) */ diff --git a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c index 63cd21540..9ebf618b4 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuitstats.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuitstats.c @@ -113,8 +113,7 @@ get_circuit_build_timeout_ms(void) * 2. If the torrc option LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is false. * 3. If we are a directory authority * 4. If we fail to write circuit build time history to our state file. - * 5. If we are compiled or configured in Tor2web mode - * 6. If we are configured in Single Onion mode + * 5. If we are configured in Single Onion mode */ int circuit_build_times_disabled(const or_options_t *options) @@ -136,7 +135,7 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options, int config_disabled = !options->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout; int dirauth_disabled = authdir_mode(options); int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0; - /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Tor2web/Single Onion Services are + /* LearnCircuitBuildTimeout and Single Onion Services are * incompatible in two ways: * * - LearnCircuitBuildTimeout results in a low CBT, which @@ -148,12 +147,11 @@ circuit_build_times_disabled_(const or_options_t *options, * * If we fix both of these issues someday, we should test * these modes with LearnCircuitBuildTimeout on again. */ - int tor2web_disabled = rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options); int single_onion_disabled = rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection( options); if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled || - state_disabled || tor2web_disabled || single_onion_disabled) { + state_disabled || single_onion_disabled) { #if 0 log_debug(LD_CIRC, "CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. " diff --git a/src/core/or/circuituse.c b/src/core/or/circuituse.c index a3b9eb171..4988a6b62 100644 --- a/src/core/or/circuituse.c +++ b/src/core/or/circuituse.c @@ -863,8 +863,7 @@ static time_t last_expired_clientside_circuits = 0; /** * As a diagnostic for bug 8387, log information about how many one-hop * circuits we have around that have been there for at least age - * seconds. Log a few of them. - * Ignores Single Onion Service intro and Tor2web redezvous circuits, they are + * seconds. Log a few of them. Ignores Single Onion Service intro, it is * expected to be long-term one-hop circuits. */ void @@ -889,10 +888,8 @@ circuit_log_ancient_one_hop_circuits(int age) (circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO || circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED)) continue; - /* Tor2web deliberately makes long term one-hop rend connections, - * particularly when Tor2webRendezvousPoints is used. We only ignore - * active rend point connections, if we take a long time to rendezvous, - * that's worth logging. */ + /* We only ignore active rend point connections, if we take a long time + * to rendezvous, that's worth logging. */ if (rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(options) && circ->purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED) continue; @@ -1999,7 +1996,7 @@ circuit_should_use_vanguards(uint8_t purpose) * Return true for the set of conditions for which it is OK to use * a cannibalized circuit. * - * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or tor2web, or certain purposes. + * Don't cannibalize for onehops, or certain purposes. */ static int circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build, @@ -2008,8 +2005,7 @@ circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(uint8_t purpose_to_build, int need_specific_rp) { - /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit, or - * is a tor2web/special rp. */ + /* Do not try to cannibalize if this is a one hop circuit. */ if (onehop_tunnel || need_specific_rp) { return 0; } @@ -2075,14 +2071,6 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose, return NULL; } - /* If Tor2webRendezvousPoints is enabled and we are dealing with an - RP circuit, we want a specific RP node so we shouldn't canibalize - an already existing circuit. */ - if (get_options()->Tor2webRendezvousPoints && - purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND) { - need_specific_rp = 1; - } - /* If we can/should cannibalize another circuit to build this one, * then do so. */ if (circuit_should_cannibalize_to_build(purpose, @@ -2485,16 +2473,6 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn, else new_circ_purpose = desired_circuit_purpose; -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* If tor2Web is on, then hidden service requests should be one-hop. - */ - if (options->Tor2webMode && - (new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND || - new_circ_purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING)) { - want_onehop = 1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* Determine what kind of a circuit to launch, and actually launch it. */ { int flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY; diff --git a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c index 8e8a5e21c..2ffd40250 100644 --- a/src/core/or/connection_edge.c +++ b/src/core/or/connection_edge.c @@ -1835,18 +1835,6 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(entry_connection_t *conn, return -1; } -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - /* If we're running in Tor2webMode, we don't allow anything BUT .onion - * addresses. */ - if (options->Tor2webMode) { - log_warn(LD_APP, "Refusing to connect to non-hidden-service hostname " - "or IP address %s because tor2web mode is enabled.", - safe_str_client(socks->address)); - connection_mark_unattached_ap(conn, END_STREAM_REASON_ENTRYPOLICY); - return -1; - } -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ - /* socks->address is a non-onion hostname or IP address. * If we can't do any non-onion requests, refuse the connection. * If we have a hostname but can't do DNS, refuse the connection. diff --git a/src/core/or/or.h b/src/core/or/or.h index 6edfd21df..e485b3a40 100644 --- a/src/core/or/or.h +++ b/src/core/or/or.h @@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ struct curve25519_public_key_t; #define cell_t tor_cell_t #endif -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE -#define NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED 1 -#endif - /** Helper macro: Given a pointer to to.base_, of type from*, return &to. */ #define DOWNCAST(to, ptr) ((to*)SUBTYPE_P(ptr, to, base_)) diff --git a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c index a72317618..230fa69a1 100644 --- a/src/feature/dircache/directory.c +++ b/src/feature/dircache/directory.c @@ -803,10 +803,8 @@ directory_choose_address_routerstatus(const routerstatus_t *status, * allowed by the firewall. * * (When Tor uploads and downloads a hidden service descriptor, it uses - * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, except for Tor2Web, which uses DIRIND_ONEHOP. - * So this code will only modify the address for Tor2Web's HS descriptor - * fetches. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, to avoid - * HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.) + * DIRIND_ANONYMOUS. Even Single Onion Servers (NYI) use DIRIND_ANONYMOUS, + * to avoid HSDirs denying service by rejecting descriptors.) */ /* Initialise the OR / Dir addresses */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c index 9f62156eb..0b7d602d9 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendclient.c @@ -449,12 +449,7 @@ directory_get_from_hs_dir(const char *desc_id, char desc_id_base32[REND_DESC_ID_V2_LEN_BASE32 + 1]; char descriptor_cookie_base64[3*REND_DESC_COOKIE_LEN_BASE64]; const rend_data_v2_t *rend_data; -#ifdef ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE - const int tor2web_mode = get_options()->Tor2webMode; - const int how_to_fetch = tor2web_mode ? DIRIND_ONEHOP : DIRIND_ANONYMOUS; -#else const int how_to_fetch = DIRIND_ANONYMOUS; -#endif /* defined(ENABLE_TOR2WEB_MODE) */ tor_assert(desc_id); tor_assert(rend_query); @@ -1226,15 +1221,12 @@ rend_parse_service_authorization(const or_options_t *options, /* Can Tor client code make direct (non-anonymous) connections to introduction * or rendezvous points? - * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED, and is - * configured in Tor2web mode. */ + * Returns true if tor was compiled with NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED. */ int rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t *options) { - /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */ #ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - /* Tor2web */ - return options->Tor2webMode ? 1 : 0; + return 1; #else (void)options; return 0; @@ -1247,9 +1239,7 @@ int rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) { (void)options; - /* Tor2web support needs to be compiled in to a tor binary. */ #ifdef NON_ANONYMOUS_MODE_ENABLED - /* Tor2web */ return 1; #else return 0; diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c index 5bf947744..567cc5c1e 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendcommon.c @@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ rend_auth_decode_cookie(const char *cookie_in, uint8_t *cookie_out, * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. * Prefer rend_client_allow_non_anonymous_connection() or * rend_service_allow_non_anonymous_connection() whenever possible, so that - * checks are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */ + * checks are specific to Single Onion Services. */ int rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) { @@ -996,7 +996,7 @@ rend_allow_non_anonymous_connection(const or_options_t* options) * Onion services can be configured to start in this mode. * Prefer rend_client_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() or * rend_service_non_anonymous_mode_enabled() whenever possible, so that checks - * are specific to Single Onion Services or Tor2web. */ + * are specific to Single Onion Services. */ int rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) { @@ -1007,9 +1007,9 @@ rend_non_anonymous_mode_enabled(const or_options_t *options) /* Make sure that tor only builds one-hop circuits when they would not * compromise user anonymity. * - * One-hop circuits are permitted in Tor2web or Single Onion modes. + * One-hop circuits are permitted in Single Onion modes. * - * Tor2web or Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits. + * Single Onion modes are also allowed to make multi-hop circuits. * For example, single onion HSDir circuits are 3-hop to prevent denial of * service. */ diff --git a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c index 22cd6c343..0fd6516ea 100644 --- a/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c +++ b/src/feature/rend/rendmid.c @@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ rend_mid_establish_rendezvous(or_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *request, } /* Check if we are configured to accept established rendezvous cells from - * client or in other words tor2web clients. */ + * client or in other words Tor2Web clients. */ if (channel_is_client(circ->p_chan) && dos_should_refuse_single_hop_client()) { /* Note it down for the heartbeat log purposes. */ diff --git a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c index 5d696b8b8..de673de54 100644 --- a/src/test/test_channelpadding.c +++ b/src/test/test_channelpadding.c @@ -406,81 +406,12 @@ test_channelpadding_killonehop(void *arg) setup_mock_consensus(); setup_mock_network(); - /* Do we disable padding if tor2webmode or rsos are enabled, and - * the consensus says don't pad? */ - - /* Ensure we can kill tor2web and rsos padding if we want. */ - // First, test that padding works if either is enabled - smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params); - channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); + /* Do we disable padding if rsos is enabled, and the consensus says don't + * pad? */ monotime_coarse_t now; monotime_coarse_get(&now); - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1; - monotime_coarse_add_msec(&client_relay3->next_padding_time, &now, 100); - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED); - tt_assert(client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 0); - - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_ALREADY_SCHEDULED); - - // Wait for the timer - new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC; - monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_coarse_get(&now); - timers_run_pending(); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - - // Then test disabling each via consensus param - smartlist_add(current_md_consensus->net_params, - (void*)"nf_pad_tor2web=0"); - channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); - - // Before the client tries to pad, the relay will still pad: - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - monotime_coarse_add_msec(&relay3_client->next_padding_time, &now, 100); - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0; - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_PADDING_SCHEDULED); - tt_assert(relay3_client->pending_padding_callback); - - // Wait for the timer - new_time += 101*NSEC_PER_MSEC; - monotime_coarse_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_set_mock_time_nsec(new_time); - monotime_coarse_get(&now); - timers_run_pending(); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - - // Test client side (it should stop immediately, but send a negotiate) - tried_to_write_cell = 0; - tt_assert(relay3_client->padding_enabled); - tt_assert(client_relay3->padding_enabled); - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 1; - /* For the relay to receive the negotiate: */ - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - decision = channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(client_relay3); - tt_int_op(decision, OP_EQ, CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD); - tt_int_op(tried_to_write_cell, OP_EQ, 1); - tt_assert(!client_relay3->pending_padding_callback); - tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled); - - // Test relay side (it should have gotten the negotiation to disable) - get_options_mutable()->ORPort_set = 1; - get_options_mutable()->Tor2webMode = 0; - tt_int_op(channelpadding_decide_to_pad_channel(relay3_client), OP_EQ, - CHANNELPADDING_WONTPAD); - tt_assert(!relay3_client->padding_enabled); - - /* Repeat for SOS */ // First, test that padding works if either is enabled smartlist_clear(current_md_consensus->net_params); channelpadding_new_consensus_params(current_md_consensus); diff --git a/src/test/test_hs.c b/src/test/test_hs.c index 135df8e9f..e3599d572 100644 --- a/src/test/test_hs.c +++ b/src/test/test_hs.c @@ -354,76 +354,6 @@ test_hs_desc_event(void *arg) tor_free(received_msg); } -/* Make sure we always pick the right RP, given a well formatted - * Tor2webRendezvousPoints value. */ -static void -test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg) -{ - or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); - const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL; - router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; - int retval, i; - const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "test003r"; - - (void) arg; - - /* Setup fake routerlist. */ - helper_setup_fake_routerlist(); - - /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */ - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new(); - options->UseMicrodescriptors = 0; - retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - tor2web_rendezvous_str, - "test_tor2web_rp"); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0); - - /* Pick rendezvous point. Make sure the correct one is - picked. Repeat many times to make sure it works properly. */ - for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) { - chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options); - tt_assert(chosen_rp); - tt_str_op(chosen_rp->ri->nickname, OP_EQ, tor2web_rendezvous_str); - } - - done: - routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); -} - -/* Make sure we never pick an RP if Tor2webRendezvousPoints doesn't - * correspond to an actual node. */ -static void -test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node(void *arg) -{ - or_options_t *options = get_options_mutable(); - const node_t *chosen_rp = NULL; - router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC; - int retval, i; - const char *tor2web_rendezvous_str = "dummy"; - - (void) arg; - - /* Setup fake routerlist. */ - helper_setup_fake_routerlist(); - - /* Parse Tor2webRendezvousPoints as a routerset. */ - options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints = routerset_new(); - retval = routerset_parse(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints, - tor2web_rendezvous_str, - "test_tor2web_rp"); - tt_int_op(retval, OP_GE, 0); - - /* Pick rendezvous point. Since Tor2webRendezvousPoints was set to a - dummy value, we shouldn't find any eligible RPs. */ - for (i = 0; i < 50 ; i++) { - chosen_rp = pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node(flags, options); - tt_ptr_op(chosen_rp, OP_EQ, NULL); - } - - done: - routerset_free(options->Tor2webRendezvousPoints); -} - /* Make sure rend_data_t is valid at creation, destruction and when * duplicated. */ static void @@ -1046,11 +976,6 @@ struct testcase_t hs_tests[] = { NULL, NULL }, { "hs_desc_event", test_hs_desc_event, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - { "pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node", test_pick_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, - { "pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node", - test_pick_bad_tor2web_rendezvous_node, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, { "hs_auth_cookies", test_hs_auth_cookies, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "single_onion_poisoning_create_dir_none", test_single_onion_poisoning, diff --git a/src/test/test_options.c b/src/test/test_options.c index 396965401..a0efd7d05 100644 --- a/src/test/test_options.c +++ b/src/test/test_options.c @@ -2424,36 +2424,6 @@ test_options_validate__circuits(void *ignored) } static void -test_options_validate__tor2web(void *ignored) -{ - (void)ignored; - int ret; - char *msg; - options_test_data_t *tdata = NULL; - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\n"); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); - tt_str_op(msg, OP_EQ, - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints cannot be set without Tor2webMode."); - tor_free(msg); - - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "Tor2webRendezvousPoints 1\nTor2webMode 1\n"); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tor_free(msg); - - done: - policies_free_all(); - free_options_test_data(tdata); - tor_free(msg); -} - -static void test_options_validate__rend(void *ignored) { (void)ignored; @@ -2566,13 +2536,11 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); free_options_test_data(tdata); - /* Test that SOCKSPort must come with Tor2webMode if - * HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */ + /* Test that SOCKSPort if HiddenServiceSingleHopMode is 1 */ tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "SOCKSPort 5000\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, -1); @@ -2587,7 +2555,6 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) "SOCKSPort 0\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); @@ -2597,27 +2564,13 @@ test_options_validate__single_onion(void *ignored) tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "SOCKSPort 5000\n" "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 0\n" - "Tor2webMode 0\n" - ); - ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); - tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); - tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); - free_options_test_data(tdata); - - tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES - "SOCKSPort 5000\n" - "HiddenServiceSingleHopMode 1\n" - "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" - "Tor2webMode 1\n" ); ret = options_validate(tdata->old_opt, tdata->opt, tdata->def_opt, 0, &msg); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); tt_ptr_op(msg, OP_EQ, NULL); free_options_test_data(tdata); - /* Test that a hidden service can't be run with Tor2web - * Use HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode instead of Tor2webMode, because - * Tor2webMode requires a compilation #define */ + /* Test that a hidden service can't be run in non anonymous mode. */ tdata = get_options_test_data(TEST_OPTIONS_DEFAULT_VALUES "HiddenServiceNonAnonymousMode 1\n" "HiddenServiceDir /Library/Tor/var/lib/tor/hidden_service/\n" @@ -4222,7 +4175,6 @@ struct testcase_t options_tests[] = { LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(path_bias), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(bandwidth), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(circuits), - LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(tor2web), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(rend), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(single_onion), LOCAL_VALIDATE_TEST(accounting),

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