February 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Function to add an ipv4 address to an address_set
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 0640da42696a666382dd569839e98312d720a22a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 12:13:56 2018 -0500 Function to add an ipv4 address to an address_set This is a convenience function, so callers don't need to wrap the IPv4 address. --- src/common/address_set.c | 9 +++++++++ src/common/address_set.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/address_set.c b/src/common/address_set.c index df7022174..6fa942b0d 100644 --- a/src/common/address_set.c +++ b/src/common/address_set.c @@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ address_set_add(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr) } } +/** As address_set_add(), but take an ipv4 address in host order. */ +void +address_set_add_ipv4h(address_set_t *set, uint32_t addr) +{ + tor_addr_t a; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&a, addr); + address_set_add(set, &a); +} + /** * Return true if addr if a member of set. (And probably, * return false if addr is not a member of set.) diff --git a/src/common/address_set.h b/src/common/address_set.h index 568528c89..aedf17fc6 100644 --- a/src/common/address_set.h +++ b/src/common/address_set.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #define TOR_ADDRESS_SET_H #include "orconfig.h" +#include "torint.h" /** * An address_set_t represents a set of tor_addr_t values. The implementation @@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ struct tor_addr_t; address_set_t *address_set_new(int max_addresses_guess); void address_set_free(address_set_t *set); void address_set_add(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr); +void address_set_add_ipv4h(address_set_t *set, uint32_t addr); int address_set_probably_contains(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Merge branch 'ticket25183_029_01' into ticket24902_029_05
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 112638921b479f09bb473952c1870b27a0867971 Merge: 22a5d3dd2 a445327b8 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 16:56:21 2018 -0500 Merge branch 'ticket25183_029_01' into ticket24902_029_05 src/common/address.c | 22 ++++++ src/common/address.h | 2 + src/common/address_set.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/address_set.h | 35 +++++++++ src/common/include.am | 2 + src/or/nodelist.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 3 + src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_address_set.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 448 insertions(+)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Fix a typo in an address_set.c comment.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 99fbbc6c478d346a469e61663a319c8cf03fec44 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 12 10:59:46 2018 -0500 Fix a typo in an address_set.c comment. --- src/common/address_set.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/common/address_set.c b/src/common/address_set.c index 6fa942b0d..4924cb65c 100644 --- a/src/common/address_set.c +++ b/src/common/address_set.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ /** How many 64-bit siphash values to extract per address */ #define N_HASHES 2 /** How many bloom-filter bits we set per address. This is twice the N_HASHES - * value, since we split the siphash outcome two 32-bit values. */ + * value, since we split the siphash output into two 32-bit values. */ #define N_BITS_PER_ITEM (N_HASHES * 2) /* XXXX This code is largely duplicated with digestset_t. We should merge

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Have tor_addr hashes return a randomized hash for AF_UNSPEC.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 1555946e202fef523b35e169c90892b57caea766 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 12 11:08:33 2018 -0500 Have tor_addr hashes return a randomized hash for AF_UNSPEC. We don't expect this to come up very much, but we may as well make sure that the value isn't predictable (as we do for the other addresses) in case the issue ever comes up. Spotted by teor. --- src/common/address.c | 7 +++++-- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/common/address.c b/src/common/address.c index 1bd52d24b..68ad63941 100644 --- a/src/common/address.c +++ b/src/common/address.c @@ -1181,6 +1181,9 @@ tor_addr_compare_masked(const tor_addr_t *addr1, const tor_addr_t *addr2, } } +/** Input for siphash, to produce some output for an unspec value. */ +static const uint32_t unspec_hash_input[] = { 0x4e4df09f, 0x92985342 }; + /** Return a hash code based on the address addr. DOCDOC extra */ uint64_t tor_addr_hash(const tor_addr_t *addr) @@ -1189,7 +1192,7 @@ tor_addr_hash(const tor_addr_t *addr) case AF_INET: return siphash24g(&addr->addr.in_addr.s_addr, 4); case AF_UNSPEC: - return 0x4e4d5342; + return siphash24g(unspec_hash_input, sizeof(unspec_hash_input)); case AF_INET6: return siphash24g(&addr->addr.in6_addr.s6_addr, 16); default: @@ -1211,7 +1214,7 @@ tor_addr_keyed_hash(const struct sipkey *key, const tor_addr_t *addr) case AF_INET: return siphash24(&addr->addr.in_addr.s_addr, 4, key); case AF_UNSPEC: - return 0x4e4d5342; + return siphash24(unspec_hash_input, sizeof(unspec_hash_input), key); case AF_INET6: return siphash24(&addr->addr.in6_addr.s6_addr, 16, key); default:

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Add an address_set to the nodelist.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 6892d3292121d02900ac9968e832353ecacca4ad Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 12:14:42 2018 -0500 Add an address_set to the nodelist. This set is rebuilt whenever a consensus arrives. In between consensuses, it is add-only. --- src/or/nodelist.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 0e9a65181..c2080db12 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "address.h" +#include "address_set.h" #include "config.h" #include "control.h" #include "dirserv.h" @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ static void count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, static void update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void); static double get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(const or_options_t *options, const networkstatus_t *ns); +static void node_add_to_address_set(const node_t *node); /** A nodelist_t holds a node_t object for every router we're "willing to use * for something". Specifically, it should hold a node_t for every node that @@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ typedef struct nodelist_t { /* Hash table to map from node ID digest to node. */ HT_HEAD(nodelist_map, node_t) nodes_by_id; + /* Set of addresses that belong to nodes we believe in. */ + address_set_t *node_addrs; } nodelist_t; static inline unsigned int @@ -150,6 +154,50 @@ node_addrs_changed(node_t *node) node->country = -1; } +/** Add all address information about node to the current address + * set (if there is one). + */ +static void +node_add_to_address_set(const node_t *node) +{ + if (!the_nodelist || !the_nodelist->node_addrs) + return; + + /* These various address sources can be redundant, but it's likely faster + * to add them all than to compare them all for equality. */ + + if (node->rs) { + if (node->rs->addr) + address_set_add_ipv4h(the_nodelist->node_addrs, node->rs->addr); + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->rs->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->rs->ipv6_addr); + } + if (node->ri) { + if (node->ri->addr) + address_set_add_ipv4h(the_nodelist->node_addrs, node->ri->addr); + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->ri->ipv6_addr); + } + if (node->md) { + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->md->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->md->ipv6_addr); + } +} + +/** Return true if addr is the address of some node in the nodelist. + * If not, probably return false. */ +int +nodelist_probably_contains_address(const tor_addr_t *addr) +{ + if (BUG(!addr)) + return 0; + + if (!the_nodelist || !the_nodelist->node_addrs) + return 0; + + return address_set_probably_contains(the_nodelist->node_addrs, addr); +} + /** Add ri to an appropriate node in the nodelist. If we replace an * old routerinfo, and ri_old_out is not NULL, set *ri_old_out * to the previous routerinfo. @@ -188,6 +236,8 @@ nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out) dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node, status); } + node_add_to_address_set(node); + return node; } @@ -219,6 +269,9 @@ nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md) node->md = md; md->held_by_nodes++; } + + node_add_to_address_set(node); + return node; } @@ -240,6 +293,11 @@ nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node, node->rs = NULL); + /* Conservatively estimate that every node will have 2 addresses. */ + const int estimated_addresses = smartlist_len(ns->routerstatus_list) * 2; + address_set_free(the_nodelist->node_addrs); + the_nodelist->node_addrs = address_set_new(estimated_addresses); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ns->routerstatus_list, routerstatus_t *, rs) { node_t *node = node_get_or_create(rs->identity_digest); node->rs = rs; @@ -278,6 +336,11 @@ nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns) nodelist_purge(); + /* Now add all the nodes we have to the address set. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node) { + node_add_to_address_set(node); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); + if (! authdir) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node) { /* We have no routerstatus for this router. Clear flags so we can skip @@ -430,6 +493,9 @@ nodelist_free_all(void) smartlist_free(the_nodelist->nodes); + address_set_free(the_nodelist->node_addrs); + the_nodelist->node_addrs = NULL; + tor_free(the_nodelist); } diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index 71a91e107..355057f39 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const node_t *node_get_by_hex_id(const char *identity_digest); node_t *nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out); node_t *nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md); void nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns); +int nodelist_probably_contains_address(const tor_addr_t *addr); void nodelist_remove_microdesc(const char *identity_digest, microdesc_t *md); void nodelist_remove_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.1] geoip: Add a lookup function for client map entry
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 93b826faaa7cca351c68256ce60a7f7e6c5fda5b Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Jan 25 15:44:48 2018 -0500 geoip: Add a lookup function for client map entry The upcoming DoS mitigation subsytem needs to keep information on a per-IP basis which is also what the geoip clientmap does. For another subsystem to access that clientmap, this commit adds a lookup function that returns the entry. For this, the clientmap_entry_t had to be moved to the header file. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/geoip.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------- src/or/geoip.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 00c055bbe..e2a1b1cee 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -472,24 +472,6 @@ geoip_db_digest(sa_family_t family) return hex_str(geoip6_digest, DIGEST_LEN); } -/** Entry in a map from IP address to the last time we've seen an incoming - * connection from that IP address. Used by bridges only, to track which - * countries have them blocked. */ -typedef struct clientmap_entry_t { - HT_ENTRY(clientmap_entry_t) node; - tor_addr_t addr; - /* Name of pluggable transport used by this client. NULL if no - pluggable transport was used. */ - char *transport_name; - - /** Time when we last saw this IP address, in MINUTES since the epoch. - * - * (This will run out of space around 4011 CE. If Tor is still in use around - * 4000 CE, please remember to add more bits to last_seen_in_minutes.) */ - unsigned int last_seen_in_minutes:30; - unsigned int action:2; -} clientmap_entry_t; - /** Largest allowable value for last_seen_in_minutes. (It's a 30-bit field, * so it can hold up to (1u<<30)-1, or 0x3fffffffu. */ @@ -564,8 +546,7 @@ geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, time_t now) { const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - clientmap_entry_t lookup, *ent; - memset(&lookup, 0, sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); + clientmap_entry_t *ent; if (action == GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT) { /* Only remember statistics as entry guard or as bridge. */ @@ -583,11 +564,7 @@ geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, safe_str_client(fmt_addr((addr))), transport_name ? transport_name : "<no transport>"); - tor_addr_copy(&lookup.addr, addr); - lookup.action = (int)action; - lookup.transport_name = (char*) transport_name; - ent = HT_FIND(clientmap, &client_history, &lookup); - + ent = geoip_lookup_client(addr, transport_name, action); if (! ent) { ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); tor_addr_copy(&ent->addr, addr); @@ -635,6 +612,25 @@ geoip_remove_old_clients(time_t cutoff) &cutoff); } +/* Return a client entry object matching the given address, transport name and + * geoip action from the clientmap. NULL if not found. The transport_name can + * be NULL. */ +clientmap_entry_t * +geoip_lookup_client(const tor_addr_t *addr, const char *transport_name, + geoip_client_action_t action) +{ + clientmap_entry_t lookup; + + tor_assert(addr); + + /* We always look for a client connection with no transport. */ + tor_addr_copy(&lookup.addr, addr); + lookup.action = action; + lookup.transport_name = (char *) transport_name; + + return HT_FIND(clientmap, &client_history, &lookup); +} + /** How many responses are we giving to clients requesting v3 network * statuses? */ static uint32_t ns_v3_responses[GEOIP_NS_RESPONSE_NUM]; diff --git a/src/or/geoip.h b/src/or/geoip.h index 070296dd0..b80efceb3 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.h +++ b/src/or/geoip.h @@ -20,6 +20,25 @@ STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv4(uint32_t ipaddr); STATIC int geoip_get_country_by_ipv6(const struct in6_addr *addr); STATIC void clear_geoip_db(void); #endif + +/** Entry in a map from IP address to the last time we've seen an incoming + * connection from that IP address. Used by bridges only to track which + * countries have them blocked, or the DoS mitigation subsystem if enabled. */ +typedef struct clientmap_entry_t { + HT_ENTRY(clientmap_entry_t) node; + tor_addr_t addr; + /* Name of pluggable transport used by this client. NULL if no + pluggable transport was used. */ + char *transport_name; + + /** Time when we last saw this IP address, in MINUTES since the epoch. + * + * (This will run out of space around 4011 CE. If Tor is still in use around + * 4000 CE, please remember to add more bits to last_seen_in_minutes.) */ + unsigned int last_seen_in_minutes:30; + unsigned int action:2; +} clientmap_entry_t; + int should_record_bridge_info(const or_options_t *options); int geoip_load_file(sa_family_t family, const char *filename); MOCK_DECL(int, geoip_get_country_by_addr, (const tor_addr_t *addr)); @@ -33,6 +52,9 @@ void geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, const tor_addr_t *addr, const char *transport_name, time_t now); void geoip_remove_old_clients(time_t cutoff); +clientmap_entry_t *geoip_lookup_client(const tor_addr_t *addr, + const char *transport_name, + geoip_client_action_t action); void geoip_note_ns_response(geoip_ns_response_t response); char *geoip_get_transport_history(void);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] dos: Don't set consensus param if we aren't a public relay
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 4fe4f8179fe81244319c7fdec64299b6506434a2 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 13 10:29:41 2018 -0500 dos: Don't set consensus param if we aren't a public relay We had this safeguard around dos_init() but not when the consensus changes which can modify consensus parameters and possibly enable the DoS mitigation even if tor wasn't a public relay. Fixes #25223 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/bug25223 | 3 +++ src/or/dos.c | 8 ++++++++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/bug25223 b/changes/bug25223 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2a7eb6b25 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug25223 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (DoS mitigation): + - Make sure we don't modify consensus parameters if we aren't a public + relay when a new consensus arrives. Fixes bug 25223. diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c index 9e8a7a9ab..bfa415e7b 100644 --- a/src/or/dos.c +++ b/src/or/dos.c @@ -738,6 +738,14 @@ dos_close_client_conn(const or_connection_t *or_conn) void dos_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns) { + /* There are two ways to configure this subsystem, one at startup through + * dos_init() which is called when the options are parsed. And this one + * through the consensus. We don't want to enable any DoS mitigation if we + * aren't a public relay. */ + if (!public_server_mode(get_options())) { + return; + } + cc_consensus_has_changed(ns); conn_consensus_has_changed(ns);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] man: Document default values if not in the consensus for DoS mitigation
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 9cf8d669fa416c151f60cb795555b6ef2ab53ecf Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 13 10:53:47 2018 -0500 man: Document default values if not in the consensus for DoS mitigation Fixes #25236 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- doc/tor.1.txt | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/tor.1.txt b/doc/tor.1.txt index 58997cdf3..a7ee7d11c 100644 --- a/doc/tor.1.txt +++ b/doc/tor.1.txt @@ -2454,7 +2454,7 @@ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. address is positively identified, tor will activate defenses against the address. See the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType option for more details. This is a client to relay detection only. "auto" means use the consensus - parameter. + parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0. (Default: auto) [[DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections]] **DoSCircuitCreationMinConnections** __NUM__:: @@ -2463,19 +2463,22 @@ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. flagged as executing a circuit creation DoS. In other words, once a client address reaches the circuit rate and has a minimum of NUM concurrent connections, a detection is positive. "0" means use the consensus - parameter. + parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 3. (Default: 0) [[DoSCircuitCreationRate]] **DoSCircuitCreationRate** __NUM__:: The allowed circuit creation rate per second applied per client IP - address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. (Default: 0) + address. If this option is 0, it obeys a consensus parameter. If not + defined in the consensus, the value is 3. + (Default: 0) [[DoSCircuitCreationBurst]] **DoSCircuitCreationBurst** __NUM__:: The allowed circuit creation burst per client IP address. If the circuit rate and the burst are reached, a client is marked as executing a circuit - creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. + creation DoS. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the + consensus, the value is 90. (Default: 0) [[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseType** __NUM__:: @@ -2486,28 +2489,31 @@ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. 1: No defense. 2: Refuse circuit creation for the DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod period of time. + - "0" means use the consensus parameter. + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 2. (Default: 0) -[[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __NUM__:: +[[DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod]] **DoSCircuitCreationDefenseTimePeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**:: - The base time period that the DoS defense is activated for. The actual - value is selected randomly for each activation from NUM+1 to 3/2 * NUM. - "0" means use the consensus parameter. - (Default: 0) + The base time period in seconds that the DoS defense is activated for. The + actual value is selected randomly for each activation from N+1 to 3/2 * N. + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 3600 seconds (1 hour). (Default: 0) [[DoSConnectionEnabled]] **DoSConnectionEnabled** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: Enable the connection DoS mitigation. For client address only, this allows tor to mitigate against large number of concurrent connections made by a - single IP address. "auto" means use the consensus parameter. + single IP address. "auto" means use the consensus parameter. If not + defined in the consensus, the value is 0. (Default: auto) [[DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount]] **DoSConnectionMaxConcurrentCount** __NUM__:: The maximum threshold of concurrent connection from a client IP address. Above this limit, a defense selected by DoSConnectionDefenseType is - applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. + applied. "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the + consensus, the value is 100. (Default: 0) [[DoSConnectionDefenseType]] **DoSConnectionDefenseType** __NUM__:: @@ -2518,7 +2524,8 @@ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. 1: No defense. 2: Immediately close new connections. + - "0" means use the consensus parameter. + "0" means use the consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, + the value is 2. (Default: 0) [[DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous]] **DoSRefuseSingleHopClientRendezvous** **0**|**1**|**auto**:: @@ -2526,7 +2533,7 @@ Denial of Service mitigation subsystem. Refuse establishment of rendezvous points for single hop clients. In other words, if a client directly connects to the relay and sends an ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, it is silently dropped. "auto" means use the - consensus parameter. + consensus parameter. If not defined in the consensus, the value is 0. (Default: auto) TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] dos: Exclude known relays from client connection count
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 666582a679cdfb2d69620db6aadf55a57d430e23 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 9 11:11:41 2018 -0500 dos: Exclude known relays from client connection count This is to avoid positively identifying Exit relays if tor client connection comes from them that is reentering the network. One thing to note is that this is done only in the DoS subsystem but we'll still add it to the geoip cache as a "client" seen. This is done that way so to avoid as much as possible changing the current behavior of the geoip client cache since this is being backported. Closes #25193 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/dos.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c index 88f1351a3..9e8a7a9ab 100644 --- a/src/or/dos.c +++ b/src/or/dos.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" #include "router.h" #include "dos.h" @@ -664,6 +665,14 @@ dos_new_client_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn) goto end; } + /* We ignore any known address meaning an address of a known relay. The + * reason to do so is because network reentry is possible where a client + * connection comes from an Exit node. Even when we'll fix reentry, this is + * a robust defense to keep in place. */ + if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&or_conn->real_addr)) { + goto end; + } + /* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn->real_addr, NULL, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);

1 0

[tor/maint-0.2.9] Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/ticket24902_029_05' into maint-0.2.9
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

1 0