February 2017 - tor-commits - lists.torproject.org

[tor/maint-0.3.0] Change approach to preventing duplicate guards.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 1582adabbb13871bcf6f91be4fa8523aeb36f79a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 14 12:21:31 2017 -0500 Change approach to preventing duplicate guards. Previously I'd made a bad assumption in the implementation of prop271 in 0.3.0.1-alpha: I'd assumed that there couldn't be two guards with the same identity. That's true for non-bridges, but in the bridge case, we allow two bridges to have the same ID if they have different addr:port combinations -- in order to have the same bridge ID running multiple PTs. Fortunately, this assumption wasn't deeply ingrained: we stop enforcing the "one guard per ID" rule in the bridge case, and instead enforce "one guard per <id,addr,port>". We also needed to tweak our implementation of get_bridge_info_for_guard, since it made the same incorrect assumption. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. --- changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug21027 b/changes/bug21027 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d20df87 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21027 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes (bridges): + + - When the same bridge is configured multiple times at different + address:port combinations (but with the same identity), treat + those bridge instances as separate guards. This allows clients to + configure the same bridge with multiple pluggable transports, once + again. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/bridges.c b/src/or/bridges.c index 8b37f41..f766931 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.c +++ b/src/or/bridges.c @@ -199,6 +199,33 @@ get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, return NULL; } +/** + * As get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port, but require that the + * address match addr:port, and that the ID digest match + * digest. (The other function will ignore the address if the + * digest matches.) + */ +bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == port) { + + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + else if (!digest) + return bridge; + } + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; +} + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a * bridge with no known digest whose address matches addr:port, * return 1. Else return 0. If digest is NULL, check for diff --git a/src/or/bridges.h b/src/or/bridges.h index de23fe6..27ea5e1 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.h +++ b/src/or/bridges.h @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest( const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); +bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest); int addr_is_a_configured_bridge(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 93dd2bd..3e87147 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -768,11 +768,6 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *id = bridge_get_rsa_id_digest(bridge); const tor_addr_port_t *addrport = bridge_get_addr_port(bridge); entry_guard_t *guard; - if (id) { - guard = get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, id); - if (guard) - return guard; - } if (BUG(!addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE guard = get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(gs, addrport); @@ -787,16 +782,17 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, static bridge_info_t * get_bridge_info_for_guard(const entry_guard_t *guard) { + const uint8_t *identity = NULL; if (! tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) { - bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(guard->identity); - if (bridge) - return bridge; + identity = (const uint8_t *)guard->identity; } if (BUG(guard->bridge_addr == NULL)) return NULL; - return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(&guard->bridge_addr->addr, - guard->bridge_addr->port, - NULL); + + return get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + &guard->bridge_addr->addr, + guard->bridge_addr->port, + (const char*)identity); } /** @@ -820,6 +816,10 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.", node_describe(node)); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity, node_get_nickname(node), @@ -843,9 +843,6 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, // XXXX #20827 take ed25519 identity here too. - /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ - if (rsa_id_digest && BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest))) - return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE /* Make sure we can actually identify the guard. */ if (BUG(!rsa_id_digest && !bridge_addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE @@ -890,6 +887,10 @@ entry_guard_add_bridge_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, tor_assert(addrport); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(gs, bridge))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, id_digest, NULL, addrport); }

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'bug21027_v2_squashed' into maint-0.3.0
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 16f337e7639c42b5c6106d6bc9828cb9e6614054 Merge: eef8bd4 1582ada Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 28 08:16:43 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug21027_v2_squashed' into maint-0.3.0 changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

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[tor/master] Change approach to preventing duplicate guards.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 1582adabbb13871bcf6f91be4fa8523aeb36f79a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 14 12:21:31 2017 -0500 Change approach to preventing duplicate guards. Previously I'd made a bad assumption in the implementation of prop271 in 0.3.0.1-alpha: I'd assumed that there couldn't be two guards with the same identity. That's true for non-bridges, but in the bridge case, we allow two bridges to have the same ID if they have different addr:port combinations -- in order to have the same bridge ID running multiple PTs. Fortunately, this assumption wasn't deeply ingrained: we stop enforcing the "one guard per ID" rule in the bridge case, and instead enforce "one guard per <id,addr,port>". We also needed to tweak our implementation of get_bridge_info_for_guard, since it made the same incorrect assumption. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. --- changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug21027 b/changes/bug21027 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d20df87 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21027 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes (bridges): + + - When the same bridge is configured multiple times at different + address:port combinations (but with the same identity), treat + those bridge instances as separate guards. This allows clients to + configure the same bridge with multiple pluggable transports, once + again. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/bridges.c b/src/or/bridges.c index 8b37f41..f766931 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.c +++ b/src/or/bridges.c @@ -199,6 +199,33 @@ get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, return NULL; } +/** + * As get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port, but require that the + * address match addr:port, and that the ID digest match + * digest. (The other function will ignore the address if the + * digest matches.) + */ +bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == port) { + + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + else if (!digest) + return bridge; + } + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; +} + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a * bridge with no known digest whose address matches addr:port, * return 1. Else return 0. If digest is NULL, check for diff --git a/src/or/bridges.h b/src/or/bridges.h index de23fe6..27ea5e1 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.h +++ b/src/or/bridges.h @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest( const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); +bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest); int addr_is_a_configured_bridge(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 93dd2bd..3e87147 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -768,11 +768,6 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *id = bridge_get_rsa_id_digest(bridge); const tor_addr_port_t *addrport = bridge_get_addr_port(bridge); entry_guard_t *guard; - if (id) { - guard = get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, id); - if (guard) - return guard; - } if (BUG(!addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE guard = get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(gs, addrport); @@ -787,16 +782,17 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, static bridge_info_t * get_bridge_info_for_guard(const entry_guard_t *guard) { + const uint8_t *identity = NULL; if (! tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) { - bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(guard->identity); - if (bridge) - return bridge; + identity = (const uint8_t *)guard->identity; } if (BUG(guard->bridge_addr == NULL)) return NULL; - return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(&guard->bridge_addr->addr, - guard->bridge_addr->port, - NULL); + + return get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + &guard->bridge_addr->addr, + guard->bridge_addr->port, + (const char*)identity); } /** @@ -820,6 +816,10 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.", node_describe(node)); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity, node_get_nickname(node), @@ -843,9 +843,6 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, // XXXX #20827 take ed25519 identity here too. - /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ - if (rsa_id_digest && BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest))) - return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE /* Make sure we can actually identify the guard. */ if (BUG(!rsa_id_digest && !bridge_addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE @@ -890,6 +887,10 @@ entry_guard_add_bridge_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, tor_assert(addrport); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(gs, bridge))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, id_digest, NULL, addrport); }

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[tor/release-0.3.0] Replace entry_guard_get_by_id_digest_for_guard_selection impl.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit f5995692dadf9bc038455d7e701be84937f28d82 Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 14 10:28:54 2017 -0500 Replace entry_guard_get_by_id_digest_for_guard_selection impl. We already implemented this whole function somewhere else; no need to have the same code twice. --- src/or/entrynodes.c | 8 +------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 3bb5169..93dd2bd 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -2901,13 +2901,7 @@ entry_guard_t * entry_guard_get_by_id_digest_for_guard_selection(guard_selection_t *gs, const char *digest) { - tor_assert(gs != NULL); - - SMARTLIST_FOREACH(gs->sampled_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry, - if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN)) - return entry; - ); - return NULL; + return get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (const uint8_t*)digest); } /** Return the node_t associated with a single entry_guard_t. May

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[tor/master] Merge branch 'maint-0.3.0'
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 928235506b1ab6c5f0e92ae1c3606c8d870ec32a Merge: c0aa7ac 16f337e Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 28 08:20:09 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'maint-0.3.0' changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

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[tor/release-0.3.0] Merge branch 'bug21027_v2_squashed' into maint-0.3.0
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 16f337e7639c42b5c6106d6bc9828cb9e6614054 Merge: eef8bd4 1582ada Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 28 08:16:43 2017 -0500 Merge branch 'bug21027_v2_squashed' into maint-0.3.0 changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++--------------------- 4 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)

1 0

[tor/release-0.3.0] Change approach to preventing duplicate guards.
by nickm＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 1582adabbb13871bcf6f91be4fa8523aeb36f79a Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 14 12:21:31 2017 -0500 Change approach to preventing duplicate guards. Previously I'd made a bad assumption in the implementation of prop271 in 0.3.0.1-alpha: I'd assumed that there couldn't be two guards with the same identity. That's true for non-bridges, but in the bridge case, we allow two bridges to have the same ID if they have different addr:port combinations -- in order to have the same bridge ID running multiple PTs. Fortunately, this assumption wasn't deeply ingrained: we stop enforcing the "one guard per ID" rule in the bridge case, and instead enforce "one guard per <id,addr,port>". We also needed to tweak our implementation of get_bridge_info_for_guard, since it made the same incorrect assumption. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. --- changes/bug21027 | 8 ++++++++ src/or/bridges.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/or/bridges.h | 4 ++++ src/or/entrynodes.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 4 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/changes/bug21027 b/changes/bug21027 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d20df87 --- /dev/null +++ b/changes/bug21027 @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + o Major bugfixes (bridges): + + - When the same bridge is configured multiple times at different + address:port combinations (but with the same identity), treat + those bridge instances as separate guards. This allows clients to + configure the same bridge with multiple pluggable transports, once + again. Fixes bug 21027; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. + diff --git a/src/or/bridges.c b/src/or/bridges.c index 8b37f41..f766931 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.c +++ b/src/or/bridges.c @@ -199,6 +199,33 @@ get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, return NULL; } +/** + * As get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port, but require that the + * address match addr:port, and that the ID digest match + * digest. (The other function will ignore the address if the + * digest matches.) + */ +bridge_info_t * +get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest) +{ + if (!bridge_list) + return NULL; + SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) { + if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) && + bridge->port == port) { + + if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) + return bridge; + else if (!digest) + return bridge; + } + + } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge); + return NULL; +} + /** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches digest, or a * bridge with no known digest whose address matches addr:port, * return 1. Else return 0. If digest is NULL, check for diff --git a/src/or/bridges.h b/src/or/bridges.h index de23fe6..27ea5e1 100644 --- a/src/or/bridges.h +++ b/src/or/bridges.h @@ -27,6 +27,10 @@ bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest( const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); +bridge_info_t *get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + const tor_addr_t *addr, + uint16_t port, + const char *digest); int addr_is_a_configured_bridge(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port, const char *digest); diff --git a/src/or/entrynodes.c b/src/or/entrynodes.c index 93dd2bd..3e87147 100644 --- a/src/or/entrynodes.c +++ b/src/or/entrynodes.c @@ -768,11 +768,6 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, const uint8_t *id = bridge_get_rsa_id_digest(bridge); const tor_addr_port_t *addrport = bridge_get_addr_port(bridge); entry_guard_t *guard; - if (id) { - guard = get_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, id); - if (guard) - return guard; - } if (BUG(!addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE guard = get_sampled_guard_by_bridge_addr(gs, addrport); @@ -787,16 +782,17 @@ get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(guard_selection_t *gs, static bridge_info_t * get_bridge_info_for_guard(const entry_guard_t *guard) { + const uint8_t *identity = NULL; if (! tor_digest_is_zero(guard->identity)) { - bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(guard->identity); - if (bridge) - return bridge; + identity = (const uint8_t *)guard->identity; } if (BUG(guard->bridge_addr == NULL)) return NULL; - return get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(&guard->bridge_addr->addr, - guard->bridge_addr->port, - NULL); + + return get_configured_bridge_by_exact_addr_port_digest( + &guard->bridge_addr->addr, + guard->bridge_addr->port, + (const char*)identity); } /** @@ -820,6 +816,10 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, log_info(LD_GUARD, "Adding %s as to the entry guard sample set.", node_describe(node)); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, (const uint8_t*)node->identity, node_get_nickname(node), @@ -843,9 +843,6 @@ entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(guard_selection_t *gs, // XXXX #20827 take ed25519 identity here too. - /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ - if (rsa_id_digest && BUG(have_sampled_guard_with_id(gs, rsa_id_digest))) - return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE /* Make sure we can actually identify the guard. */ if (BUG(!rsa_id_digest && !bridge_addrport)) return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE @@ -890,6 +887,10 @@ entry_guard_add_bridge_to_sample(guard_selection_t *gs, tor_assert(addrport); + /* make sure that the guard is not already sampled. */ + if (BUG(get_sampled_guard_for_bridge(gs, bridge))) + return NULL; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE + return entry_guard_add_to_sample_impl(gs, id_digest, NULL, addrport); }

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[metrics-web/master] Update JavaScript from CollecTor/Onionoo.
by karsten＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit d0d8758d12d799aac5b5083223f9149616348035 Author: Karsten Loesing <karsten.loesing(a)gmx.net> Date: Tue Feb 28 13:33:35 2017 +0100 Update JavaScript from CollecTor/Onionoo. --- website/web/WEB-INF/glossary.jsp | 54 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------- website/web/WEB-INF/top.jsp | 2 +- website/web/js/script.js | 29 ++++++++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) diff --git a/website/web/WEB-INF/glossary.jsp b/website/web/WEB-INF/glossary.jsp index 1c8b3ce..edde87d 100644 --- a/website/web/WEB-INF/glossary.jsp +++ b/website/web/WEB-INF/glossary.jsp @@ -17,50 +17,50 @@ <h1>Glossary <a href="#glossary" name="glossary" class="anchor">#</a></h1> - <a name="advertised-bandwidth"></a> - <a href="#advertised-bandwidth">advertised bandwidth:</a> the + <a href="#advertised-bandwidth">advertised + bandwidth:</a> the volume of traffic, both incoming and outgoing, that a <a href="#relay">relay</a> is willing to sustain, as configured by the operator and claimed to be observed from recent data transfers. - <a name="bandwidth-history"></a> - <a href="#bandwidth-history">bandwidth history:</a> the volume + <a href="#bandwidth-history">bandwidth + history:</a> the volume of incoming and/or outgoing traffic that a <a href="#relay">relay</a> claims to have handled on behalf of <a href="#client">clients</a>. - <a name="bridge"></a> - <a href="#bridge">bridge:</a> a <a href="#relay">relay</a> whose + <a href="#bridge">bridge:</a> a + <a href="#relay">relay</a> whose existence is non-public and which can therefore provide access for blocked <a href="#client">clients</a>, often in combination with <a href="#pluggable-transport">pluggable transports</a>, which registers itself with the <a href="#bridge-authority">bridge authority</a>. - <a name="bridge-authority"></a> - <a href="#bridge-authority">bridge authority:</a> a + <a href="#bridge-authority">bridge + authority:</a> a special-purpose <a href="#relay">relay</a> that maintains a list of bridges as input for external bridge distribution mechanisms (for example, <a href="https://bridges.torproject.org/">BridgeDB</a>). - <a name="circuit"></a> - <a href="#circuit">circuit:</a> a path through the Tor network + <a href="#circuit">circuit:</a> a path through the + Tor network built by <a href="#client">clients</a> consisting of at most one <a href="#bridge">bridge</a> and at least one <a href="#relay">relay</a>. - <a name="client"></a> - <a href="#client">client:</a> a node in the Tor network, + <a href="#client">client:</a> a node in the Tor + network, typically running on behalf of one user, that routes application connections over a series of <a href="#relay">relays</a>. - <a name="consensus"></a> - <a href="#consensus">consensus:</a> a single document compiled + <a href="#consensus">consensus:</a> a single + document compiled and voted on by the <a href="#directory-authority">directory authorities</a> once per hour, ensuring that all <a href="#client">clients</a> have the same information about the <a href="#relay">relays</a> that make up the Tor network. - <a name="consensus-weight"></a> - <a href="#consensus-weight">consensus weight:</a> a value + <a href="#consensus-weight">consensus + weight:</a> a value assigned to a <a href="#relay">relay</a> that is based on bandwidth observed by the relay and bandwidth measured by the <a href="#directory-authority">directory authorities</a>, included in the @@ -68,38 +68,36 @@ <a href="#client">clients</a> to select relays for their <a href="#circuit">circuits</a>. - <a name="directory-authority"></a> - <a href="#directory-authority">directory authority:</a> a + <a href="#directory-authority">directory + authority:</a> a special-purpose <a href="#relay">relay</a> that maintains a list of currently-running relays and periodically publishes a <a href="#consensus">consensus</a> together with the other directory authorities. - <a name="directory-mirror"></a> - <a href="#directory-mirror">directory mirror:</a> a + <a href="#directory-mirror">directory + mirror:</a> a <a href="#relay">relay</a> that provides a recent copy of directory information to clients, in order to reduce the load on <a href="#directory-authority">directory authorities</a>. - <a name="onion-service"></a> - <a href="#onion-service">onion service:</a> a + <a href="#onion-service">onion service:</a> a service (for example, a website or instant-messaging server) that is only accessible via the Tor network. - <a name="pluggable-transport"></a> - <a href="#pluggable-transport">pluggable transport:</a> an + <a href="#pluggable-transport">pluggable + transport:</a> an alternative transport protocol provided by <a href="#bridge">bridges</a> and used by <a href="#client">clients</a> to circumvent transport-level blockings (for example, by ISPs or governments). - <a name="relay"></a> - <a href="#relay">relay:</a> a publicly-listed node in the Tor + <a href="#relay">relay:</a> a publicly-listed node in + the Tor network that forwards traffic on behalf of <a href="#client">clients</a>, and that registers itself with the <a href="#directory-authority">directory authorities</a>. - <a name="relay-flag"></a> - <a href="#relay-flag">relay flag:</a> a special + <a href="#relay-flag">relay flag:</a> a special (dis-)qualification of <a href="#relay">relays</a> for circuit positions (for example, "Guard", "Exit", "BadExit"), circuit properties (for example, "Fast", "Stable"), or roles (for example, "Authority", "HSDir"), diff --git a/website/web/WEB-INF/top.jsp b/website/web/WEB-INF/top.jsp index c0428e2..f34031b 100644 --- a/website/web/WEB-INF/top.jsp +++ b/website/web/WEB-INF/top.jsp @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ <script type="text/javascript"> document.write('<div class="topButton" style="display:none;"><a href="#top"></a></div>'); </script> -<a name="top" id="anchor-top"></a> +<a id="top"></a>  <nav class="navbar navbar-default navbar-secondary"> diff --git a/website/web/js/script.js b/website/web/js/script.js index 5efcf10..6d195bc 100644 --- a/website/web/js/script.js +++ b/website/web/js/script.js @@ -1,6 +1,26 @@ /* Please keep this file [✓] UTF-8 encoded */ + +function getCoords(elem) { // crossbrowser version + var box = elem.getBoundingClientRect(); + + var body = document.body; + var docEl = document.documentElement; + + var scrollTop = window.pageYOffset || docEl.scrollTop || body.scrollTop; + var scrollLeft = window.pageXOffset || docEl.scrollLeft || body.scrollLeft; + + var clientTop = docEl.clientTop || body.clientTop || 0; + var clientLeft = docEl.clientLeft || body.clientLeft || 0; + + var top = box.top + scrollTop - clientTop; + var left = box.left + scrollLeft - clientLeft; + + return { top: Math.round(top), left: Math.round(left) }; +} + + jQuery(function() { // jQuery is .ready() - let's do stuff! @@ -21,11 +41,12 @@ jQuery(function() { // smooth scolling for all anchor links jQuery('a[href^="#"]:not(.anchor)').on('click',function (e) { - e.preventDefault(); var target = this.hash; - var $target = $(target.split('#').join('#anchor-')); - if ($target.offset() != null) { - jQuery('html,body').animate({scrollTop: $target.offset().top},900, function(){ + var tID = document.getElementById(target.split('#').join('')); + if (tID != null) { + e.preventDefault(); + var offset = getCoords(tID); + jQuery('html,body').animate({scrollTop: offset.top},900, function(){ window.location.hash = target; }); }

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[translation/tor-browser-manual] Update translations for tor-browser-manual
by translation＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 052a3dc5881df3f5f207e6fc4f76a7b10cb17da1 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 28 10:48:23 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-browser-manual --- vi/vi.po | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/vi/vi.po b/vi/vi.po index c8dc02d..9f3dbb2 100644 --- a/vi/vi.po +++ b/vi/vi.po @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ msgstr "" #: managing-identities.page:101 msgid "Changing identities and circuits" -msgstr "" +msgstr "Thay đổi danh tính và lộ trình" #. This is a reference to an external file such as an image or video. When #. the file changes, the md5 hash will change to let you know you need to @@ -720,8 +720,8 @@ msgid "" "Tor Browser features “New Identity” and “New Tor Circuit for this Site” " "options, located in the Torbutton menu." msgstr "" -"Trình duyệt Tor gồm có các lựa chọn “Định dạng mới” và “Lộ trình Tor mới cho" -" trang này”, được đặt trong danh mục nút Tor." +"Trình duyệt Tor gồm có các lựa chọn “Định dạng Mới” và “Lộ trình Tor Mới cho" +" Trang này”, được đặt trong danh mục nút Tor." #: managing-identities.page:111 msgid "New Identity"

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[translation/tor-browser-manual] Update translations for tor-browser-manual
by translation＠torproject.org 28 Feb '17

28 Feb '17

commit 1ac9954290d68b681ce697d10298c15a4845426a Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Tue Feb 28 10:18:21 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-browser-manual --- vi/vi.po | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/vi/vi.po b/vi/vi.po index 0bb756c..c8dc02d 100644 --- a/vi/vi.po +++ b/vi/vi.po @@ -712,12 +712,16 @@ msgid "" "external ref='media/managing-identities/new_identity.png' " "md5='15b01e35fa83185d94b57bf0ccf09d76'" msgstr "" +"Tham chiếu ngoài ref='media/managing-identities/new_identity.png' " +"md5='15b01e35fa83185d94b57bf0ccf09d76'" #: managing-identities.page:105 msgid "" "Tor Browser features “New Identity” and “New Tor Circuit for this Site” " "options, located in the Torbutton menu." msgstr "" +"Trình duyệt Tor gồm có các lựa chọn “Định dạng mới” và “Lộ trình Tor mới cho" +" trang này”, được đặt trong danh mục nút Tor." #: managing-identities.page:111 msgid "New Identity"

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