June 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[torspec/master] Fix syntax: measurements is plural
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit ded4213b174e4078010b7683f85098db1a430fd2 Author: juga0 <juga(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon May 28 21:05:24 2018 +0000 Fix syntax: measurements is plural --- bandwidth-file-spec.txt | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/bandwidth-file-spec.txt b/bandwidth-file-spec.txt index 864fffc..c647aee 100644 --- a/bandwidth-file-spec.txt +++ b/bandwidth-file-spec.txt @@ -336,21 +336,21 @@ Every RelayLine in sbws version 0.1.0 consists of: [Zero or one time.] - The number of times that the bandwidth measurement for this relay + The number of times that the bandwidth measurements for this relay failed because of circuit failures. "error_stream=" Int NL [Zero or one time.] - The number of times that the bandwidth measurement for this relay + The number of times that the bandwidth measurements for this relay failed because of stream failures. "error_misc=" Int NL [Zero or one time.] - The number of times that the bandwidth measurement for this relay + The number of times that the bandwidth measurements for this relay failed because of other reasons. 2.4.2. Torflow

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[torspec/master] Add forgotten error_misc
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit 9934884f017ed9b15ec1ef3e31ae262adf1c0bcf Author: juga0 <juga(a)riseup.net> Date: Mon May 28 21:03:43 2018 +0000 Add forgotten error_misc --- bandwidth-file-spec.txt | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/bandwidth-file-spec.txt b/bandwidth-file-spec.txt index 7a82510..864fffc 100644 --- a/bandwidth-file-spec.txt +++ b/bandwidth-file-spec.txt @@ -346,6 +346,13 @@ Every RelayLine in sbws version 0.1.0 consists of: The number of times that the bandwidth measurement for this relay failed because of stream failures. + "error_misc=" Int NL + + [Zero or one time.] + + The number of times that the bandwidth measurement for this relay + failed because of other reasons. + 2.4.2. Torflow Torflow RelayLines include node_id and bw, and other KeyValue pairs [2].

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[tor/master] Make dh_param_* stuff static again.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit 827b85e9070950c524546adb40541c7c6d3dbcb2 Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue May 8 16:25:40 2018 +0200 Make dh_param_* stuff static again. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> --- src/common/crypto_dh.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_dh.c b/src/common/crypto_dh.c index 7e5d4c78d..625a27025 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_dh.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_dh.c @@ -42,11 +42,11 @@ crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh) #define DH_GENERATOR 2 /** Shared P parameter for our circuit-crypto DH key exchanges. */ -BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL; +static BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL; /** Shared P parameter for our TLS DH key exchanges. */ -BIGNUM *dh_param_p_tls = NULL; +static BIGNUM *dh_param_p_tls = NULL; /** Shared G parameter for our DH key exchanges. */ -BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL; +static BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL; /** Validate a given set of Diffie-Hellman parameters. This is moderately * computationally expensive (milliseconds), so should only be called when

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[tor/master] Include crypto_dh.h in order to solve dependency issues.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit ffbf8673b55e0f05bd27e9aa34f45f758941f446 Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue May 8 15:56:04 2018 +0200 Include crypto_dh.h in order to solve dependency issues. Included crypto_dh.h in some files in order to solve DH module dependency issues. Follows #24658. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> --- src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 1 + src/common/include.am | 2 ++ src/common/tortls.c | 1 + src/or/onion_ntor.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 1 + 5 files changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_s2k.c b/src/common/crypto_s2k.c index 8543760ec..47cb62d07 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_s2k.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_s2k.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include "compat.h" #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" #include "crypto_rand.h" #include "crypto_s2k.h" #include "crypto_util.h" diff --git a/src/common/include.am b/src/common/include.am index bce3fa20f..6dafcea20 100644 --- a/src/common/include.am +++ b/src/common/include.am @@ -115,6 +115,7 @@ LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SRC = \ src/common/compress_zlib.c \ src/common/compress_zstd.c \ src/common/crypto.c \ + src/common/crypto_dh.c \ src/common/crypto_digest.c \ src/common/crypto_format.c \ src/common/crypto_openssl_mgt.c \ @@ -169,6 +170,7 @@ COMMONHEADERS = \ src/common/confline.h \ src/common/container.h \ src/common/crypto.h \ + src/common/crypto_dh.h \ src/common/crypto_digest.h \ src/common/crypto_curve25519.h \ src/common/crypto_ed25519.h \ diff --git a/src/common/tortls.c b/src/common/tortls.c index 10b0319be..a85124df2 100644 --- a/src/common/tortls.c +++ b/src/common/tortls.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_rand.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" #include "crypto_util.h" #include "compat.h" diff --git a/src/or/onion_ntor.c b/src/or/onion_ntor.c index 02d43cb72..74403ac7a 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_ntor.c +++ b/src/or/onion_ntor.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ #define ONION_NTOR_PRIVATE #include "crypto.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" #include "crypto_util.h" #include "onion_ntor.h" diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index cd77b2105..e64ad1d4b 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_format.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" #include "tortls.h" #include "torlog.h" #include "container.h"

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[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'ffmancera-1/bug24658-dh_stream'
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit 3640c63498399f85d44358b0d3cfd8a6d62325f4 Merge: 16dd2f7bb d38e7ddf5 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jun 17 20:39:13 2018 -0400 Merge remote-tracking branch 'ffmancera-1/bug24658-dh_stream' src/common/crypto.c | 601 +---------------------------------------------- src/common/crypto.h | 34 --- src/common/crypto_dh.c | 509 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_dh.h | 49 ++++ src/common/crypto_hkdf.c | 112 +++++++++ src/common/crypto_hkdf.h | 28 +++ src/common/crypto_rsa.c | 21 -- src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 1 + src/common/crypto_util.c | 23 ++ src/common/crypto_util.h | 3 + src/common/include.am | 4 + src/common/tortls.c | 1 + src/or/onion_ntor.c | 1 + src/or/or.h | 2 + src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 23 -- 15 files changed, 735 insertions(+), 677 deletions(-) diff --cc src/common/crypto.c index d5b7c9691,072fed792..1c0b9cc82 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@@ -1072,17 -482,10 +482,10 @@@ crypto_global_cleanup(void ERR_free_strings(); #endif - if (dh_param_p) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_p); - if (dh_param_p_tls) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); - if (dh_param_g) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_g); - - dh_param_p = dh_param_p_tls = dh_param_g = NULL; + crypto_dh_free_all(); #ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API ENGINE_cleanup(); #endif #endif

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[tor/master] Add crypto_log_errors() to crypto_util.[ch]
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit 5b7a12d58a9e58d35c0007062377ea308faf1989 Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue May 8 15:40:11 2018 +0200 Add crypto_log_errors() to crypto_util.[ch] crypto_log_errors() has been moved to crypto_util.[ch]. It was duplicated in some files so they have been removed too. Follows #24658. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> --- src/common/crypto.c | 21 --------------------- src/common/crypto_rsa.c | 21 --------------------- src/common/crypto_util.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_util.h | 3 +++ src/tools/tor-gencert.c | 23 ----------------------- 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 052f31723..6518ea9cc 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -86,27 +86,6 @@ static int crypto_early_initialized_ = 0; /** Boolean: has OpenSSL's crypto been initialized? */ static int crypto_global_initialized_ = 0; -/** Log all pending crypto errors at level severity. Use - * doing to describe our current activities. - */ -static void -crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) -{ - unsigned long err; - const char *msg, *lib, *func; - while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { - msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); - lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); - func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); - if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; - if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; - if (!func) func = "(null)"; - if (BUG(!doing)) doing = "(null)"; - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", - doing, msg, lib, func); - } -} - #ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES /** Log any OpenSSL engines we're using at NOTICE. */ static void diff --git a/src/common/crypto_rsa.c b/src/common/crypto_rsa.c index 0a88b0e77..5d44dd67f 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_rsa.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_rsa.c @@ -44,27 +44,6 @@ struct crypto_pk_t RSA *key; /**< The key itself */ }; -/** Log all pending crypto errors at level severity. Use - * doing to describe our current activities. - */ -static void -crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) -{ - unsigned long err; - const char *msg, *lib, *func; - while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { - msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); - lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); - func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); - if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; - if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; - if (!func) func = "(null)"; - if (BUG(!doing)) doing = "(null)"; - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", - doing, msg, lib, func); - } -} - /** Return the number of bytes added by padding method padding. */ int diff --git a/src/common/crypto_util.c b/src/common/crypto_util.c index b0d5b6b2f..1e1e7284e 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_util.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_util.c @@ -27,10 +27,13 @@ DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) +#include <openssl/err.h> #include <openssl/crypto.h> ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) +#include "torlog.h" + /** * Destroy the sz bytes of data stored at mem, setting them to * the value byte. @@ -103,5 +106,22 @@ memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) memset(mem, byte, sz); } +void +crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) +{ + unsigned long err; + const char *msg, *lib, *func; + while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { + msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); + lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); + func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); + if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; + if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; + if (!func) func = "(null)"; + if (BUG(!doing)) doing = "(null)"; + tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", + doing, msg, lib, func); + } +} #endif /* !defined(CRYPTO_UTIL_PRIVATE) */ diff --git a/src/common/crypto_util.h b/src/common/crypto_util.h index 922942b37..31af52bff 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_util.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_util.h @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ /** OpenSSL-based utility functions. */ void memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz); +/** Log utility function */ +void crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing); + #ifdef CRYPTO_UTIL_PRIVATE #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS #endif /* defined(TOR_UNIT_TESTS) */ diff --git a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c index aafefdad7..ff3ce517e 100644 --- a/src/tools/tor-gencert.c +++ b/src/tools/tor-gencert.c @@ -78,29 +78,6 @@ show_help(void) "[--passphrase-fd <fd>]\n"); } -/* XXXX copied from crypto.c */ -static void -crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) -{ - unsigned long err; - const char *msg, *lib, *func; - while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) { - msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err); - lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err); - func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err); - if (!msg) msg = "(null)"; - if (!lib) lib = "(null)"; - if (!func) func = "(null)"; - if (doing) { - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)", - doing, msg, lib, func); - } else { - tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error: %s (in %s:%s)", - msg, lib, func); - } - } -} - /** Read the passphrase from the passphrase fd. */ static int load_passphrase(void)

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[tor/master] Refactor crypto.[ch] into smaller DH module.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit f91469c16555836f91691be8adc9c29bb33dfc3f Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> Date: Tue May 8 15:51:39 2018 +0200 Refactor crypto.[ch] into smaller DH module. Add two new files (crypto_dh.c, crypto_dh.h) as new module of crypto.[ch]. This new module includes all functions and dependencies related to DH operations. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch]. Follows #24658. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> --- src/common/crypto.c | 580 +---------------------------------------------- src/common/crypto.h | 34 --- src/common/crypto_dh.c | 605 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_dh.h | 58 +++++ 4 files changed, 665 insertions(+), 612 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.c b/src/common/crypto.c index 6518ea9cc..072fed792 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.c +++ b/src/common/crypto.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_curve25519.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" #include "crypto_ed25519.h" #include "crypto_format.h" #include "crypto_rand.h" @@ -72,14 +73,6 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) #include "keccak-tiny/keccak-tiny.h" -/** A structure to hold the first half (x, g^x) of a Diffie-Hellman handshake - * while we're waiting for the second.*/ -struct crypto_dh_t { - DH *dh; /**< The openssl DH object */ -}; - -static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn); - /** Boolean: has OpenSSL's crypto been initialized? */ static int crypto_early_initialized_ = 0; @@ -285,14 +278,6 @@ crypto_thread_cleanup(void) #endif } -/** Used by tortls.c: Get the DH* from a crypto_dh_t. - */ -DH * -crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh) -{ - return dh->dh; -} - /** Allocate and return a new symmetric cipher using the provided key and iv. * The key is bits bits long; the IV is CIPHER_IV_LEN bytes. Both * must be provided. Key length must be 128, 192, or 256 */ @@ -480,560 +465,6 @@ crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(const char *key, return (int)(fromlen - CIPHER_IV_LEN); } -/* DH */ - -/** Our DH 'g' parameter */ -#define DH_GENERATOR 2 - -/** Shared P parameter for our circuit-crypto DH key exchanges. */ -static BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL; -/** Shared P parameter for our TLS DH key exchanges. */ -static BIGNUM *dh_param_p_tls = NULL; -/** Shared G parameter for our DH key exchanges. */ -static BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL; - -/** Validate a given set of Diffie-Hellman parameters. This is moderately - * computationally expensive (milliseconds), so should only be called when - * the DH parameters change. Returns 0 on success, * -1 on failure. - */ -static int -crypto_validate_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g) -{ - DH *dh = NULL; - int ret = -1; - - /* Copy into a temporary DH object, just so that DH_check() can be called. */ - if (!(dh = DH_new())) - goto out; -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; - if (!(dh_p = BN_dup(p))) - goto out; - if (!(dh_g = BN_dup(g))) - goto out; - if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) - goto out; -#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ - if (!(dh->p = BN_dup(p))) - goto out; - if (!(dh->g = BN_dup(g))) - goto out; -#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - - /* Perform the validation. */ - int codes = 0; - if (!DH_check(dh, &codes)) - goto out; - if (BN_is_word(g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) { - /* Per https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Diffie-Hellman_parameters - * - * OpenSSL checks the prime is congruent to 11 when g = 2; while the - * IETF's primes are congruent to 23 when g = 2. - */ - BN_ULONG residue = BN_mod_word(p, 24); - if (residue == 11 || residue == 23) - codes &= ~DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; - } - if (codes != 0) /* Specifics on why the params suck is irrelevant. */ - goto out; - - /* Things are probably not evil. */ - ret = 0; - - out: - if (dh) - DH_free(dh); - return ret; -} - -/** Set the global Diffie-Hellman generator, used for both TLS and internal - * DH stuff. - */ -static void -crypto_set_dh_generator(void) -{ - BIGNUM *generator; - int r; - - if (dh_param_g) - return; - - generator = BN_new(); - tor_assert(generator); - - r = BN_set_word(generator, DH_GENERATOR); - tor_assert(r); - - dh_param_g = generator; -} - -/** Set the global TLS Diffie-Hellman modulus. Use the Apache mod_ssl DH - * modulus. */ -void -crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void) -{ - BIGNUM *tls_prime = NULL; - int r; - - /* If the space is occupied, free the previous TLS DH prime */ - if (BUG(dh_param_p_tls)) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START - * - * We shouldn't be calling this twice. - */ - BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); - dh_param_p_tls = NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } - - tls_prime = BN_new(); - tor_assert(tls_prime); - - /* This is the 1024-bit safe prime that Apache uses for its DH stuff; see - * modules/ssl/ssl_engine_dh.c; Apache also uses a generator of 2 with this - * prime. - */ - r = BN_hex2bn(&tls_prime, - "D67DE440CBBBDC1936D693D34AFD0AD50C84D239A45F520BB88174CB98" - "BCE951849F912E639C72FB13B4B4D7177E16D55AC179BA420B2A29FE324A" - "467A635E81FF5901377BEDDCFD33168A461AAD3B72DAE8860078045B07A7" - "DBCA7874087D1510EA9FCC9DDD330507DD62DB88AEAA747DE0F4D6E2BD68" - "B0E7393E0F24218EB3"); - tor_assert(r); - - tor_assert(tls_prime); - - dh_param_p_tls = tls_prime; - crypto_set_dh_generator(); - tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p_tls, dh_param_g)); -} - -/** Initialize dh_param_p and dh_param_g if they are not already - * set. */ -static void -init_dh_param(void) -{ - BIGNUM *circuit_dh_prime; - int r; - if (BUG(dh_param_p && dh_param_g)) - return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE This function isn't supposed to be called twice. - - circuit_dh_prime = BN_new(); - tor_assert(circuit_dh_prime); - - /* This is from rfc2409, section 6.2. It's a safe prime, and - supposedly it equals: - 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }. - */ - r = BN_hex2bn(&circuit_dh_prime, - "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" - "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" - "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" - "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" - "49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"); - tor_assert(r); - - /* Set the new values as the global DH parameters. */ - dh_param_p = circuit_dh_prime; - crypto_set_dh_generator(); - tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p, dh_param_g)); - - if (!dh_param_p_tls) { - crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(); - } -} - -/** Number of bits to use when choosing the x or y value in a Diffie-Hellman - * handshake. Since we exponentiate by this value, choosing a smaller one - * lets our handhake go faster. - */ -#define DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS 320 - -/** Allocate and return a new DH object for a key exchange. Returns NULL on - * failure. - */ -crypto_dh_t * -crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) -{ - crypto_dh_t *res = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t)); - - tor_assert(dh_type == DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT || dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS || - dh_type == DH_TYPE_REND); - - if (!dh_param_p) - init_dh_param(); - - if (!(res->dh = DH_new())) - goto err; - -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; - - if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { - dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls); - } else { - dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p); - } - if (!dh_p) - goto err; - - dh_g = BN_dup(dh_param_g); - if (!dh_g) { - BN_free(dh_p); - goto err; - } - - if (!DH_set0_pqg(res->dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) { - goto err; - } - - if (!DH_set_length(res->dh, DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS)) - goto err; -#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ - if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { - if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls))) - goto err; - } else { - if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p))) - goto err; - } - - if (!(res->dh->g = BN_dup(dh_param_g))) - goto err; - - res->dh->length = DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS; -#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - - return res; - - /* LCOV_EXCL_START - * This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */ - err: - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object"); - if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */ - tor_free(res); - return NULL; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ -} - -/** Return a copy of dh, sharing its internal state. */ -crypto_dh_t * -crypto_dh_dup(const crypto_dh_t *dh) -{ - crypto_dh_t *dh_new = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t)); - tor_assert(dh); - tor_assert(dh->dh); - dh_new->dh = dh->dh; - DH_up_ref(dh->dh); - return dh_new; -} - -/** Return the length of the DH key in dh, in bytes. - */ -int -crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh) -{ - tor_assert(dh); - return DH_size(dh->dh); -} - -/** Generate \<x,g^x\> for our part of the key exchange. Return 0 on - * success, -1 on failure. - */ -int -crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) -{ -#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API - again: -#endif - if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START - * To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */ - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key"); - return -1; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - /* OpenSSL 1.1.x doesn't appear to let you regenerate a DH key, without - * recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness - * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure. - */ - const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; - DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key); - if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" - "the-universe chances really do happen. Treating as a failure."); - return -1; - } -#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ - if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) { - /* LCOV_EXCL_START - * If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */ - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" - "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again."); - /* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */ - BN_clear_free(dh->dh->pub_key); - BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key); - dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL; - goto again; - /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ - } -#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - return 0; -} - -/** Generate g^x as necessary, and write the g^x for the key exchange - * as a pubkey_len-byte value into pubkey. Return 0 on - * success, -1 on failure. pubkey_len must be \>= DH_BYTES. - */ -int -crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) -{ - int bytes; - tor_assert(dh); - - const BIGNUM *dh_pub; - -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - const BIGNUM *dh_priv; - DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); -#else - dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; -#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ - - if (!dh_pub) { - if (crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) - return -1; - else { -#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API - DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); -#else - dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; -#endif - } - } - - tor_assert(dh_pub); - bytes = BN_num_bytes(dh_pub); - tor_assert(bytes >= 0); - if (pubkey_len < (size_t)bytes) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, - "Weird! pubkey_len (%d) was smaller than DH_BYTES (%d)", - (int) pubkey_len, bytes); - return -1; - } - - memset(pubkey, 0, pubkey_len); - BN_bn2bin(dh_pub, (unsigned char*)(pubkey+(pubkey_len-bytes))); - - return 0; -} - -/** Check for bad Diffie-Hellman public keys (g^x). Return 0 if the key is - * okay (in the subgroup [2,p-2]), or -1 if it's bad. - * See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips. - */ -static int -tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn) -{ - BIGNUM *x; - char *s; - tor_assert(bn); - x = BN_new(); - tor_assert(x); - if (BUG(!dh_param_p)) - init_dh_param(); //LCOV_EXCL_LINE we already checked whether we did this. - BN_set_word(x, 1); - if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) { - log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2."); - goto err; - } - BN_copy(x,dh_param_p); - BN_sub_word(x, 1); - if (BN_cmp(bn,x)>=0) { - log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2."); - goto err; - } - BN_clear_free(x); - return 0; - err: - BN_clear_free(x); - s = BN_bn2hex(bn); - log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s); - OPENSSL_free(s); - return -1; -} - -/** Given a DH key exchange object, and our peer's value of g^y (as a - * pubkey_len-byte value in pubkey) generate - * secret_bytes_out bytes of shared key material and write them - * to secret_out. Return the number of bytes generated on success, - * or -1 on failure. - * - * (We generate key material by computing - * SHA1( g^xy || "\x00" ) || SHA1( g^xy || "\x01" ) || ... - * where || is concatenation.) - */ -ssize_t -crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, - const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, - char *secret_out, size_t secret_bytes_out) -{ - char *secret_tmp = NULL; - BIGNUM *pubkey_bn = NULL; - size_t secret_len=0, secret_tmp_len=0; - int result=0; - tor_assert(dh); - tor_assert(secret_bytes_out/DIGEST_LEN <= 255); - tor_assert(pubkey_len < INT_MAX); - - if (!(pubkey_bn = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char*)pubkey, - (int)pubkey_len, NULL))) - goto error; - if (tor_check_dh_key(severity, pubkey_bn)<0) { - /* Check for invalid public keys. */ - log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x"); - goto error; - } - secret_tmp_len = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh); - secret_tmp = tor_malloc(secret_tmp_len); - result = DH_compute_key((unsigned char*)secret_tmp, pubkey_bn, dh->dh); - if (result < 0) { - log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"DH_compute_key() failed."); - goto error; - } - secret_len = result; - if (crypto_expand_key_material_TAP((uint8_t*)secret_tmp, secret_len, - (uint8_t*)secret_out, secret_bytes_out)<0) - goto error; - secret_len = secret_bytes_out; - - goto done; - error: - result = -1; - done: - crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "completing DH handshake"); - if (pubkey_bn) - BN_clear_free(pubkey_bn); - if (secret_tmp) { - memwipe(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); - tor_free(secret_tmp); - } - if (result < 0) - return result; - else - return secret_len; -} - -/** Given key_in_len bytes of negotiated randomness in key_in - * ("K"), expand it into key_out_len bytes of negotiated key material in - * key_out by taking the first key_out_len bytes of - * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | .... - * - * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension - * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols. - * - * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -int -crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) -{ - int i, r = -1; - uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); - uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - - /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ - tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256); - - memcpy(tmp, key_in, key_in_len); - for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len; - ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) { - tmp[key_in_len] = i; - if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1) < 0) - goto exit; - memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); - } - - r = 0; - exit: - memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); - tor_free(tmp); - memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); - return r; -} - -/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the - * underlying hash. The key_in_len bytes at key_in are the - * secret key material; the salt_in_len bytes at salt_in and the - * info_in_len bytes in info_in_len are the algorithm's "salt" - * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write key_out_len - * bytes to key_out and return 0. Assert on failure. - */ -int -crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( - const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, - const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) -{ - uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN]; - uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1]; - uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; - int i; - uint8_t *outp; - size_t tmp_len; - - crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk, - (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len, - (const char*)key_in, key_in_len); - - /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ - tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256); - tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128); - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - outp = key_out; - i = 1; - - while (key_out_len) { - size_t n; - if (i > 1) { - memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN); - memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len); - tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i; - tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1; - } else { - memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len); - tmp[info_in_len] = i; - tmp_len = info_in_len + 1; - } - crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac, - (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN, - (const char*)tmp, tmp_len); - n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN; - memcpy(outp, mac, n); - key_out_len -= n; - outp += n; - ++i; - } - - memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac)); - return 0; -} - -/** Free a DH key exchange object. - */ -void -crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh) -{ - if (!dh) - return; - tor_assert(dh->dh); - DH_free(dh->dh); - tor_free(dh); -} - /** @{ */ /** Uninitialize the crypto library. Return 0 on success. Does not detect * failure. @@ -1051,14 +482,7 @@ crypto_global_cleanup(void) ERR_free_strings(); #endif - if (dh_param_p) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_p); - if (dh_param_p_tls) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); - if (dh_param_g) - BN_clear_free(dh_param_g); - - dh_param_p = dh_param_p_tls = dh_param_g = NULL; + crypto_dh_free_all(); #ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < OPENSSL_V_SERIES(1,1,0) diff --git a/src/common/crypto.h b/src/common/crypto.h index c77355731..3de363bdf 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto.h +++ b/src/common/crypto.h @@ -27,15 +27,12 @@ #define CIPHER_IV_LEN 16 /** Length of our symmetric cipher's keys of 256-bit. */ #define CIPHER256_KEY_LEN 32 -/** Length of our DH keys. */ -#define DH_BYTES (1024/8) /** Length of encoded public key fingerprints, including space; but not * including terminating NUL. */ #define FINGERPRINT_LEN 49 typedef struct aes_cnt_cipher crypto_cipher_t; -typedef struct crypto_dh_t crypto_dh_t; /* global state */ int crypto_init_siphash_key(void); @@ -51,7 +48,6 @@ void crypto_thread_cleanup(void); int crypto_global_cleanup(void); /* environment setup */ -void crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void); crypto_cipher_t *crypto_cipher_new(const char *key); crypto_cipher_t *crypto_cipher_new_with_bits(const char *key, int bits); crypto_cipher_t *crypto_cipher_new_with_iv(const char *key, const char *iv); @@ -78,36 +74,6 @@ int crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(const char *key, char *to, size_t tolen, const char *from, size_t fromlen); -/* Key negotiation */ -#define DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT 1 -#define DH_TYPE_REND 2 -#define DH_TYPE_TLS 3 -crypto_dh_t *crypto_dh_new(int dh_type); -crypto_dh_t *crypto_dh_dup(const crypto_dh_t *dh); -int crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh); -int crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh); -int crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey_out, - size_t pubkey_out_len); -ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, - const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, - char *secret_out, size_t secret_out_len); -void crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh); -#define crypto_dh_free(dh) FREE_AND_NULL(crypto_dh_t, crypto_dh_free_, (dh)) - -int crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, - size_t key_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); -int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( - const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, - const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); - -/* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the - * unit tests. */ -struct dh_st; -struct dh_st *crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh); - void crypto_add_spaces_to_fp(char *out, size_t outlen, const char *in); #endif /* !defined(TOR_CRYPTO_H) */ diff --git a/src/common/crypto_dh.c b/src/common/crypto_dh.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7e5d4c78d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/crypto_dh.c @@ -0,0 +1,605 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file crypto_dh.c + * \brief Block of functions related with DH utilities and operations. + **/ + +#include "compat_openssl.h" +#include "crypto_dh.h" +#include "crypto_digest.h" +#include "crypto_util.h" + +DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include <openssl/dh.h> + +ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) + +#include "torlog.h" + +/** A structure to hold the first half (x, g^x) of a Diffie-Hellman handshake + * while we're waiting for the second.*/ +struct crypto_dh_t { + DH *dh; /**< The openssl DH object */ +}; + +static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn); + +/** Used by tortls.c: Get the DH* from a crypto_dh_t. + */ +DH * +crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh) +{ + return dh->dh; +} + +/** Our DH 'g' parameter */ +#define DH_GENERATOR 2 + +/** Shared P parameter for our circuit-crypto DH key exchanges. */ +BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL; +/** Shared P parameter for our TLS DH key exchanges. */ +BIGNUM *dh_param_p_tls = NULL; +/** Shared G parameter for our DH key exchanges. */ +BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL; + +/** Validate a given set of Diffie-Hellman parameters. This is moderately + * computationally expensive (milliseconds), so should only be called when + * the DH parameters change. Returns 0 on success, * -1 on failure. + */ +static int +crypto_validate_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g) +{ + DH *dh = NULL; + int ret = -1; + + /* Copy into a temporary DH object, just so that DH_check() can be called. */ + if (!(dh = DH_new())) + goto out; +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g; + if (!(dh_p = BN_dup(p))) + goto out; + if (!(dh_g = BN_dup(g))) + goto out; + if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) + goto out; +#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ + if (!(dh->p = BN_dup(p))) + goto out; + if (!(dh->g = BN_dup(g))) + goto out; +#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + + /* Perform the validation. */ + int codes = 0; + if (!DH_check(dh, &codes)) + goto out; + if (BN_is_word(g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) { + /* Per https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Diffie-Hellman_parameters + * + * OpenSSL checks the prime is congruent to 11 when g = 2; while the + * IETF's primes are congruent to 23 when g = 2. + */ + BN_ULONG residue = BN_mod_word(p, 24); + if (residue == 11 || residue == 23) + codes &= ~DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR; + } + if (codes != 0) /* Specifics on why the params suck is irrelevant. */ + goto out; + + /* Things are probably not evil. */ + ret = 0; + + out: + if (dh) + DH_free(dh); + return ret; +} + +/** Set the global Diffie-Hellman generator, used for both TLS and internal + * DH stuff. + */ +static void +crypto_set_dh_generator(void) +{ + BIGNUM *generator; + int r; + + if (dh_param_g) + return; + + generator = BN_new(); + tor_assert(generator); + + r = BN_set_word(generator, DH_GENERATOR); + tor_assert(r); + + dh_param_g = generator; +} + +/** Set the global TLS Diffie-Hellman modulus. Use the Apache mod_ssl DH + * modulus. */ +void +crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void) +{ + BIGNUM *tls_prime = NULL; + int r; + + /* If the space is occupied, free the previous TLS DH prime */ + if (BUG(dh_param_p_tls)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * + * We shouldn't be calling this twice. + */ + BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); + dh_param_p_tls = NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + } + + tls_prime = BN_new(); + tor_assert(tls_prime); + + /* This is the 1024-bit safe prime that Apache uses for its DH stuff; see + * modules/ssl/ssl_engine_dh.c; Apache also uses a generator of 2 with this + * prime. + */ + r = BN_hex2bn(&tls_prime, + "D67DE440CBBBDC1936D693D34AFD0AD50C84D239A45F520BB88174CB98" + "BCE951849F912E639C72FB13B4B4D7177E16D55AC179BA420B2A29FE324A" + "467A635E81FF5901377BEDDCFD33168A461AAD3B72DAE8860078045B07A7" + "DBCA7874087D1510EA9FCC9DDD330507DD62DB88AEAA747DE0F4D6E2BD68" + "B0E7393E0F24218EB3"); + tor_assert(r); + + tor_assert(tls_prime); + + dh_param_p_tls = tls_prime; + crypto_set_dh_generator(); + tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p_tls, dh_param_g)); +} + +/** Initialize dh_param_p and dh_param_g if they are not already + * set. */ +static void +init_dh_param(void) +{ + BIGNUM *circuit_dh_prime; + int r; + if (BUG(dh_param_p && dh_param_g)) + return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE This function isn't supposed to be called twice. + + circuit_dh_prime = BN_new(); + tor_assert(circuit_dh_prime); + + /* This is from rfc2409, section 6.2. It's a safe prime, and + supposedly it equals: + 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }. + */ + r = BN_hex2bn(&circuit_dh_prime, + "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08" + "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B" + "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9" + "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6" + "49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF"); + tor_assert(r); + + /* Set the new values as the global DH parameters. */ + dh_param_p = circuit_dh_prime; + crypto_set_dh_generator(); + tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p, dh_param_g)); + + if (!dh_param_p_tls) { + crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(); + } +} + +/** Number of bits to use when choosing the x or y value in a Diffie-Hellman + * handshake. Since we exponentiate by this value, choosing a smaller one + * lets our handhake go faster. + */ +#define DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS 320 + +/** Allocate and return a new DH object for a key exchange. Returns NULL on + * failure. + */ +crypto_dh_t * +crypto_dh_new(int dh_type) +{ + crypto_dh_t *res = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t)); + + tor_assert(dh_type == DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT || dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS || + dh_type == DH_TYPE_REND); + + if (!dh_param_p) + init_dh_param(); + + if (!(res->dh = DH_new())) + goto err; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL; + + if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { + dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls); + } else { + dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p); + } + if (!dh_p) + goto err; + + dh_g = BN_dup(dh_param_g); + if (!dh_g) { + BN_free(dh_p); + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set0_pqg(res->dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) { + goto err; + } + + if (!DH_set_length(res->dh, DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS)) + goto err; +#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ + if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) { + if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls))) + goto err; + } else { + if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p))) + goto err; + } + + if (!(res->dh->g = BN_dup(dh_param_g))) + goto err; + + res->dh->length = DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS; +#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + + return res; + + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */ + err: + crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object"); + if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */ + tor_free(res); + return NULL; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ +} + +/** Return a copy of dh, sharing its internal state. */ +crypto_dh_t * +crypto_dh_dup(const crypto_dh_t *dh) +{ + crypto_dh_t *dh_new = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t)); + tor_assert(dh); + tor_assert(dh->dh); + dh_new->dh = dh->dh; + DH_up_ref(dh->dh); + return dh_new; +} + +/** Return the length of the DH key in dh, in bytes. + */ +int +crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh) +{ + tor_assert(dh); + return DH_size(dh->dh); +} + +/** Generate \<x,g^x\> for our part of the key exchange. Return 0 on + * success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh) +{ +#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API + again: +#endif + if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */ + crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key"); + return -1; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + } +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + /* OpenSSL 1.1.x doesn't appear to let you regenerate a DH key, without + * recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness + * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure. + */ + const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key; + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key); + if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" + "the-universe chances really do happen. Treating as a failure."); + return -1; + } +#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */ + if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) { + /* LCOV_EXCL_START + * If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */ + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-" + "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again."); + /* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */ + BN_clear_free(dh->dh->pub_key); + BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key); + dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL; + goto again; + /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */ + } +#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + return 0; +} + +/** Generate g^x as necessary, and write the g^x for the key exchange + * as a pubkey_len-byte value into pubkey. Return 0 on + * success, -1 on failure. pubkey_len must be \>= DH_BYTES. + */ +int +crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len) +{ + int bytes; + tor_assert(dh); + + const BIGNUM *dh_pub; + +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + const BIGNUM *dh_priv; + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); +#else + dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; +#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */ + + if (!dh_pub) { + if (crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0) + return -1; + else { +#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API + DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv); +#else + dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key; +#endif + } + } + + tor_assert(dh_pub); + bytes = BN_num_bytes(dh_pub); + tor_assert(bytes >= 0); + if (pubkey_len < (size_t)bytes) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, + "Weird! pubkey_len (%d) was smaller than DH_BYTES (%d)", + (int) pubkey_len, bytes); + return -1; + } + + memset(pubkey, 0, pubkey_len); + BN_bn2bin(dh_pub, (unsigned char*)(pubkey+(pubkey_len-bytes))); + + return 0; +} + +/** Check for bad Diffie-Hellman public keys (g^x). Return 0 if the key is + * okay (in the subgroup [2,p-2]), or -1 if it's bad. + * See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips. + */ +static int +tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn) +{ + BIGNUM *x; + char *s; + tor_assert(bn); + x = BN_new(); + tor_assert(x); + if (BUG(!dh_param_p)) + init_dh_param(); //LCOV_EXCL_LINE we already checked whether we did this. + BN_set_word(x, 1); + if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) { + log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2."); + goto err; + } + BN_copy(x,dh_param_p); + BN_sub_word(x, 1); + if (BN_cmp(bn,x)>=0) { + log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2."); + goto err; + } + BN_clear_free(x); + return 0; + err: + BN_clear_free(x); + s = BN_bn2hex(bn); + log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s); + OPENSSL_free(s); + return -1; +} + +/** Given a DH key exchange object, and our peer's value of g^y (as a + * pubkey_len-byte value in pubkey) generate + * secret_bytes_out bytes of shared key material and write them + * to secret_out. Return the number of bytes generated on success, + * or -1 on failure. + * + * (We generate key material by computing + * SHA1( g^xy || "\x00" ) || SHA1( g^xy || "\x01" ) || ... + * where || is concatenation.) + */ +ssize_t +crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, + const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, + char *secret_out, size_t secret_bytes_out) +{ + char *secret_tmp = NULL; + BIGNUM *pubkey_bn = NULL; + size_t secret_len=0, secret_tmp_len=0; + int result=0; + tor_assert(dh); + tor_assert(secret_bytes_out/DIGEST_LEN <= 255); + tor_assert(pubkey_len < INT_MAX); + + if (!(pubkey_bn = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char*)pubkey, + (int)pubkey_len, NULL))) + goto error; + if (tor_check_dh_key(severity, pubkey_bn)<0) { + /* Check for invalid public keys. */ + log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x"); + goto error; + } + secret_tmp_len = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh); + secret_tmp = tor_malloc(secret_tmp_len); + result = DH_compute_key((unsigned char*)secret_tmp, pubkey_bn, dh->dh); + if (result < 0) { + log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"DH_compute_key() failed."); + goto error; + } + secret_len = result; + if (crypto_expand_key_material_TAP((uint8_t*)secret_tmp, secret_len, + (uint8_t*)secret_out, secret_bytes_out)<0) + goto error; + secret_len = secret_bytes_out; + + goto done; + error: + result = -1; + done: + crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "completing DH handshake"); + if (pubkey_bn) + BN_clear_free(pubkey_bn); + if (secret_tmp) { + memwipe(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len); + tor_free(secret_tmp); + } + if (result < 0) + return result; + else + return secret_len; +} + +/** Free a DH key exchange object. + */ +void +crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh) +{ + if (!dh) + return; + tor_assert(dh->dh); + DH_free(dh->dh); + tor_free(dh); +} + +/** Given key_in_len bytes of negotiated randomness in key_in + * ("K"), expand it into key_out_len bytes of negotiated key material in + * key_out by taking the first key_out_len bytes of + * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | .... + * + * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension + * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols. + * + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + int i, r = -1; + uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); + uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ + tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256); + + memcpy(tmp, key_in, key_in_len); + for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len; + ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) { + tmp[key_in_len] = i; + if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1) < 0) + goto exit; + memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); + } + + r = 0; + exit: + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + tor_free(tmp); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + return r; +} + +/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the + * underlying hash. The key_in_len bytes at key_in are the + * secret key material; the salt_in_len bytes at salt_in and the + * info_in_len bytes in info_in_len are the algorithm's "salt" + * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write key_out_len + * bytes to key_out and return 0. Assert on failure. + */ +int +crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN]; + uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1]; + uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + int i; + uint8_t *outp; + size_t tmp_len; + + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk, + (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len, + (const char*)key_in, key_in_len); + + /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ + tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256); + tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128); + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + outp = key_out; + i = 1; + + while (key_out_len) { + size_t n; + if (i > 1) { + memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN); + memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1; + } else { + memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = info_in_len + 1; + } + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac, + (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN, + (const char*)tmp, tmp_len); + n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN; + memcpy(outp, mac, n); + key_out_len -= n; + outp += n; + ++i; + } + + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac)); + return 0; +} + +void +crypto_dh_free_all(void) +{ + if (dh_param_p) + BN_clear_free(dh_param_p); + if (dh_param_p_tls) + BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls); + if (dh_param_g) + BN_clear_free(dh_param_g); + + dh_param_p = dh_param_p_tls = dh_param_g = NULL; +} + diff --git a/src/common/crypto_dh.h b/src/common/crypto_dh.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7c78d8c90 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/crypto_dh.h @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file crypto_dh.h + * + * \brief Headers for crypto_dh.c + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CRYPTO_DH_H +#define TOR_CRYPTO_DH_H + +#include "util.h" + +/** Length of our DH keys. */ +#define DH_BYTES (1024/8) + +typedef struct crypto_dh_t crypto_dh_t; + +/* Key negotiation */ +#define DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT 1 +#define DH_TYPE_REND 2 +#define DH_TYPE_TLS 3 +void crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void); +crypto_dh_t *crypto_dh_new(int dh_type); +crypto_dh_t *crypto_dh_dup(const crypto_dh_t *dh); +int crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh); +int crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh); +int crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey_out, + size_t pubkey_out_len); +ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, + const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len, + char *secret_out, size_t secret_out_len); +void crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh); +#define crypto_dh_free(dh) FREE_AND_NULL(crypto_dh_t, crypto_dh_free_, (dh)) + +int crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, + size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); +int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); + +/* Crypto DH free */ +void crypto_dh_free_all(void); + +/* Prototypes for private functions only used by tortls.c, crypto.c, and the + * unit tests. */ +struct dh_st; +struct dh_st *crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CRYPTO_DH_H) */ +

1 0

[tor/master] Refactor crypto.[ch] into smaller HKDF module.
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit d38e7ddf5b930ae7e4d3a5da63cfc32d92a8dfa7 Author: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> Date: Fri May 18 10:47:35 2018 +0200 Refactor crypto.[ch] into smaller HKDF module. Add two new files (crypto_hkdf.c, crypto_hkdf.h) as new module of crypto.[ch]. This new module includes all functions and dependencies related to HKDF operations. Those have been removed from crypto.[ch]. Follows #24658. Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera(a)riseup.net> --- src/common/crypto_dh.c | 98 +---------------------------------------- src/common/crypto_dh.h | 9 ---- src/common/crypto_hkdf.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_hkdf.h | 28 ++++++++++++ src/common/crypto_s2k.c | 2 +- src/common/crypto_util.c | 3 ++ src/common/include.am | 2 + src/or/onion_ntor.c | 2 +- src/or/or.h | 1 + 9 files changed, 149 insertions(+), 108 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/crypto_dh.c b/src/common/crypto_dh.c index 625a27025..09e6ca506 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_dh.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_dh.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include "compat_openssl.h" #include "crypto_dh.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" +#include "crypto_hkdf.h" #include "crypto_util.h" DISABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls) @@ -493,103 +494,6 @@ crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh) tor_free(dh); } -/** Given key_in_len bytes of negotiated randomness in key_in - * ("K"), expand it into key_out_len bytes of negotiated key material in - * key_out by taking the first key_out_len bytes of - * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | .... - * - * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension - * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols. - * - * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. - */ -int -crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) -{ - int i, r = -1; - uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); - uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; - - /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ - tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256); - - memcpy(tmp, key_in, key_in_len); - for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len; - ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) { - tmp[key_in_len] = i; - if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1) < 0) - goto exit; - memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); - } - - r = 0; - exit: - memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); - tor_free(tmp); - memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); - return r; -} - -/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the - * underlying hash. The key_in_len bytes at key_in are the - * secret key material; the salt_in_len bytes at salt_in and the - * info_in_len bytes in info_in_len are the algorithm's "salt" - * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write key_out_len - * bytes to key_out and return 0. Assert on failure. - */ -int -crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( - const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, - const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) -{ - uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN]; - uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1]; - uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; - int i; - uint8_t *outp; - size_t tmp_len; - - crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk, - (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len, - (const char*)key_in, key_in_len); - - /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ - tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256); - tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128); - memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - outp = key_out; - i = 1; - - while (key_out_len) { - size_t n; - if (i > 1) { - memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN); - memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len); - tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i; - tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1; - } else { - memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len); - tmp[info_in_len] = i; - tmp_len = info_in_len + 1; - } - crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac, - (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN, - (const char*)tmp, tmp_len); - n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN; - memcpy(outp, mac, n); - key_out_len -= n; - outp += n; - ++i; - } - - memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); - memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac)); - return 0; -} - void crypto_dh_free_all(void) { diff --git a/src/common/crypto_dh.h b/src/common/crypto_dh.h index 7c78d8c90..111c199fa 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_dh.h +++ b/src/common/crypto_dh.h @@ -37,15 +37,6 @@ ssize_t crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh, void crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh); #define crypto_dh_free(dh) FREE_AND_NULL(crypto_dh_t, crypto_dh_free_, (dh)) -int crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, - size_t key_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); -int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( - const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, - const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, - const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, - uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); - /* Crypto DH free */ void crypto_dh_free_all(void); diff --git a/src/common/crypto_hkdf.c b/src/common/crypto_hkdf.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6256f632d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/crypto_hkdf.c @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file crypto_hkdf.c + * \brief Block of functions related with HKDF utilities and operations. + **/ + +#include "crypto_hkdf.h" +#include "crypto_util.h" +#include "crypto_digest.h" + +/** Given key_in_len bytes of negotiated randomness in key_in + * ("K"), expand it into key_out_len bytes of negotiated key material in + * key_out by taking the first key_out_len bytes of + * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | .... + * + * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension + * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols. + * + * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. + */ +int +crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + int i, r = -1; + uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1); + uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN]; + + /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ + tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256); + + memcpy(tmp, key_in, key_in_len); + for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len; + ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) { + tmp[key_in_len] = i; + if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1) < 0) + goto exit; + memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out))); + } + + r = 0; + exit: + memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1); + tor_free(tmp); + memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest)); + return r; +} + +/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the + * underlying hash. The key_in_len bytes at key_in are the + * secret key material; the salt_in_len bytes at salt_in and the + * info_in_len bytes in info_in_len are the algorithm's "salt" + * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write key_out_len + * bytes to key_out and return 0. Assert on failure. + */ +int +crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len) +{ + uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN]; + uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1]; + uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN]; + int i; + uint8_t *outp; + size_t tmp_len; + + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk, + (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len, + (const char*)key_in, key_in_len); + + /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/ + tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256); + tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128); + memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + outp = key_out; + i = 1; + + while (key_out_len) { + size_t n; + if (i > 1) { + memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN); + memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1; + } else { + memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len); + tmp[info_in_len] = i; + tmp_len = info_in_len + 1; + } + crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac, + (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN, + (const char*)tmp, tmp_len); + n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN; + memcpy(outp, mac, n); + key_out_len -= n; + outp += n; + ++i; + } + + memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp)); + memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac)); + return 0; +} + diff --git a/src/common/crypto_hkdf.h b/src/common/crypto_hkdf.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5b5517209 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/common/crypto_hkdf.h @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2001, Matej Pfajfar. + * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. + * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. + * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +/** + * \file crypto_hkdf.h + * + * \brief Headers for crypto_hkdf.h + **/ + +#ifndef TOR_CRYPTO_HKDF_H +#define TOR_CRYPTO_HKDF_H + +#include "util.h" + +int crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, + size_t key_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); +int crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256( + const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len, + const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len, + const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len, + uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len); + +#endif /* !defined(TOR_CRYPTO_HKDF_H) */ + diff --git a/src/common/crypto_s2k.c b/src/common/crypto_s2k.c index 47cb62d07..2977a2d12 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_s2k.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_s2k.c @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ #include "compat.h" #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" -#include "crypto_dh.h" +#include "crypto_hkdf.h" #include "crypto_rand.h" #include "crypto_s2k.h" #include "crypto_util.h" diff --git a/src/common/crypto_util.c b/src/common/crypto_util.c index 1e1e7284e..2933579cf 100644 --- a/src/common/crypto_util.c +++ b/src/common/crypto_util.c @@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ memwipe(void *mem, uint8_t byte, size_t sz) memset(mem, byte, sz); } +/** Log all pending crypto errors at level severity. Use + * doing to describe our current activities. + */ void crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing) { diff --git a/src/common/include.am b/src/common/include.am index 6dafcea20..c9706c6b4 100644 --- a/src/common/include.am +++ b/src/common/include.am @@ -118,6 +118,7 @@ LIBOR_CRYPTO_A_SRC = \ src/common/crypto_dh.c \ src/common/crypto_digest.c \ src/common/crypto_format.c \ + src/common/crypto_hkdf.c \ src/common/crypto_openssl_mgt.c \ src/common/crypto_pwbox.c \ src/common/crypto_rand.c \ @@ -175,6 +176,7 @@ COMMONHEADERS = \ src/common/crypto_curve25519.h \ src/common/crypto_ed25519.h \ src/common/crypto_format.h \ + src/common/crypto_hkdf.h \ src/common/crypto_openssl_mgt.h \ src/common/crypto_pwbox.h \ src/common/crypto_rand.h \ diff --git a/src/or/onion_ntor.c b/src/or/onion_ntor.c index 74403ac7a..3df8c2ab6 100644 --- a/src/or/onion_ntor.c +++ b/src/or/onion_ntor.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #define ONION_NTOR_PRIVATE #include "crypto.h" -#include "crypto_dh.h" +#include "crypto_hkdf.h" #include "crypto_digest.h" #include "crypto_util.h" #include "onion_ntor.h" diff --git a/src/or/or.h b/src/or/or.h index e64ad1d4b..30a9828aa 100644 --- a/src/or/or.h +++ b/src/or/or.h @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ #include "crypto.h" #include "crypto_format.h" #include "crypto_dh.h" +#include "crypto_hkdf.h" #include "tortls.h" #include "torlog.h" #include "container.h"

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[torspec/master] add back in the version where md/all started
by arma＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit 72bb3d3a92927e0b1aa63cdb4d2aa5211ea5bc55 Author: Roger Dingledine <arma(a)torproject.org> Date: Sun Jun 17 20:23:16 2018 -0400 add back in the version where md/all started accidentally removed in commit dc4e88d4ca --- control-spec.txt | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/control-spec.txt b/control-spec.txt index 1fae378..2fca25c 100644 --- a/control-spec.txt +++ b/control-spec.txt @@ -579,8 +579,9 @@ microdescriptors instead. If microdescriptors are enabled, you'll need to use "md" instead.) - "md/all" -- all known microdescriptors for entire Tor network. + "md/all" -- all known microdescriptors for the entire Tor network. Each microdescriptor is terminated by a newline. + [First implemented in 0.3.5.1-alpha] "md/id/<OR identity>" or "md/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest microdescriptor for a given OR. Empty if we have no microdescriptor for

1 0

[tor/master] Refrain from mentioning old bug in a warning
by nickm＠torproject.org 18 Jun '18

18 Jun '18

commit eb7a3fae08638e38e55014b293d347d500cf14fa Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Wed May 30 19:44:20 2018 +0200 Refrain from mentioning old bug in a warning --- changes/bug25477 | 3 +++ src/or/rendcache.c | 4 +--- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug25477 b/changes/bug25477 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0eac06137 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug25477 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (logging): + - Refrain from mentioning bug 21018, as it is already fixed. + Fixes bug 25477; bugfix on 0.2.9.8. diff --git a/src/or/rendcache.c b/src/or/rendcache.c index d27e1c293..854142c26 100644 --- a/src/or/rendcache.c +++ b/src/or/rendcache.c @@ -908,9 +908,7 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc, if (n_intro_points <= 0) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the " "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have " - "provided invalid authorization data, or (maybe!) the " - "server is deliberately serving broken data in an attempt " - "to crash you with bug 21018."); + "provided invalid authorization data."); goto err; } else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden "

1 0