commit 2834cc9c18230c36278ffa94a252abeb91b6cff9
Author: Nick Mathewson <nickm(a)torproject.org>
Date: Sat Nov 11 13:40:21 2017 -0500
Fix length of replaycache-checked data.
This is a regression; we should have been checking only the
public-key encrypted portion. Fixes bug 24244, TROVE-2017-009, and
CVE-2017-8819.
---
changes/trove-2017-009 | 10 ++++++++++
src/or/rendservice.c | 4 +++-
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/changes/trove-2017-009 b/changes/trove-2017-009
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..512d18c29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/changes/trove-2017-009
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+ o Major fixes (security):
+ - When checking for replays in the INTRODUCE1 cell data for a (legacy)
+ hiddden service, correctly detect replays in the RSA-encrypted part of
+ the cell. We were previously checking for replays on the entire cell,
+ but those can be circumvented due to the malleability of Tor's legacy
+ hybrid encryption. This fix helps prevent a traffic confirmation
+ attack. Fixes bug 24244; bugfix on 0.2.4.1-alpha. This issue is also
+ tracked as TROVE-2017-009 and CVE-2017-8819.
+
+
diff --git a/src/or/rendservice.c b/src/or/rendservice.c
index d958de9df..ba8891ead 100644
--- a/src/or/rendservice.c
+++ b/src/or/rendservice.c
@@ -1162,6 +1162,7 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
time_t now = time(NULL);
time_t elapsed;
int replay;
+ size_t keylen;
/* Do some initial validation and logging before we parse the cell */
if (circuit->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_INTRO) {
@@ -1245,9 +1246,10 @@ rend_service_introduce(origin_circuit_t *circuit, const uint8_t *request,
}
/* check for replay of PK-encrypted portion. */
+ keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(intro_key);
replay = replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(
intro_point->accepted_intro_rsa_parts,
- parsed_req->ciphertext, parsed_req->ciphertext_len,
+ parsed_req->ciphertext, MIN(parsed_req->ciphertext_len, keylen),
&elapsed);
if (replay) {