tor-commits December 2017

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[translation/torbutton-abouttorproperties] Update translations for torbutton-abouttorproperties
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 0e63035ec5c3fdc335609f05a40583a17a4eb961 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:48:30 2017 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-abouttorproperties --- hu/abouttor.properties | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/hu/abouttor.properties b/hu/abouttor.properties index ab476d989..bf41c573e 100644 --- a/hu/abouttor.properties +++ b/hu/abouttor.properties @@ -8,13 +8,13 @@ aboutTor.searchDDG.privacy.link=https://duckduckgo.com/privacy.html # The following string is a link which replaces %2$S above. aboutTor.searchDDG.search.link=https://duckduckgo.com/ -aboutTor.donationBanner.donate=Donate Now! +aboutTor.donationBanner.donate=Támogasson Most! aboutTor.donationBanner.slogan=Tor: Powering Digital Resistance aboutTor.donationBanner.mozilla=Give today and Mozilla will match your gift! aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline1=Protecting Journalists, Whistleblowers, & Activists Since 2006 aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline2=Networking Freedom Worldwide -aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline3=Freedom Online +aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline3=Internetes szabadság aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline4=Fostering Free Expression Worldwide -aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline5=Protecting the Privacy of Millions Every Day +aboutTor.donationBanner.tagline5=Milliók személyes adatainak megvédése minden egyes nap

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[translation/torbutton-torbuttondtd] Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit a0450c5434b1db57e3e004a9f6b369411e86eaf6 Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 17:47:41 2017 +0000 Update translations for torbutton-torbuttondtd --- hu/torbutton.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/hu/torbutton.dtd b/hu/torbutton.dtd index 15448e2b2..086528cf5 100644 --- a/hu/torbutton.dtd +++ b/hu/torbutton.dtd @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.restrict_thirdparty_tooltip "Hagyja ezt a gombot bejelölve, hogy megakadályozza, hogy különböző böngésző lehetőségek eltérítésre kerülhessenek a webes nyomon követhetősége érdekében. A módosított szolgáltatások többek között, blob URL, broadcast csatornák, böngésző cache, sütik, favikonok, HTTP Auth fejlécek, link előcsatlakozások, localStorage, mediaSource URL-ek, OCSP kérések, SharedWorkers-ek, és TLS session ticketek."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting "Változtassa meg a részleteket, amik megkülönböztetik a többi Tor Browser felhasználótól"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting.accesskey "F"> -<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip "Keep this box checked to hide things from websites that could be unique about you, including your computer performance, keyboard layout, locale, the location of installed plugins, the list of installed plugins, your network status, screen orientation, screen size, site-specific zoom levels, supported file types, system colors, and WebGL capabilities."> +<!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.resist_fingerprinting_tooltip "Hagyja ezt a gombot bejelölve, hogy elrejtsen dolgokat weboldalak elől, amik egyedivé tehetik, mint elem állapot, számítógép teljesítmény, billentyűzet kiosztás, hely, a telepített pluginek helye, a telepített pluginek listája, hálózati állapota, képernyő irányítottsága, oldal specifikus nagyítás szintek, támogatott fájltípusok, rendszerszínek, és WebGL képességek,"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption "Biztonsági szint"> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_caption_tooltip "A Biztonsági Csúszóka lehetővé tesz, hogy kikapcsoljon olyan böngésző funkcionalitásokat, amik sebezhetővé teszik a törési kísérletekben."> <!ENTITY torbutton.prefs.sec_low "Alacsony (alapértelmezett)">

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[tor-launcher/master] Bug 24624: tbb-logo.svg may cause network access
by gk＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit c22a773ffaeb0398d8be0119f6e89f3c8161e4aa Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Thu Dec 14 10:14:15 2017 -0500 Bug 24624: tbb-logo.svg may cause network access Remove www.w3.org DTD, unused xlink namespace declaration, and "Generator" comment. --- src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.svg | 4 +--- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.svg b/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.svg index 26cd158..8be32c2 100644 --- a/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.svg +++ b/src/chrome/skin/tbb-logo.svg @@ -1,7 +1,5 @@ <?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> - -<!DOCTYPE svg PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD SVG 1.1//EN" "http://www.w3.org/Graphics/SVG/1.1/DTD/svg11.dtd"> -<svg version="1.1" id="Layer_1" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" x="0px" y="0px" +<svg version="1.1" id="Layer_1" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" x="0px" y="0px" viewBox="0 0 328.6 66.3" enable-background="new 0 0 328.6 66.3" xml:space="preserve"> <g> <g>

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[tor-launcher/master] Bug 24623: revise "country that censors Tor" text
by gk＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 12baf2b089479b3e043dbfad8ac246a5226feeae Author: Kathy Brade <brade(a)pearlcrescent.com> Date: Thu Dec 14 09:51:11 2017 -0500 Bug 24623: revise "country that censors Tor" text List Egypt, China, Turkey as countries that may block Tor. This list was derived from data provided by OONI. --- src/chrome/locale/en/network-settings.dtd | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/src/chrome/locale/en/network-settings.dtd b/src/chrome/locale/en/network-settings.dtd index 240154c..85645d7 100644 --- a/src/chrome/locale/en/network-settings.dtd +++ b/src/chrome/locale/en/network-settings.dtd @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@  <!ENTITY torSettings.connectPrompt "Click “Connect” to connect to Tor."> -<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt "Click “Configure” to adjust network settings if you are in a country that censors Tor (such as China, Iran, Syria) or if you are connecting from a private network that requires a proxy."> +<!ENTITY torSettings.configurePrompt "Click “Configure” to adjust network settings if you are in a country that censors Tor (such as Egypt, China, Turkey) or if you are connecting from a private network that requires a proxy."> <!ENTITY torSettings.configure "Configure"> <!ENTITY torSettings.connect "Connect">

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2] Bug 23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales
by gk＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 8ea9839478bfddd4f078f16c9268edf1755e9cb0 Author: Richard Pospesel <richard(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Nov 15 10:48:38 2017 -0800 Bug 23016: "Print to File" does not create the expected file in non-English locales The Problem: During firefox and Web Content process startup, ::OverrideDefaultLocaleIfNeeded() is called which will conditionally ::setlocale() to "C.UTF-8" or "C" based off of the javascript.use_us_english_locale preference (to prevent fingerprinting based on how dates and what-not are formatted). Sometime after this call in the Web Content process the locale is set to the system's locale which effectively stomps over the work done by the ::OverrideDefaultLocaleIfNeeded() call. As a result, the firefox process and the Web Content process are configured to use different locales; firefox uses "C.UTF-8" while Web Content uses "" (system default). On Linux, the "Print to File" printer is a default GTK printer whose name is localized based off of the process's locale. The GTK print dialog is hosted in the firefox process and therefore the printer name will be 'Print to File.' This process sends this name over to the Web Content process, which iterates over the list of printers and finds one whose name matches. However, as the Web Content process's locale is set to system, its printer names will be localized and in the language of the system, so no printer with the name 'Print to File' will be found, and printing fails. This is why disabling javascript.use_us_english_locale fixes the issue. It also explains why disabling multi-process mode via the browser.tabs.remote.autostart.2 preference fixes the issue; one process means the printer-name is never used as a selector and also means no mismatched locale can happen. The Solution: The fix for this issue is to first check the javascript.use_us_english_locale preference each place in code where setlocale occurs, particularly in the nsLocaleService object which is the particular code path which overrides setlocale in the Web Content process. --- intl/locale/nsLocaleService.cpp | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp | 14 ++++++-- xpcom/io/nsNativeCharsetUtils.cpp | 14 ++++++-- 3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/intl/locale/nsLocaleService.cpp b/intl/locale/nsLocaleService.cpp index 6d45ec9afa2a..e89ff32346cd 100644 --- a/intl/locale/nsLocaleService.cpp +++ b/intl/locale/nsLocaleService.cpp @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ #include "nsTArray.h" #include "nsString.h" #include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" +#include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include <ctype.h> @@ -93,12 +94,20 @@ protected: // nsLocaleService::nsLocaleService(void) { + // conditionally use us english locale when initialization locale objects + const auto use_us_english_locale = + mozilla::Preferences::GetBool("javascript.use_us_english_locale", false); + #ifdef XP_WIN nsAutoString xpLocale; + // 1033 is default english us locale LCID + // https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms912047(v=winembedded.10).aspx + const LCID en_US_lcid = 1033; + // // get the system LCID // - LCID win_lcid = GetSystemDefaultLCID(); + LCID win_lcid = use_us_english_locale ? en_US_lcid : GetSystemDefaultLCID(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE_VOID(win_lcid); nsWin32Locale::GetXPLocale(win_lcid, xpLocale); nsresult rv = NewLocale(xpLocale, getter_AddRefs(mSystemLocale)); @@ -107,7 +116,7 @@ nsLocaleService::nsLocaleService(void) // // get the application LCID // - win_lcid = GetUserDefaultLCID(); + win_lcid = use_us_english_locale ? en_US_lcid : GetUserDefaultLCID(); NS_ENSURE_TRUE_VOID(win_lcid); nsWin32Locale::GetXPLocale(win_lcid, xpLocale); rv = NewLocale(xpLocale, getter_AddRefs(mApplicationLocale)); @@ -118,7 +127,7 @@ nsLocaleService::nsLocaleService(void) NS_ENSURE_TRUE_VOID(resultLocale); // Get system configuration - const char* lang = getenv("LANG"); + const char* lang = use_us_english_locale ? "en-US" : getenv("LANG"); nsAutoString xpLocale, platformLocale; nsAutoString category, category_platform; @@ -127,7 +136,19 @@ nsLocaleService::nsLocaleService(void) for( i = 0; i < LocaleListLength; i++ ) { nsresult result; // setlocale( , "") evaluates LC_* and LANG - char* lc_temp = setlocale(posix_locale_category[i], ""); + const auto current_posix_locale_category = posix_locale_category[i]; + const char* lc_temp = nullptr; + + if (use_us_english_locale) { + lc_temp = setlocale(current_posix_locale_category, "C.UTF-8"); + if (lc_temp == nullptr) { + lc_temp = setlocale(current_posix_locale_category, "C"); + } + } + else { + lc_temp = setlocale(current_posix_locale_category, ""); + } + CopyASCIItoUTF16(LocaleList[i], category); category_platform = category; category_platform.AppendLiteral("##PLATFORM"); @@ -163,30 +184,37 @@ nsLocaleService::nsLocaleService(void) #endif // XP_UNIX #ifdef XP_MACOSX - // Get string representation of user's current locale - CFLocaleRef userLocaleRef = ::CFLocaleCopyCurrent(); - CFStringRef userLocaleStr = ::CFLocaleGetIdentifier(userLocaleRef); - ::CFRetain(userLocaleStr); - - AutoTArray<UniChar, 32> buffer; - int size = ::CFStringGetLength(userLocaleStr); - buffer.SetLength(size + 1); - CFRange range = ::CFRangeMake(0, size); - ::CFStringGetCharacters(userLocaleStr, range, buffer.Elements()); - buffer[size] = 0; - - // Convert the locale string to the format that Mozilla expects - nsAutoString xpLocale(reinterpret_cast<char16_t*>(buffer.Elements())); - xpLocale.ReplaceChar('_', '-'); + nsAutoString xpLocale; + + if (use_us_english_locale) { + xpLocale = NS_LITERAL_STRING("en-US").get(); + } + else { + // Get string representation of user's current locale + CFLocaleRef userLocaleRef = ::CFLocaleCopyCurrent(); + CFStringRef userLocaleStr = ::CFLocaleGetIdentifier(userLocaleRef); + ::CFRetain(userLocaleStr); + + AutoTArray<UniChar, 32> buffer; + int size = ::CFStringGetLength(userLocaleStr); + buffer.SetLength(size + 1); + CFRange range = ::CFRangeMake(0, size); + ::CFStringGetCharacters(userLocaleStr, range, buffer.Elements()); + buffer[size] = 0; + + // Convert the locale string to the format that Mozilla expects + xpLocale = reinterpret_cast<char16_t*>(buffer.Elements()); + xpLocale.ReplaceChar('_', '-'); + + ::CFRelease(userLocaleStr); + ::CFRelease(userLocaleRef); + } nsresult rv = NewLocale(xpLocale, getter_AddRefs(mSystemLocale)); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { mApplicationLocale = mSystemLocale; } - ::CFRelease(userLocaleStr); - ::CFRelease(userLocaleRef); - NS_ASSERTION(mApplicationLocale, "Failed to create locale objects"); #endif // XP_MACOSX } diff --git a/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp b/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp index c72ea48d77c8..4fe9c93de2ec 100644 --- a/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp +++ b/xpcom/build/XPCOMInit.cpp @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include "mozilla/Poison.h" #include "mozilla/SharedThreadPool.h" #include "mozilla/XPCOM.h" +#include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "nsXULAppAPI.h" #include "nsXPCOMPrivate.h" @@ -571,11 +572,18 @@ NS_InitXPCOM2(nsIServiceManager** aResult, } #ifndef ANDROID + // If the locale hasn't already been setup by our embedder, - // get us out of the "C" locale and into the system - if (strcmp(setlocale(LC_ALL, nullptr), "C") == 0) { - setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); + // get us out of the "C" locale and into the system, + // but only do so if we aren't force using english locale + if (mozilla::Preferences::GetBool("javascript.use_us_english_locale", false)) { + setlocale(LC_ALL, "C.UTF-8") || setlocale(LC_ALL, "C"); + } else { + if (strcmp(setlocale(LC_ALL, nullptr), "C") == 0) { + setlocale(LC_ALL, ""); + } } + #endif #if defined(XP_UNIX) diff --git a/xpcom/io/nsNativeCharsetUtils.cpp b/xpcom/io/nsNativeCharsetUtils.cpp index e53307af5628..f81c1179256b 100644 --- a/xpcom/io/nsNativeCharsetUtils.cpp +++ b/xpcom/io/nsNativeCharsetUtils.cpp @@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ NS_ShutdownNativeCharsetUtils() #include <stdlib.h> // mbtowc, wctomb #include <locale.h> // setlocale #include "mozilla/Mutex.h" +#include "mozilla/Preferences.h" #include "nscore.h" #include "nsAString.h" #include "nsReadableUtils.h" @@ -316,7 +317,12 @@ nsNativeCharsetConverter::LazyInit() // NS_StartupNativeCharsetUtils, assume we are called early enough that // we are the first to care about the locale's charset. if (!gLock) { - setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); + + if (mozilla::Preferences::GetBool("javascript.use_us_english_locale", false)) { + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") || setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); + } else { + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); + } } const char* blank_list[] = { "", nullptr }; const char** native_charset_list = blank_list; @@ -884,7 +890,11 @@ NS_StartupNativeCharsetUtils() // XXX we assume that we are called early enough that we should // always be the first to care about the locale's charset. // - setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); + if (mozilla::Preferences::GetBool("javascript.use_us_english_locale", false)) { + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") || setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C"); + } else { + setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); + } nsNativeCharsetConverter::GlobalInit(); }

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2] Bug 1372072 - Part 1: Spoofing network information API and blocking ontypechange event when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. r=arthuredelstein, baku
by gk＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit a1beadc5b70e1b6e4727506656723684cf3225bf Author: Tim Huang <tihuang(a)mozilla.com> Date: Wed Dec 13 15:29:00 2017 -0200 Bug 1372072 - Part 1: Spoofing network information API and blocking ontypechange event when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. r=arthuredelstein,baku This patch makes the network information API always returns the default type 'unknown' and blocking the ontypechange event while connection type changed when 'privacy. resistFingerprinting' is true. MozReview-Commit-ID: 4eOdHgAGtyY --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 78449fb4888b787062ff2139e36c219e0eac0b2c --- dom/network/Connection.cpp | 3 ++- dom/network/Connection.h | 7 ++++++- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/dom/network/Connection.cpp b/dom/network/Connection.cpp index 3bf6f40384a6..cc06b5e14b6a 100644 --- a/dom/network/Connection.cpp +++ b/dom/network/Connection.cpp @@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ Connection::Notify(const hal::NetworkInformation& aNetworkInfo) UpdateFromNetworkInfo(aNetworkInfo); - if (previousType == mType) { + if (previousType == mType || + nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting()) { return; } diff --git a/dom/network/Connection.h b/dom/network/Connection.h index 907aea144bc0..19e00d93c907 100644 --- a/dom/network/Connection.h +++ b/dom/network/Connection.h @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ #include "mozilla/dom/NetworkInformationBinding.h" #include "nsCycleCollectionParticipant.h" #include "nsINetworkProperties.h" +#include "nsContentUtils.h" namespace mozilla { @@ -44,7 +45,11 @@ public: virtual JSObject* WrapObject(JSContext* aCx, JS::Handle<JSObject*> aGivenProto) override; - ConnectionType Type() const { return mType; } + ConnectionType Type() const + { + return nsContentUtils::ShouldResistFingerprinting() ? + static_cast<ConnectionType>(ConnectionType::Unknown) : mType; + } IMPL_EVENT_HANDLER(typechange)

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[tor-browser/tor-browser-52.5.2esr-7.5-2] Bug 1372072 - Part 2: Add a test case for check whether network information API has been spoofed correctly when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. r=arthuredelstein, baku
by gk＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit a72faadea544a71ae5ca95ec816f2684c205b56a Author: Tim Huang <tihuang(a)mozilla.com> Date: Wed Dec 13 15:35:50 2017 -0200 Bug 1372072 - Part 2: Add a test case for check whether network information API has been spoofed correctly when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. r=arthuredelstein,baku This adds a test case to test that network information is correctly spoofed when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true. Firefox ESR 52 does not have the navigation object inside workers. Thus, the worker test was removed. MozReview-Commit-ID: Lt6HZlFrcja --HG-- extra : rebase_source : 70d44115532549814af9fce3af9fe379e36bca80 --- .../resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser.ini | 1 + .../test/browser/browser_netInfo.js | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser.ini b/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser.ini index 4b81c91d8c6c..b596f437caa2 100644 --- a/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser.ini +++ b/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser.ini @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ support-files = file_dummy.html head.js +[browser_netInfo.js] [browser_roundedWindow_dialogWindow.js] [browser_roundedWindow_newWindow.js] [browser_roundedWindow_open_max.js] diff --git a/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser_netInfo.js b/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser_netInfo.js new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7c6114212ffd --- /dev/null +++ b/browser/components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/browser_netInfo.js @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +/** + * Bug 1372072 - A test case for check whether network information API has been + * spoofed correctly when 'privacy.resistFingerprinting' is true; + */ + +const TEST_PATH = "http://example.net/browser/browser/" + + "components/resistfingerprinting/test/browser/" + +async function testWindow() { + // Open a tab to test network information in a content. + let tab = await BrowserTestUtils.openNewForegroundTab( + gBrowser, TEST_PATH + "file_dummy.html"); + + await ContentTask.spawn(tab.linkedBrowser, null, async function() { + ok("connection" in content.navigator, "navigator.connection should exist"); + + is(content.navigator.connection.type, "unknown", "The connection type is spoofed correctly"); + }); + + await BrowserTestUtils.removeTab(tab); +} + +add_task(async function runTest() { + await SpecialPowers.pushPrefEnv({"set": + [ + ["privacy.resistFingerprinting", true], + ["dom.netinfo.enabled", true] + ] + }); + + await testWindow(); +});

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[translation/tor-launcher-network-settings] Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings
by translation＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 1ba7bf4b55d47d4863a666a4d649a803e5fc5a1b Author: Translation commit bot <translation(a)torproject.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 08:16:53 2017 +0000 Update translations for tor-launcher-network-settings --- hu/network-settings.dtd | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/hu/network-settings.dtd b/hu/network-settings.dtd index 7e16f4099..53eb286b5 100644 --- a/hu/network-settings.dtd +++ b/hu/network-settings.dtd @@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ <!ENTITY torsettings.useProxy.type.http "HTTP / HTTPS"> <!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.checkbox "A számítógép egy tűzfalon keresztül kommunikál ami csak adott portokon keresztül engedélyezi a kapcsolatotokat."> <!ENTITY torsettings.firewall.allowedPorts "Engedélyezett portok:"> -<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.checkbox "Tor is censored in my country"> -<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.default "Select a built-in bridge"> -<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.default.placeholder "select a bridge"> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.checkbox "A Tor cenzúrázva van az országomban"> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.default "Válasszon ki egy beépített hidat"> +<!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.default.placeholder "Válasszon ki egy hidat"> <!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.custom "Provide a bridge I know"> <!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.label "Enter bridge information from a trusted source."> <!ENTITY torsettings.useBridges.placeholder "type address:port (one per line)"> @@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ <!ENTITY torsettings.copyLog "A Tor log Vágólapra másolása"> <!ENTITY torsettings.proxyHelpTitle "Proxy segítség"> -<!ENTITY torsettings.proxyHelp1 "A local proxy is needed when connecting through a company, school, or university network. If you are not sure how to answer this question, look at the Internet settings in another browser or check your system's network settings to see whether a proxy is needed."> +<!ENTITY torsettings.proxyHelp1 "Egy helyi proxy szükséges amennyiben olyan hálózaton keresztül csatlakozik amely, cégen, iskolán, vagy egyetemi hálózaton megy keresztül.  Ha nem biztos benne, hogyan válaszoljon erre a kérdésre, akkor nézze meg egy másik böngésző vagy a rendszer hálózati beállításait, hogy szükséges-e proxyt beállítani."> <!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelpTitle "Híd kapcsoló súgó"> <!ENTITY torsettings.bridgeHelp1 "Bridges are unlisted relays that make it more difficult to block connections to the Tor Network.  Each type of bridge uses a different method to avoid censorship.  The obfs ones make your traffic look like random noise, and the meek ones make your traffic look like it's connecting to that service instead of Tor.">

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[atlas/master] Fixes SVG downloads for Firefox 58
by irl＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 7d68fb16762c04360c73eb4b14798658c51e8953 Author: Iain R. Learmonth <irl(a)fsfe.org> Date: Thu Dec 14 05:16:23 2017 +0000 Fixes SVG downloads for Firefox 58 See: https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/11/27/blocking-top-level-navigations… --- js/views/aggregate/map.js | 2 +- js/views/details/main.js | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/js/views/aggregate/map.js b/js/views/aggregate/map.js index 367845c..1e1bca4 100644 --- a/js/views/aggregate/map.js +++ b/js/views/aggregate/map.js @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ define([ html = d3.select("#aggregate-map") .node() .innerHTML; - window.open("data:image/svg+xml;base64," + btoa(html), "SaveSVG"); + window.open("data:data/xml;base64," + btoa(html), "SaveSVG"); }, render: function(query){ document.title = "Relay Search"; diff --git a/js/views/details/main.js b/js/views/details/main.js index 3597dca..7f0770f 100644 --- a/js/views/details/main.js +++ b/js/views/details/main.js @@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ define([ .node() .innerHTML; d3.select("#save_" + g) - .attr("href", "data:image/svg+xml;base64," + btoa(html)); + .attr("href", "data:data/xml;base64," + btoa(html)); }, render: function() { var data = {relay: this.model};

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[torspec/master] prop#249: Add note on padding being randomness or zeroes.
by isis＠torproject.org 14 Dec '17

14 Dec '17

commit 03a9d4f13431f6f09b3d8c26c6b01dcbaf9685ae Author: Isis Lovecruft <isis(a)torproject.org> Date: Wed Dec 13 23:50:29 2017 +0000 prop#249: Add note on padding being randomness or zeroes. --- proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt b/proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt index b7505c6..b1967f3 100644 --- a/proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt +++ b/proposals/249-large-create-cells.txt @@ -46,11 +46,11 @@ Status: Open }; The 'ignored' fields, which extend to the end of the variable-length - cells, are reserved. Initiators MAY set them to any length, but MUST - fill them with zero-valued bytes. Responders MUST ignore them, - regardless of what they contain. When a CREATE2V cell is generated - in response to a set of EXTEND2 cells, these fields are set by the - relay that receives the EXTEND2 cells. + cells, are reserved. Initiators MAY set them to any length, and MUST + fill them with either zero-valued bytes or pseudo-random bytes. + Responders MUST ignore them, regardless of what they contain. When a + CREATE2V cell is generated in response to a set of EXTEND2 cells, these + fields are set by the relay that receives the EXTEND2 cells. (The purpose of the 'ignored' fields here is future-proofing and padding.)

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tor-commits December 2017