December 2018 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/release-0.3.5] sr: Switch from tor_assert() to BUG()
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit d18a167ff38799ea5cd846dd80acccab6404952a Author: Neel Chauhan <neel(a)neelc.org> Date: Tue Sep 19 16:08:24 2017 -0400 sr: Switch from tor_assert() to BUG() Closes #19566 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket19566 | 6 ++++++ src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c | 3 ++- src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket19566 b/changes/ticket19566 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf7071e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket19566 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring (shared random, dirauth): + - Change many tor_assert() to use BUG() instead. The idea is to not crash + a dirauth but rather scream loudly with a stacktrace and let it continue + run. The shared random subsystem is very resilient and if anything wrong + happens with it, at worst a non coherent value will be put in the vote + and discarded by the other authorities. Closes ticket 19566. diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c index db4f9d328..b027d9e37 100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c @@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ sr_compute_srv(void) /* Computing a shared random value in the commit phase is very wrong. This * should only happen at the very end of the reveal phase when a new * protocol run is about to start. */ - tor_assert(sr_state_get_phase() == SR_PHASE_REVEAL); + if (BUG(sr_state_get_phase() != SR_PHASE_REVEAL)) + return; state_commits = sr_state_get_commits(); commits = smartlist_new(); diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c index 38c7fd76d..7ae4a5dc8 100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c @@ -594,8 +594,10 @@ disk_state_update(void) { config_line_t **next, *line; - tor_assert(sr_disk_state); - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_disk_state)) + return; + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Reset current disk state. */ disk_state_reset(); @@ -759,7 +761,8 @@ disk_state_save_to_disk(void) STATIC void reset_state_for_new_protocol_run(time_t valid_after) { - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Keep counters in track */ sr_state->n_reveal_rounds = 0; @@ -1091,7 +1094,8 @@ sr_state_update(time_t valid_after) { sr_phase_t next_phase; - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Don't call this function twice in the same voting period. */ if (valid_after <= sr_state->valid_after) { @@ -1130,7 +1134,8 @@ sr_state_update(time_t valid_after) /* Count the current round */ if (sr_state->phase == SR_PHASE_COMMIT) { /* invariant check: we've not entered reveal phase yet */ - tor_assert(sr_state->n_reveal_rounds == 0); + if (BUG(sr_state->n_reveal_rounds != 0)) + return; sr_state->n_commit_rounds++; } else { sr_state->n_reveal_rounds++; @@ -1320,7 +1325,8 @@ sr_state_init(int save_to_disk, int read_from_disk) void set_sr_phase(sr_phase_t phase) { - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; sr_state->phase = phase; }

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] sr: Switch from tor_assert() to BUG()
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit d18a167ff38799ea5cd846dd80acccab6404952a Author: Neel Chauhan <neel(a)neelc.org> Date: Tue Sep 19 16:08:24 2017 -0400 sr: Switch from tor_assert() to BUG() Closes #19566 Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet(a)torproject.org> --- changes/ticket19566 | 6 ++++++ src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c | 3 ++- src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c | 18 ++++++++++++------ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/ticket19566 b/changes/ticket19566 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..bf7071e66 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket19566 @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + o Code simplification and refactoring (shared random, dirauth): + - Change many tor_assert() to use BUG() instead. The idea is to not crash + a dirauth but rather scream loudly with a stacktrace and let it continue + run. The shared random subsystem is very resilient and if anything wrong + happens with it, at worst a non coherent value will be put in the vote + and discarded by the other authorities. Closes ticket 19566. diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c index db4f9d328..b027d9e37 100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random.c @@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ sr_compute_srv(void) /* Computing a shared random value in the commit phase is very wrong. This * should only happen at the very end of the reveal phase when a new * protocol run is about to start. */ - tor_assert(sr_state_get_phase() == SR_PHASE_REVEAL); + if (BUG(sr_state_get_phase() != SR_PHASE_REVEAL)) + return; state_commits = sr_state_get_commits(); commits = smartlist_new(); diff --git a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c index 38c7fd76d..7ae4a5dc8 100644 --- a/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c +++ b/src/feature/dirauth/shared_random_state.c @@ -594,8 +594,10 @@ disk_state_update(void) { config_line_t **next, *line; - tor_assert(sr_disk_state); - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_disk_state)) + return; + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Reset current disk state. */ disk_state_reset(); @@ -759,7 +761,8 @@ disk_state_save_to_disk(void) STATIC void reset_state_for_new_protocol_run(time_t valid_after) { - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Keep counters in track */ sr_state->n_reveal_rounds = 0; @@ -1091,7 +1094,8 @@ sr_state_update(time_t valid_after) { sr_phase_t next_phase; - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; /* Don't call this function twice in the same voting period. */ if (valid_after <= sr_state->valid_after) { @@ -1130,7 +1134,8 @@ sr_state_update(time_t valid_after) /* Count the current round */ if (sr_state->phase == SR_PHASE_COMMIT) { /* invariant check: we've not entered reveal phase yet */ - tor_assert(sr_state->n_reveal_rounds == 0); + if (BUG(sr_state->n_reveal_rounds != 0)) + return; sr_state->n_commit_rounds++; } else { sr_state->n_reveal_rounds++; @@ -1320,7 +1325,8 @@ sr_state_init(int save_to_disk, int read_from_disk) void set_sr_phase(sr_phase_t phase) { - tor_assert(sr_state); + if (BUG(!sr_state)) + return; sr_state->phase = phase; }

1 0

[tor/master] Entry Nodes: Test on reasonably live consensuses
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 805f75182a87286a727df323be7c37add595bdff Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 22 17:47:12 2018 +1000 Entry Nodes: Test on reasonably live consensuses As well as live consensuses. Tests for 24661. --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 1071b04ce..52b87a84a 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) * that we need for entrynodes.c. */ const int N_NODES = 271; + const char *argument = testcase->setup_data; + int reasonably_live_consensus = 0; + if (argument) { + reasonably_live_consensus = strstr(argument, "reasonably-live") != NULL; + } + big_fake_net_nodes = smartlist_new(); for (i = 0; i < N_NODES; ++i) { curve25519_secret_key_t curve25519_secret_key; @@ -192,8 +198,16 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) dummy_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(or_state_t)); dummy_consensus = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(networkstatus_t)); - dummy_consensus->valid_after = approx_time() - 3600; - dummy_consensus->valid_until = approx_time() + 3600; + if (reasonably_live_consensus) { + /* Make the dummy consensus valid from 4 hours ago, but expired an hour + * ago. */ + dummy_consensus->valid_after = approx_time() - 4*3600; + dummy_consensus->valid_until = approx_time() - 3600; + } else { + /* Make the dummy consensus valid for an hour either side of now. */ + dummy_consensus->valid_after = approx_time() - 3600; + dummy_consensus->valid_until = approx_time() + 3600; + } MOCK(nodelist_get_list, bfn_mock_nodelist_get_list); MOCK(node_get_by_id, bfn_mock_node_get_by_id); @@ -3020,10 +3034,14 @@ static const struct testcase_setup_t upgrade_circuits = { #define EN_TEST_FORK(name) EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL) #define BFN_TEST(name) \ - EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &big_fake_network, NULL) + EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &big_fake_network, NULL), \ + { #name "_reasonably_live", test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, \ + &big_fake_network, (void*)("reasonably-live") } #define UPGRADE_TEST(name, arg) \ - EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &upgrade_circuits, arg) + EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &upgrade_circuits, arg), \ + { #name "_reasonably_live", test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, \ + &upgrade_circuits, (void*)(arg " reasonably-live") } struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { NO_PREFIX_TEST(node_preferred_orport),

1 0

[tor/master] Entry Nodes: Use a reasonably live consensus to select guards
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit d1ac5613fc832f4b298fbc243a35660dbd0976e3 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Mon Nov 5 15:27:38 2018 +1000 Entry Nodes: Use a reasonably live consensus to select guards Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. --- changes/bug24661 | 3 +++ src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug24661 b/changes/bug24661 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a915a93e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug24661 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (client, guard selection): + - When Tor's consensus has expired, but is still reasonably live, use it + to select guards. Fixes bug 24661; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c index 20208ef61..e0fe1b9a5 100644 --- a/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/feature/client/entrynodes.c @@ -287,7 +287,9 @@ create_initial_guard_context(void) guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER; const char *name = choose_guard_selection( get_options(), - networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()), + networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus( + approx_time(), + usable_consensus_flavor()), NULL, &type); tor_assert(name); // "name" can only be NULL if we had an old name. @@ -726,7 +728,9 @@ update_guard_selection_choice(const or_options_t *options) guard_selection_type_t type = GS_TYPE_INFER; const char *new_name = choose_guard_selection( options, - networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()), + networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus( + approx_time(), + usable_consensus_flavor()), curr_guard_context, &type); tor_assert(new_name); @@ -1125,14 +1129,16 @@ select_and_add_guard_item_for_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, * or if we don't need a consensus because we're using bridges.) */ static int -live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs) +reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(const guard_selection_t *gs) { tor_assert(gs); if (gs->type == GS_TYPE_BRIDGE) { /* We don't update bridges from the consensus; they aren't there. */ return 0; } - return networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time()) == NULL; + return networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus( + approx_time(), + usable_consensus_flavor()) == NULL; } /** @@ -1147,9 +1153,9 @@ entry_guards_expand_sample(guard_selection_t *gs) tor_assert(gs); const or_options_t *options = get_options(); - if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) { + if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) { log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not expanding the sample guard set; we have " - "no live consensus."); + "no reasonably live consensus."); return NULL; } @@ -1395,11 +1401,12 @@ sampled_guards_update_from_consensus(guard_selection_t *gs) { tor_assert(gs); - // It's important to use only a live consensus here; we don't want to - // make changes based on anything expired or old. - if (live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) { + // It's important to use a reasonably live consensus here; we want clients + // to bootstrap even if their clock is skewed by more than 2-3 hours. + // But we don't want to make changes based on anything that's really old. + if (reasonably_live_consensus_is_missing(gs)) { log_info(LD_GUARD, "Not updating the sample guard set; we have " - "no live consensus."); + "no reasonably live consensus."); return; } log_info(LD_GUARD, "Updating sampled guard status based on received "

1 0

[tor/master] Test: make unit tests use a reasonably live consensus
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit cebc39bcd56dde8f9824055fcd54707de56ab9b1 Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 21 15:55:43 2018 +1000 Test: make unit tests use a reasonably live consensus Cleanup after 24661. --- src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 7 ++----- src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h | 5 +++-- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 9 +++++---- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c index de2451b79..51e720a98 100644 --- a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c +++ b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c @@ -1448,13 +1448,10 @@ networkstatus_valid_until_is_reasonably_live(time_t valid_until, return (now <= valid_until + REASONABLY_LIVE_TIME); } -/* XXXX remove this in favor of get_live_consensus. But actually, - * leave something like it for bridge users, who need to not totally - * lose if they spend a while fetching a new consensus. */ /** As networkstatus_get_live_consensus(), but is way more tolerant of expired * consensuses. */ -networkstatus_t * -networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time_t now, int flavor) +MOCK_IMPL(networkstatus_t *, +networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus,(time_t now, int flavor)) { networkstatus_t *consensus = networkstatus_get_latest_consensus_by_flavor(flavor); diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h index 6f8b2dc96..7b1a0ff72 100644 --- a/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h +++ b/src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h @@ -89,8 +89,9 @@ int networkstatus_consensus_reasonably_live(const networkstatus_t *consensus, time_t now); int networkstatus_valid_until_is_reasonably_live(time_t valid_until, time_t now); -networkstatus_t *networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time_t now, - int flavor); +MOCK_DECL(networkstatus_t *,networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus, + (time_t now, + int flavor)); MOCK_DECL(int, networkstatus_consensus_is_bootstrapping,(time_t now)); int networkstatus_consensus_can_use_multiple_directories( const or_options_t *options); diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index b67c9fae5..3653feaff 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -74,9 +74,10 @@ bfn_mock_nodelist_get_list(void) } static networkstatus_t * -bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now) +bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(time_t now, int flavor) { (void)now; + (void)flavor; return dummy_consensus; } @@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ big_fake_network_cleanup(const struct testcase_t *testcase, void *ptr) UNMOCK(nodelist_get_list); UNMOCK(node_get_by_id); UNMOCK(get_or_state); - UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus); + UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus); or_state_free(dummy_state); dummy_state = NULL; tor_free(dummy_consensus); @@ -198,8 +199,8 @@ big_fake_network_setup(const struct testcase_t *testcase) MOCK(node_get_by_id, bfn_mock_node_get_by_id); MOCK(get_or_state, get_or_state_replacement); - MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, - bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus); + MOCK(networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus, + bfn_mock_networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus); /* Return anything but NULL (it's interpreted as test fail) */ return (void*)testcase; }

1 0

[tor/master] Entry Nodes: Mark outdated dirservers in reasonably live consensuses
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 657618ba9bd96830b0a283c28db203bf9fffb15d Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 21 19:51:34 2018 +1000 Entry Nodes: Mark outdated dirservers in reasonably live consensuses Fixes bug 28569; bugfix on Tor 0.3.2.5-alpha. --- changes/bug28569 | 3 +++ src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c | 10 ++++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug28569 b/changes/bug28569 new file mode 100644 index 000000000..45a57a80a --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug28569 @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Minor bugfixes (unit tests, directory clients): + - Mark outdated dirservers when Tor only has a reasonably live consensus. + Fixes bug 28569; bugfix on 0.3.2.5-alpha. diff --git a/src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c b/src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c index 146c772da..3f5085412 100644 --- a/src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c +++ b/src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c @@ -108,10 +108,12 @@ microdesc_note_outdated_dirserver(const char *relay_digest) { char relay_hexdigest[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]; - /* Don't register outdated dirservers if we don't have a live consensus, - * since we might be trying to fetch microdescriptors that are not even - * currently active. */ - if (!networkstatus_get_live_consensus(approx_time())) { + /* If we have a reasonably live consensus, then most of our dirservers should + * still be caching all the microdescriptors in it. Reasonably live + * consensuses are up to a day old. But microdescriptors expire 7 days after + * the last consensus that referenced them. */ + if (!networkstatus_get_reasonably_live_consensus(approx_time(), + FLAV_MICRODESC)) { return; }

1 0

[tor/master] Entry Nodes: refactor tests to use macros
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 390112d07e7daad1ce1e79b37c3357ca936fd9ae Author: teor <teor(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Nov 22 17:10:28 2018 +1000 Entry Nodes: refactor tests to use macros Part of 24661. --- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c index 3653feaff..1071b04ce 100644 --- a/src/test/test_entrynodes.c +++ b/src/test/test_entrynodes.c @@ -2692,7 +2692,7 @@ test_entry_guard_upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending(void *arg) } static void -test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg) +test_entry_guard_should_expire_waiting(void *arg) { (void)arg; circuit_guard_state_t *fake_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*fake_state)); @@ -3010,39 +3010,38 @@ static const struct testcase_setup_t upgrade_circuits = { upgrade_circuits_setup, upgrade_circuits_cleanup }; +#define NO_PREFIX_TEST(name) \ + { #name, test_ ## name, 0, NULL, NULL } + +#define EN_TEST_BASE(name, fork, setup, arg) \ + { #name, test_entry_guard_ ## name, fork, setup, (void*)(arg) } + +#define EN_TEST(name) EN_TEST_BASE(name, 0, NULL, NULL) +#define EN_TEST_FORK(name) EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL) + #define BFN_TEST(name) \ - { #name, test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, &big_fake_network, NULL } + EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &big_fake_network, NULL) -#define UPGRADE_TEST(name, arg) \ - { #name, test_entry_guard_ ## name, TT_FORK, &upgrade_circuits, \ - (void*)(arg) } +#define UPGRADE_TEST(name, arg) \ + EN_TEST_BASE(name, TT_FORK, &upgrade_circuits, arg) struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { - { "node_preferred_orport", - test_node_preferred_orport, - 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "entry_guard_describe", test_entry_guard_describe, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "randomize_time", test_entry_guard_randomize_time, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "encode_for_state_minimal", - test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_minimal, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "encode_for_state_maximal", - test_entry_guard_encode_for_state_maximal, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_minimal", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_minimal, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_maximal", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_maximal, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_failure", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_failure, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_partial_failure", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_partial_failure, 0, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_full", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_full, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - { "parse_from_state_broken", - test_entry_guard_parse_from_state_broken, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - { "get_guard_selection_by_name", - test_entry_guard_get_guard_selection_by_name, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, - { "number_of_primaries", - test_entry_guard_number_of_primaries, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + NO_PREFIX_TEST(node_preferred_orport), + NO_PREFIX_TEST(entry_guard_describe), + + EN_TEST(randomize_time), + EN_TEST(encode_for_state_minimal), + EN_TEST(encode_for_state_maximal), + EN_TEST(parse_from_state_minimal), + EN_TEST(parse_from_state_maximal), + EN_TEST(parse_from_state_failure), + EN_TEST(parse_from_state_partial_failure), + + EN_TEST_FORK(parse_from_state_full), + EN_TEST_FORK(parse_from_state_broken), + EN_TEST_FORK(get_guard_selection_by_name), + EN_TEST_FORK(number_of_primaries), + BFN_TEST(choose_selection_initial), BFN_TEST(add_single_guard), BFN_TEST(node_filter), @@ -3056,7 +3055,9 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { BFN_TEST(sample_reachable_filtered_empty), BFN_TEST(retry_unreachable), BFN_TEST(manage_primary), - { "guard_preferred", test_entry_guard_guard_preferred, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, + + EN_TEST_FORK(guard_preferred), + BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_no_confirmed), BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_confirmed), BFN_TEST(select_for_circuit_highlevel_primary), @@ -3079,8 +3080,8 @@ struct testcase_t entrynodes_tests[] = { UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_restricted_circ_pending, "c2-done"), UPGRADE_TEST(upgrade_not_blocked_by_worse_circ_pending, "c1-done"), - { "should_expire_waiting", test_enty_guard_should_expire_waiting, TT_FORK, - NULL, NULL }, + + EN_TEST_FORK(should_expire_waiting), END_OF_TESTCASES };

1 0

[tor/master] Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/536'
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 7e9985b75aa69d4572aac739d44d50056ed20e82 Merge: af9dc12fa 805f75182 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Sat Dec 1 11:24:02 2018 -0500 Merge remote-tracking branch 'tor-github/pr/536' changes/bug24661 | 3 ++ changes/bug28569 | 3 ++ src/feature/client/entrynodes.c | 27 ++++++---- src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c | 10 ++-- src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.c | 7 +-- src/feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h | 5 +- src/test/test_entrynodes.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 7 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 60 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] In test_rebind.py, log stuff with timestamps
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 320f5f30b35695adf1cb1254f26af3b87ec4d2a3 Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 18:09:31 2018 +0200 In test_rebind.py, log stuff with timestamps --- src/test/test_rebind.py | 13 +++++++++---- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/test/test_rebind.py b/src/test/test_rebind.py index c63341a68..64eba14f0 100644 --- a/src/test/test_rebind.py +++ b/src/test/test_rebind.py @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ from __future__ import print_function import errno +import logging import os import random import socket @@ -13,7 +14,7 @@ LOG_WAIT = 0.1 LOG_CHECK_LIMIT = LOG_TIMEOUT / LOG_WAIT def fail(msg): - print('FAIL') + logging.error('FAIL') sys.exit(msg) def try_connecting_to_socksport(): @@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ def wait_for_log(s): l = l.decode('utf8') if s in l: return - print('Tor logged: "{}", waiting for "{}"'.format(l.strip(), s)) + logging.info('Tor logged: "{}", waiting for "{}"'.format(l.strip(), s)) # readline() returns a blank string when there is no output # avoid busy-waiting if len(s) == 0: @@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ def pick_random_port(): return port +logging.basicConfig(level=logging.DEBUG, + format='%(asctime)s.%(msecs)03d %(message)s', + datefmt='%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S') + if sys.hexversion < 0x02070000: fail("ERROR: unsupported Python version (should be >= 2.7)") @@ -108,13 +113,13 @@ try_connecting_to_socksport() control_socket.sendall('SIGNAL HALT\r\n'.encode('utf8')) wait_for_log('exiting cleanly') -print('OK') +logging.info('OK') try: tor_process.terminate() except OSError as e: if e.errno == errno.ESRCH: # errno 3: No such process # assume tor has already exited due to SIGNAL HALT - print("Tor has already exited") + logging.warn("Tor has already exited") else: raise

1 0

[tor/maint-0.3.5] Add changes file
by nickm＠torproject.org 01 Dec '18

01 Dec '18

commit 9bbf7ec3031a2597944e2df59b634ff77a36a3f8 Author: rl1987 <rl1987(a)sdf.lonestar.org> Date: Sun Nov 4 19:10:40 2018 +0200 Add changes file --- changes/ticket28229_diag | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/changes/ticket28229_diag b/changes/ticket28229_diag new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cd02b81fa --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/ticket28229_diag @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + o Testing: + - Increase logging and tag all log entries with timestamps + in test_rebind.py. Provides diagnostics for issue 28229.

1 0