February 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.2.9] Function to add an ipv4 address to an address_set
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 0640da42696a666382dd569839e98312d720a22a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 12:13:56 2018 -0500 Function to add an ipv4 address to an address_set This is a convenience function, so callers don't need to wrap the IPv4 address. --- src/common/address_set.c | 9 +++++++++ src/common/address_set.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/common/address_set.c b/src/common/address_set.c index df7022174..6fa942b0d 100644 --- a/src/common/address_set.c +++ b/src/common/address_set.c @@ -97,6 +97,15 @@ address_set_add(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr) } } +/** As address_set_add(), but take an ipv4 address in host order. */ +void +address_set_add_ipv4h(address_set_t *set, uint32_t addr) +{ + tor_addr_t a; + tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&a, addr); + address_set_add(set, &a); +} + /** * Return true if addr if a member of set. (And probably, * return false if addr is not a member of set.) diff --git a/src/common/address_set.h b/src/common/address_set.h index 568528c89..aedf17fc6 100644 --- a/src/common/address_set.h +++ b/src/common/address_set.h @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #define TOR_ADDRESS_SET_H #include "orconfig.h" +#include "torint.h" /** * An address_set_t represents a set of tor_addr_t values. The implementation @@ -26,6 +27,7 @@ struct tor_addr_t; address_set_t *address_set_new(int max_addresses_guess); void address_set_free(address_set_t *set); void address_set_add(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr); +void address_set_add_ipv4h(address_set_t *set, uint32_t addr); int address_set_probably_contains(address_set_t *set, const struct tor_addr_t *addr);

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[tor/release-0.2.9] dos: Make sure cc_stats_refill_bucket can't overflow while calculating
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit a09d5f5735abe2e1d16cf0ee9389ae096d5e7ef1 Author: teor <teor2345(a)gmail.com> Date: Wed Jan 31 11:13:17 2018 +1100 dos: Make sure cc_stats_refill_bucket can't overflow while calculating Debug log the elapsed time in cc_stats_refill_bucket Part of #25094. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/dos.c | 82 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- src/or/dos.h | 2 +- src/test/test_dos.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c index a614d1231..c221e5ecd 100644 --- a/src/or/dos.c +++ b/src/or/dos.c @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ cc_consensus_has_changed(const networkstatus_t *ns) /** Return the number of circuits we allow per second under the current * configuration. */ -STATIC uint32_t +STATIC uint64_t get_circuit_rate_per_second(void) { return dos_cc_circuit_rate; @@ -234,31 +234,40 @@ get_circuit_rate_per_second(void) STATIC void cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats, const tor_addr_t *addr) { - uint32_t new_circuit_bucket_count, circuit_rate = 0, num_token; - time_t now, elapsed_time_last_refill; + uint32_t new_circuit_bucket_count; + uint64_t num_token, elapsed_time_last_refill = 0, circuit_rate = 0; + time_t now; + int64_t last_refill_ts; tor_assert(stats); tor_assert(addr); now = approx_time(); + last_refill_ts = (int64_t)stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts; - /* We've never filled the bucket so fill it with the maximum being the burst - * and we are done. */ - if (stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts == 0) { - num_token = dos_cc_circuit_burst; - goto end; + /* If less than a second has elapsed, don't add any tokens. + * Note: If a relay's clock is ever 0, any new clients won't get a refill + * until the next second. But a relay that thinks it is 1970 will never + * validate the public consensus. */ + if ((int64_t)now == last_refill_ts) { + goto done; } /* At this point, we know we might need to add token to the bucket. We'll - * first compute the circuit rate that is how many circuit are we allowed to - * do per second. */ + * first get the circuit rate that is how many circuit are we allowed to do + * per second. */ circuit_rate = get_circuit_rate_per_second(); - /* How many seconds have elapsed between now and the last refill? */ - elapsed_time_last_refill = now - stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts; + /* We've never filled the bucket so fill it with the maximum being the burst + * and we are done. + * Note: If a relay's clock is ever 0, all clients that were last refilled + * in that zero second will get a full refill here. */ + if (last_refill_ts == 0) { + num_token = dos_cc_circuit_burst; + goto end; + } - /* If the elapsed time is below 0 it means our clock jumped backward so in - * that case, lets be safe and fill it up to the maximum. Not filling it + /* Our clock jumped backward so fill it up to the maximum. Not filling it * could trigger a detection for a valid client. Also, if the clock jumped * negative but we didn't notice until the elapsed time became positive * again, then we potentially spent many seconds not refilling the bucket @@ -266,28 +275,51 @@ cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats, const tor_addr_t *addr) * until now means that no circuit creation requests came in during that * time, so the client doesn't end up punished that much from this hopefully * rare situation.*/ - if (elapsed_time_last_refill < 0) { - /* Dividing the burst by the circuit rate gives us the time span that will - * give us the maximum allowed value of token. */ - elapsed_time_last_refill = (dos_cc_circuit_burst / circuit_rate); + if ((int64_t)now < last_refill_ts) { + /* Use the maximum allowed value of token. */ + num_token = dos_cc_circuit_burst; + goto end; + } + + /* How many seconds have elapsed between now and the last refill? + * This subtraction can't underflow, because now >= last_refill_ts. + * And it can't overflow, because INT64_MAX - (-INT64_MIN) == UINT64_MAX. */ + elapsed_time_last_refill = (uint64_t)now - last_refill_ts; + + /* If the elapsed time is very large, it means our clock jumped forward. + * If the multiplication would overflow, use the maximum allowed value. */ + if (elapsed_time_last_refill > UINT32_MAX) { + num_token = dos_cc_circuit_burst; + goto end; } /* Compute how many circuits we are allowed in that time frame which we'll - * add to the bucket. This can be big but it is cap to a maximum after. */ + * add to the bucket. This can't overflow, because both multiplicands + * are less than or equal to UINT32_MAX, and num_token is uint64_t. */ num_token = elapsed_time_last_refill * circuit_rate; end: - /* We cap the bucket to the burst value else this could grow to infinity - * over time. */ - new_circuit_bucket_count = MIN(stats->circuit_bucket + num_token, - dos_cc_circuit_burst); + /* If the sum would overflow, use the maximum allowed value. */ + if (num_token > UINT32_MAX - stats->circuit_bucket) { + new_circuit_bucket_count = dos_cc_circuit_burst; + } else { + /* We cap the bucket to the burst value else this could overflow uint32_t + * over time. */ + new_circuit_bucket_count = MIN(stats->circuit_bucket + (uint32_t)num_token, + dos_cc_circuit_burst); + } + /* This function is not allowed to make the bucket count smaller */ + tor_assert_nonfatal(new_circuit_bucket_count >= stats->circuit_bucket); log_debug(LD_DOS, "DoS address %s has its circuit bucket value: %" PRIu32 - ". Filling it to %" PRIu32 ". Circuit rate is %" PRIu32, + ". Filling it to %" PRIu32 ". Circuit rate is %" PRIu64 + ". Elapsed time is %" PRIi64, fmt_addr(addr), stats->circuit_bucket, new_circuit_bucket_count, - circuit_rate); + circuit_rate, (int64_t)elapsed_time_last_refill); stats->circuit_bucket = new_circuit_bucket_count; stats->last_circ_bucket_refill_ts = now; + + done: return; } diff --git a/src/or/dos.h b/src/or/dos.h index 8695512ea..5d35a2b12 100644 --- a/src/or/dos.h +++ b/src/or/dos.h @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ STATIC uint32_t get_param_cc_circuit_burst(const networkstatus_t *ns); STATIC uint32_t get_param_cc_min_concurrent_connection( const networkstatus_t *ns); -STATIC uint32_t get_circuit_rate_per_second(void); +STATIC uint64_t get_circuit_rate_per_second(void); STATIC void cc_stats_refill_bucket(cc_client_stats_t *stats, const tor_addr_t *addr); diff --git a/src/test/test_dos.c b/src/test/test_dos.c index 80abc1937..7fe549560 100644 --- a/src/test/test_dos.c +++ b/src/test/test_dos.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ test_dos_bucket_refill(void *arg) /* Initialize DoS subsystem and get relevant limits */ dos_init(); uint32_t max_circuit_count = get_param_cc_circuit_burst(NULL); - int circ_rate = get_circuit_rate_per_second(); + uint64_t circ_rate = get_circuit_rate_per_second(); /* Check that the circuit rate is a positive number and smaller than the max * circuit count */ tt_int_op(circ_rate, OP_GT, 1);

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[tor/release-0.2.9] geoip: Add clientmap_entry_new() function
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit e758d659a0bc8b9a0e2bd6a0126755fd1fb58e0a Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 2 13:24:37 2018 -0500 geoip: Add clientmap_entry_new() function Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/geoip.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 92db9742e..76fca43f6 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -580,6 +580,31 @@ clientmap_entry_free(clientmap_entry_t *ent) tor_free(ent); } +/* Return a newly allocated clientmap entry with the given action and address + * that are mandatory. The transport_name can be optional. This can't fail. */ +static clientmap_entry_t * +clientmap_entry_new(geoip_client_action_t action, const tor_addr_t *addr, + const char *transport_name) +{ + clientmap_entry_t *entry; + + tor_assert(action == GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT || + action == GEOIP_CLIENT_NETWORKSTATUS); + tor_assert(addr); + + entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); + entry->action = action; + tor_addr_copy(&entry->addr, addr); + if (transport_name) { + entry->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); + } + + /* Allocated and initialized, note down its size for the OOM handler. */ + geoip_increment_client_history_cache_size(clientmap_entry_size(entry)); + + return entry; +} + /** Clear history of connecting clients used by entry and bridge stats. */ static void client_history_clear(void) @@ -632,13 +657,8 @@ geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, ent = HT_FIND(clientmap, &client_history, &lookup); if (! ent) { - ent = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(clientmap_entry_t)); - tor_addr_copy(&ent->addr, addr); - if (transport_name) - ent->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); - ent->action = (int)action; + ent = clientmap_entry_new(action, addr, transport_name); HT_INSERT(clientmap, &client_history, ent); - geoip_increment_client_history_cache_size(clientmap_entry_size(ent)); } if (now / 60 <= (int)MAX_LAST_SEEN_IN_MINUTES && now >= 0) ent->last_seen_in_minutes = (unsigned)(now/60);

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[tor/release-0.2.9] geoip: Make geoip_client_cache_total_allocation() return the counter
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit f08fa974600625e4ea0b21d0143d28fe280008d5 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Feb 5 10:39:10 2018 -0500 geoip: Make geoip_client_cache_total_allocation() return the counter The HT_FOREACH() is insanely heavy on the CPU and this is part of the fast path so make it return the nice memory size counter we added in 4d812e29b9b1ec88. Fixes #25148 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/geoip.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index 20dad5f15..a39366ed1 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -769,13 +769,7 @@ geoip_client_cache_handle_oom(time_t now, size_t min_remove_bytes) size_t geoip_client_cache_total_allocation(void) { - size_t bytes = 0; - clientmap_entry_t **ent; - - HT_FOREACH(ent, clientmap, &client_history) { - bytes += clientmap_entry_size(*ent); - } - return bytes; + return geoip_client_history_cache_size; } /** How many responses are we giving to clients requesting v3 network

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[tor/release-0.2.9] dos: Add changes file for ticket 24902
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 9aca7d47306222f2870ec16a7291a8215d6c3316 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Jan 30 09:15:33 2018 -0500 dos: Add changes file for ticket 24902 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket24902 | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket24902 b/changes/ticket24902 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1a2ef95cc --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket24902 @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + o Major features (denial of service mitigation): + - Give relays some defenses against the recent network overload. We start + with three defenses (default parameters in parentheses). First: if a + single client address makes too many concurrent connections (>100), hang + up on further connections. Second: if a single client address makes + circuits too quickly (more than 3 per second, with an allowed burst of + 90) while also having too many connections open (3), refuse new create + cells for the next while (1-2 hours). Third: if a client asks to + establish a rendezvous point to you directly, ignore the request. These + defenses can be manually controlled by new torrc options, but relays + will also take guidance from consensus parameters, so there's no need to + configure anything manually. Implements ticket 24902. +

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[tor/release-0.2.9] geoip: Increment and decrement functions for the geoip client cache
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 4d812e29b9b1ec88fe268c150a826466b23a8762 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 2 13:14:50 2018 -0500 geoip: Increment and decrement functions for the geoip client cache These functions protect againts over and underflow. They BUG() in case we overflow the counter. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/geoip.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/geoip.c b/src/or/geoip.c index c5e8cdab9..92db9742e 100644 --- a/src/or/geoip.c +++ b/src/or/geoip.c @@ -76,6 +76,34 @@ static char geoip6_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; * handler. */ static size_t geoip_client_history_cache_size; +/* Increment the geoip client history cache size counter with the given bytes. + * This prevents an overflow and set it to its maximum in that case. */ +static inline void +geoip_increment_client_history_cache_size(size_t bytes) +{ + /* This is shockingly high, lets log it so it can be reported. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(geoip_client_history_cache_size > (SIZE_MAX - bytes)) { + geoip_client_history_cache_size = SIZE_MAX; + return; + } + geoip_client_history_cache_size += bytes; +} + +/* Decrement the geoip client history cache size counter with the given bytes. + * This prevents an underflow and set it to 0 in that case. */ +static inline void +geoip_decrement_client_history_cache_size(size_t bytes) +{ + /* Going below 0 means that we either allocated an entry without + * incrementing the counter or we have different sizes when allocating and + * freeing. It shouldn't happened so log it. */ + IF_BUG_ONCE(geoip_client_history_cache_size < bytes) { + geoip_client_history_cache_size = 0; + return; + } + geoip_client_history_cache_size -= bytes; +} + /** Return the index of the country's entry in the GeoIP * country list if it is a valid 2-letter country code, otherwise * return -1. */ @@ -546,7 +574,7 @@ clientmap_entry_free(clientmap_entry_t *ent) if (!ent) return; - geoip_client_history_cache_size -= clientmap_entry_size(ent); + geoip_decrement_client_history_cache_size(clientmap_entry_size(ent)); tor_free(ent->transport_name); tor_free(ent); @@ -610,7 +638,7 @@ geoip_note_client_seen(geoip_client_action_t action, ent->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name); ent->action = (int)action; HT_INSERT(clientmap, &client_history, ent); - geoip_client_history_cache_size += clientmap_entry_size(ent); + geoip_increment_client_history_cache_size(clientmap_entry_size(ent)); } if (now / 60 <= (int)MAX_LAST_SEEN_IN_MINUTES && now >= 0) ent->last_seen_in_minutes = (unsigned)(now/60);

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Add an address_set to the nodelist.
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 6892d3292121d02900ac9968e832353ecacca4ad Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 12:14:42 2018 -0500 Add an address_set to the nodelist. This set is rebuilt whenever a consensus arrives. In between consensuses, it is add-only. --- src/or/nodelist.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 67 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index 0e9a65181..c2080db12 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "or.h" #include "address.h" +#include "address_set.h" #include "config.h" #include "control.h" #include "dirserv.h" @@ -52,6 +53,7 @@ static void count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, static void update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void); static double get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(const or_options_t *options, const networkstatus_t *ns); +static void node_add_to_address_set(const node_t *node); /** A nodelist_t holds a node_t object for every router we're "willing to use * for something". Specifically, it should hold a node_t for every node that @@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ typedef struct nodelist_t { /* Hash table to map from node ID digest to node. */ HT_HEAD(nodelist_map, node_t) nodes_by_id; + /* Set of addresses that belong to nodes we believe in. */ + address_set_t *node_addrs; } nodelist_t; static inline unsigned int @@ -150,6 +154,50 @@ node_addrs_changed(node_t *node) node->country = -1; } +/** Add all address information about node to the current address + * set (if there is one). + */ +static void +node_add_to_address_set(const node_t *node) +{ + if (!the_nodelist || !the_nodelist->node_addrs) + return; + + /* These various address sources can be redundant, but it's likely faster + * to add them all than to compare them all for equality. */ + + if (node->rs) { + if (node->rs->addr) + address_set_add_ipv4h(the_nodelist->node_addrs, node->rs->addr); + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->rs->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->rs->ipv6_addr); + } + if (node->ri) { + if (node->ri->addr) + address_set_add_ipv4h(the_nodelist->node_addrs, node->ri->addr); + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->ri->ipv6_addr); + } + if (node->md) { + if (!tor_addr_is_null(&node->md->ipv6_addr)) + address_set_add(the_nodelist->node_addrs, &node->md->ipv6_addr); + } +} + +/** Return true if addr is the address of some node in the nodelist. + * If not, probably return false. */ +int +nodelist_probably_contains_address(const tor_addr_t *addr) +{ + if (BUG(!addr)) + return 0; + + if (!the_nodelist || !the_nodelist->node_addrs) + return 0; + + return address_set_probably_contains(the_nodelist->node_addrs, addr); +} + /** Add ri to an appropriate node in the nodelist. If we replace an * old routerinfo, and ri_old_out is not NULL, set *ri_old_out * to the previous routerinfo. @@ -188,6 +236,8 @@ nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out) dirserv_set_node_flags_from_authoritative_status(node, status); } + node_add_to_address_set(node); + return node; } @@ -219,6 +269,9 @@ nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md) node->md = md; md->held_by_nodes++; } + + node_add_to_address_set(node); + return node; } @@ -240,6 +293,11 @@ nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns) SMARTLIST_FOREACH(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node, node->rs = NULL); + /* Conservatively estimate that every node will have 2 addresses. */ + const int estimated_addresses = smartlist_len(ns->routerstatus_list) * 2; + address_set_free(the_nodelist->node_addrs); + the_nodelist->node_addrs = address_set_new(estimated_addresses); + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(ns->routerstatus_list, routerstatus_t *, rs) { node_t *node = node_get_or_create(rs->identity_digest); node->rs = rs; @@ -278,6 +336,11 @@ nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns) nodelist_purge(); + /* Now add all the nodes we have to the address set. */ + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node) { + node_add_to_address_set(node); + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node); + if (! authdir) { SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodelist->nodes, node_t *, node) { /* We have no routerstatus for this router. Clear flags so we can skip @@ -430,6 +493,9 @@ nodelist_free_all(void) smartlist_free(the_nodelist->nodes); + address_set_free(the_nodelist->node_addrs); + the_nodelist->node_addrs = NULL; + tor_free(the_nodelist); } diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index 71a91e107..355057f39 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ const node_t *node_get_by_hex_id(const char *identity_digest); node_t *nodelist_set_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri, routerinfo_t **ri_old_out); node_t *nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md); void nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns); +int nodelist_probably_contains_address(const tor_addr_t *addr); void nodelist_remove_microdesc(const char *identity_digest, microdesc_t *md); void nodelist_remove_routerinfo(routerinfo_t *ri);

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[tor/release-0.2.9] test: Add unit tests for addressset.c
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit a445327b80478c72093d8f1b0e205a279318f651 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 14:35:22 2018 -0500 test: Add unit tests for addressset.c This also adds one that tests the integration with the nodelist. Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/nodelist.c | 14 +++- src/or/nodelist.h | 2 + src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_address_set.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.c b/src/or/nodelist.c index c2080db12..5a02648c5 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.c +++ b/src/or/nodelist.c @@ -275,6 +275,17 @@ nodelist_add_microdesc(microdesc_t *md) return node; } +/* Default value. */ +#define ESTIMATED_ADDRESS_PER_NODE 2 + +/* Return the estimated number of address per node_t. This is used for the + * size of the bloom filter in the nodelist (node_addrs). */ +MOCK_IMPL(int, +get_estimated_address_per_node, (void)) +{ + return ESTIMATED_ADDRESS_PER_NODE; +} + /** Tell the nodelist that the current usable consensus is ns. * This makes the nodelist change all of the routerstatus entries for * the nodes, drop nodes that no longer have enough info to get used, @@ -294,7 +305,8 @@ nodelist_set_consensus(networkstatus_t *ns) node->rs = NULL); /* Conservatively estimate that every node will have 2 addresses. */ - const int estimated_addresses = smartlist_len(ns->routerstatus_list) * 2; + const int estimated_addresses = smartlist_len(ns->routerstatus_list) * + get_estimated_address_per_node(); address_set_free(the_nodelist->node_addrs); the_nodelist->node_addrs = address_set_new(estimated_addresses); diff --git a/src/or/nodelist.h b/src/or/nodelist.h index 355057f39..098f1d155 100644 --- a/src/or/nodelist.h +++ b/src/or/nodelist.h @@ -125,5 +125,7 @@ void router_dir_info_changed(void); const char *get_dir_info_status_string(void); int count_loading_descriptors_progress(void); +MOCK_DECL(int, get_estimated_address_per_node, (void)); + #endif diff --git a/src/test/include.am b/src/test/include.am index 8ecfaf10c..cf29d4cb2 100644 --- a/src/test/include.am +++ b/src/test/include.am @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ src_test_test_SOURCES = \ src/test/test_accounting.c \ src/test/test_addr.c \ src/test/test_address.c \ + src/test/test_address_set.c \ src/test/test_buffers.c \ src/test/test_cell_formats.c \ src/test/test_cell_queue.c \ diff --git a/src/test/test.c b/src/test/test.c index 9a41b976b..9b0775ce4 100644 --- a/src/test/test.c +++ b/src/test/test.c @@ -1182,6 +1182,7 @@ struct testgroup_t testgroups[] = { { "accounting/", accounting_tests }, { "addr/", addr_tests }, { "address/", address_tests }, + { "address_set/", address_set_tests }, { "buffer/", buffer_tests }, { "cellfmt/", cell_format_tests }, { "cellqueue/", cell_queue_tests }, diff --git a/src/test/test.h b/src/test/test.h index 25336ac83..22b207207 100644 --- a/src/test/test.h +++ b/src/test/test.h @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ extern const struct testcase_setup_t ed25519_test_setup; extern struct testcase_t accounting_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t addr_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t address_tests[]; +extern struct testcase_t address_set_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t buffer_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t cell_format_tests[]; extern struct testcase_t cell_queue_tests[]; diff --git a/src/test/test_address_set.c b/src/test/test_address_set.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..df022f539 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/test/test_address_set.c @@ -0,0 +1,174 @@ +/* Copyright (c) 2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ +/* See LICENSE for licensing information */ + +#include "or.h" +#include "address_set.h" +#include "microdesc.h" +#include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" +#include "routerlist.h" +#include "torcert.h" + +#include "test.h" + +static networkstatus_t *dummy_ns = NULL; +static networkstatus_t * +mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus(void) +{ + return dummy_ns; +} + +static networkstatus_t * +mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(consensus_flavor_t f) +{ + tor_assert(f == FLAV_MICRODESC); + return dummy_ns; +} + +/* Number of address a single node_t can have. Default to the production + * value. This is to control the size of the bloom filter. */ +static int addr_per_node = 2; +static int +mock_get_estimated_address_per_node(void) +{ + return addr_per_node; +} + +static void +test_contains(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + address_set_t *set = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + /* Setup an IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. */ + tor_addr_t addr_v6; + tor_addr_parse(&addr_v6, "1:2:3:4::"); + tor_addr_t addr_v4; + tor_addr_parse(&addr_v4, "42.42.42.42"); + uint32_t ipv4h = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&addr_v4); + + /* Make it very big so the chance of failing the contain test will be + * extremely rare. */ + set = address_set_new(1024); + tt_assert(set); + + /* Add and lookup IPv6. */ + address_set_add(set, &addr_v6); + ret = address_set_probably_contains(set, &addr_v6); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + /* Add and lookup IPv4. */ + address_set_add_ipv4h(set, ipv4h); + ret = address_set_probably_contains(set, &addr_v4); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + + /* Try a lookup of rubbish. */ + tor_addr_t dummy_addr; + memset(&dummy_addr, 'A', sizeof(dummy_addr)); + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET; + ret = address_set_probably_contains(set, &dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET6; + ret = address_set_probably_contains(set, &dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + address_set_free(set); +} + +static void +test_nodelist(void *arg) +{ + int ret; + routerstatus_t *rs = NULL; microdesc_t *md = NULL; routerinfo_t *ri = NULL; + + (void) arg; + + MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus, + mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); + MOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor, + mock_networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor); + MOCK(get_estimated_address_per_node, + mock_get_estimated_address_per_node); + + dummy_ns = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*dummy_ns)); + dummy_ns->flavor = FLAV_MICRODESC; + dummy_ns->routerstatus_list = smartlist_new(); + + tor_addr_t addr_v4, addr_v6, dummy_addr; + tor_addr_parse(&addr_v4, "42.42.42.42"); + uint32_t ipv4h = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&addr_v4); + tor_addr_parse(&addr_v6, "1:2:3:4::"); + memset(&dummy_addr, 'A', sizeof(dummy_addr)); + + /* This will make the nodelist bloom filter very large + * (the_nodelist->node_addrs) so we will fail the contain test rarely. */ + addr_per_node = 1024; + + /* No node no nothing. The lookups should be empty. */ + nodelist_set_consensus(dummy_ns); + + /* The address set should be empty. */ + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&addr_v4); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&addr_v6); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET; + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET6; + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + md = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*md)); + ri = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*ri)); + rs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*rs)); + crypto_rand(rs->identity_digest, sizeof(rs->identity_digest)); + crypto_rand(md->digest, sizeof(md->digest)); + memcpy(rs->descriptor_digest, md->digest, DIGEST256_LEN); + + /* Setup the rs, ri and md addresses. */ + rs->addr = ipv4h; + tor_addr_parse(&rs->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::"); + ri->addr = ipv4h; + tor_addr_parse(&ri->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::"); + tor_addr_parse(&md->ipv6_addr, "1:2:3:4::"); + + /* Add the rs to the consensus becoming a node_t. */ + smartlist_add(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list, rs); + nodelist_set_consensus(dummy_ns); + + /* At this point, the address set should be initialized in the nodelist and + * we should be able to lookup. */ + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&addr_v4); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&addr_v6); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 1); + /* Lookup unknown address. */ + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET; + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + dummy_addr.family = AF_INET6; + ret = nodelist_probably_contains_address(&dummy_addr); + tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); + + done: + routerstatus_free(rs); routerinfo_free(ri); microdesc_free(md); + smartlist_clear(dummy_ns->routerstatus_list); + networkstatus_vote_free(dummy_ns); + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus); + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor); + UNMOCK(get_estimated_address_per_node); +} + +struct testcase_t address_set_tests[] = { + { "contains", test_contains, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + { "nodelist", test_nodelist, TT_FORK, + NULL, NULL }, + + END_OF_TESTCASES +}; +

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[tor/release-0.2.9] Merge branch 'ticket25183_029_01' into ticket24902_029_05
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 112638921b479f09bb473952c1870b27a0867971 Merge: 22a5d3dd2 a445327b8 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Feb 8 16:56:21 2018 -0500 Merge branch 'ticket25183_029_01' into ticket24902_029_05 src/common/address.c | 22 ++++++ src/common/address.h | 2 + src/common/address_set.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/common/address_set.h | 35 +++++++++ src/common/include.am | 2 + src/or/nodelist.c | 78 ++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/nodelist.h | 3 + src/test/include.am | 1 + src/test/test.c | 1 + src/test/test.h | 1 + src/test/test_address_set.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 11 files changed, 448 insertions(+)

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[tor/release-0.2.9] dos: Exclude known relays from client connection count
by nickm＠torproject.org 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

commit 666582a679cdfb2d69620db6aadf55a57d430e23 Author: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> Date: Fri Feb 9 11:11:41 2018 -0500 dos: Exclude known relays from client connection count This is to avoid positively identifying Exit relays if tor client connection comes from them that is reentering the network. One thing to note is that this is done only in the DoS subsystem but we'll still add it to the geoip cache as a "client" seen. This is done that way so to avoid as much as possible changing the current behavior of the geoip client cache since this is being backported. Closes #25193 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- src/or/dos.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/src/or/dos.c b/src/or/dos.c index 88f1351a3..9e8a7a9ab 100644 --- a/src/or/dos.c +++ b/src/or/dos.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include "geoip.h" #include "main.h" #include "networkstatus.h" +#include "nodelist.h" #include "router.h" #include "dos.h" @@ -664,6 +665,14 @@ dos_new_client_conn(or_connection_t *or_conn) goto end; } + /* We ignore any known address meaning an address of a known relay. The + * reason to do so is because network reentry is possible where a client + * connection comes from an Exit node. Even when we'll fix reentry, this is + * a robust defense to keep in place. */ + if (nodelist_probably_contains_address(&or_conn->real_addr)) { + goto end; + } + /* We are only interested in client connection from the geoip cache. */ entry = geoip_lookup_client(&or_conn->real_addr, NULL, GEOIP_CLIENT_CONNECT);

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